git.stella-ops.org/docs/ARCHITECTURE_ATTESTOR.md

# component_architecture_attestor.md — **Stella Ops Attestor** (2025Q4)

> **Scope.** Implementation‑ready architecture for the **Attestor**: the service that **submits** DSSE envelopes to **Rekor v2**, retrieves/validates inclusion proofs, caches results, and exposes verification APIs. It accepts DSSE **only** from the **Signer** over mTLS, enforces chain‑of‑trust to Stella Ops roots, and returns `{uuid, index, proof, logURL}` to calling services (Scanner.WebService for SBOMs; backend for final reports; Excititor exports when configured).

---

## 0) Mission & boundaries

**Mission.** Turn a signed DSSE envelope from the Signer into a **transparency‑logged, verifiable fact** with a durable, replayable proof (Merkle inclusion + (optional) checkpoint anchoring). Provide **fast verification** for downstream consumers and a stable retrieval interface for UI/CLI.

**Boundaries.**

* Attestor **does not sign**; it **must not** accept unsigned or third‑party‑signed bundles.
* Attestor **does not decide PASS/FAIL**; it logs attestations for SBOMs, reports, and export artifacts.
* Rekor v2 backends may be **local** (self‑hosted) or **remote**; Attestor handles both with retries, backoff, and idempotency.

---

## 1) Topology & dependencies

**Process shape:** single stateless service `stellaops/attestor` behind mTLS.

**Dependencies:**

* **Signer** (caller) — authenticated via **mTLS** and **Authority** OpToks.
* **Rekor v2** — tile‑backed transparency log endpoint(s).
* **MinIO (S3)** — optional archive store for DSSE envelopes & verification bundles.
* **MongoDB** — local cache of `{uuid, index, proof, artifactSha256, bundleSha256}`; job state; audit.
* **Redis** — dedupe/idempotency keys and short‑lived rate‑limit buckets.
* **Licensing Service (optional)** — “endorse” call for cross‑log publishing when customer opts‑in.

Trust boundary: **Only the Signer** is allowed to call submission endpoints; enforced by **mTLS peer cert allowlist** + `aud=attestor` OpTok.

---

## 2) Data model (Mongo)

Database: `attestor`

**Collections & schemas**

* `entries`

  ```
  { _id: "<rekor-uuid>",
    artifact: { sha256: "<sha256>", kind: "sbom|report|vex-export", imageDigest?, subjectUri? },
    bundleSha256: "<sha256>",                           // canonicalized DSSE
    index: <int>,                                       // log index/sequence if provided by backend
    proof: {                                            // inclusion proof
      checkpoint: { origin, size, rootHash, timestamp },
      inclusion: { leafHash, path[] }                   // Merkle path (tiles)
    },
    log: { url, logId? },
    createdAt, status: "included|pending|failed",
    signerIdentity: { mode: "keyless|kms", issuer, san?, kid? }
  }
  ```

* `dedupe`

  ```
  { key: "bundle:<sha256>", rekorUuid, createdAt, ttlAt }     // idempotency key
  ```

* `audit`

  ```
  { _id, ts, caller: { cn, mTLSThumbprint, sub, aud },        // from mTLS + OpTok
    action: "submit|verify|fetch",
    artifactSha256, bundleSha256, rekorUuid?, index?, result, latencyMs, backend }
  ```

Indexes:

* `entries` on `artifact.sha256`, `bundleSha256`, `createdAt`, and `{status:1, createdAt:-1}`.
* `dedupe.key` unique (TTL 24–48h).
* `audit.ts` for time‑range queries.

---

## 3) Input contract (from Signer)

**Attestor accepts only** DSSE envelopes that satisfy all of:

1. **mTLS** peer certificate maps to `signer` service (CA‑pinned).
2. **Authority** OpTok with `aud=attestor`, `scope=attestor.write`, DPoP or mTLS bound.
3. DSSE envelope is **signed by the Signer’s key** (or includes a **Fulcio‑issued** cert chain) and **chains to configured roots** (Fulcio/KMS).
4. **Predicate type** is one of Stella Ops types (sbom/report/vex‑export) with valid schema.
5. `subject[*].digest.sha256` is present and canonicalized.

