git.stella-ops.org/docs/security/authority-scopes.md

# Authority Scopes & Tenancy — AOC Update

> **Audience:** Authority Core, platform security engineers, DevOps owners.  
> **Scope:** Scope taxonomy, tenancy enforcement, rollout guidance for the Aggregation-Only Contract (Sprint 19).

Authority issues short-lived tokens bound to tenants and scopes. Sprint 19 introduces new scopes to support the AOC guardrails in Concelier and Excititor. This document lists the canonical scope catalogue, describes tenancy propagation, and outlines operational safeguards.

---

## 1 · Scope catalogue (post AOC)

| Scope | Surface | Purpose | Notes |
|-------|---------|---------|-------|
| `advisory:ingest` | Concelier ingestion APIs | Append-only writes to `advisory_raw` collections. | Requires tenant claim; blocked for global clients. |
| `advisory:read` | `/aoc/verify`, Concelier dashboards, CLI | Read-only access to stored advisories and guard results. | Must be requested with `aoc:verify`; Authority rejects tokens missing the pairing. |
| `advisory-ai:view` | Advisory AI dashboards, remediation exports | Read-only access to Advisory AI artefacts (summaries, remediation bundles). | Requires `aoc:verify`; defaults granted to `advisory-ai-viewer` role. |
| `advisory-ai:operate` | Advisory AI remote inference workflows | Submit Advisory AI inference/remediation jobs and retrieve anonymized outputs. | Requires `aoc:verify`; remote inference must be enabled and tenant-consented. |
| `advisory-ai:admin` | Advisory AI configuration APIs, Console admin | Manage Advisory AI profiles, remote inference toggles, and audit exports. | Restricted to platform admins; requires `aoc:verify`; all operations audited. |
| `vex:ingest` | Excititor ingestion APIs | Append-only writes to `vex_raw`. | Mirrors `advisory:ingest`; tenant required. |
| `vex:read` | `/aoc/verify`, Excititor dashboards, CLI | Read-only access to stored VEX material. | Must be requested with `aoc:verify`; Authority rejects tokens missing the pairing. |
| `aoc:verify` | CLI/CI pipelines, Console verification jobs | Execute Aggregation-Only Contract guard runs. | Always issued with tenant; required whenever requesting `advisory:read`, `vex:read`, or any `signals:*` scope. |
| `signals:read` | Signals API, reachability dashboards | Read-only access to stored reachability signals. | Tenant and `aoc:verify` required; missing pairing returns `invalid_scope`. |
| `signals:write` | Signals ingestion APIs | Append-only writes for reachability signals. | Requires tenant and `aoc:verify`; Authority logs `authority.aoc_scope_violation` on mismatch. |
| `signals:admin` | Signals administration tooling | Rotate credentials, manage reachability sensors, purge stale data. | Reserved for automation; `aoc:verify` + tenant mandatory; violations are audited. |
| `airgap:status:read` | AirGap Controller status API, Console status pane, CLI | Read sealed state, staleness metrics, and import history. | Tenant required; defaulted via `airgap-viewer` and Console bundles. |
| `airgap:import` | AirGap Importer APIs, CLI workflows | Import offline bundles into catalog and object storage. | Tenant required; issued to `airgap-operator`; operations are fully audited. |
| `airgap:seal` | AirGap Controller sealing endpoints | Seal or unseal installations and confirm sealing tickets. | Tenant required; restrict to `airgap-admin`; pair with operator ticket policy. |
| `obs:read` | Observability API, Console dashboards | Read observability dashboards, SLO digests, and incident overlays. | Tenant required; typically paired with `timeline:read` and `evidence:read`. |
| `timeline:read` | Timeline API, observability consoles, CLI | Read incident timeline entries and annotations. | Issue alongside `obs:read` for analyst workflows; tenant enforced. |
| `timeline:write` | Timeline ingest workers, Scheduler | Append deterministic incident timeline events and annotations. | Automation only; Authority audits source client + tenant. |
