git.stella-ops.org/docs/modules/platform/proof-driven-moats-architecture.md

# Proof-Driven Moats: Architecture Specification

**Version:** 1.0.0
**Status:** Design
**Owner:** Platform Architecture
**Last Updated:** 2025-12-23

---

## Executive Summary

This document specifies the architecture for **Proof-Driven Moats**, a dual capability that establishes StellaOps as best-in-class for vulnerability assessment accuracy:

1. **Patch-Aware Backport Detector**: Automated detection of distro backports with cryptographic proof, eliminating false positives from version-string mismatches.

2. **Regional Crypto & Offline Audit Packs**: Jurisdiction-compliant attestation bundles with multi-profile signing (eIDAS, FIPS, GOST, SM, PQC).

---

## 1. Strategic Goals

### 1.1 Business Objectives

- **Eliminate backport false positives** without human intervention
- **Provide cryptographic proof** for every vulnerability verdict
- **Enable global deployment** with regional crypto compliance
- **Support air-gapped environments** with sealed audit packs
- **Establish competitive moat** through binary-level analysis

### 1.2 Technical Objectives

- **Deterministic, reproducible proofs** with canonical hashing
- **Pluggable crypto profiles** for jurisdiction compliance
- **Four-tier backport detection**: distro feeds → changelog → patches → binary
- **Offline-first design** with embedded trust anchors
- **PostgreSQL-backed storage** with efficient querying

---

## 2. System Architecture

### 2.1 High-Level Component Diagram

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                     PROOF-DRIVEN MOATS                           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              │
        ┌─────────────────────┴─────────────────────┐
        │                                           │
        ▼                                           ▼
┌──────────────────┐                    ┌──────────────────────┐
│  BACKPORT        │                    │  REGIONAL CRYPTO &   │
│  DETECTOR        │                    │  AUDIT PACKS         │
└──────────────────┘                    └──────────────────────┘
        │                                           │
        │                                           │
  ┌─────┴─────┐                           ┌────────┴────────┐
  │           │                           │                 │
  ▼           ▼                           ▼                 ▼
┌─────┐  ┌─────────┐              ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────────┐
│Feedser│ │SourceIntel│            │MultiProfile│  │ AuditBundle  │
│       │ │           │            │  Signer    │  │  Packager    │
└─────┘  └─────────┘              └──────────┘    └──────────────┘
  │           │                           │                 │
  │           │                           │                 │
  ▼           ▼                           ▼                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    PROOF CHAIN INFRASTRUCTURE                    │
│  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐  ┌──────────┐       │
│  │ProofBlob │  │ProofLedger│  │ProofStore│  │ProofVerify│      │
│  └──────────┘  └──────────┘  └──────────┘  └──────────┘       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                    ┌──────────────────┐
                    │   PostgreSQL     │
                    │   (scanner,      │
                    │    concelier,    │
                    │    attestor)     │
                    └──────────────────┘
```

### 2.2 Module Responsibilities

| Module | Responsibility | Owner |
|--------|----------------|-------|
| **Feedser** | Upstream patch extraction and HunkSig generation | New module |
| **SourceIntel** | Changelog and patch header parsing | Concelier library |
| **BinaryFingerprint** | Binary-level vulnerability fingerprinting | Scanner library |
| **ProofChain** | Proof blob creation, storage, verification | Attestor library |
| **MultiProfileSigner** | Pluggable crypto with regional profiles | Cryptography library |
| **AuditBundlePackager** | Sealed audit pack generation | ExportCenter |
| **VEX Integration** | Proof-carrying VEX statements | Excititor |

---

## 3. Backport Detector Architecture

### 3.1 Four-Tier Detection System

```
Tier 1: Distro Security Feeds (EXISTING ✓)
   ├─ RHEL CSAF/RHSA
   ├─ SUSE CSAF
   ├─ Ubuntu USN
   ├─ Debian DSA
   └─ Alpine secdb
   Confidence: 0.95-0.99

