dac8e10e36
## Summary
This commit completes Phase 2 of the configuration-driven crypto architecture, achieving
100% crypto compliance by eliminating all hardcoded cryptographic implementations.
## Key Changes
### Phase 1: Plugin Loader Infrastructure
- **Plugin Discovery System**: Created StellaOps.Cryptography.PluginLoader with manifest-based loading
- **Configuration Model**: Added CryptoPluginConfiguration with regional profiles support
- **Dependency Injection**: Extended DI to support plugin-based crypto provider registration
- **Regional Configs**: Created appsettings.crypto.{international,russia,eu,china}.yaml
- **CI Workflow**: Added .gitea/workflows/crypto-compliance.yml for audit enforcement
### Phase 2: Code Refactoring
- **API Extension**: Added ICryptoProvider.CreateEphemeralVerifier for verification-only scenarios
- **Plugin Implementation**: Created OfflineVerificationCryptoProvider with ephemeral verifier support
- Supports ES256/384/512, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512
- SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) public key format
- **100% Compliance**: Refactored DsseVerifier to remove all BouncyCastle cryptographic usage
- **Unit Tests**: Created OfflineVerificationProviderTests with 39 passing tests
- **Documentation**: Created comprehensive security guide at docs/security/offline-verification-crypto-provider.md
- **Audit Infrastructure**: Created scripts/audit-crypto-usage.ps1 for static analysis
### Testing Infrastructure (TestKit)
- **Determinism Gate**: Created DeterminismGate for reproducibility validation
- **Test Fixtures**: Added PostgresFixture and ValkeyFixture using Testcontainers
- **Traits System**: Implemented test lane attributes for parallel CI execution
- **JSON Assertions**: Added CanonicalJsonAssert for deterministic JSON comparisons
- **Test Lanes**: Created test-lanes.yml workflow for parallel test execution
### Documentation
- **Architecture**: Created CRYPTO_CONFIGURATION_DRIVEN_ARCHITECTURE.md master plan
- **Sprint Tracking**: Created SPRINT_1000_0007_0002_crypto_refactoring.md (COMPLETE)
- **API Documentation**: Updated docs2/cli/crypto-plugins.md and crypto.md
- **Testing Strategy**: Created testing strategy documents in docs/implplan/SPRINT_5100_0007_*
## Compliance & Testing
- ✅ Zero direct System.Security.Cryptography usage in production code
- ✅ All crypto operations go through ICryptoProvider abstraction
- ✅ 39/39 unit tests passing for OfflineVerificationCryptoProvider
- ✅ Build successful (AirGap, Crypto plugin, DI infrastructure)
- ✅ Audit script validates crypto boundaries
## Files Modified
**Core Crypto Infrastructure:**
- src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/CryptoProvider.cs (API extension)
- src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/CryptoSigningKey.cs (verification-only constructor)
- src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/EcdsaSigner.cs (fixed ephemeral verifier)
**Plugin Implementation:**
- src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.OfflineVerification/ (new)
- src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.PluginLoader/ (new)
**Production Code Refactoring:**
- src/AirGap/StellaOps.AirGap.Importer/Validation/DsseVerifier.cs (100% compliant)
**Tests:**
- src/__Libraries/__Tests/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.OfflineVerification.Tests/ (new, 39 tests)
- src/__Libraries/__Tests/StellaOps.Cryptography.PluginLoader.Tests/ (new)
**Configuration:**
- etc/crypto-plugins-manifest.json (plugin registry)
- etc/appsettings.crypto.*.yaml (regional profiles)
**Documentation:**
- docs/security/offline-verification-crypto-provider.md (600+ lines)
- docs/implplan/CRYPTO_CONFIGURATION_DRIVEN_ARCHITECTURE.md (master plan)
- docs/implplan/SPRINT_1000_0007_0002_crypto_refactoring.md (Phase 2 complete)
## Next Steps
Phase 3: Docker & CI/CD Integration
- Create multi-stage Dockerfiles with all plugins
- Build regional Docker Compose files
- Implement runtime configuration selection
- Add deployment validation scripts
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1.7 KiB
Security hardening
Sender constraints (DPoP and mTLS)
- DPoP is required for browser tokens; proofs are nonce protected.
- Authority stores cnf.jkt and validates it on introspection.
- mTLS-bound tokens are required for high-assurance tenants and automation.
- Emergency bypass is logged and should be time-boxed.
Rate limiting and lockout
- Fixed-window limits on /token and /authorize protect against brute force.
- Retry-After headers and structured logs are required for audit.
- Lockout policies complement rate limiting and should remain enabled.
Password hashing
- Argon2id is the default for Authority identity providers.
- PBKDF2-SHA256 remains supported for legacy hashes and FIPS profile.
- Successful legacy verification rehashes to Argon2id.
Secrets handling
- Services store secretRef only; secret values are never persisted.
- Secrets must not appear in logs, traces, or exports.
- Rotation is handled through Authority and refreshed by workers at step start.
Notifications hardening
- Tenant isolation enforced on rules and delivery ledger.
- Webhook deliveries are signed with HMAC-SHA256 and include nonce or timestamp.
- Outbound allowlists default to block public internet in air-gapped kits.
Export hardening
- Exports include content hashes and optional DSSE manifests.
- Export endpoints enforce tenant scoping and export-specific scopes.
- Redaction rules default to exclude secrets and sensitive fields.
Related references
- docs/security/dpop-mtls-rollout.md
- docs/security/password-hashing.md
- docs/security/secrets-handling.md
- docs/security/rate-limits.md
- docs/security/notifications-hardening.md
- docs/security/export-hardening.md
- docs/security/audit-events.md
- docs/security/revocation-bundle.md