Add SBOM, symbols, traces, and VEX files for CVE-2022-21661 SQLi case
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- Created CycloneDX and SPDX SBOM files for both reachable and unreachable images.
- Added symbols.json detailing function entry and sink points in the WordPress code.
- Included runtime traces for function calls in both reachable and unreachable scenarios.
- Developed OpenVEX files indicating vulnerability status and justification for both cases.
- Updated README for evaluator harness to guide integration with scanner output.
This commit is contained in:
master
2025-11-08 20:53:45 +02:00
parent 515975edc5
commit 536f6249a6
837 changed files with 37279 additions and 14675 deletions

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@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ on:
- 'docs/**'
- 'scripts/**'
- '.gitea/workflows/**'
schedule:
- cron: '0 5 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
force_deploy:
@@ -28,6 +30,11 @@ on:
required: false
default: 'false'
type: boolean
excititor_batch:
description: 'Run Excititor batch-ingest validation suite'
required: false
default: 'false'
type: boolean
env:
DOTNET_VERSION: '10.0.100-rc.1.25451.107'
@@ -48,6 +55,18 @@ jobs:
tar -xzf /tmp/helm.tgz -C /tmp
sudo install -m 0755 /tmp/linux-amd64/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
- name: Validate Helm chart rendering
run: |
set -euo pipefail
CHART_PATH="deploy/helm/stellaops"
helm lint "$CHART_PATH"
for values in values.yaml values-dev.yaml values-stage.yaml values-prod.yaml values-airgap.yaml values-mirror.yaml; do
release="stellaops-${values%.*}"
echo "::group::Helm template ${release} (${values})"
helm template "$release" "$CHART_PATH" -f "$CHART_PATH/$values" >/dev/null
echo "::endgroup::"
done
- name: Validate deployment profiles
run: ./deploy/tools/validate-profiles.sh
@@ -442,6 +461,15 @@ PY
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 7
- name: Run console endpoint tests
run: |
mkdir -p "$TEST_RESULTS_DIR"
dotnet test src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Tests/StellaOps.Authority.Tests.csproj \
--configuration $BUILD_CONFIGURATION \
--logger "trx;LogFileName=console-endpoints.trx" \
--results-directory "$TEST_RESULTS_DIR" \
--filter ConsoleEndpointsTests
- name: Upload test results
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
@@ -451,6 +479,44 @@ PY
if-no-files-found: ignore
retention-days: 7
sealed-mode-ci:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
needs: build-test
permissions:
contents: read
packages: read
env:
COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME: sealedmode
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Login to registry
if: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME != '' && secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD != '' }}
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: registry.stella-ops.org
username: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
- name: Run sealed-mode CI harness
working-directory: ops/devops/sealed-mode-ci
env:
COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME: sealedmode
run: |
set -euo pipefail
./run-sealed-ci.sh
- name: Upload sealed-mode CI artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: sealed-mode-ci
path: ops/devops/sealed-mode-ci/artifacts/sealed-mode-ci
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 14
authority-container:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
needs: build-test
@@ -464,6 +530,41 @@ PY
- name: Build Authority container image
run: docker build -f ops/authority/Dockerfile -t stellaops-authority:ci .
excititor-batch-validation:
needs: build-test
if: github.event_name == 'schedule' || (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && github.event.inputs.excititor_batch == 'true')
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
env:
BATCH_RESULTS_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/artifacts/test-results/excititor-batch
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v4
with:
dotnet-version: ${{ env.DOTNET_VERSION }}
include-prerelease: true
- name: Run Excititor batch ingest validation suite
env:
DOTNET_SKIP_FIRST_TIME_EXPERIENCE: 1
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p "$BATCH_RESULTS_DIR"
dotnet test src/Excititor/__Tests/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService.Tests/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService.Tests.csproj \
--configuration $BUILD_CONFIGURATION \
--filter "Category=BatchIngestValidation" \
--logger "trx;LogFileName=excititor-batch.trx" \
--results-directory "$BATCH_RESULTS_DIR"
- name: Upload Excititor batch ingest results
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: excititor-batch-ingest-results
path: ${{ env.BATCH_RESULTS_DIR }}
docs:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
env:

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@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
{{- $root := . -}}
{{- range $name, $svc := .Values.services }}
{{- $root := . -}}
{{- $configMaps := default (dict) .Values.configMaps -}}
{{- $hasPolicyActivationConfig := hasKey $configMaps "policy-engine-activation" -}}
{{- $policyActivationConfigName := "" -}}
{{- if $hasPolicyActivationConfig -}}
{{- $policyActivationConfigName = include "stellaops.fullname" (dict "root" $root "name" "policy-engine-activation") -}}
{{- end -}}
{{- $policyActivationTargets := dict "policy-engine" true "policy-gateway" true -}}
{{- range $name, $svc := .Values.services }}
{{- $configMounts := (default (list) $svc.configMounts) }}
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
@@ -36,18 +43,31 @@ spec:
- {{ $arg | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if $svc.env }}
env:
{{- range $envName, $envValue := $svc.env }}
- name: {{ $envName }}
value: {{ $envValue | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if $svc.envFrom }}
envFrom:
{{ toYaml $svc.envFrom | nindent 12 }}
{{- end }}
{{- if $svc.ports }}
{{- if $svc.env }}
env:
{{- range $envName, $envValue := $svc.env }}
- name: {{ $envName }}
value: {{ $envValue | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- $needsPolicyActivation := and $hasPolicyActivationConfig (hasKey $policyActivationTargets $name) }}
{{- $envFrom := default (list) $svc.envFrom }}
{{- if and $needsPolicyActivation (ne $policyActivationConfigName "") }}
{{- $hasActivationReference := false }}
{{- range $envFromEntry := $envFrom }}
{{- if and (hasKey $envFromEntry "configMapRef") (eq (index (index $envFromEntry "configMapRef") "name") $policyActivationConfigName) }}
{{- $hasActivationReference = true }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if not $hasActivationReference }}
{{- $envFrom = append $envFrom (dict "configMapRef" (dict "name" $policyActivationConfigName)) }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if $envFrom }}
envFrom:
{{ toYaml $envFrom | nindent 12 }}
{{- end }}
{{- if $svc.ports }}
ports:
{{- range $port := $svc.ports }}
- name: {{ default (printf "%s-%v" $name $port.containerPort) $port.name | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}

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@@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ configMaps:
telemetry:
enableRequestLogging: true
minimumLogLevel: Warning
policy-engine-activation:
data:
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__FORCETWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__DEFAULTREQUIRESTWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__EMITAUDITLOGS: "true"
services:
authority:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/authority@sha256:5551a3269b7008cd5aceecf45df018c67459ed519557ccbe48b093b926a39bcc

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@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ configMaps:
telemetry:
enableRequestLogging: true
minimumLogLevel: Debug
policy-engine-activation:
data:
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__FORCETWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "false"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__DEFAULTREQUIRESTWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "false"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__EMITAUDITLOGS: "true"
services:
authority:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/authority@sha256:a8e8faec44a579aa5714e58be835f25575710430b1ad2ccd1282a018cd9ffcdd

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@@ -106,11 +106,18 @@ configMaps:
proxy_cache off;
}
location / {
return 404;
}
services:
location / {
return 404;
}
policy-engine-activation:
data:
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__FORCETWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__DEFAULTREQUIRESTWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__EMITAUDITLOGS: "true"
services:
concelier:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/concelier@sha256:dafef3954eb4b837e2c424dd2d23e1e4d60fa83794840fac9cd3dea1d43bd085
service:

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@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ configMaps:
telemetry:
enableRequestLogging: true
minimumLogLevel: Information
policy-engine-activation:
data:
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__FORCETWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__DEFAULTREQUIRESTWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__EMITAUDITLOGS: "true"
services:
authority:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/authority@sha256:b0348bad1d0b401cc3c71cb40ba034c8043b6c8874546f90d4783c9dbfcc0bf5

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@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ configMaps:
telemetry:
enableRequestLogging: true
minimumLogLevel: Information
policy-engine-activation:
data:
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__FORCETWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__DEFAULTREQUIRESTWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "true"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__EMITAUDITLOGS: "true"
services:
authority:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/authority@sha256:b0348bad1d0b401cc3c71cb40ba034c8043b6c8874546f90d4783c9dbfcc0bf5

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@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ configMaps:
issuerTrustCollection: issuer_trust_overrides
auditCollection: issuer_audit
policy-engine-activation:
data:
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__FORCETWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "false"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__DEFAULTREQUIRESTWOPERSONAPPROVAL: "false"
STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__EMITAUDITLOGS: "true"
services:
issuer-directory:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/issuer-directory-web:2025.10.0-edge