**Wire shape (JSON):**

```json
{
  "bundle": { "dsse": { "payloadType": "application/vnd.in-toto+json", "payload": "<b64>", "signatures": [ ... ] },
              "certificateChain": [ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----..." ],
              "mode": "keyless" },
  "meta": {
    "artifact": { "sha256": "<subject sha256>", "kind": "sbom|report|vex-export", "imageDigest": "sha256:..." },
    "bundleSha256": "<sha256 of canonical dsse>",
    "logPreference": "primary",               // "primary" | "mirror" | "both"
    "archive": true                           // whether Attestor should archive bundle to S3
  }
}
```

---

## 4) APIs

### 4.1 Submission

`POST /api/v1/rekor/entries`  *(mTLS + OpTok required)*

* **Body**: as above.
* **Behavior**:

  * Verify caller (mTLS + OpTok).
  * Validate DSSE bundle (signature, cert chain to Fulcio/KMS; DSSE structure; payloadType allowed).
  * Idempotency: compute `bundleSha256`; check `dedupe`. If present, return existing `rekorUuid`.
  * Submit canonicalized bundle to Rekor v2 (primary or mirror according to `logPreference`).
  * Retrieve **inclusion proof** (blocking until inclusion or up to `proofTimeoutMs`); if backend returns promise only, return `status=pending` and retry asynchronously.
  * Persist `entries` record; archive DSSE to S3 if `archive=true`.
* **Response 200**:

  ```json
  {
    "uuid": "…",
    "index": 123456,
    "proof": {
      "checkpoint": { "origin": "rekor@site", "size": 987654, "rootHash": "…", "timestamp": "…" },
      "inclusion": { "leafHash": "…", "path": ["…","…"] }
    },
    "logURL": "https://rekor…/api/v2/log/…/entries/…",
    "status": "included"
  }
  ```
* **Errors**: `401 invalid_token`, `403 not_signer|chain_untrusted`, `409 duplicate_bundle` (with existing `uuid`), `502 rekor_unavailable`, `504 proof_timeout`.

### 4.2 Proof retrieval

`GET /api/v1/rekor/entries/{uuid}`

* Returns `entries` row (refreshes proof from Rekor if stale/missing).
* Accepts `?refresh=true` to force backend query.

### 4.3 Verification (third‑party or internal)

`POST /api/v1/rekor/verify`

* **Body** (one of):

  * `{ "uuid": "…" }`
  * `{ "bundle": { …DSSE… } }`
  * `{ "artifactSha256": "…" }`  *(looks up most recent entry)*

* **Checks**:

  1. **Bundle signature** → cert chain to Fulcio/KMS roots configured.
  2. **Inclusion proof** → recompute leaf hash; verify Merkle path against checkpoint root.
  3. Optionally verify **checkpoint** against local trust anchors (if Rekor signs checkpoints).
  4. Confirm **subject.digest** matches caller‑provided hash (when given).

* **Response**:

  ```json
  { "ok": true, "uuid": "…", "index": 123, "logURL": "…", "checkedAt": "…" }
  ```

### 4.4 Batch submission (optional)

`POST /api/v1/rekor/batch` accepts an array of submission objects; processes with per‑item results.

---

## 5) Rekor v2 driver (backend)

* **Canonicalization**: DSSE envelopes are **normalized** (stable JSON ordering, no insignificant whitespace) before hashing and submission.
* **Transport**: HTTP/2 with retries (exponential backoff, jitter), budgeted timeouts.
* **Idempotency**: if backend returns “already exists,” map to existing `uuid`.
* **Proof acquisition**:

  * In synchronous mode, poll the log for inclusion up to `proofTimeoutMs`.
  * In asynchronous mode, return `pending` and schedule a **proof fetcher** job (Mongo job doc + backoff).
* **Mirrors/dual logs**:

  * When `logPreference="both"`, submit to primary and mirror; store **both** UUIDs (primary canonical).
  * Optional **cloud endorsement**: POST to the Stella Ops cloud `/attest/endorse` with `{uuid, artifactSha256}`; store returned endorsement id.