Tier 2: Source Changelog Parsing (NEW)
   ├─ debian/changelog CVE mentions
   ├─ RPM %changelog CVE mentions
   └─ Alpine APKBUILD secfixes
   Confidence: 0.75-0.85

Tier 3: Patch Header Analysis (NEW)
   ├─ debian/patches/* DEP-3 headers
   ├─ RPM .spec patch references
   └─ Patch filename CVE patterns
   Confidence: 0.80-0.90

Tier 4: Binary Fingerprinting (NEW - OPTIONAL)
   ├─ Function normalized hash
   ├─ Basic-block multiset hash
   └─ Control-flow graph hash
   Confidence: 0.85-0.95
```

### 3.2 Decision Algorithm

```python
def decide_cve_status(cve_id, package, installed_version, evidences):
    """Deterministic, ordered decision algorithm with proof generation."""

    proof = ProofBlob()

    # Step 1: Check Tier 1 (distro feeds)
    for feed_evidence in evidences.filter(tier=1).sort_by_confidence():
        if feed_evidence.state == "not_affected" and feed_evidence.confidence >= 0.9:
            proof.add(feed_evidence)
            return VerdictWithProof("NOT_AFFECTED", proof, confidence=feed_evidence.confidence)

        if feed_evidence.state == "fixed":
            if version_compare(installed_version, feed_evidence.fixed_version) >= 0:
                proof.add(feed_evidence)
                return VerdictWithProof("FIXED", proof, confidence=feed_evidence.confidence)

    # Step 2: Check Tier 2 (changelog)
    for changelog_evidence in evidences.filter(tier=2).sort_by_confidence():
        if cve_id in changelog_evidence.cve_mentions:
            if version_compare(installed_version, changelog_evidence.version) >= 0:
                proof.add(changelog_evidence)
                return VerdictWithProof("FIXED", proof, confidence=changelog_evidence.confidence)

    # Step 3: Check Tier 3 (patches)
    for patch_evidence in evidences.filter(tier=3).sort_by_confidence():
        if cve_id in patch_evidence.cve_references:
            proof.add(patch_evidence)
            return VerdictWithProof("FIXED", proof, confidence=patch_evidence.confidence)

    # Step 4: Check Tier 4 (binary fingerprints)
    for binary_evidence in evidences.filter(tier=4):
        if binary_evidence.fingerprint_match and not binary_evidence.vulnerable_match:
            proof.add(binary_evidence)
            return VerdictWithProof("FIXED", proof, confidence=binary_evidence.confidence)

    # Default: vulnerable
    proof.add_note("No fix evidence found across all tiers")
    return VerdictWithProof("VULNERABLE", proof, confidence=0.95)
```

### 3.3 Data Flow

```
┌──────────────┐
│   Feedser    │ ← Pulls upstream patches from GitHub/GitLab
└──────┬───────┘
       │ Extracts HunkSig
       ▼
┌──────────────────────┐
│  Patch Signature DB  │ (concelier.source_patch_sig)
└──────────────────────┘
       │
       │ Referenced by
       ▼
┌──────────────────────┐       ┌──────────────┐
│  SourceIntel Parser  │ ←───→ │  Scanner     │
└──────────────────────┘       └──────┬───────┘
       │                              │
       │ Generates                    │ Extracts BuildID
       ▼                              ▼
┌──────────────────────┐       ┌─────────────────┐
│    ProofBlob         │       │ Binary          │
│  (evidence bundle)   │       │ Fingerprints    │
└──────────────────────┘       └─────────────────┘
       │                              │
       │                              │
       └──────────┬───────────────────┘
                  │ Both feed into
                  ▼
          ┌──────────────┐
          │  VEX with    │
          │  proof_ref   │
          └──────────────┘
                  │
                  ▼
          ┌──────────────┐
          │  DSSE Sign   │
          │  Multi-Profile│
          └──────────────┘
```

---

## 4. Regional Crypto Architecture

### 4.1 Pluggable Crypto Abstraction