| `evidence:create` | Evidence Locker ingestion APIs | Create evidence items, upload artefacts, and link attestations. | Append-only; emits `authority.evidence.create` audit trail per item. |
| `evidence:read` | Evidence Locker APIs, Offline Kit exports | Read evidence items, artefacts, and linkage metadata. | Analysts/legal staff; tenant enforced. |
| `evidence:hold` | Evidence Locker legal hold endpoints | Apply or release legal holds on evidence items. | Restricted to compliance/legal operators; audited. |
| `attest:read` | Attestation evidence explorer, Observability UI | Read attestation records, DSSE bundles, and verification proofs. | Read-only counterpart to signer/attestor pipelines; tenant required. |
| `obs:incident` | Incident bridge automation, Console | Toggle incident mode, extend retention, enable emergency telemetry. | Requires fresh auth + `incident_reason`, no refresh; audit via `/authority/audit/incident`. |
> **Observability scope bundle (added 2 Nov 2025).** `obs:read`, `timeline:read`, `timeline:write`, `evidence:create`, `evidence:read`, `evidence:hold`, `attest:read`, and `obs:incident` always require a tenant claim. Gateways must forward `X-StellaOps-Tenant` (or the configured tenant header) or resource servers will reject the request with `tenant_header_missing`. The sample `authority.yaml` assigns these scopes via the `observability-*` roles; reuse those roles when onboarding new tenants to keep bundles consistent.
> **Fresh auth enforcement (Sprint 55).** Authority-issued `obs:incident` tokens must carry both `incident_reason` and `auth_time`. Resource servers enforce a five-minute freshness window and log `incident.reason`, `incident.auth_time`, and `incident.fresh_auth_satisfied` in `authority.resource.authorize` audit events, enabling `/authority/audit/incident` to verify activation reason and freshness.
| `graph:write` | Cartographer pipeline | Enqueue graph build/overlay jobs. | Reserved for Cartographer service identity; tenant required. |
| `graph:read` | Graph API, Scheduler overlays, UI | Read graph projections/overlays. | Tenant required; granted to Cartographer, Graph API, Scheduler. |
| `graph:export` | Graph export endpoints | Stream GraphML/JSONL artefacts. | UI/gateway automation only; tenant required. |
| `graph:simulate` | Policy simulation overlays | Trigger what-if overlays on graphs. | Restricted to automation; tenant required. |
| `effective:write` | Policy Engine | Create/update `effective_finding_*` collections. | **Only** the Policy Engine service client may hold this scope; tenant required. |
| `findings:read` | Console, CLI, exports | Read derived findings materialised by Policy Engine. | Shared across tenants with RBAC; tenant claim still enforced. |
| `policy:author` | Policy Studio (Console, CLI) | Author drafts, run lint, execute quick simulations. | Tenant required; typically granted via `role/policy-author`. |
| `policy:review` | Policy Studio review panes | Review drafts, leave comments, request changes. | Tenant required; pair with `policy:simulate` for diff previews. |
| `policy:approve` | Policy Studio approvals | Approve or reject policy drafts. | Tenant required; fresh-auth enforced by Console UI. |
| `policy:operate` | Policy Studio promotion controls | Trigger batch simulations, promotions, and canary runs. | Tenant required; combine with `policy:run`/`policy:activate`. |
| `policy:audit` | Policy audit exports | Access immutable policy history, comments, and signatures. | Tenant required; read-only access. |
| `policy:simulate` | Policy Studio / CLI simulations | Run simulations against tenant inventories. | Tenant required; available to authors, reviewers, operators. |
| `vuln:read` | Vuln Explorer API/UI | Read normalized vulnerability data. | Tenant required. |
| `export.viewer` | Export Center APIs | List export profiles/runs, fetch manifests and bundles. | Tenant required; read-only access. |
| `export.operator` | Export Center APIs | Trigger export runs, manage schedules, request verifications. | Tenant required; pair with `export.admin` for retention/encryption changes. |