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@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ These registrations are provided as examples in `etc/authority.yaml.sample`. Clo
- **Interactive only.** `policy:publish` and `policy:promote` are restricted to password/device-code flows (Console, CLI) and are rejected when requested via client credentials or app secrets. Tokens inherit the 5-minute fresh-auth window; resource servers reject stale tokens and emit `authority.policy_attestation_validated=false`.
- **Mandatory parameters.** Requests must include:
- `policy_reason` (≤512 chars) — human-readable justification (e.g., “Promote tenant A baseline to production”).
- Authority enforces mTLS bindings on /token, /fresh-auth, and /introspect by comparing the presented TLS client certificate thumbprint against the stored claim. Requests missing a certificate or presenting a different certificate are rejected with , and the counter is incremented for operational alerts.
- `policy_ticket` (≤128 chars) — change request / CAB identifier (e.g., `CR-2025-1102`).
- `policy_digest` — lowercase hex digest (32128 characters) of the policy bundle being published/promoted.
- **Audit surfaces.** On success, the metadata is copied into the access token (`stellaops:policy_reason`, `stellaops:policy_ticket`, `stellaops:policy_digest`, `stellaops:policy_operation`) and recorded in [`authority.password.grant`] audit events as `policy.*` properties.
@@ -142,6 +142,14 @@ These registrations are provided as examples in `etc/authority.yaml.sample`. Clo
Graph Explorer introduces dedicated scopes: `graph:write` for Cartographer build jobs, `graph:read` for query/read operations, `graph:export` for long-running export downloads, and `graph:simulate` for what-if overlays. Assign only the scopes a client actually needs to preserve least privilege—UI-facing clients should typically request read/export access, while background services (Cartographer, Scheduler) require write privileges.
### Policy activation dual-control
- **Config knobs.** `PolicyEngine.activation.forceTwoPersonApproval` forces every activation to collect two distinct `policy:activate` approvals (first response = `202 pending_second_approval`). `PolicyEngine.activation.defaultRequiresTwoPersonApproval` sets the default when callers omit the flag.
- **Operator choice.** When force is disabled, Console/CLI can opt any revision into dual-control by setting `requiresTwoPersonApproval: true`; the service persists the requirement alongside the revision metadata.
- **Audit coverage.** With `PolicyEngine.activation.emitAuditLogs` (default `true`), every activation emits structured `policy.activation.*` logger scopes (pack id, revision, actor(s), tenant, approval count, comment) so SOC pipelines can diff the two-person trail.
- **Status codes.** First approval on a dual-control revision returns `202 pending_second_approval`; duplicates produce `400 duplicate_approval`; the second distinct actor returns the usual `200 activated`.
#### Least-privilege guidance for graph clients
- **Service identities** The Cartographer worker should request `graph:write` and `graph:read` only; grant `graph:simulate` exclusively to pipeline automation that invokes Policy Engine overlays on demand. Keep `graph:export` scoped to API gateway components responsible for streaming GraphML/JSONL artifacts. Authority enforces this by rejecting `graph:write` tokens that lack `properties.serviceIdentity: cartographer`.
@@ -356,6 +364,7 @@ exceptions:
| Bootstrap | `bootstrap.apiKey` | Shared secret required for `/internal/*`. | Only required when `bootstrap.enabled` is true. |
### 7.1 Sender-constrained clients (DPoP & mTLS)
> Rollout tracker: see [`docs/security/dpop-mtls-rollout.md`](security/dpop-mtls-rollout.md) for phase gates tied to `AUTH-DPOP-11-001` and `AUTH-MTLS-11-002`.
Authority now understands two flavours of sender-constrained OAuth clients:
@@ -386,6 +395,7 @@ Authority now understands two flavours of sender-constrained OAuth clients:
- Declare client `audiences` in bootstrap manifests or plug-in provisioning metadata; Authority now defaults the token `aud` claim and `resource` indicator from this list, which is also used to trigger nonce enforcement for audiences such as `signer` and `attestor`.
- **Mutual TLS clients** client registrations may declare an mTLS binding (`senderConstraint: mtls`). When enabled via `security.senderConstraints.mtls`, Authority validates the presented client certificate against stored bindings (`certificateBindings[]`), optional chain verification, and timing windows. Successful requests embed `cnf.x5t#S256` into the access token (and introspection output) so resource servers can enforce the certificate thumbprint.
- `security.senderConstraints.mtls.enforceForAudiences` forces mTLS whenever the requested `aud`/`resource` (or the client's configured audiences) intersect the configured allow-list (default includes `signer`). Clients configured for different sender constraints are rejected early so operator policy remains consistent.
- Authority enforces mTLS bindings on `/token`, `/fresh-auth`, and `/introspect` by comparing the presented TLS client certificate thumbprint against the stored `authority_sender_certificate_hex` claim. Requests missing a certificate or presenting a different certificate are rejected with `invalid_token`, and the `authority_mtls_mismatch_total{reason=...}` counter is incremented for visibility.
- Certificate bindings now act as an allow-list: Authority verifies thumbprint, subject, issuer, serial number, and any declared SAN values against the presented certificate, with rotation grace windows applied to `notBefore/notAfter`. Operators can enforce subject regexes, SAN type allow-lists (`dns`, `uri`, `ip`), trusted certificate authorities, and rotation grace via `security.senderConstraints.mtls.*`.
Both modes persist additional metadata in `authority_tokens`: `senderConstraint` records the enforced policy, while `senderKeyThumbprint` stores the DPoP JWK thumbprint or mTLS certificate hash captured at issuance. Downstream services can rely on these fields (and the corresponding `cnf` claim) when auditing offline copies of the token store.

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@@ -57,7 +57,62 @@ The script spins up MongoDB/Redis via Testcontainers and requires:
* Docker25
* Node20 (for Jest/Playwright)
---
#### Mongo2Go / OpenSSL shim
Multiple suites (Concelier connectors, Excititor worker/WebService, Scheduler)
fall back to [Mongo2Go](https://github.com/Mongo2Go/Mongo2Go) when a developer
does not have a local `mongod` listening on `127.0.0.1:27017`. Modern distros
ship OpenSSL3 by default, so you **must** expose the legacy OpenSSL1.1
libraries that the embedded `mongod` requires:
1. From the repo root, export the provided binaries before running any tests:
```bash
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$(pwd)/tests/native/openssl-1.1/linux-x64:${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:-}"
```
2. (Optional) If you only need the shim for a single command, prefix it:
```bash
LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$(pwd)/tests/native/openssl-1.1/linux-x64" \
dotnet test src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.sln --nologo
```
3. CI runners or dev containers should either copy
`tests/native/openssl-1.1/linux-x64/libcrypto.so.1.1` and `libssl.so.1.1`
into a directory that is already on the default library path, or export the
`LD_LIBRARY_PATH` value shown above before invoking `dotnet test`.
The shim lives under `tests/native/openssl-1.1/README.md` with upstream source
and licensing details. When the system already has OpenSSL1.1 installed you
can skip this step.
#### Local Mongo helper
Some suites (Concelier WebService/Core, Exporter JSON) need a full
`mongod` instance when you want to debug outside of Mongo2Go (for example to
inspect data with `mongosh` or pin a specific server version). A thin wrapper
is available under `tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh`:
```bash
# download (cached under .cache/mongodb-local) and start a local replica set
tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh start
# reuse an existing data set
tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh restart
# stop / clean
tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh stop
tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh clean
```
By default the script downloads MongoDB 6.0.16 for Ubuntu 22.04, binds to
`127.0.0.1:27017`, and initialises a single-node replica set called `rs0`. The
current URI is printed on start, e.g.
`mongodb://127.0.0.1:27017/?replicaSet=rs0`, and you can export it before
running `dotnet test` if a suite supports overriding its connection string.
---
### Concelier OSV↔GHSA parity fixtures
@@ -106,4 +161,3 @@ flowchart LR
---
*Last updated {{ "now" | date: "%Y%m%d" }}*

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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
| DOCS-REPLAY-185-004 | TODO | Docs Guild, Platform Guild | REPLAY-CORE-185-001 | Expand `docs/replay/DEVS_GUIDE_REPLAY.md` with integration checklist and cross-links to sections 3 & 11 of `docs/replay/DETERMINISTIC_REPLAY.md`. | Guide updated with checklist; references validated; lint passes. |
| DOCS-REPLAY-186-004 | TODO | Docs Guild, Scanner Guild | SCAN-REPLAY-186-001 | Publish `docs/replay/TEST_STRATEGY.md` detailing golden replay, feed drift, and tool upgrade verification steps; link from scanner architecture doc. | New doc merged; links verified; CI scenario notes documented. |
| RUNBOOK-REPLAY-187-004 | TODO | Docs Guild, Ops Guild | EVID-REPLAY-187-001, CLI-REPLAY-187-002 | Create `/docs/runbooks/replay_ops.md` covering retention enforcement, RootPack rotation, offline kit workflows, and verification drills referencing `docs/replay/DETERMINISTIC_REPLAY.md`. | Runbook merged; rehearsal notes captured; cross-links added. |
| DOCS-REACH-201-006 | TODO | Docs Guild | ZASTAVA-REACH-201-001, SCAN-REACH-201-002, SIGNALS-REACH-201-003 | Author reachability doc suite (`docs/signals/reachability.md`, `docs/signals/callgraph-formats.md`, `docs/signals/runtime-facts.md`, CLI/UI appendices) plus embed replay evidence guidance. | Docs merged with imposed rule text; cross-links to Scanner/Zastava/Replay guides validated. |
| DOCS-OBS-50-002 | TODO | Docs Guild, Security Guild | TELEMETRY-OBS-50-002 | Author `/docs/observability/telemetry-standards.md` detailing common fields, scrubbing policy, sampling defaults, and redaction override procedure. | Doc merged; imposed rule banner present; examples validated with telemetry fixtures; security review sign-off captured. |
| DOCS-OBS-50-003 | TODO | Docs Guild, Observability Guild | TELEMETRY-OBS-50-001 | Create `/docs/observability/logging.md` covering structured log schema, dos/don'ts, tenant isolation, and copyable examples. | Doc merged with banner; sample logs redacted; lint passes; linked from coding standards. |
| DOCS-OBS-50-004 | TODO | Docs Guild, Observability Guild | TELEMETRY-OBS-50-002 | Draft `/docs/observability/tracing.md` explaining context propagation, async linking, CLI header usage, and sampling strategies. | Doc merged; imposed rule banner included; diagrams updated; references to CLI/Console features added. |
@@ -304,7 +305,8 @@
> 2025-11-03: DOCS-AIAI-31-002 completed architecture deep dive documents pipeline, deterministic tooling, caching, profiles, and deployment guidance.
| DOCS-AIAI-31-003 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild | AIAI-31-006 | Write `/docs/advisory-ai/api.md` describing endpoints, schemas, errors, rate limits. | API doc aligned with OpenAPI; examples validated; checklist appended. |
> 2025-11-03: DOCS-AIAI-31-003 completed `docs/advisory-ai/api.md` covers scopes, request/response schema, rate limits, error codes, observability, offline notes.
| DOCS-AIAI-31-004 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Docs Guild, Console Guild | CONSOLE-VULN-29-001, CONSOLE-VEX-30-001, EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001 | Create `/docs/advisory-ai/console.md` with screenshots, a11y notes, copy-as-ticket instructions. | Doc merged; images stored; checklist appended. |
| DOCS-AIAI-31-004 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Docs Guild, Console Guild | CONSOLE-VULN-29-001, CONSOLE-VEX-30-001, EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001 | Create `/docs/advisory-ai/console.md` with screenshots, a11y notes, copy-as-ticket instructions. | Doc merged; images stored; checklist appended. |
> 2025-11-07: Draft outline committed; waiting on final console endpoints for screenshots + API captures.
> 2025-11-03: BLOCKED waiting for Console endpoints/widgets (CONSOLE-VULN-29-001, CONSOLE-VEX-30-001, EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001) to land before documenting UI flows.
| DOCS-AIAI-31-005 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Docs Guild, DevEx/CLI Guild | CLI-VULN-29-001, CLI-VEX-30-001, AIAI-31-004C | Publish `/docs/advisory-ai/cli.md` covering commands, exit codes, scripting patterns. | Doc merged; examples tested; checklist appended. |
> 2025-11-03: BLOCKED awaiting CLI implementation (`stella advise run`) and golden outputs (CLI-VULN-29-001, CLI-VEX-30-001, AIAI-31-004C).