```csharp
// Core abstraction (StellaOps.Cryptography)
public interface IContentSigner
{
    string KeyId { get; }
    SignatureProfile Profile { get; }
    Task<SignatureResult> SignAsync(ReadOnlyMemory<byte> payload, CancellationToken ct);
}

public interface IContentVerifier
{
    Task<VerificationResult> VerifyAsync(
        ReadOnlyMemory<byte> payload,
        Signature signature,
        CancellationToken ct);
}

public enum SignatureProfile
{
    EdDsa,          // Baseline (Ed25519)
    EcdsaP256,      // FIPS 186-4
    RsaPss,         // FIPS 186-4
    Gost2012,       // GOST R 34.10-2012
    SM2,            // GM/T 0003.2-2012
    Eidas,          // ETSI TS 119 312
    Dilithium,      // NIST PQC (optional)
    Falcon          // NIST PQC (optional)
}

// Multi-profile signing
public class MultiProfileSigner : IContentSigner
{
    private readonly IReadOnlyList<IContentSigner> _signers;

    public async Task<MultiSignatureResult> SignAllAsync(
        ReadOnlyMemory<byte> payload,
        CancellationToken ct)
    {
        var signatures = new List<Signature>();
        foreach (var signer in _signers)
        {
            var result = await signer.SignAsync(payload, ct);
            signatures.Add(result.Signature);
        }
        return new MultiSignatureResult(signatures);
    }
}
```

### 4.2 Profile Implementations

Each profile is a separate NuGet package:

- `StellaOps.Cryptography.Profiles.EdDsa` - Baseline (libsodium)
- `StellaOps.Cryptography.Profiles.Ecdsa` - FIPS (System.Security.Cryptography)
- `StellaOps.Cryptography.Profiles.Rsa` - FIPS (System.Security.Cryptography)
- `StellaOps.Cryptography.Profiles.Gost` - Russia (BouncyCastle or CryptoPro)
- `StellaOps.Cryptography.Profiles.SM` - China (BouncyCastle)
- `StellaOps.Cryptography.Profiles.Eidas` - EU (DSS library)
- `StellaOps.Cryptography.Profiles.Pqc` - Post-quantum (liboqs)

### 4.3 Configuration-Driven Selection

```yaml
# etc/cryptography.yaml
signing:
  profiles:
    - profile: EdDsa
      keyId: "stella-ed25519-2024"
      enabled: true

    - profile: EcdsaP256
      keyId: "stella-ecdsa-p256-2024"
      enabled: true
      kms:
        provider: "azure-keyvault"
        keyName: "stellaops-ecdsa"

    - profile: Gost2012
      keyId: "stella-gost-2024"
      enabled: false  # Enable for Russian deployments

    - profile: SM2
      keyId: "stella-sm2-2024"
      enabled: false  # Enable for Chinese deployments

    - profile: Eidas
      keyId: "stella-eidas-2024"
      enabled: false  # Enable for EU qualified signatures
      certificate: "/etc/stellaops/certs/eidas-qscd.pem"

verification:
  allowedProfiles:
    - EdDsa
    - EcdsaP256
    - Gost2012
    - SM2
    - Eidas

  trustAnchors:
    - path: "/etc/stellaops/trust/root-ca.pem"
    - path: "/etc/stellaops/trust/eidas-tsl.xml"
```

---

## 5. ProofBlob Specification

### 5.1 Data Model

```csharp
// StellaOps.Attestor.ProofChain
public sealed record ProofBlob
{
    public required string ProofId { get; init; }  // sha256:...
    public required string SubjectId { get; init; }  // CVE-XXXX-YYYY + PURL
    public required ProofBlobType Type { get; init; }
    public required DateTimeOffset CreatedAt { get; init; }

    // Evidence entries
    public required IReadOnlyList<ProofEvidence> Evidences { get; init; }

    // Computation details
    public required string Method { get; init; }  // "distro_feed" | "changelog" | "patch_header" | "binary_match"
    public required double Confidence { get; init; }  // 0.0-1.0

    // Provenance
    public required string ToolVersion { get; init; }
    public required string SnapshotId { get; init; }