| `export.admin` | Export Center administrative APIs | Configure retention policies, encryption keys, and scheduling defaults. | Tenant required; token requests must include `export_reason` + `export_ticket`; Authority audits denials. |
| `notify.viewer` | Notifier APIs, Console, CLI | Read notifier rules, channel configuration, and delivery history. | Tenant required; responses are redacted for cross-tenant data; no mutation rights. |
| `notify.operator` | Notifier APIs, automation hooks | Manage notifier rules, trigger tests, acknowledge/resolve incidents. | Tenant required; Authority enforces operator metadata (`notify_reason`, `notify_ticket`) when configured. |
| `notify.admin` | Notifier administrative APIs | Configure channels, secrets, quiet hours, and escalation policies. | Tenant required; Authority audits secret rotations and escalation changes. |
| `notify.escalate` | Notifier ack/escalation bridge | Issue escalation-bearing ack tokens and honour escalation acknowledgements. | Tenant required; Authority enforces pairing with `notify.admin` when escalation mutates platform state. |
| `orch:read` | Orchestrator dashboards/API | Read queued jobs, worker state, and rate-limit telemetry. | Tenant required; never grants mutation rights. |
| `orch:operate` | Orchestrator control actions | Execute pause/resume, retry, sync-now, and backfill operations. Requires tenant assignment **and** `operator_reason`/`operator_ticket` parameters when requesting tokens. |
| `orch:quota` | Orchestrator quota administration | Adjust per-tenant quotas, burst ceilings, and backfill allowances. Requires tenant assignment and `quota_reason` (≤256 chars); optional `quota_ticket` (≤128 chars) is recorded for audit. |
| `packs.read` | Packs Registry, Task Runner | Discover Task Packs, download manifests, and inspect metadata. | Tenant claim required; Authority rejects cross-tenant tokens and tags violations with `authority.pack_scope_violation`. |
| `packs.write` | Packs Registry APIs | Publish or update Task Packs (requires signed bundles). | Tenant claim required; typically restricted to registry automation; violations surface via `authority.pack_scope_violation`. |
| `packs.run` | Task Runner | Execute Task Packs via CLI or Task Runner APIs. | Tenant claim required; Task Runner enforces tenant isolation; Authority emits `authority.pack_scope_violation` when missing. |
| `packs.approve` | Task Runner approvals | Fulfil Task Pack approval gates and resume runs. | Tenant claim required; approval events audited with run ID and Pack scope violations tagged as `authority.pack_scope_violation`. |
| `exceptions:read` | Exception service APIs, Console | Enumerate exception definitions, routing templates, and approval state. | Tenant and approval routing metadata required for audit replay. |
| `exceptions:write` | Policy Engine → Authority bridge | Persist exception evaluations, lifecycle events, and status changes. | Tenant required; only service principals should hold this scope. |
| `exceptions:approve` | Console fresh-auth flows, delegated admins | Approve or reject exception requests routed through Authority. | Tenant required; Authority enforces MFA when any bound routing template has `requireMfa=true`. |
| `ui.read` | Console base APIs | Retrieve tenant catalog, profile metadata, and token introspection results. | Tenant header required; responses are DPoP-bound and audit logged. |
| `authority:tenants.read` | Console admin workspace | Enumerate configured tenants, default roles, and isolation metadata. | Tenant claim must match header; access audited via `authority.console.tenants.read`. |
| Existing scopes | (e.g., `policy:*`, `concelier.jobs.trigger`) | Unchanged. | `concelier.merge` is retired — clients must request `advisory:ingest`/`advisory:read`; requests continue to fail with `invalid_client`. Review `/docs/security/policy-governance.md` for policy-specific scopes. |

