Introduces CGS determinism test runs to CI workflows for Windows, macOS, Linux, Alpine, and Debian, fulfilling CGS-008 cross-platform requirements. Updates local-ci scripts to support new smoke steps, test timeouts, progress intervals, and project slicing for improved test isolation and diagnostics.
6.5 KiB
ADR 0042: CGS Merkle Tree Implementation
Status
ACCEPTED (2025-12-29)
Context
The CGS (Canonical Graph Signature) system requires deterministic hash computation for verdicts. We need to decide whether to:
- Reuse existing
StellaOps.Attestor.ProofChainMerkle tree builder - Build a custom Merkle tree implementation in
VerdictBuilderService
Requirements
- Determinism: Same evidence must always produce identical CGS hash
- Order Independence: VEX document ordering should not affect hash (sorted internally)
- Cross-Platform: Identical hash on Windows, macOS, Linux (glibc), Linux (musl), BSD
- Leaf Composition: Specific ordering of evidence components (SBOM, VEX sorted, reachability, policy lock)
Existing ProofChain Merkle Builder
Located at: src/Attestor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Attestor.ProofChain/
Pros:
- Already implements Merkle tree construction
- Tested and proven in production
- Handles parent/child attestation chains
Cons:
- Designed for attestation chains, not evidence hashing
- Includes attestation-specific metadata in hash
- Doesn't support custom leaf ordering required for CGS
- Would require modifications that might break existing attestation behavior
Decision
Build custom Merkle tree implementation in VerdictBuilderService.
Rationale
-
Separation of Concerns: CGS hash computation has different requirements than attestation chain verification
-
Full Control Over Determinism: Custom implementation allows:
- Explicit leaf ordering: SBOM → VEX (sorted) → Reachability → PolicyLock
- VEX document sorting by content hash (not insertion order)
- Culture-invariant string comparison (
StringComparer.Ordinal)
-
Simplicity: ~50 lines of code vs modifying 500+ lines in ProofChain
-
No Breaking Changes: Doesn't affect existing attestation infrastructure
Implementation
// VerdictBuilderService.cs
private static string ComputeCgsHash(EvidencePack evidence, PolicyLock policyLock)
{
// Build Merkle tree from evidence components (sorted for determinism)
var leaves = new List<string>
{
ComputeHash(evidence.SbomCanonJson),
ComputeHash(evidence.FeedSnapshotDigest)
};
// Add VEX digests in sorted order (ORDER-CRITICAL for determinism!)
foreach (var vex in evidence.VexCanonJson.OrderBy(v => v, StringComparer.Ordinal))
{
leaves.Add(ComputeHash(vex));
}
// Add reachability if present
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(evidence.ReachabilityGraphJson))
{
leaves.Add(ComputeHash(evidence.ReachabilityGraphJson));
}
// Add policy lock hash
var policyLockJson = JsonSerializer.Serialize(policyLock, CanonicalJsonOptions);
leaves.Add(ComputeHash(policyLockJson));
// Build Merkle root
var merkleRoot = BuildMerkleRoot(leaves);
return $"cgs:sha256:{merkleRoot}";
}
private static string BuildMerkleRoot(List<string> leaves)
{
if (leaves.Count == 0)
return ComputeHash("");
if (leaves.Count == 1)
return leaves[0];
var level = leaves.ToList();
while (level.Count > 1)
{
var nextLevel = new List<string>();
for (int i = 0; i < level.Count; i += 2)
{
if (i + 1 < level.Count)
{
// Combine two hashes
var combined = level[i] + level[i + 1];
nextLevel.Add(ComputeHash(combined));
}
else
{
// Odd number of nodes, promote last one
nextLevel.Add(level[i]);
}
}
level = nextLevel;
}
return level[0];
}
private static string ComputeHash(string input)
{
var bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(input);
var hashBytes = SHA256.HashData(bytes);
return Convert.ToHexString(hashBytes).ToLowerInvariant();
}
Consequences
Positive
- ✅ Full control over CGS hash computation logic
- ✅ No risk of breaking existing attestation chains
- ✅ Simple, testable implementation (~50 lines)
- ✅ Explicit ordering guarantees determinism
- ✅ Cross-platform verified (Windows, macOS, Linux, Alpine, Debian)
Negative
- ⚠️ Code duplication with ProofChain (minimal - different use case)
- ⚠️ Need to maintain separate Merkle tree implementation (low maintenance burden)
Neutral
- 📝 Custom implementation documented in tests (CgsDeterminismTests.cs)
- 📝 Future: Could extract shared Merkle tree primitives if needed
Alternatives Considered
Alternative 1: Modify ProofChain Builder
Rejected because:
- Would require adding configuration options to ProofChain
- Risk of breaking existing attestation behavior
- Increased complexity for both use cases
- Tight coupling between verdict and attestation systems
Alternative 2: Use Third-Party Merkle Tree Library
Rejected because:
- External dependency for ~50 lines of code
- Less control over ordering and hash format
- Potential platform-specific issues
- Security review overhead
Alternative 3: Single-Level Hash (No Merkle Tree)
Rejected because:
- Loses incremental verification capability
- Can't prove individual evidence components without full evidence pack
- Less efficient for large evidence packs (can't skip unchanged components)
Verification
Test Coverage
File: src/__Tests/Determinism/CgsDeterminismTests.cs
- Golden File Test: Known evidence produces expected hash
- 10-Iteration Stability: Same input produces identical hash 10 times
- VEX Order Independence: VEX document ordering doesn't affect hash
- Reachability Inclusion: Reachability graph changes hash predictably
- Policy Lock Versioning: Different policy versions produce different hashes
Cross-Platform Verification
CI/CD Workflow: .gitea/workflows/cross-platform-determinism.yml
- ✅ Windows (glibc)
- ✅ macOS (BSD libc)
- ✅ Linux Ubuntu (glibc)
- ✅ Linux Alpine (musl libc)
- ✅ Linux Debian (glibc)
All platforms produce identical CGS hash for same input.
Migration
No migration required - this is a new feature.
References
- Sprint:
docs/implplan/archived/SPRINT_20251229_001_001_BE_cgs_infrastructure.md - Implementation:
src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Verdict/VerdictBuilderService.cs - Tests:
src/__Tests/Determinism/CgsDeterminismTests.cs - ProofChain:
src/Attestor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Attestor.ProofChain/
Decision Date
2025-12-29
Decision Makers
- Backend Team
- Security Team
- Attestation Team (consulted)
Review Date
2026-06-29 (6 months) - Evaluate if code duplication warrants shared library