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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# Advisory AI Console Workflows
_Last updated: 2025-11-07_
This guide documents the forthcoming Advisory AI console experience so that console, docs, and QA guilds share a single reference while the new endpoints finish landing.
## 1. Entry points & navigation
- **Dashboard tile**: `Advisory AI` card on the console overview routes to `/console/vuln/advisory-ai` once CONSOLE-VULN-29-001 ships. The tile must include the current model build stamp and data freshness time.
- **Deep links**: Copy-as-ticket payloads link back into the console using `/console/vex/{statementId}` (CONSOLE-VEX-30-001). Provide fallbacks that open the Evidence modal with a toast if the workspace is still loading.
## 2. Evidence surfacing
| Workflow | Required API | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Findings overview | `GET /console/vuln/findings` | Must include policy verdict badge, VEX justification summary, and last-seen timestamps. |
| Evidence drawer | `GET /console/vex/statements/{id}` | Stream SSE chunk descriptions so long-form provenance renders progressively. |
| Copy as ticket | `POST /console/vuln/tickets` | Returns signed payload + attachment list for JIRA/ServiceNow templates. |
## 3. Accessibility & offline requirements
- Console screens must pass WCAG 2.2 AA contrast and provide focus order that matches the keyboard shortcuts planned for Advisory AI (see `docs/advisory-ai/overview.md`).
- All screenshots captured for this doc must come from sealed-mode bundles (no external fonts/CDNs). Store them under `docs/assets/advisory-ai/console/` with hashed filenames.
- Modal dialogs need `aria-describedby` attributes referencing the explanation text returned by the API; translation strings must live with existing locale packs.
## 4. Copy-as-ticket guidance
1. Operators select one or more VEX-backed findings.
2. Console renders the sanitized payload (JSON) plus context summary for the receiving system.
3. Users can download the payload or send it via webhook; both flows must log `console.ticket.export` events for audit.
## 5. Open items before publication
- [ ] Replace placeholder API responses with captures from the first merged build of CONSOLE-VULN-29-001 / CONSOLE-VEX-30-001.
- [ ] Capture at least two screenshots (list view + evidence drawer) once UI polish is complete.
- [ ] Verify copy-as-ticket instructions with Support to ensure the payload fields align with existing SOC runbooks.
> Tracking: DOCS-AIAI-31-004 (Docs Guild, Console Guild)
**Reference**: API contracts and sample payloads live in `docs/api/console/workspaces.md` (see `/console/vuln/*` and `/console/vex/*` sections) plus the JSON fixtures under `docs/api/console/samples/`.

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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
{"event":"statement.created","data":{"statementId":"vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a","advisoryId":"CVE-2024-12345","product":"registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0","state":"under_investigation","justification":"exploit_observed","sequence":4178,"updatedAt":"2025-11-07T23:10:09Z"}}
{"event":"statement.updated","data":{"statementId":"vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a","advisoryId":"CVE-2024-12345","product":"registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0","state":"fixed","justification":"solution_available","sequence":4182,"updatedAt":"2025-11-08T11:44:32Z"}}
{"event":"statement.conflict","data":{"statementId":"vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a","advisoryId":"CVE-2024-12345","product":"registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0","conflictSummary":"Excititor statement GHSA-1111 differs on status","sequence":4183,"updatedAt":"2025-11-08T11:44:59Z"}}
{"event":"statement.updated","data":{"statementId":"vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a","advisoryId":"CVE-2024-12345","product":"registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0","state":"fixed","justification":"solution_available","sequence":4184,"updatedAt":"2025-11-08T11:45:04Z"}}
{"event":"statement.deleted","data":{"statementId":"vex:tenant-default:legacy:1a2b","advisoryId":"CVE-2023-9999","product":"registry.local/ops/legacy:2024.01.0","sequence":4185,"updatedAt":"2025-11-08T12:01:01Z"}}