---

## 6) Security model

* **mTLS required** for submission from **Signer** (CA‑pinned).
* **Authority token** with `aud=attestor` and DPoP/mTLS binding must be presented; Attestor verifies both.
* **Bundle acceptance policy**:

  * DSSE signature must chain to the configured **Fulcio** (keyless) or **KMS/HSM** roots.
  * SAN (Subject Alternative Name) must match **Signer identity** policy (e.g., `urn:stellaops:signer` or pinned OIDC issuer).
  * Predicate `predicateType` must be on allowlist (sbom/report/vex-export).
  * `subject.digest.sha256` values must be present and well‑formed (hex).
* **No public submission** path. **Never** accept bundles from untrusted clients.
* **Client certificate allowlists**: optional `security.mtls.allowedSubjects` / `allowedThumbprints` tighten peer identity checks beyond CA pinning.
* **Rate limits**: token-bucket per caller derived from `quotas.perCaller` (QPS/burst) returns `429` + `Retry-After` when exceeded.
* **Redaction**: Attestor never logs secret material; DSSE payloads **should** be public by design (SBOMs/reports). If customers require redaction, enforce policy at Signer (predicate minimization) **before** Attestor.

---

## 7) Storage & archival

* **Entries** in Mongo provide a local ledger keyed by `rekorUuid` and **artifact sha256** for quick reverse lookups.
* **S3 archival** (if enabled):

  ```
  s3://stellaops/attest/
    dsse/<bundleSha256>.json
    proof/<rekorUuid>.json
    bundle/<artifactSha256>.zip               # optional verification bundle
  ```
* **Verification bundles** (zip):

  * DSSE (`*.dsse.json`), proof (`*.proof.json`), `chain.pem` (certs), `README.txt` with verification steps & hashes.

---

## 8) Observability & audit

**Metrics** (Prometheus):

* `attestor.submit_total{result,backend}`
* `attestor.submit_latency_seconds{backend}`
* `attestor.proof_fetch_total{result}`
* `attestor.verify_total{result}`
* `attestor.dedupe_hits_total`
* `attestor.errors_total{type}`

**Correlation**:

* HTTP callers may supply `X-Correlation-Id`; Attestor will echo the header and push `CorrelationId` into the log scope for cross-service tracing.

**Tracing**:

* Spans: `validate`, `rekor.submit`, `rekor.poll`, `persist`, `archive`, `verify`.

**Audit**:

* Immutable `audit` rows (ts, caller, action, hashes, uuid, index, backend, result, latency).

---

## 9) Configuration (YAML)

```yaml
attestor:
  listen: "https://0.0.0.0:8444"
  security:
    mtls:
      caBundle: /etc/ssl/signer-ca.pem
      requireClientCert: true
    authority:
      issuer: "https://authority.internal"
      jwksUrl: "https://authority.internal/jwks"
      requireSenderConstraint: "dpop"   # or "mtls"
    signerIdentity:
      mode: ["keyless","kms"]
      fulcioRoots: ["/etc/fulcio/root.pem"]
      allowedSANs: ["urn:stellaops:signer"]
      kmsKeys: ["kms://cluster-kms/stellaops-signer"]
  rekor:
    primary:
      url: "https://rekor-v2.internal"
      proofTimeoutMs: 15000
      pollIntervalMs: 250
      maxAttempts: 60
    mirror:
      enabled: false
      url: "https://rekor-v2.mirror"
  mongo:
    uri: "mongodb://mongo/attestor"
  s3:
    enabled: true
    endpoint: "http://minio:9000"
    bucket: "stellaops"
    prefix: "attest/"
    objectLock: "governance"
  redis:
    url: "redis://redis:6379/2"
  quotas:
    perCaller:
      qps: 50
      burst: 100
```

---

## 10) End‑to‑end sequences

**A) Submit & include (happy path)**

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
  autonumber
  participant SW as Scanner.WebService
  participant SG as Signer
  participant AT as Attestor
  participant RK as Rekor v2