    // Computed hash (excludes this field)
    public string? ProofHash { get; init; }
}

public sealed record ProofEvidence
{
    public required string EvidenceId { get; init; }
    public required EvidenceType Type { get; init; }
    public required string Source { get; init; }
    public required DateTimeOffset Timestamp { get; init; }
    public required JsonDocument Data { get; init; }
    public required string DataHash { get; init; }  // sha256 of canonical JSON
}

public enum ProofBlobType
{
    BackportFixed,      // Distro backported the fix
    NotAffected,        // Package not affected by CVE
    Vulnerable,         // Confirmed vulnerable
    Unknown             // Insufficient evidence
}

public enum EvidenceType
{
    DistroAdvisory,     // Tier 1
    ChangelogMention,   // Tier 2
    PatchHeader,        // Tier 3
    BinaryFingerprint,  // Tier 4
    VersionComparison,  // Supporting evidence
    BuildCatalog        // Build ID mapping
}
```

### 5.2 Canonical Hashing

```csharp
public static class ProofHashing
{
    public static string ComputeProofHash(ProofBlob blob)
    {
        // Clone without ProofHash field
        var normalized = blob with { ProofHash = null };

        // Canonicalize (sorted keys, stable ordering)
        var canonical = CanonJson.Canonicalize(normalized);

        // SHA-256
        var hash = SHA256.HashData(canonical);
        return "sha256:" + Convert.ToHexString(hash).ToLowerInvariant();
    }

    public static ProofBlob WithHash(ProofBlob blob)
    {
        var hash = ComputeProofHash(blob);
        return blob with { ProofHash = hash };
    }
}
```

### 5.3 Storage Schema

```sql
-- concelier.backport_proof
CREATE TABLE concelier.backport_proof (
    proof_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,  -- sha256:...
    subject_id TEXT NOT NULL,   -- CVE-XXXX-YYYY:pkg:rpm/...
    proof_type TEXT NOT NULL,   -- backport_fixed | not_affected | vulnerable
    method TEXT NOT NULL,       -- distro_feed | changelog | patch_header | binary_match
    confidence NUMERIC(5,4) NOT NULL,  -- 0.0-1.0

    -- Provenance
    tool_version TEXT NOT NULL,
    snapshot_id TEXT NOT NULL,
    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),

    -- Proof blob (JSONB)
    proof_blob JSONB NOT NULL,

    -- Indexes
    CONSTRAINT backport_proof_confidence_check CHECK (confidence >= 0 AND confidence <= 1)
);

CREATE INDEX idx_backport_proof_subject ON concelier.backport_proof(subject_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_backport_proof_method ON concelier.backport_proof(method);
CREATE INDEX idx_backport_proof_created ON concelier.backport_proof(created_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX idx_backport_proof_confidence ON concelier.backport_proof(confidence DESC);

-- GIN index for JSONB queries
CREATE INDEX idx_backport_proof_blob ON concelier.backport_proof USING GIN(proof_blob);
```

---

## 6. Audit Bundle Specification

### 6.1 Bundle Structure

