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- Added `SchedulerWorkerOptions` class to encapsulate configuration for the scheduler worker.
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Authority Scopes & Tenancy — AOC Update

Audience: Authority Core, platform security engineers, DevOps owners.
Scope: Scope taxonomy, tenancy enforcement, rollout guidance for the Aggregation-Only Contract (Sprint19).

Authority issues short-lived tokens bound to tenants and scopes. Sprint19 introduces new scopes to support the AOC guardrails in Concelier and Excititor. This document lists the canonical scope catalogue, describes tenancy propagation, and outlines operational safeguards.


1·Scope catalogue (post AOC)

Scope Surface Purpose Notes
advisory:ingest Concelier ingestion APIs Append-only writes to advisory_raw collections. Requires tenant claim; blocked for global clients.
advisory:read /aoc/verify, Concelier dashboards, CLI Read-only access to stored advisories and guard results. Needed alongside aoc:verify for CLI/console verification.
vex:ingest Excititor ingestion APIs Append-only writes to vex_raw. Mirrors advisory:ingest; tenant required.
vex:read /aoc/verify, Excititor dashboards, CLI Read-only access to stored VEX material. Pair with aoc:verify for guard checks.
aoc:verify CLI/CI pipelines, Console verification jobs Execute Aggregation-Only Contract guard runs. Always issued with tenant; read-only combined with advisory:read/vex:read.
graph:write Cartographer pipeline Enqueue graph build/overlay jobs. Reserved for Cartographer service identity; tenant required.
graph:read Graph API, Scheduler overlays, UI Read graph projections/overlays. Tenant required; granted to Cartographer, Graph API, Scheduler.
graph:export Graph export endpoints Stream GraphML/JSONL artefacts. UI/gateway automation only; tenant required.
graph:simulate Policy simulation overlays Trigger what-if overlays on graphs. Restricted to automation; tenant required.
effective:write Policy Engine Create/update effective_finding_* collections. Only the Policy Engine service client may hold this scope; tenant required.
findings:read Console, CLI, exports Read derived findings materialised by Policy Engine. Shared across tenants with RBAC; tenant claim still enforced.
vuln:read Vuln Explorer API/UI Read normalized vulnerability data. Tenant required.
Existing scopes (e.g., policy:*, concelier.jobs.trigger) Unchanged. Review /docs/security/policy-governance.md for policy-specific scopes.

1.1Scope bundles (roles)

  • role/concelier-ingestadvisory:ingest, advisory:read.
  • role/excititor-ingestvex:ingest, vex:read.
  • role/aoc-operatoraoc:verify, advisory:read, vex:read.
  • role/policy-engineeffective:write, findings:read.
  • role/cartographer-servicegraph:write, graph:read.
  • role/graph-gatewaygraph:read, graph:export, graph:simulate.
  • role/consoleadvisory:read, vex:read, aoc:verify, findings:read, vuln:read.

Roles are declared per tenant in authority.yaml:

tenants:
  - name: default
    roles:
      concelier-ingest:
        scopes: [advisory:ingest, advisory:read]
      aoc-operator:
        scopes: [aoc:verify, advisory:read, vex:read]
      policy-engine:
        scopes: [effective:write, findings:read]

2·Tenancy enforcement

2.1Token claims

Tokens now include:

  • tenant claim (string) — required for all ingestion and verification scopes.
  • service_identity (optional) — e.g., policy-engine, cartographer. Required when requesting effective:write or graph:write.
  • delegation_allowed (boolean) — defaults false. Prevents console tokens from delegating ingest scopes.

Authority rejects requests when:

  • tenant is missing while requesting advisory:ingest, advisory:read, vex:ingest, vex:read, or aoc:verify scopes.
  • service_identity != policy-engine but effective:write is present (ERR_AOC_006 enforcement).
  • service_identity != cartographer but graph:write is present (graph pipeline enforcement).
  • Tokens attempt to combine advisory:ingest with effective:write (separation of duties).

2.2Propagation

  • API Gateway forwards tenant claim as header (X-Stella-Tenant). Services refuse requests lacking the header.
  • Concelier/Excititor stamp tenant into raw documents and structured logs.
  • Policy Engine copies tenant from tokens into effective_finding_* collections.