### 1.1 Scope bundles (roles)

- **`role/concelier-ingest`** → `advisory:ingest`, `advisory:read`.
- **`role/excititor-ingest`** → `vex:ingest`, `vex:read`.
- **`role/signals-uploader`** → `signals:write`, `signals:read`, `aoc:verify`.
- **`role/aoc-operator`** → `aoc:verify`, `advisory:read`, `vex:read`.
- **`role/policy-engine`** → `effective:write`, `findings:read`.
- **`role/cartographer-service`** → `graph:write`, `graph:read`.
- **`role/graph-gateway`** → `graph:read`, `graph:export`, `graph:simulate`.
- **`role/console`** → `ui.read`, `advisory:read`, `vex:read`, `exceptions:read`, `aoc:verify`, `findings:read`, `airgap:status:read`, `orch:read`, `vuln:read`.
- **`role/ui-console-admin`** → `ui.read`, `authority:tenants.read`, `authority:roles.read`, `authority:tokens.read`, `authority:clients.read` (paired with write scopes where required).  
- **`role/orch-viewer`** *(Authority role: `Orch.Viewer`)* → `orch:read`.
- **`role/orch-operator`** *(Authority role: `Orch.Operator`)* → `orch:read`, `orch:operate`.
- **`role/orch-admin`** *(Authority role: `Orch.Admin`)* → `orch:read`, `orch:operate`, `orch:quota`, `orch:backfill`.
- **`role/packs-runner`** → `packs.read`, `packs.run`.
- **`role/packs-publisher`** → `packs.read`, `packs.write`.
- **`role/packs-approver`** → `packs.read`, `packs.approve`.
- **`role/policy-author`** → `policy:author`, `policy:read`, `policy:simulate`, `findings:read`.
- **`role/policy-reviewer`** → `policy:review`, `policy:read`, `policy:simulate`, `findings:read`.
- **`role/policy-approver`** → `policy:approve`, `policy:review`, `policy:read`, `policy:simulate`, `findings:read`.
- **`role/policy-operator`** → `policy:operate`, `policy:run`, `policy:activate`, `policy:read`, `policy:simulate`, `findings:read`.
- **`role/policy-auditor`** → `policy:audit`, `policy:read`, `policy:simulate`, `findings:read`.
- **`role/export-viewer`** *(Authority role: `Export.Viewer`)* → `export.viewer`.
- **`role/export-operator`** *(Authority role: `Export.Operator`)* → `export.viewer`, `export.operator`.
- **`role/export-admin`** *(Authority role: `Export.Admin`)* → `export.viewer`, `export.operator`, `export.admin`.
- **`role/notify-viewer`** *(Authority role: `Notify.Viewer`)* → `notify.viewer`.
- **`role/notify-operator`** *(Authority role: `Notify.Operator`)* → `notify.viewer`, `notify.operator`.
- **`role/notify-admin`** *(Authority role: `Notify.Admin`)* → `notify.viewer`, `notify.operator`, `notify.admin`.
- **`role/observability-viewer`** *(Authority role: `Observability.Viewer`)* → `obs:read`, `timeline:read`, `evidence:read`, `attest:read`.
- **`role/observability-investigator`** *(Authority role: `Observability.Investigator`)* → `obs:read`, `timeline:read`, `timeline:write`, `evidence:read`, `evidence:create`, `attest:read`.
- **`role/observability-legal`** *(Authority role: `Observability.Legal`)* → `evidence:read`, `evidence:hold`.
- **`role/observability-incident-commander`** *(Authority role: `Observability.IncidentCommander`)* → `obs:read`, `obs:incident`, `timeline:read`, `timeline:write`, `evidence:create`, `evidence:read`, `attest:read`.
- **`role/airgap-viewer`** → `airgap:status:read`.
- **`role/airgap-operator`** → `airgap:status:read`, `airgap:import`.
- **`role/airgap-admin`** → `airgap:status:read`, `airgap:import`, `airgap:seal`.
- **`role/exceptions-service`** → `exceptions:read`, `exceptions:write`.
- **`role/exceptions-approver`** → `exceptions:read`, `exceptions:approve`.

Roles are declared per tenant in `authority.yaml`:

```yaml
tenants:
  - name: default
    roles:
      concelier-ingest:
        scopes: [advisory:ingest, advisory:read]
      signals-uploader:
        scopes: [signals:write, signals:read, aoc:verify]
      aoc-operator:
        scopes: [aoc:verify, advisory:read, vex:read]
      orch-viewer:
        scopes: [orch:read]
      orch-operator:
        scopes: [orch:read, orch:operate]
      policy-author:
        scopes: [policy:author, policy:read, policy:simulate, findings:read]
      policy-reviewer:
        scopes: [policy:review, policy:read, policy:simulate, findings:read]
      policy-approver:
        scopes: [policy:approve, policy:review, policy:read, policy:simulate, findings:read]
      policy-operator:
        scopes: [policy:operate, policy:run, policy:activate, policy:read, policy:simulate, findings:read]
      policy-auditor:
        scopes: [policy:audit, policy:read, policy:simulate, findings:read]
      pack-viewer:
        scopes: [packs.read]
      pack-operator:
        scopes: [packs.read, packs.run]
      pack-publisher:
        scopes: [packs.read, packs.write]
      pack-approver:
        scopes: [packs.read, packs.approve]
      pack-admin:
        scopes: [packs.read, packs.write, packs.run, packs.approve]
      policy-engine:
        scopes: [effective:write, findings:read]
      exceptions-service:
        scopes: [exceptions:read, exceptions:write]
      exceptions-approver:
        scopes: [exceptions:read, exceptions:approve]
      notify-viewer:
        scopes: [notify.viewer]
      notify-operator:
        scopes: [notify.viewer, notify.operator]
      notify-admin:
        scopes: [notify.viewer, notify.operator, notify.admin]
      observability-viewer:
        scopes: [obs:read, timeline:read, evidence:read, attest:read]
      observability-investigator:
        scopes: [obs:read, timeline:read, timeline:write, evidence:read, evidence:create, attest:read]
      observability-legal:
        scopes: [evidence:read, evidence:hold]
      observability-incident-commander:
        scopes: [obs:read, obs:incident, timeline:read, timeline:write, evidence:create, evidence:read, attest:read]
```