```
audit-bundle-{artifact-digest}.stella.bundle.tgz
├── manifest.json                    # Bundle manifest
├── manifest.dsse.json               # DSSE envelope with multi-sig
├── evidence/
│   ├── sbom.spdx.json              # SPDX 3.0.1 SBOM
│   ├── sbom.cdx.json               # CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM
│   ├── vex-statements.json         # OpenVEX statements
│   ├── reachability-graph.json     # Call graph + paths
│   ├── policy-ledger.json          # Policy evaluation ledger
│   └── proofs/
│       ├── {proof-id-1}.json       # ProofBlob 1
│       ├── {proof-id-2}.json       # ProofBlob 2
│       └── ...
├── attestations/
│   ├── sbom.dsse.json              # SBOM attestation
│   ├── vex.dsse.json               # VEX attestation
│   ├── reachability.dsse.json      # Reachability attestation
│   ├── verdict.dsse.json           # Policy verdict attestation
│   └── proofs.dsse.json            # Proof chain attestation
├── replay/
│   ├── scan-manifest.json          # Scan parameters
│   ├── feed-snapshots.json         # Feed snapshot IDs
│   ├── policy-versions.json        # Policy versions used
│   └── seeds.json                  # Deterministic seeds
├── trust/
│   ├── tuf-root.json               # TUF root for offline verification
│   ├── certificates.pem            # Certificate chain
│   ├── crls.pem                    # Certificate Revocation Lists
│   └── timestamps.rfc3161          # RFC 3161 timestamp tokens
└── meta.json                        # Bundle metadata
```

### 6.2 Manifest Schema

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://stellaops.dev/schemas/audit-bundle-manifest/v1",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "bundleId": "sha256:abc123...",
  "createdAt": "2025-12-23T10:00:00Z",
  "generator": {
    "name": "StellaOps ExportCenter",
    "version": "1.5.0"
  },
  "subject": {
    "artifactDigest": "sha256:def456...",
    "artifactPurl": "pkg:oci/myapp@sha256:def456...?repository_url=ghcr.io/myorg",
    "scanId": "01234567-89ab-cdef-0123-456789abcdef"
  },
  "contents": {
    "sbom": {
      "formats": ["spdx-3.0.1", "cyclonedx-1.6"],
      "digests": {
        "sbom.spdx.json": "sha256:...",
        "sbom.cdx.json": "sha256:..."
      }
    },
    "vex": {
      "statementCount": 42,
      "digest": "sha256:..."
    },
    "reachability": {
      "nodeCount": 1523,
      "edgeCount": 8741,
      "digest": "sha256:..."
    },
    "proofs": {
      "proofCount": 15,
      "digests": [
        "sha256:proof1...",
        "sha256:proof2...",
        "..."
      ]
    }
  },
  "signatures": [
    {
      "profile": "EdDsa",
      "keyId": "stella-ed25519-2024",
      "algorithm": "Ed25519",
      "digest": "sha256:sig1..."
    },
    {
      "profile": "EcdsaP256",
      "keyId": "stella-ecdsa-p256-2024",
      "algorithm": "ES256",
      "digest": "sha256:sig2..."
    },
    {
      "profile": "Gost2012",
      "keyId": "stella-gost-2024",
      "algorithm": "GOST3410-2012-256",
      "digest": "sha256:sig3..."
    }
  ],
  "replay": {
    "deterministic": true,
    "snapshotIds": {
      "concelier": "sha256:feed123...",
      "excititor": "sha256:vex456...",
      "policy": "sha256:pol789..."
    },
    "seed": "base64encodedSeed=="
  },
  "trust": {
    "tufRoot": "sha256:tuf123...",
    "certificateChainDigest": "sha256:certs456...",
    "crlDigest": "sha256:crl789...",
    "timestampDigest": "sha256:ts012..."
  }
}
```

---

## 7. Module Implementations

### 7.1 Feedser Module

**Location:** `src/Feedser/`

**Purpose:** Extract upstream patches and generate patch signatures (HunkSig).

**Components:**
- `StellaOps.Feedser.Core` - Orchestration and scheduling
- `StellaOps.Feedser.PatchExtractor` - CVE→commit mapping via OSV
- `StellaOps.Feedser.HunkSig` - Patch signature generation
- `StellaOps.Feedser.Storage.Postgres` - Equivalence map storage

**Key Operations:**
1. Query OSV for CVE→commit mappings
2. Fetch commit diffs from Git repositories
3. Extract and normalize patch hunks
4. Compute HunkSig (hash of normalized hunks)
5. Store in `concelier.source_patch_sig`

### 7.2 SourceIntel Library

**Location:** `src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.SourceIntel/`

**Purpose:** Parse source package metadata for CVE mentions.

**Components:**
- `ChangelogParser` - Parse Debian/RPM changelogs
- `PatchHeaderParser` - Parse patch files for CVE references
- `CveExtractor` - Extract CVE-XXXX-YYYY patterns
- `ConfidenceScorer` - Compute confidence based on context

