- Introduced AGENTS.md, README.md, TASKS.md, and implementation_plan.md for Vexer, detailing mission, responsibilities, key components, and operational notes. - Established similar documentation structure for Vulnerability Explorer and Zastava modules, including their respective workflows, integrations, and observability notes. - Created risk scoring profiles documentation outlining the core workflow, factor model, governance, and deliverables. - Ensured all modules adhere to the Aggregation-Only Contract and maintain determinism and provenance in outputs.
		
			
				
	
	
		
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			Markdown
		
	
	
	
	
	
| # Implementation plan — Signer
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| 
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| ## Delivery phases
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| - **Phase 1 – Core service & PoE**  
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|   Harden OpTok validation, Proof-of-Entitlement (PoE) checks, quota enforcement, scanner release verification, and DSSE signing pipeline (keyless + keyful).
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| - **Phase 2 – Export Center integration**  
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|   Produce signing bundles with provenance manifests for Export Center, deliver cosign-compatible outputs, and document verification workflows for offline exports.
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| - **Phase 3 – Attestor alignment**  
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|   Emit DSSE envelopes, metadata, and signer identity information required by Attestor (key metadata, certificate chains, bundle hashes); expose audit APIs.
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| - **Phase 4 – Observability & resilience**  
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|   Complete telemetry, throttling dashboards, audit trails, fallback key rotation, and offline kit packaging.
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| 
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| ## Work breakdown
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| - **Authentication & entitlement**
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|   - Enforce Authority-issued DPoP/mTLS tokens with `signer.sign` scope and tenant checks.
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|   - Integrate PoE introspection (cloud licensing) and plan quotas.
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|   - Validate scanner release signature via OCI referrers before signing reports/SBOMs.
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| - **Signing pipeline**
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|   - Implement DSSE canonicalisation, keyless (Fulcio) and keyful (KMS/HSM/FIDO2) signing.
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|   - Support multi-signature output, certificate chain embedding, and deterministic bundle hashing.
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|   - Provide policy metadata (policy digest, view set) for report predicates.
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| - **Integrations**
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|   - Coordinate with Attestor on bundle schema, signer identity payload, and error codes.
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|   - Expose Export Center-ready signing API (`/sign/export`) that returns manifest + signature tuple.
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|   - Surface CLI flows (`stella sign sbom/report`, offline verification helpers).
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| - **Security & key management**
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|   - Key rotation and revocation runbooks; separation of signing keys per tenancy/plan.
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|   - Hardware-backed key support (HSM/FIDO2) with audit logging and attested builds.
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| - **Observability**
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|   - Metrics: signing latency, PoE failures, quota hits, key usage distribution.
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|   - Structured logs with trace/context IDs, subject digests, issuer mode, decision outcome.
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|   - Alerts for PoE outages, key exhaustion, quota breach, signing failure spikes.
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| - **Documentation & runbooks**
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|   - Update README/architecture/implementation plan, operator runbooks, offline verification guidance, and CLI reference.
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| 
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| ## Acceptance criteria
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| - Signer only signs requests that satisfy OpTok, PoE, quota, and scanner provenance checks.
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| - DSSE outputs (keyless + keyful) verify with standard cosign tooling; Attestor logs them without additional transformation.
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| - Export Center receives signed bundles, provenance manifests, and signature metadata to package exports deterministically.
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| - Audit logs capture every signing request with tenant, issuer, subject digest, PoE state, and key source.
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| - Observability dashboards/alerts reflect latency, failure rate, PoE status, and quota usage.
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| - CLI/Offline workflows verify signatures using Offline Kit trust roots.
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| 
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| ## Risks & mitigations
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| - **PoE/entitlement outages:** cache last-known entitlement within TTL, provide emergency bypass toggles with audit trail.
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| - **Key compromise:** enforce hardware-backed keys, rotation cadence, immediate revocation workflow, incident runbook.
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| - **Release verification failures:** maintain allowlist for trusted scanner digests, fallback to manual approval with audit.
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| - **Determinism drift:** canonicalise JSON, lock timestamp sources, regression tests for DSSE hashing.
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| 
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| ## Test strategy
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| - **Unit:** OpTok/PoE validation, quota enforcement, scanner signature verification, DSSE canonicalisation, multi-sig bundling.
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| - **Integration:** end-to-end signing for SBOM, report, export artifacts; Attestor ingestion; Export Center bundle signing.
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| - **Security:** fuzz signing inputs, simulate PoE tampering, ensure unauthorized actors are rejected.
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| - **Performance:** signing throughput benchmarks (keyless vs keyful), quota pressure, concurrency checks.
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| - **Offline:** verify signatures using Offline Kit trust roots and cosign CLI without network access.
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| 
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| ## Definition of done
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| - Signing pipeline deployed with observability and incident runbooks.
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| - Export Center + Attestor dependencies validated; CLI parity confirmed.
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| - Documentation updated (README, architecture, runbooks, CLI guides) with imposed rule compliance.
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| - ./TASKS.md and ../../TASKS.md reflect the latest status transitions.
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