> **MFA requirement:** When any `exceptions.routingTemplates` entry sets `requireMfa: true`, Authority refuses to mint tokens containing `exceptions:approve` unless the authenticating identity provider advertises MFA support. Password/OIDC flows produce `authority.password.grant` audit events with `reason="Exception approval scope requires an MFA-capable identity provider."` when the requirement is violated.

---

## 2 · Tenancy enforcement

### 2.1 Token claims

Tokens now include:

- `tenant` claim (string) — required for all ingestion and verification scopes.
- `service_identity` (optional) — e.g., `policy-engine`, `cartographer`. Required when requesting `effective:write` or `graph:write`.
- `delegation_allowed` (boolean) — defaults `false`. Prevents console tokens from delegating ingest scopes.

Authority rejects requests when:

- `tenant` is missing while requesting `advisory:ingest`, `advisory:read`, `vex:ingest`, `vex:read`, or `aoc:verify` scopes.
- `aoc:verify` is absent while tokens request `advisory:read`, `vex:read`, or any `signals:*` scope (`invalid_scope` with deterministic message).
- `service_identity != policy-engine` but `effective:write` is present (`ERR_AOC_006` enforcement).
- `service_identity != cartographer` but `graph:write` is present (graph pipeline enforcement).
- Tokens attempt to combine `advisory:ingest` with `effective:write` (separation of duties).
- `exceptions:approve` is requested by a client without a tenant assignment or via an identity provider lacking MFA when `RequireMfaForApprovals=true`.

### 2.2 Propagation

- API Gateway forwards `tenant` claim as header (`X-Stella-Tenant`). Services refuse requests lacking the header.
- Concelier/Excititor stamp tenant into raw documents and structured logs.
- Policy Engine copies `tenant` from tokens into `effective_finding_*` collections.
- Exception lifecycle services persist tenant and the selected routing template identifier alongside approval decisions. Authority audit events (`authority.password.grant`, `authority.client_credentials.grant`) surface `audit.scopes` and, on denials, a `scope.invalid` metadata entry so operators can trace exception approval attempts without inspecting downstream services.

### 2.3 Cross-tenant scenarios

- Platform operators with `tenant:admin` can assume other tenants via `/authority/tenant/switch` if explicitly permitted.
- CLI commands accept `--tenant <id>` to override environment default; Authority logs tenant switch events (`authority.tenant.switch`).
- Console tenant picker uses delegated token exchange (`/token/exchange`) to obtain scoped tenant tokens without exposing raw credentials.

---

## 3 · Configuration changes

### 3.1 Authority configuration (`authority.yaml`)

Add new scopes and optional claims transformations:

```yaml
security:
  scopes:
    - name: advisory:ingest
      description: Concelier raw ingestion (append-only)
    - name: advisory:read
      description: Read Concelier advisories and guard verdicts
    - name: vex:ingest
      description: Excititor raw ingestion
    - name: vex:read
      description: Read Excititor VEX records
    - name: aoc:verify
      description: Run AOC verification
    - name: airgap:status:read
      description: Read air-gap sealing status and staleness indicators
    - name: airgap:import
      description: Import offline bundles into the air-gapped catalog
    - name: airgap:seal
      description: Seal or unseal the installation during change control
    - name: effective:write
      description: Policy Engine materialisation
    - name: findings:read
      description: Read derived findings
    - name: graph:write
      description: Cartographer build submissions
    - name: graph:read
      description: Read graph overlays
    - name: graph:export
      description: Export graph artefacts
    - name: graph:simulate
      description: Run graph what-if simulations
    - name: vuln:read
      description: Read Vuln Explorer data
  claimTransforms:
    - match: { scope: "effective:write" }
      require:
        serviceIdentity: policy-engine
    - match: { scope: "graph:write" }
      require:
        serviceIdentity: cartographer
```

