18d87c64c5
- Implemented PolicyPackSelectorComponent for selecting policy packs. - Added unit tests for component behavior, including API success and error handling. - Introduced monaco-workers type declarations for editor workers. - Created acceptance tests for guardrails with stubs for AT1–AT10. - Established SCA Failure Catalogue Fixtures for regression testing. - Developed plugin determinism harness with stubs for PL1–PL10. - Added scripts for evidence upload and verification processes.
33 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
33 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# Aggregation-Only Contract (AOC) Invariants
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Last updated: 2025-11-25 (DOCS-ATTEST-75-002)
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## Core invariants (all components)
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- **Tenant isolation**: Every API call requires `X-Stella-Tenant`; storage and caches are keyed by tenant.
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- **Append-only inputs**: Evidence, advisories, and attestations are stored immutably; no in-place edits.
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- **Determinism**: Sorting and pagination are stable; timestamps are UTC ISO-8601; hashes are lowercase hex.
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- **No consensus**: Components enforce validation/verification only; no severity or policy decisions inside AOC services.
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- **Offline-first**: All external data (feeds, keys, checkpoints) must be supplied via bundled inputs; no live fetches when sealed.
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## Attestor-specific invariants
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- **Trust roots**: Verification keys are loaded exclusively from the bundled trust store; network key discovery is disabled in sealed mode.
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- **DSSE only**: Inputs must be DSSE envelopes; detached signatures are rejected with a deterministic error code.
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- **Transparency optional, explicit**: If a mirrored checkpoint is provided, inclusion proof is validated; otherwise results record `transparency=skipped` without failing the request.
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- **Rationale trail**: Each verification emits a rationale list (e.g., `key.match`, `transparency.included`, `transparency.skipped`) so results are replayable.
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- **Immutability**: Verified statements and rationale are recorded append-only in the delivery/verification ledger; retries must not overwrite prior entries.
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## Guardrails for implementers
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- Never permit unsigned or partially signed payloads to proceed past parsing.
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## Pending Update
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- Add risk scoring provenance guarantees (DOCS-RISK-68-002) once Export/Risk inputs land; due 2025-12-11 per sprint action tracker. Include deterministic hash list for any new examples or schemas.
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- Reject any outbound HTTP/S fetch during verification when `Attestor__Offline__Enabled=true`.
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- Keep secret material out of logs; log statement digests and key ids only.
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- Round numeric scores/weights only at the presentation boundary; internal math stays high-precision.
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## Audit checklist
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- [ ] Tenant header enforced on every endpoint.
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- [ ] Trust bundle hash matches the signed manifest on disk.
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- [ ] Transparency verification results are captured per request.
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- [ ] Ledger entries are append-only and carry rationale + trace ids.
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