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{
"items": [
{
"findingId": "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a",
"coordinates": {
"advisoryId": "CVE-2024-12345",
"package": "pkg:npm/jsonwebtoken@9.0.2",
"component": "jwt-auth-service",
"image": "registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0"
},
"summary": "jsonwebtoken <10.0.0 allows algorithm downgrade.",
"severity": "high",
"cvss": 8.1,
"kev": true,
"policyBadge": "fail",
"vex": {
"statementId": "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
"state": "under_investigation",
"justification": "Advisory AI flagged reachable path via Scheduler run 42."
},
"reachability": {
"status": "reachable",
"lastObserved": "2025-11-07T23:11:04Z",
"signalsVersion": "signals-2025.310.1"
},
"evidence": {
"sbomDigest": "sha256:6c81f2bbd8bd7336f197f3f68fba2f76d7287dd1a5e2a0f0e9f14f23f3c2f917",
"policyRunId": "policy-run::2025-11-07::ca9f",
"attestationId": "dsse://authority/attest/84a2"
},
"timestamps": {
"firstSeen": "2025-10-31T04:22:18Z",
"lastSeen": "2025-11-07T23:16:51Z"
}
},
{
"findingId": "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:9bf4",
"coordinates": {
"advisoryId": "GHSA-xxxx-yyyy-zzzz",
"package": "pkg:docker/library/nginx@1.25.2",
"component": "ingress-gateway",
"image": "registry.local/ops/ingress:2025.09.1"
},
"summary": "Heap overflow in nginx HTTP/3 parsing.",
"severity": "critical",
"cvss": 9.8,
"kev": false,
"policyBadge": "warn",
"vex": {
"statementId": "vex:tenant-default:ingress:9bf4",
"state": "not_affected",
"justification": "component_not_present"
},
"reachability": {
"status": "unknown",
"signalsVersion": "signals-2025.309.0"
},
"evidence": {
"sbomDigest": "sha256:99f1e2a7aa0f7c970dcb6674244f0bfb5f37148e3ee09fd4f925d3358dea2239",
"policyRunId": "policy-run::2025-11-06::b210",
"attestationId": "dsse://authority/attest/1d34"
},
"timestamps": {
"firstSeen": "2025-10-29T18:03:11Z",
"lastSeen": "2025-11-07T10:45:03Z"
}
}
],
"facets": {
"severity": [
{ "value": "critical", "count": 1 },
{ "value": "high", "count": 1 }
],
"policyBadge": [
{ "value": "fail", "count": 1 },
{ "value": "warn", "count": 1 }
],
"reachability": [
{ "value": "reachable", "count": 1 },
{ "value": "unknown", "count": 1 }
]
},
"nextPageToken": "eyJjdXJzb3IiOiJmZjg0NiJ9"
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
# Console Workspaces API
_Tracking: CONSOLE-VULN-29-001, CONSOLE-VEX-30-001, DOCS-AIAI-31-004_
## 1. Goals & Scope
The console workspaces provide read-only aggregates for Advisory AI operators:
- `/console/vuln/*` surfaces tenant-scoped findings annotated with policy verdicts, VEX justifications, Scheduler reachability signals, and Advisory AI rationale.
- `/console/vex/*` streams the underlying VEX statements, conflicts, and justification summaries (with SSE support for live updates).
All endpoints MUST:
1. Remain deterministic offline (stable sort keys, ISO-8601 UTC timestamps, hashed assets).
2. Operate with Authority-issued DPoP or mTLS client credentials that include `console:read` and either `vuln:read` or `vex:read`.
3. Respect tenant isolation every request carries `X-StellaOps-Tenant`.
## 2. Shared Request/Response Conventions
| Requirement | Description |
| --- | --- |
| Headers | `Authorization: DPoP <token>`, `DPoP: <proof>`, `X-StellaOps-Tenant: <tenantId>`, `Accept: application/json` (or `text/event-stream` for SSE). |
| Pagination | Cursor-based via `pageToken`; defaults to 50 items, max 200. Cursors are opaque, base64url, signed. |
| Sorting | Findings sorted by `(severity desc, exploitScore desc, findingId asc)`. Statements sorted by `(lastUpdated desc, statementId asc)`. |
| Dates | RFC 3339 / ISO-8601 UTC (e.g., `2025-11-08T12:02:11Z`). |
| Determinism | All arrays must be pre-sorted; no server-generated uuids in responses. |
## 3. Vulnerability Workspace (`/console/vuln/*`)
### 3.1 `GET /console/vuln/findings`
Query parameters:
| Parameter | Type | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `pageToken` | string | Optional cursor from previous response. |
| `pageSize` | int | 1-200, default 50. |
| `severity` | string[] | Accepts `critical`, `high`, `medium`, `low`, `info`. |
| `product` | string[] | SBOM `purl` or image digest anchors. |
| `policyBadge` | string[] | `pass`, `warn`, `fail`, `waived`. |
| `vexState` | string[] | `not_affected`, `fixed`, `under_investigation`, etc. |
| `reachability` | string[] | `reachable`, `unreachable`, `unknown`. |
| `search` | string | Substring match on CVE/GHSA/KEV ID (case-insensitive). |
Response body:
```jsonc
{
"items": [
{
"findingId": "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a",
"coordinates": {
"advisoryId": "CVE-2024-12345",
"package": "pkg:npm/jsonwebtoken@9.0.2",
"component": "jwt-auth-service",
"image": "registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0"
},
"summary": "jsonwebtoken <10.0.0 allows algorithm downgrade.",
"severity": "high",
"cvss": 8.1,
"kev": true,
"policyBadge": "fail",
"vex": {
"statementId": "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
"state": "under_investigation",
"justification": "Advisory AI flagged reachable path via Scheduler run 42."
},
"reachability": {
"status": "reachable",
"lastObserved": "2025-11-07T23:11:04Z",
"signalsVersion": "signals-2025.310.1"
},
"evidence": {
"sbomDigest": "sha256:6c81…",
"policyRunId": "policy-run::2025-11-07::ca9f",
"attestationId": "dsse://authority/attest/84a2"
},
"timestamps": {
"firstSeen": "2025-10-31T04:22:18Z",
"lastSeen": "2025-11-07T23:16:51Z"
}
}
],
"facets": {
"severity": [
{ "value": "critical", "count": 2 },
{ "value": "high", "count": 7 }
],
"policyBadge": [
{ "value": "fail", "count": 6 },
{ "value": "warn", "count": 3 },
{ "value": "waived", "count": 1 }
],
"reachability": [
{ "value": "reachable", "count": 5 },
{ "value": "unreachable", "count": 2 },
{ "value": "unknown", "count": 1 }
]
},
"nextPageToken": "eyJjdXJzb3IiOiJmZjg0NiJ9"
}
```
### 3.2 `GET /console/vuln/facets`
Returns the full facet catalog (counts by severity, product, policy badge, VEX state, reachability, KEV flag). Designed for sidebar filters without paging; identical parameter surface as `/findings`.
### 3.3 `GET /console/vuln/{findingId}`
Returns the full finding document, including evidence timeline, policy overlays, and export-ready metadata:
```jsonc
{
"findingId": "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a",
"details": {
"description": "jsonwebtoken <10.0.0 allows algorithm downgrade.",
"references": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12345",
"https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/security/advisories/GHSA-45mw-4jw3-g2wg"
],
"exploitAvailability": "known_exploit"
},
"policyBadges": [
{
"policyId": "policy://tenant-default/runtime-hardening",
"verdict": "fail",
"explainUrl": "https://console.local/policy/runs/policy-run::2025-11-07::ca9f"
}
],
"vex": {
"statementId": "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
"state": "under_investigation",
"justification": "Runtime telemetry confirmed exploitation path.",
"impactStatement": "Token exchange service remains exposed until patch 2025.11.2.",
"remediations": [
{
"type": "patch",
"description": "Upgrade jwt-auth-service to 2025.11.2.",
"deadline": "2025-11-12T00:00:00Z"
}
]
},
"reachability": {
"status": "reachable",
"callPathSamples": [
"api-gateway -> jwt-auth-service -> jsonwebtoken.verify"
],
"lastUpdated": "2025-11-07T23:11:04Z"
},
"evidence": {
"sbom": {
"digest": "sha256:6c81…",
"componentPath": [
"/src/jwt-auth/package.json",
"/src/jwt-auth/node_modules/jsonwebtoken"
]
},
"attestations": [
{
"type": "scan-report",
"attestationId": "dsse://authority/attest/84a2",
"signer": "attestor@stella-ops.org",
"bundleDigest": "sha256:e2bb…"
}
]
},
"timestamps": {
"firstSeen": "2025-10-31T04:22:18Z",
"lastSeen": "2025-11-07T23:16:51Z",
"vexLastUpdated": "2025-11-07T23:10:09Z"
}
}
```
### 3.4 `POST /console/vuln/tickets`
```jsonc
POST /console/vuln/tickets
{
"tenant": "tenant-default",
"selection": [
"tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a",
"tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:9bf4"
],
"targetSystem": "servicenow",
"metadata": {
"assignmentGroup": "runtime-security",
"priority": "P1"
}
}
```
Response:
```jsonc
{
"ticketId": "console-ticket::tenant-default::2025-11-08::00018",
"payload": {
"version": "2025-11-01",
"tenant": "tenant-default",
"findings": [
{ "findingId": "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a", "severity": "high" },
{ "findingId": "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:9bf4", "severity": "critical" }
],
"policyBadge": "fail",
"vexSummary": "2 reachable findings pending patch.",
"attachments": [
{
"type": "json",
"name": "console-ticket-20251108.json",
"digest": "sha256:1fdd…",
"contentType": "application/json",
"expiresAt": "2025-11-15T00:00:00Z"
}
]
},
"auditEventId": "console.ticket.export::2025-11-08::00018"
}
```
Requests emit `console.ticket.export` audit events (tenant, user, selection counts, target system).
## 4. VEX Workspace (`/console/vex/*`)
### 4.1 `GET /console/vex/statements`
Parameters mirror `/console/vuln/findings` plus:
| Parameter | Type | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `advisoryId` | string[] | CVE/GHSA/OVAL identifiers. |
| `justification` | string[] | `exploit_observed`, `component_not_present`, etc. |
| `statementType` | string[] | `vex`, `openvex`, `custom`, `advisory_ai`. |
| `prefer` | string | `prefer=stream` enables chunked streaming (NDJSON). |
Response (paged JSON):
```jsonc
{
"items": [
{
"statementId": "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
"advisoryId": "CVE-2024-12345",
"product": "registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0",
"status": "under_investigation",
"justification": "exploit_observed",
"lastUpdated": "2025-11-07T23:10:09Z",
"source": {
"type": "advisory_ai",
"modelBuild": "aiai-console-2025-10-28",
"confidence": 0.74
},
"links": [
{
"rel": "finding",
"href": "/console/vuln/findings/tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a"
}
]
}
],
"nextPageToken": null
}
```
When `Accept: text/event-stream`, the endpoint emits events (see §4.3) instead of paged JSON.
### 4.2 `GET /console/vex/statements/{statementId}`
Returns the canonical statement plus provenance extracts. SSE clients can call this endpoint when they need full bodies after receiving a summary event.
### 4.3 `GET /console/vex/events` (SSE)
Streams live updates for VEX statements affecting the tenant:
- Event types: `statement.created`, `statement.updated`, `statement.deleted`, `statement.conflict`.
- Fields: `id`, `advisoryId`, `product`, `vexState`, `severityHint`, `policyBadge`, `conflictSummary`, `sequence`.
- Replay: Clients include `Last-Event-ID`; server resumes from sequence.
- Heartbeats every 15 seconds (`event: keepalive`, `data: {}`).
Example event payload:
```jsonc
event: statement.updated
data: {
"statementId": "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
"advisoryId": "CVE-2024-12345",
"product": "registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0",
"state": "fixed",
"justification": "solution_available",
"sequence": 4182,
"updatedAt": "2025-11-08T11:44:32Z"
}
```
## 5. Signals & Scheduler Integration
- Reachability data is materialized by Scheduler delta jobs (`SCHED-CONSOLE-23-001`). `/console/vuln/findings` should cache the most recent job ID and expose `signalsVersion`.
- VEX justification fields reference Excititor statement IDs; ensure the gateway checks Excititor availability and degrades gracefully (returns `state: unavailable` plus telemetry).
- Scheduler must publish `console.vuln.refresh` events whenever advisory/VEX deltas warrant workspace refresh; console SSE endpoint may piggyback on the same Redis/NATS channel.
## 6. Determinism & Offline Notes
1. All responses are compressible JSON; no CDN fonts/assets referenced.
2. SSE endpoints must tolerate sealed mode by operating on loopback addresses only.
3. `authority-sealed-ci.json` (see DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002) is the evidence Authority consumes before enabling these APIs for sealed tenants; console responses echo `sealed: true/false` flags for UI badges.
## 7. Sample Payloads for Docs
- `docs/api/console/samples/vuln-findings-sample.json` exported via `scripts/generate-console-samples.ts` (placeholder script to be added when backend lands).
- `docs/api/console/samples/vex-statement-sse.ndjson` contains 5 chronological SSE events for screenshot reproduction.
> Until backend implementations ship, use the examples above to unblock DOCS-AIAI-31-004; replace them with live captures once the gateway endpoints are available in staging.