  SW->>SG: POST /sign/dsse (OpTok+PoE)
  SG-->>SW: DSSE bundle (+certs)
  SW->>AT: POST /rekor/entries (mTLS + OpTok)
  AT->>AT: Validate DSSE (chain to Fulcio/KMS; signer identity)
  AT->>RK: submit(bundle)
  RK-->>AT: {uuid, index?}
  AT->>RK: poll inclusion until proof or timeout
  RK-->>AT: inclusion proof (checkpoint + path)
  AT-->>SW: {uuid, index, proof, logURL}
```

**B) Verify by artifact digest (CLI)**

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
  autonumber
  participant CLI as stellaops verify
  participant SW as Scanner.WebService
  participant AT as Attestor

  CLI->>SW: GET /catalog/artifacts/{id}
  SW-->>CLI: {artifactSha256, rekor: {uuid}}
  CLI->>AT: POST /rekor/verify { uuid }
  AT-->>CLI: { ok: true, index, logURL }
```

---

## 11) Failure modes & responses

| Condition                             | Return                  | Details                                                   |          |              |
| ------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------ |
| mTLS/OpTok invalid                    | `401 invalid_token`     | Include `WWW-Authenticate` DPoP challenge when applicable |          |              |
| Bundle not signed by trusted identity | `403 chain_untrusted`   | DSSE accepted only from Signer identities                 |          |              |
| Duplicate bundle                      | `409 duplicate_bundle`  | Return existing `uuid` (idempotent)                       |          |              |
| Rekor unreachable/timeout             | `502 rekor_unavailable` | Retry with backoff; surface `Retry-After`                 |          |              |
| Inclusion proof timeout               | `202 accepted`          | `status=pending`, background job continues to fetch proof |          |              |
| Archive failure                       | `207 multi-status`      | Entry recorded; archive will retry asynchronously         |          |              |
| Verification mismatch                 | `400 verify_failed`     | Include reason: chain                                     | leafHash | rootMismatch |

---

## 12) Performance & scale

* Stateless; scale horizontally.
* **Targets**:

  * Submit+proof P95 ≤ **300 ms** (warm log; local Rekor).
  * Verify P95 ≤ **30 ms** from cache; ≤ **120 ms** with live proof fetch.
  * 1k submissions/minute per replica sustained.
* **Hot caches**: `dedupe` (bundle hash → uuid), recent `entries` by artifact sha256.

---

## 13) Testing matrix

* **Happy path**: valid DSSE, inclusion within timeout.
* **Idempotency**: resubmit same `bundleSha256` → same `uuid`.
* **Security**: reject non‑Signer mTLS, wrong `aud`, DPoP replay, untrusted cert chain, forbidden predicateType.
* **Rekor variants**: promise‑then‑proof, proof delayed, mirror dual‑submit, mirror failure.
* **Verification**: corrupt leaf path, wrong root, tampered bundle.
* **Throughput**: soak test with 10k submissions; latency SLOs, zero drops.

---

## 14) Implementation notes

* Language: **.NET 10** minimal API; `HttpClient` with **sockets handler** tuned for HTTP/2.
* JSON: **canonical writer** for DSSE payload hashing.
* Crypto: use **BouncyCastle**/**System.Security.Cryptography**; PEM parsing for cert chains.
* Rekor client: pluggable driver; treat backend errors as retryable/non‑retryable with granular mapping.
* Safety: size caps on bundles; decompress bombs guarded; strict UTF‑8.
* CLI integration: `stellaops verify attestation <uuid|bundle|artifact>` calls `/rekor/verify`.

---

## 15) Optional features

* **Dual‑log** write (primary + mirror) and **cross‑log proof** packaging.
* **Cloud endorsement**: send `{uuid, artifactSha256}` to Stella Ops cloud; store returned endorsement id for marketing/chain‑of‑custody.
* **Checkpoint pinning**: periodically pin latest Rekor checkpoints to an external audit store for independent monitoring.