### 3.2 Client registration

Update service clients:

- `Concelier.WebService` → request `advisory:ingest`, `advisory:read`.
- `Excititor.WebService` → request `vex:ingest`, `vex:read`.
- `Policy.Engine` → request `effective:write`, `findings:read`; set `properties.serviceIdentity=policy-engine`.
- `Cartographer.Service` → request `graph:write`, `graph:read`; set `properties.serviceIdentity=cartographer`.
- `Graph API Gateway` → request `graph:read`, `graph:export`, `graph:simulate`; tenant hint required.
- `Console` → request `advisory:read`, `vex:read`, `aoc:verify`, `findings:read`, `vuln:read` plus existing UI scopes.
- `CLI automation` → request `aoc:verify`, `advisory:read`, `vex:read` as needed.

Client definition snippet:

```yaml
clients:
  - clientId: concelier-web
    grantTypes: [client_credentials]
    scopes: [advisory:ingest, advisory:read]
    tenants: [default]
  - clientId: policy-engine
    grantTypes: [client_credentials]
    scopes: [effective:write, findings:read]
    properties:
      serviceIdentity: policy-engine
  - clientId: cartographer-service
    grantTypes: [client_credentials]
    scopes: [graph:write, graph:read]
    properties:
      serviceIdentity: cartographer
```

---

## 4 · Operational safeguards

- **Audit events:** Authority emits `authority.scope.granted` and `authority.scope.revoked` events with `scope` and `tenant`. Monitor for unexpected grants.
- **Rate limiting:** Apply stricter limits on `/token` endpoints for clients requesting `advisory:ingest` or `vex:ingest` to mitigate brute-force ingestion attempts.
- **Incident response:** Link AOC alerts to Authority audit logs to confirm whether violations come from expected identities.
- **Rotation:** Rotate ingest client secrets alongside guard deployments; add rotation steps to `ops/authority-key-rotation.md`.
- **Testing:** Integration tests must fail if tokens lacking `tenant` attempt ingestion; add coverage in Concelier/Excititor smoke suites (see `CONCELIER-CORE-AOC-19-013`).

---

## 5 · Offline & air-gap notes

- Offline Kit bundles include tenant-scoped service credentials. Ensure ingest bundles ship without `advisory:ingest` scopes unless strictly required.
- CLI verification in offline environments uses pre-issued `aoc:verify` tokens; document expiration and renewal processes.
- Authority replicas in air-gapped environments should restrict scope issuance to known tenants and log all `/token` interactions for later replay.

---

## 6 · References

- [Aggregation-Only Contract reference](../ingestion/aggregation-only-contract.md)
- [Architecture overview](../modules/platform/architecture-overview.md)
- [Concelier architecture](../modules/concelier/architecture.md)
- [Excititor architecture](../modules/excititor/architecture.md)
- [Policy governance](policy-governance.md)
- [Authority key rotation playbook](../modules/authority/operations/key-rotation.md)

---

## 7 · Compliance checklist

- [ ] Scope catalogue updated in Authority configuration templates.
- [ ] Role mappings documented for each tenant profile.
- [ ] Claim transforms enforce `serviceIdentity` for `effective:write`.
- [ ] Claim transforms enforce `serviceIdentity` for `graph:write`.
- [ ] Concelier/Excititor smoke tests cover missing tenant rejection.
- [ ] Offline kit credentials reviewed for least privilege.
- [ ] Audit/monitoring guidance validated with Observability Guild.
- [ ] Authority Core sign-off recorded (owner: @authority-core, due 2025-10-28).

---

*Last updated: 2025-10-27 (Sprint 19).*