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@@ -18,14 +18,35 @@
- Build linksets from conflicting advisory observations (e.g., differing severity or status flags).
- Confirm conflict markers propagate to `AdvisoryLinkset` outputs and associated metrics/log records.
- Capture deterministic ordering of conflict explanations for evidence exports.
- Coverage landed via `AdvisoryObservationFactoryTests.Create_PreservesRawReferencesForConflictAudits` (raw linkset + attribute parity) and `AdvisoryEventLogTests.AppendAsync_SortsConflictStatementIds` (canonical conflict JSON + stable hashes).
3. **Evidence/export parity**
- Re-run observation/linkset pipelines against identical fixtures and assert resulting evidence manifests hash-identically.
- Track monotonic `supersedes` chains and ensure canonical link records include `PRIMARY` schemes.
- `JsonExportSnapshotBuilderTests.WriteAsync_DifferentInputOrderProducesSameDigest` now proves export bundles remain byte-identical regardless of advisory enumeration order; digest sampling extends `ProducesIdenticalBytesAcrossRuns`.
## Mongo2Go/OpenSSL toolchain
Concelier solution tests (and most connector suites) depend on Mongo2Gos embedded `mongod`, which is linked against OpenSSL 1.1. The repo already ships the required libraries in `tests/native/openssl-1.1/linux-x64/{libcrypto.so.1.1,libssl.so.1.1}`; use them instead of installing global packages so offline runners stay deterministic.
1. Add the shim to your shell before executing any Mongo-backed suite:
```bash
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/tests/native/openssl-1.1/linux-x64:${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:-}"
```
2. For single commands you can prefix the invocation (handy for CI copy/paste):
```bash
LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$(pwd)/tests/native/openssl-1.1/linux-x64" \
dotnet test src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.sln --nologo
```
3. The shims provenance and troubleshooting notes live in `tests/native/openssl-1.1/README.md`; reference it when mirroring the toolchain into air-gapped runners.
## Migration Steps
- [ ] Retire `StellaOps.Concelier.Merge.Tests` determinism suites once observation/linkset equivalents land.
- [ ] Introduce new regression fixtures under `StellaOps.Concelier.Core.Tests` (shared via `StellaOps.Concelier.Testing`).
- [x] Retire `StellaOps.Concelier.Merge.Tests` determinism suites once observation/linkset equivalents land.
- [x] Introduce new regression fixtures under `StellaOps.Concelier.Core.Tests` (shared via `StellaOps.Concelier.Testing`).
- [ ] Wire test helpers to Mongo in-memory harness for end-to-end parity runs.
- [ ] Update documentation (`docs/migration/no-merge.md`) with validation checklist once new tests are green.

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@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ Follow the sprint files below in order. Update task status in both `SPRINTS` and
> 2025-11-03: MERGE-LNM-21-001 marked DONE published `docs/migration/no-merge.md` with rollout, backfill, validation, and rollback guidance for the LNM cutover.
> 2025-11-04: GRAPH-INDEX-28-011 marked DONE (Graph Indexer Guild) SBOM ingest DI wiring now emits graph snapshots by default, snapshot root configurable via `STELLAOPS_GRAPH_SNAPSHOT_DIR`, and Graph Indexer tests exercised with Mongo URI guidance.
> 2025-11-06: MERGE-LNM-21-002 remains DOING (BE-Merge) default-off merge DI + job gating landed, but Concelier WebService ingest/mirror tests are failing; guard and migration fixes pending before completion.
> 2025-11-07: MERGE-LNM-21-002 marked DONE (BE-Merge) Link-Not-Merge telemetry gaps closed by introducing `StellaOps.Ingestion.Telemetry`, guard metrics/tests updated, and Concelier Exporter JSON + solution smoke suites re-run to cover the new filename normalization.
> 2025-11-06: TASKRUN-43-001 marked DONE (Task Runner Guild) approvals resume API now requeues packs, plan snapshots persisted, and filesystem artifact uploader stores manifests/files for offline review.
> 2025-11-06: CLI-POLICY-23-005 marked DONE (DevEx/CLI Guild) policy activate CLI verifies scheduling/approval flow, Spectre console fallbacks emit warnings offline, and full CLI suite passes against local feeds.
> 2025-11-07: DOCS-AIAI-31-007 marked DONE (Docs Guild, Security Guild) published `/docs/security/assistant-guardrails.md` covering redaction rules, blocked phrases, telemetry, and alert wiring.