**Supported Formats:**
- Debian: `debian/changelog`, `debian/patches/*`
- RPM: `%changelog`, `.spec` patches
- Alpine: `APKBUILD` secfixes section

### 7.3 BinaryFingerprint Library

**Location:** `src/Scanner/__Libraries/StellaOps.Scanner.BinaryFingerprint/`

**Purpose:** Generate and match vulnerability fingerprints at binary level.

**Components:**
- `BuildIdExtractor` - Extract ELF/PE build IDs
- `Disassembler` - Disassemble functions (via Capstone or similar)
- `FunctionNormalizer` - Normalize disassembly (strip addresses, etc.)
- `CfgExtractor` - Extract control flow graphs
- `FingerprintComputer` - Compute function/CFG hashes
- `FingerprintMatcher` - Query-time matching
- `ValidationHarness` - Validate against test corpus

**Fingerprint Types:**
1. **Function Normalized Hash** - Hash of normalized instruction sequence
2. **Basic-Block Multiset** - Multiset of basic block hashes (order-independent)
3. **CFG Hash** - Hash of canonical CFG representation

---

## 8. Implementation Phases

### Phase 1: Foundation (Sprints 7200-7201)
**Duration:** 4-5 sprints
**Goal:** Basic automated backport detection with proof

**Deliverables:**
- Cryptography abstraction layer
- ProofBlob data model and storage
- Source intelligence parsers (Tier 2/3)
- Feedser patch extraction (basic)
- Proof-carrying VEX integration
- Alpine APK comparator

**Success Criteria:**
- Tier 1-3 backport detection operational
- ProofBlobs generated and stored
- VEX statements include proof references
- 50+ test cases passing per distro

### Phase 2: Regional Crypto (Sprints 7202-7203)
**Duration:** 3-4 sprints
**Goal:** Jurisdiction-compliant audit packs

**Deliverables:**
- Multi-profile signer implementation
- eIDAS/ETSI profile
- FIPS profile (ECDSA + RSA-PSS)
- GOST profile (BouncyCastle)
- SM profile (BouncyCastle)
- TUF root embedding
- CRL/OCSP embedding
- Audit bundle packager

**Success Criteria:**
- Multi-signature DSSE envelopes working
- All profiles validated against test vectors
- Offline verification working
- Audit bundles < 50MB for typical scans

### Phase 3: Binary Moat (Sprints 7204-7206)
**Duration:** 4-5 sprints
**Goal:** Universal backport detection via binary analysis

**Deliverables:**
- Binary fingerprinting factory
- Disassembler integration (Capstone)
- CFG extraction
- Fingerprint validation harness
- Query-time matching engine
- Test corpus (vulnerable/fixed/benign)

**Success Criteria:**
- >90% precision on test corpus
- >85% recall on known vulnerabilities
- <1% false positive rate
- Query latency <100ms p95

### Phase 4: Production Hardening (Sprints 7207-7208)
**Duration:** 2-3 sprints
**Goal:** Production readiness and optimization

**Deliverables:**
- Performance optimization
- Comprehensive test coverage
- Operational runbooks
- Monitoring dashboards
- CLI commands
- Documentation

**Success Criteria:**
- All acceptance tests passing
- Performance benchmarks met
- Documentation complete
- Ready for production deployment

---

## 9. Success Metrics

### 9.1 Functional Metrics

| Metric | Target | Measurement |
|--------|--------|-------------|
| **False Positive Reduction** | >90% | Before/after comparison on test corpus |
| **Proof Coverage** | >95% | % of verdicts with proof blobs |
| **Tier 1 Detection** | >99% | % using distro feeds |
| **Tier 2 Detection** | >75% | % using changelog |
| **Tier 3 Detection** | >80% | % using patches |
| **Tier 4 Detection** | >85% | % using binary fingerprints |