2.3Cross-tenant scenarios

  • Platform operators with tenant:admin can assume other tenants via /authority/tenant/switch if explicitly permitted.
  • CLI commands accept --tenant <id> to override environment default; Authority logs tenant switch events (authority.tenant.switch).
  • Console tenant picker uses delegated token exchange (/token/exchange) to obtain scoped tenant tokens without exposing raw credentials.

3·Configuration changes

3.1Authority configuration (authority.yaml)

Add new scopes and optional claims transformations:

security:
  scopes:
    - name: advisory:ingest
      description: Concelier raw ingestion (append-only)
    - name: advisory:read
      description: Read Concelier advisories and guard verdicts
    - name: vex:ingest
      description: Excititor raw ingestion
    - name: vex:read
      description: Read Excititor VEX records
    - name: aoc:verify
      description: Run AOC verification
    - name: effective:write
      description: Policy Engine materialisation
    - name: findings:read
      description: Read derived findings
    - name: graph:write
      description: Cartographer build submissions
    - name: graph:read
      description: Read graph overlays
    - name: graph:export
      description: Export graph artefacts
    - name: graph:simulate
      description: Run graph what-if simulations
    - name: vuln:read
      description: Read Vuln Explorer data
  claimTransforms:
    - match: { scope: "effective:write" }
      require:
        serviceIdentity: policy-engine
    - match: { scope: "graph:write" }
      require:
        serviceIdentity: cartographer

3.2Client registration

Update service clients:

  • Concelier.WebService → request advisory:ingest, advisory:read.
  • Excititor.WebService → request vex:ingest, vex:read.
  • Policy.Engine → request effective:write, findings:read; set properties.serviceIdentity=policy-engine.
  • Cartographer.Service → request graph:write, graph:read; set properties.serviceIdentity=cartographer.
  • Graph API Gateway → request graph:read, graph:export, graph:simulate; tenant hint required.
  • Console → request advisory:read, vex:read, aoc:verify, findings:read, vuln:read plus existing UI scopes.
  • CLI automation → request aoc:verify, advisory:read, vex:read as needed.

Client definition snippet:

clients:
  - clientId: concelier-web
    grantTypes: [client_credentials]
    scopes: [advisory:ingest, advisory:read]
    tenants: [default]
  - clientId: policy-engine
    grantTypes: [client_credentials]
    scopes: [effective:write, findings:read]
    properties:
      serviceIdentity: policy-engine
  - clientId: cartographer-service
    grantTypes: [client_credentials]
    scopes: [graph:write, graph:read]
    properties:
      serviceIdentity: cartographer

4·Operational safeguards

  • Audit events: Authority emits authority.scope.granted and authority.scope.revoked events with scope and tenant. Monitor for unexpected grants.
  • Rate limiting: Apply stricter limits on /token endpoints for clients requesting advisory:ingest or vex:ingest to mitigate brute-force ingestion attempts.
  • Incident response: Link AOC alerts to Authority audit logs to confirm whether violations come from expected identities.
  • Rotation: Rotate ingest client secrets alongside guard deployments; add rotation steps to ops/authority-key-rotation.md.
  • Testing: Integration tests must fail if tokens lacking tenant attempt ingestion; add coverage in Concelier/Excititor smoke suites (see CONCELIER-CORE-AOC-19-013).

5·Offline & air-gap notes

  • Offline Kit bundles include tenant-scoped service credentials. Ensure ingest bundles ship without advisory:ingest scopes unless strictly required.
  • CLI verification in offline environments uses pre-issued aoc:verify tokens; document expiration and renewal processes.
  • Authority replicas in air-gapped environments should restrict scope issuance to known tenants and log all /token interactions for later replay.

6·References


7·Compliance checklist

  • Scope catalogue updated in Authority configuration templates.
  • Role mappings documented for each tenant profile.
  • Claim transforms enforce serviceIdentity for effective:write.
  • Claim transforms enforce serviceIdentity for graph:write.
  • Concelier/Excititor smoke tests cover missing tenant rejection.
  • Offline kit credentials reviewed for least privilege.
  • Audit/monitoring guidance validated with Observability Guild.
  • Authority Core sign-off recorded (owner: @authority-core, due 2025-10-28).

Last updated: 2025-10-27 (Sprint19).