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ ATTEST-VERIFY-74-001 | DONE | Emit telemetry (spans/metrics) tagged by subject,
ATTEST-VERIFY-74-002 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Document verification report schema and explainability in `/docs/modules/attestor/workflows.md`. Dependencies: ATTEST-VERIFY-73-001. | Verification Guild, Docs Guild (src/Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor.Verify/TASKS.md)
ATTESTOR-72-001 | DONE | Scaffold service (REST API skeleton, storage interfaces, KMS integration stubs) and DSSE validation pipeline. Dependencies: ATTEST-ENVELOPE-72-001. | Attestor Service Guild (src/Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor/TASKS.md)
ATTESTOR-72-002 | DONE | Implement attestation store (DB tables, object storage integration), CRUD, and indexing strategies. Dependencies: ATTESTOR-72-001. | Attestor Service Guild (src/Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor/TASKS.md)
ATTESTOR-72-003 | BLOCKED | Validate attestation store TTL against production-like Mongo/Redis stack; capture logs and remediation plan. Dependencies: ATTESTOR-72-002. | Attestor Service Guild, QA Guild (src/Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor/TASKS.md)
ATTESTOR-72-003 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Validate attestation store TTL against production-like Mongo/Redis stack; capture logs and remediation plan. Dependencies: ATTESTOR-72-002. | Attestor Service Guild, QA Guild (src/Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-03: TTL soak tests captured in `docs/modules/attestor/ttl-validation.md`; Mongo/Redis evidence archived for replay.
ATTESTOR-73-001 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Implement signing endpoint with Ed25519/ECDSA support, KMS integration, and audit logging. Dependencies: ATTESTOR-72-002, KMS-72-001. | Attestor Service Guild, KMS Guild (src/Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor/TASKS.md)
@@ -48,8 +49,11 @@ AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Provision new scopes (`airgap:seal`, `a
> 2025-11-04: Verified discovery metadata now advertises the airgap scope trio, `etc/authority.yaml.sample` + offline kit docs ship the new roles, and Authority tests enforce tenant gating for `airgap:*` scopes (`dotnet test` executed).
AUTH-AIRGAP-56-002 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Audit import actions with actor, tenant, bundle ID, and trace ID; expose `/authority/audit/airgap` endpoint. Dependencies: AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001, AIRGAP-IMP-58-001. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-04: `/authority/audit/airgap` minimal APIs persist tenant-scoped records with paging, RBAC checks for `airgap:import`/`airgap:status:read` pass, and Authority integration suite (187 tests) exercised the audit flow.
AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001 | BLOCKED (2025-11-01) | Enforce sealed-mode CI gating by refusing token issuance when declared sealed install lacks sealing confirmation. Dependencies: AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001, DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002. | Authority Core & Security Guild, DevOps Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Enforce sealed-mode CI gating by refusing token issuance when declared sealed install lacks sealing confirmation. Dependencies: AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001, DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002. | Authority Core & Security Guild, DevOps Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-01: AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001 blocked pending definition of sealed-confirmation evidence and configuration shape before gating (Authority Core & Security Guild, DevOps Guild).
> 2025-11-08: Flipped to DOING; partnering with DevOps on artifacts so Authority gating tests can consume sealed confirmations once published (target 2025-11-10).
> 2025-11-07: Still waiting on DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 sealed-mode CI suite (`ops/devops/sealed-mode-ci/*`) to publish artefacts so Authority can wire the gating tests.
> 2025-11-08: DevOps sealed-mode CI now uploads `artifacts/sealed-mode-ci/<commit>/authority-sealed-ci.json`; Authority to hook the gating middleware/tests up to that feed next.
AUTH-NOTIFY-38-001 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Define `Notify.Viewer`, `Notify.Operator`, `Notify.Admin` scopes/roles, update discovery metadata, offline defaults, and issuer templates. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-01: AUTH-NOTIFY-38-001 completed—Notify scope catalog, discovery metadata, docs, configuration samples, and service tests updated for new roles.
AUTH-NOTIFY-40-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Implement signed ack token key rotation, webhook allowlists, admin-only escalation settings, and audit logging of ack actions. Dependencies: AUTH-NOTIFY-38-001, WEB-NOTIFY-40-001. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ AUTH-PACKS-41-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Define CLI SSO profiles and pack scopes
> 2025-11-04: Verified discovery metadata, OpenAPI, `etc/authority.yaml.sample`, and offline kit docs reflect the packs scope set; Authority suite re-run (`dotnet test`) to confirm tenant gating and policy checks.
> 2025-11-02: Shared OpenSSL 1.1 shim now feeds Mongo2Go for Authority & Signals tests, keeping pack scope regressions and other Mongo flows working on OpenSSL 3 hosts.
AUTH-PACKS-43-001 | BLOCKED (2025-10-27) | Enforce pack signing policies, approval RBAC checks, CLI CI token scopes, and audit logging for approvals. Dependencies: AUTH-PACKS-41-001, TASKRUN-42-001, ORCH-SVC-42-101. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: AUTH-PACKS-41-001 + TASKRUN-42-001 are DONE; remaining blocker is ORCH-SVC-42-101 (still TODO) for log streaming/approvals APIs. Not deleted—waiting on Orchestrator to publish contracts.
[Identity & Signing] 100.B) Authority.II
@@ -80,8 +85,17 @@ Depends on: Sprint 100.B - Authority.I
Summary: Identity & Signing focus on Authority (phase II).
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
AUTH-POLICY-23-002 | BLOCKED (2025-10-29) | Implement optional two-person rule for activation: require two distinct `policy:activate` approvals when configured; emit audit logs. Dependencies: AUTH-POLICY-23-001. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
AUTH-POLICY-23-003 | BLOCKED (2025-10-29) | Update documentation and sample configs for policy roles, approval workflow, and signing requirements. Dependencies: AUTH-POLICY-23-001. | Authority Core & Docs Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
AUTH-POLICY-23-001 | DONE (2025-10-27) | Introduce fine-grained policy scopes (`policy:read`, `policy:author`, `policy:review`, `policy:simulate`, `findings:read`) for CLI/service accounts; update discovery metadata, issuer templates, and offline defaults. Dependencies: AUTH-AOC-19-002. | Authority Core & Docs Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
AUTH-POLICY-23-002 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Implement optional two-person rule for activation: require two distinct `policy:activate` approvals when configured; emit audit logs. Dependencies: AUTH-POLICY-23-001. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-08: Added Policy Engine activation options (force/default/audit toggles), enforced pending-second-approval responses, and emitted `policy.activation.*` telemetry across auditor logs.
AUTH-POLICY-23-003 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Update documentation and sample configs for policy roles, approval workflow, and signing requirements. Dependencies: AUTH-POLICY-23-001. | Authority Core & Docs Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-08: Documented dual-control activation steps, new `PolicyEngine.activation.*` knobs, sample YAML defaults, and console/operator guidance for audit visibility.
> 2025-11-07: Scope migration (AUTH-POLICY-23-001) shipped; activation guardrail and documentation updates now waiting on pairing.
AUTH-DPOP-11-001 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Enforce DPoP sender constraints for `/token` flows (nonce policies, JKT persistence, structured telemetry) so downstream services can trust `cnf` metadata. Dependencies: AUTH-AOC-19-002. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
AUTH-MTLS-11-002 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Deliver mTLS-bound token issuance/validation (cert thumbprint storage, JWKS rotation hooks) required for high-assurance tenants and plugin mitigations. Dependencies: AUTH-DPOP-11-001. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Authority + DevOps stand-up aligned on a 2025-11-10 delivery target for AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 and DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 so plugin security/air-gap gating can flip to DOING immediately after.
> 2025-11-08: Taking ownership to wire certificate thumbprint persistence + audit logging; blocking issues from AUTH-DPOP-11-001 now resolved, so mTLS enforcement can proceed.
> 2025-11-08: `/token`/`/introspect` now enforce TLS certificate matches for mTLS-bound tokens and emit `authority_mtls_mismatch_total` telemetry when rejections occur.
AUTH-POLICY-27-002 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Provide attestation signing service bindings (OIDC token exchange, cosign integration) and enforce publish/promote scope checks, fresh-auth requirements, and audit logging. Dependencies: AUTH-POLICY-27-001, REGISTRY-API-27-007. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-02: Added interactive-only `policy:publish`/`policy:promote` scopes with metadata requirements (`policy_reason`, `policy_ticket`, `policy_digest`), fresh-auth validation, audit enrichment, and updated config/docs for operators.
AUTH-POLICY-27-003 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Update Authority configuration/docs for Policy Studio roles, signing policies, approval workflows, and CLI integration; include compliance checklist. Dependencies: AUTH-POLICY-27-001, AUTH-POLICY-27-002. | Authority Core & Docs Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
@@ -100,9 +114,11 @@ AUTH-VULN-29-003 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Update security docs/config samples for V
PLG4-6.CAPABILITIES | BLOCKED (2025-10-12) | Finalise capability metadata exposure, config validation, and developer guide updates; remaining action is Docs polish/diagram export. | BE-Auth Plugin, Docs Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
PLG6.DIAGRAM | TODO | Export final sequence/component diagrams for the developer guide and add offline-friendly assets under `docs/assets/authority`. | Docs Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
PLG7.RFC | REVIEW | Socialize LDAP plugin RFC (`docs/rfcs/authority-plugin-ldap.md`) and capture guild feedback. | BE-Auth Plugin, Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
SEC2.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Emit audit events from password verification outcomes and persist via `IAuthorityLoginAttemptStore`. <br>⛔ Waiting on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 / PLUGIN-DI-08-001 to stabilise Authority auth surfaces before final verification + publish. | Security Guild, Storage Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
SEC3.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Ensure lockout responses and rate-limit metadata flow through plugin logs/events (include retry-after). <br>⛔ Pending AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 / PLUGIN-DI-08-001 so limiter telemetry contract matches final authority surface. | Security Guild, BE-Auth Plugin (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
SEC5.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Address plugin-specific mitigations (bootstrap user handling, password policy docs) in threat model backlog. <br>⛔ Final documentation depends on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 / PLUGIN-DI-08-001 outcomes. | Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
SEC2.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Emit audit events from password verification outcomes and persist via `IAuthorityLoginAttemptStore`. <br>⛔ Waiting on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 to stabilise Authority auth surfaces (PLUGIN-DI-08-001 closed 2025-10-21; re-run once sender constraints land). | Security Guild, Storage Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
SEC3.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Ensure lockout responses and rate-limit metadata flow through plugin logs/events (include retry-after). <br>⛔ Pending AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002; PLUGIN-DI-08-001 already merged, so limiter telemetry just awaits final Authority surface. | Security Guild, BE-Auth Plugin (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
SEC5.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Address plugin-specific mitigations (bootstrap user handling, password policy docs) in threat model backlog. <br>⛔ Final documentation now hinges on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 (PLUGIN-DI-08-001 landed 2025-10-21). | Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Upstream AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 now DOING; revisit plugin backlog once sender-constraint hardening lands.
> 2025-11-08: Dependency audit confirmed — AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 staffed with 2025-11-10 delivery; no missing SEC2/SEC3/SEC5 subtasks, so these remain BLOCKED only until sender constraints merge.
PLG7.IMPL-001 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Scaffold `StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Ldap` + tests, bind configuration (client certificate, trust-store, insecure toggle) with validation and docs samples. | BE-Auth Plugin (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-03: Initial `StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Ldap` project/tests scaffolded with configuration options + registrar; sample manifest (`etc/authority.plugins/ldap.yaml`) updated to new schema (client certificate, trust store, insecure toggle).
PLG7.IMPL-002 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Implement LDAP credential store with TLS/mutual TLS enforcement, deterministic retry/backoff, and structured logging/metrics. | BE-Auth Plugin, Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard/TASKS.md)
@@ -131,7 +147,14 @@ KMS-73-001 | TODO | Add cloud KMS driver (e.g., AWS KMS, GCP KMS) with signing a
KMS-73-002 | TODO | Implement PKCS#11/HSM driver plus FIDO2 signing support for high assurance workflows. Dependencies: KMS-73-001. | KMS Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.Kms/TASKS.md)
[Identity & Signing] 100.E) Deployment
Depends on: Helm base chart scaffolding (HELM-45-001)
Summary: Wire deployment assets so Policy Engine activation guardrails stay deterministic across clusters/offline kits.
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
HELM-45-004 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Mount the new `policy-engine-activation` ConfigMap into the Policy Engine (and Policy Gateway) pods, ensure runtime config loads activation overrides from env/file, and refresh Helm/Compose samples for offline parity. | Deployment Guild, Policy Guild (ops/deployment/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-08: Helm template now injects the activation ConfigMap for policy-engine/gateway pods, Policy Engine host loads `/config/policy-engine/activation.yaml`, Policy Engine/Gateway tests are green, and CI now runs `helm lint`/`helm template` over every `values*.yaml`.
If all tasks are done - read next sprint section - SPRINT_110_ingestion_evidence.md