### 9.2 Performance Metrics

| Metric | Target | Measurement |
|--------|--------|-------------|
| **Proof Generation** | <500ms p95 | Time to generate ProofBlob |
| **Multi-Sign** | <2s p95 | Time to sign with 3 profiles |
| **Bundle Creation** | <10s p95 | Time to create audit bundle |
| **Fingerprint Match** | <100ms p95 | Query time for fingerprint |
| **Bundle Size** | <50MB p95 | Compressed bundle size |

### 9.3 Quality Metrics

| Metric | Target | Measurement |
|--------|--------|-------------|
| **Test Coverage** | >90% | Line coverage |
| **Determinism** | 100% | Reproducible outputs |
| **Offline Capability** | 100% | No network calls in sealed mode |
| **Crypto Compliance** | 100% | All profiles pass validation |

---

## 10. Risks and Mitigations

### 10.1 Technical Risks

| Risk | Impact | Likelihood | Mitigation |
|------|--------|------------|------------|
| **Binary fingerprinting FP rate** | High | Medium | Extensive validation harness, confidence scoring |
| **Distro-specific edge cases** | Medium | High | Comprehensive test corpus, distro validation |
| **Crypto library compatibility** | Medium | Low | Abstraction layer, fallback implementations |
| **Performance degradation** | Medium | Medium | Caching, incremental computation, profiling |

### 10.2 Operational Risks

| Risk | Impact | Likelihood | Mitigation |
|------|--------|------------|------------|
| **Database growth** | High | High | Retention policies, partitioning, archival |
| **Feedser downtime** | Medium | Medium | Cached patches, graceful degradation |
| **Key rotation complexity** | Medium | Low | Automated rotation, clear procedures |
| **Bundle distribution costs** | Low | Medium | Compression, deduplication, CDN |

---

## 11. Dependencies

### 11.1 Internal Dependencies

- **Scanner Module**: Binary analysis, SBOM generation
- **Concelier Module**: Distro feed ingestion, merge logic
- **Excititor Module**: VEX statement generation
- **Attestor Module**: DSSE signing, Rekor anchoring
- **ExportCenter Module**: Bundle packaging, distribution

### 11.2 External Dependencies

| Dependency | Purpose | License | Risk |
|------------|---------|---------|------|
| **OSV API** | CVE→commit mapping | Public | Rate limits, availability |
| **BouncyCastle** | GOST/SM crypto | MIT | Maintenance, updates |
| **Capstone** | Disassembler | BSD | Native dependency |
| **libsodium** | EdDSA signing | ISC | Well-maintained |
| **liboqs** | Post-quantum (optional) | MIT | Experimental |

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## 12. References

### 12.1 Product Advisories

- `docs/product-advisories/23-Dec-2026 - Proof‑Driven Moats Stella Ops Can Ship.md`
- `docs/product-advisories/23-Dec-2026 - Binary Mapping as Attestable Proof.md`
- `docs/product-advisories/archived/22-Dec-2025 - Getting Distro Backport Logic Right.md`

### 12.2 Standards

- **DSSE:** https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse
- **in-toto:** https://in-toto.io/
- **OpenVEX:** https://github.com/openvex/spec
- **TUF:** https://theupdateframework.io/
- **RFC 3161:** Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)
- **ETSI TS 119 312:** Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI)
- **FIPS 186-4:** Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

### 12.3 Related Documentation

- `docs/07_HIGH_LEVEL_ARCHITECTURE.md`
- `docs/modules/concelier/architecture.md`
- `docs/modules/scanner/architecture.md`
- `docs/modules/attestor/architecture.md`
- `docs/modules/excititor/architecture.md`

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## Appendix A: Glossary

- **ProofBlob**: A cryptographically signed evidence bundle proving a vulnerability verdict
- **HunkSig**: Hash of normalized patch hunks for equivalence matching
- **Multi-Profile Signer**: Crypto abstraction that produces multiple signatures with different algorithms
- **Audit Bundle**: Sealed package containing all evidence and attestations for offline replay
- **Tier 1-4**: Four-level hierarchy of backport detection methods
- **BuildID**: Unique identifier embedded in ELF/PE binaries (`.note.gnu.build-id`)

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**END OF DOCUMENT**