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ AIAI-31-004C | DONE (2025-11-06) | Deliver CLI `stella advise run` command, rend
DOCS-AIAI-31-002 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Author `/docs/advisory-ai/architecture.md` detailing RAG pipeline, deterministic tooling, caching, model profiles. Dependencies: AIAI-31-004. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-001 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Publish `/docs/advisory-ai/overview.md` covering capabilities, guardrails, RBAC personas, and offline posture. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-003 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Write `/docs/advisory-ai/api.md` covering endpoints, schemas, errors, rate limits, and imposed-rule banner. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-002. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-004 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Create `/docs/advisory-ai/console.md` with screenshots, a11y notes, copy-as-ticket instructions. Dependencies: CONSOLE-VULN-29-001, CONSOLE-VEX-30-001, EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001. | Docs Guild, Console Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-004 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Create `/docs/advisory-ai/console.md` with screenshots, a11y notes, copy-as-ticket instructions. Dependencies: CONSOLE-VULN-29-001, CONSOLE-VEX-30-001, EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001. | Docs Guild, Console Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Draft doc committed (`docs/advisory-ai/console.md`) with workflow outline; screenshots will be added once CONSOLE-VULN-29-001 / CONSOLE-VEX-30-001 ship.
> 2025-11-08: Console endpoints are staffed (CONSOLE-VULN-29-001 / CONSOLE-VEX-30-001 DOING); still waiting on EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001 feeds before capturing screenshots/tests.
DOCS-AIAI-31-005 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Publish `/docs/advisory-ai/cli.md` covering commands, exit codes, scripting patterns. Dependencies: CLI-VULN-29-001, CLI-VEX-30-001, AIAI-31-004C. | Docs Guild, DevEx/CLI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-006 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Update `/docs/policy/assistant-parameters.md` covering temperature, token limits, ranking weights, TTLs. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-31-001. | Docs Guild, Policy Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-007 | DONE (2025-11-07) | Write `/docs/security/assistant-guardrails.md` detailing redaction, injection defense, logging. Dependencies: AIAI-31-005. | Docs Guild, Security Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
@@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ CONCELIER-OAS-61-001 `Spec coverage` | TODO | Update Concelier OAS with advisory
CONCELIER-OAS-61-002 `Examples library` | TODO | Provide rich examples for advisories, linksets, conflict annotations used by SDK + docs. Dependencies: CONCELIER-OAS-61-001. | Concelier Core Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-OAS-62-001 `SDK smoke tests` | TODO | Add SDK tests covering advisory search, pagination, and conflict handling; ensure source metadata surfaced. Dependencies: CONCELIER-OAS-61-002. | Concelier Core Guild, SDK Generator Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-OAS-63-001 `Deprecation headers` | TODO | Implement deprecation header support and timeline events for retiring endpoints. Dependencies: CONCELIER-OAS-62-001. | Concelier Core Guild, API Governance Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | TODO | Replace ad-hoc logging with telemetry core across ingestion/linking pipelines; ensure spans/logs include tenant, source vendor, upstream id, content hash, and trace IDs. | Concelier Core Guild, Observability Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Replace ad-hoc logging with telemetry core across ingestion/linking pipelines; ensure spans/logs include tenant, source vendor, upstream id, content hash, and trace IDs. | Concelier Core Guild, Observability Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-OBS-51-001 `Metrics & SLOs` | TODO | Emit metrics for ingest latency (cold/warm), queue depth, aoc violation rate, and publish SLO burn-rate alerts (ingest P95 <30s cold / <5s warm). Ship dashboards + alert configs. Dependencies: CONCELIER-OBS-50-001. | Concelier Core Guild, DevOps Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-OBS-52-001 `Timeline events` | TODO | Emit `timeline_event` records for advisory ingest/normalization/linkset creation with provenance, trace IDs, conflict summaries, and evidence placeholders. Dependencies: CONCELIER-OBS-51-001. | Concelier Core Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-OBS-53-001 `Evidence snapshots` | TODO | Produce advisory evaluation bundle payloads (raw doc, linkset, normalization diff) for evidence locker; ensure Merkle manifests seeded with content hashes. Dependencies: CONCELIER-OBS-52-001. | Concelier Core Guild, Evidence Locker Guild (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Core/TASKS.md)
@@ -172,14 +174,17 @@ CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-001 `Mirror import APIs` | TODO | Extend ingestion endpo
CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-002 `Airgap status surfaces` | TODO | Add staleness metadata and bundle provenance to advisory APIs (`/advisories/observations`, `/advisories/linksets`). Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-001. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-57-001 `Error remediation` | TODO | Map sealed-mode violations to `AIRGAP_EGRESS_BLOCKED` responses with user guidance. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-002. | Concelier WebService Guild, AirGap Policy Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-58-001 `Import timeline emission` | TODO | Emit timeline events for bundle ingestion operations with bundle ID, scope, and actor metadata. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-57-001. | Concelier WebService Guild, AirGap Importer Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002 `AOC observability` | TODO | Emit `ingestion_write_total`, `aoc_violation_total`, latency histograms, and tracing spans (`ingest.fetch/transform/write`, `aoc.guard`). Wire structured logging to include tenant, source vendor, upstream id, and content hash. | Concelier WebService Guild, Observability Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002 `AOC observability` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Emit `ingestion_write_total`, `aoc_violation_total`, latency histograms, and tracing spans (`ingest.fetch/transform/write`, `aoc.guard`). Wire structured logging to include tenant, source vendor, upstream id, and content hash. | Concelier WebService Guild, Observability Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-003 `Schema/guard unit tests` | TODO | Add unit tests covering schema validation failures, forbidden field rejections (`ERR_AOC_001/002/006/007`), idempotent upserts, and supersedes chains using deterministic fixtures. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002. | QA Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-004 `End-to-end ingest verification` | TODO | Create integration tests ingesting large advisory batches (cold/warm) validating linkset enrichment, metrics emission, and reproducible outputs. Capture load-test scripts + doc notes for Offline Kit dry runs. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-003. | Concelier WebService Guild, QA Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-005 `Chunk evidence regression` | TODO (2025-11-08) | Fix `/advisories/{key}/chunks` fixture seeding so AdvisoryChunksEndpoint tests stop returning 404/not-found when raw documents are pre-populated; ensure the Mongo migration no longer emits Unable to locate advisory_raw documents during WebService test boot. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002. | Concelier WebService Guild, QA Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-006 `Allowlist ingest auth parity` | TODO (2025-11-08) | Align WebService auth defaults with the test tokens so the allowlisted tenant can create an advisory before forbidden tenants are rejected in `AdvisoryIngestEndpoint_RejectsTenantOutsideAllowlist`. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-007 `AOC verify violation codes` | TODO (2025-11-08) | Update AOC verify logic/fixtures so guard failures produce the expected `ERR_AOC_001` payload (current regression returns `ERR_AOC_004`) while keeping mapper/guard parity exercised by the new tests. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002. | Concelier WebService Guild, QA Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-61-001 `/.well-known/openapi` | DONE (2025-11-02) | Implement discovery endpoint emitting Concelier spec with version metadata and ETag. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-61-002 `Error envelope migration` | TODO | Ensure all API responses use standardized error envelope; update controllers/tests. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-61-001. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-62-001 `Examples expansion` | TODO | Add curated examples for advisory observations/linksets/conflicts; integrate into dev portal. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-61-002. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-63-001 `Deprecation headers` | TODO | Add Sunset/Deprecation headers for retiring endpoints and update documentation/notifications. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-62-001. | Concelier WebService Guild, API Governance Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | TODO | Adopt telemetry core in web service host, ensure ingest + read endpoints emit trace/log fields (`tenant_id`, `route`, `decision_effect`), and add correlation IDs to responses. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Adopt telemetry core in web service host, ensure ingest + read endpoints emit trace/log fields (`tenant_id`, `route`, `decision_effect`), and add correlation IDs to responses. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-51-001 `Observability APIs` | TODO | Surface ingest health metrics, queue depth, and SLO status via `/obs/concelier/health` endpoint for Console widgets, with caching and tenant partitioning. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-52-001 `Timeline streaming` | TODO | Provide SSE stream `/obs/concelier/timeline` bridging to Timeline Indexer with paging tokens, guardrails, and audit logging. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-51-001. | Concelier WebService Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
@@ -194,7 +199,7 @@ CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-54-001 `Attestation exposure` | TODO | Provide `/attestations/
CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-55-001 `Incident mode toggles` | TODO | Implement incident mode toggle endpoints, propagate to orchestrator/locker, and document cooldown/backoff semantics. Dependencies: CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-54-001. | Concelier WebService Guild, DevOps Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
FEEDCONN-CCCS-02-009 Version range provenance (Oct 2025) | BE-Conn-CCCS | **TODO (due 2025-10-21)** Map CCCS advisories into the new `advisory_observations.affected.versions[]` structure, preserving each upstream range with provenance anchors (`cccs:{serial}:{index}`) and normalized comparison keys. Update mapper tests/fixtures for the Link-Not-Merge schema and verify linkset builders consume the ranges without relying on legacy merge counters.<br>2025-10-29: `docs/dev/normalized-rule-recipes.md` now documents helper snippets for building observation version entries—use them instead of merge-specific builders and refresh fixtures with `UPDATE_CCCS_FIXTURES=1`. | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cccs/TASKS.md)
FEEDCONN-CERTBUND-02-010 Version range provenance | BE-Conn-CERTBUND | **TODO (due 2025-10-22)** Translate `product.Versions` phrases (e.g., `2023.1 bis 2024.2`, `alle`) into comparison helpers for `advisory_observations.affected.versions[]`, capturing provenance (`certbund:{advisoryId}:{vendor}`) and localisation notes. Update mapper/tests for the Link-Not-Merge schema and refresh documentation accordingly. | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.CertBund/TASKS.md)
FEEDCONN-CISCO-02-009 SemVer range provenance | BE-Conn-Cisco | **TODO (due 2025-10-21)** Emit Cisco SemVer ranges into `advisory_observations.affected.versions[]` with provenance identifiers (`cisco:{productId}`) and deterministic comparison keys. Update mapper/tests for the Link-Not-Merge schema and replace legacy merge counter checks with observation/linkset validation. | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Cisco/TASKS.md)
FEEDCONN-CISCO-02-009 SemVer range provenance | BE-Conn-Cisco | **DOING (2025-11-08)** Emitting Cisco SemVer ranges into `advisory_observations.affected.versions[]` with provenance identifiers (`cisco:{productId}`) and deterministic comparison keys. Updating mapper/tests for the Link-Not-Merge schema and replacing legacy merge counter checks with observation/linkset validation. | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Cisco/TASKS.md)
FEEDCONN-ICSCISA-02-012 Version range provenance | BE-Conn-ICS-CISA | **DONE (2025-11-03)** Promote existing firmware/semver data into `advisory_observations.affected.versions[]` entries with deterministic comparison keys and provenance identifiers (`ics-cisa:{advisoryId}:{product}`). Add regression coverage for mixed firmware strings and raise a Models ticket only when observation schema needs a new comparison helper.<br>2025-10-29: Follow `docs/dev/normalized-rule-recipes.md` §2 to build observation version entries and log failures without invoking the retired merge helpers.<br>2025-11-03: Completed connector now normalizes semver ranges with provenance notes, RSS fallback content clears the AOC guard, and end-to-end Fetch/Parse/Map integration tests pass. | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ics.Cisa/TASKS.md)
FEEDCONN-KISA-02-008 Firmware range provenance | BE-Conn-KISA, Models | **DONE (2025-11-04)** Define comparison helpers for Hangul-labelled firmware ranges (`XFU 1.0.1.0084 ~ 2.0.1.0034`) and map them into `advisory_observations.affected.versions[]` with provenance tags. Coordinate with Models only if a new comparison scheme is required, then update localisation notes and fixtures for the Link-Not-Merge schema.<br>2025-11-03: Analysis in progress auditing existing mapper output/fixtures ahead of implementing firmware range normalization and provenance wiring.<br>2025-11-03: SemVer normalization helper wired through `KisaMapper` with provenance slugs + vendor extensions; integration tests updated and green, follow-up capture for additional Hangul exclusivity markers queued before completion.<br>2025-11-03: Extended connector tests to cover single-ended (`이상`, `초과`, `이하`, `미만`) and non-numeric phrases, verifying normalized rule types (`gt`, `gte`, `lt`, `lte`) and fallback behaviour; broader corpus review remains before transitioning to DONE.<br>2025-11-03: Captured the top 10 `detailDos.do?IDX=` pages into `seed-data/kisa/html/` via `scripts/kisa_capture_html.py`; JSON endpoint (`rssDetailData.do?IDX=…`) now returns error pages, so connector updates must parse the embedded HTML or secure authenticated API access before closing.<br>2025-11-04: Fetch + parse pipeline now consumes the HTML detail pages end to end (metadata persisted, DOM parser extracts vendor/product ranges); fixtures/tests operate on the HTML snapshots to guard normalized SemVer + vendor extension expectations and severity extraction. | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Kisa/TASKS.md)
FEEDCONN-SHARED-STATE-003 Source state seeding helper | Tools Guild, BE-Conn-MSRC | **DONE (2025-11-04)** Delivered `SourceStateSeeder` CLI + processor APIs, Mongo fixtures, and MSRC runbook updates. Seeds raw docs + cursor state deterministically; tests cover happy/path/idempotent flows (`dotnet test src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.Tests/...` note: requires `libcrypto.so.1.1` when running Mongo2Go locally). | Tools (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common/TASKS.md)
@@ -212,7 +217,7 @@ Summary: Ingestion & Evidence focus on Concelier (phase VII).
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
MERGE-LNM-21-002 | DONE (2025-11-07) | Refactor or retire `AdvisoryMergeService` and related pipelines, ensuring callers transition to observation/linkset APIs; add compile-time analyzer preventing merge service usage.<br>2025-11-03: Began dependency audit and call-site inventory ahead of deprecation plan; cataloging service registrations/tests referencing merge APIs.<br>2025-11-05 14:42Z: Drafted `concelier:features:noMergeEnabled` gating, merge job allowlist handling, and deprecation/telemetry changes prior to analyzer rollout.<br>2025-11-06 16:10Z: Landed analyzer project (`CONCELIER0002`), wired into Concelier WebService/tests, and updated docs to direct suppressions through explicit migration notes.<br>2025-11-07 03:25Z: Default-on toggle + job gating surfaced ingestion test brittleness; guard/migration diagnostics capture requests missing `upstream.contentHash`.<br>2025-11-07 19:45Z: Set `ConcelierOptions.Features.NoMergeEnabled` default to `true`, added regression coverage (`Features_NoMergeEnabled_DefaultsToTrue`), and rechecked ingest helpers to carry canonical links. Remote .NET 10 CLI run remains queued for validation. | BE-Merge (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge/TASKS.md)
MERGE-LNM-21-003 Determinism/test updates | DOING (2025-11-07) | QA Guild, BE-Merge | Replace merge determinism suites with observation/linkset regression tests verifying no data mutation and conflicts remain visible. Dependencies: MERGE-LNM-21-002.<br>2025-11-07: Drafting test migration plan (`docs/dev/lnm-determinism-tests.md`) to map legacy merge fixtures onto observation/linkset pipelines; identifying coverage gaps (conflict surfacing, raw vs canonical parity, hash stability).<br>2025-11-07 20:05Z: Landed `AdvisoryObservationFactoryTests.Create_IsDeterministicAcrossRuns` to cover canonical JSON stability and pruned the old merge determinism integration test. | MERGE-LNM-21-002 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge/TASKS.md)
MERGE-LNM-21-003 Determinism/test updates | DONE (2025-11-07) | QA Guild, BE-Merge | Replaced the retired merge determinism harness with observation/linkset/export regressions. `AdvisoryObservationFactoryTests` now assert raw reference parity + conflict notes, `AdvisoryEventLogTests` sort/uniquify conflict statement IDs, and `JsonExportSnapshotBuilderTests` guard digest parity across reordered input. `docs/dev/lnm-determinism-tests.md` checklist updated with the new coverage. | MERGE-LNM-21-002 (src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge/TASKS.md)
WEB-AOC-19-001 (dependency) | DONE (2025-11-07) | Shared guard primitives now enforce the top-level allowlist (`_id`, tenant, source, upstream, content, identifiers, linkset, supersedes, created/ingested timestamps, attributes) and emit the reusable `AocError` payload consumed by HTTP/CLI tooling. Extend `AocGuardOptions.AllowedTopLevelFields` when staging new schema fields to avoid false-positive `ERR_AOC_007` violations. | BE-Base Platform Guild (docs/aoc/guard-library.md, src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
@@ -278,7 +283,7 @@ EXCITITOR-OAS-61-001 `Spec coverage` | TODO | Update VEX OAS to include observat
EXCITITOR-OAS-61-002 `Example catalog` | TODO | Provide examples for VEX justifications, statuses, conflicts; ensure SDK docs reference them. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-OAS-61-001. | Excititor Core Guild (src/Excititor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Excititor.Core/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-OAS-62-001 `SDK smoke tests` | TODO | Add SDK scenarios for VEX observation queries and conflict handling to language smoke suites. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-OAS-61-002. | Excititor Core Guild, SDK Generator Guild (src/Excititor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Excititor.Core/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-OAS-63-001 `Deprecation headers` | TODO | Add deprecation metadata and notifications for legacy VEX routes. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-OAS-62-001. | Excititor Core Guild, API Governance Guild (src/Excititor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Excititor.Core/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | TODO | Integrate telemetry core across VEX ingestion/linking, ensuring spans/logs capture tenant, product scope, upstream id, justification hash, and trace IDs. | Excititor Core Guild, Observability Guild (src/Excititor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Excititor.Core/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Integrate telemetry core across VEX ingestion/linking, ensuring spans/logs capture tenant, product scope, upstream id, justification hash, and trace IDs. | Excititor Core Guild, Observability Guild (src/Excititor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Excititor.Core/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-OBS-51-001 `Metrics & SLOs` | TODO | Publish metrics for VEX ingest latency, scope resolution success, conflict rate, signature verification failures. Define SLOs (link latency P95 <30s) and configure burn-rate alerts. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-OBS-50-001. | Excititor Core Guild, DevOps Guild (src/Excititor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Excititor.Core/TASKS.md)
@@ -332,16 +337,16 @@ Summary: Ingestion & Evidence focus on Excititor (phase VI).
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
EXCITITOR-WEB-AIRGAP-58-001 | TODO | Emit timeline events for VEX bundle imports with bundle ID, scope, and actor metadata. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-AIRGAP-57-001. | Excititor WebService Guild, AirGap Importer Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-001 `Raw VEX ingestion APIs` | TODO | Implement `POST /ingest/vex`, `GET /vex/raw*`, and `POST /aoc/verify` endpoints. Enforce Authority scopes, tenant injection, and guard pipeline to ensure only immutable VEX facts are persisted. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-002 `AOC observability + metrics` | TODO | Export metrics (`ingestion_write_total`, `aoc_violation_total`, signature verification counters) and tracing spans matching Conseiller naming. Ensure structured logging includes tenant, source vendor, upstream id, and content hash. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-001. | Excititor WebService Guild, Observability Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-003 `Guard + schema test harness` | TODO | Add unit/integration tests for schema validation, forbidden field rejection (`ERR_AOC_001/006/007`), and supersedes behavior using CycloneDX-VEX & CSAF fixtures with deterministic expectations. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-002. | QA Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-004 `Batch ingest validation` | TODO | Build large fixture ingest covering mixed VEX statuses, verifying raw storage parity, metrics, and CLI `aoc verify` compatibility. Document load test/runbook updates. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-003. | Excititor WebService Guild, QA Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-001 `Raw VEX ingestion APIs` | DONE (2025-11-08) | Implement `POST /ingest/vex`, `GET /vex/raw*`, and `POST /aoc/verify` endpoints. Enforce Authority scopes, tenant injection, and guard pipeline to ensure only immutable VEX facts are persisted. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-002 `AOC observability + metrics` | DONE (2025-11-08) | Export metrics (`ingestion_write_total`, `aoc_violation_total`, signature verification counters) and tracing spans matching Conseiller naming. Ensure structured logging includes tenant, source vendor, upstream id, and content hash. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-001. | Excititor WebService Guild, Observability Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-003 `Guard + schema test harness` | DONE (2025-11-08) | Add unit/integration tests for schema validation, forbidden field rejection (`ERR_AOC_001/006/007`), and supersedes behavior using CycloneDX-VEX & CSAF fixtures with deterministic expectations. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-002. | QA Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-004 `Batch ingest validation` | DONE (2025-11-08) | Build large fixture ingest covering mixed VEX statuses, verifying raw storage parity, metrics, and CLI `aoc verify` compatibility. Document load test/runbook updates. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-AOC-19-003. | Excititor WebService Guild, QA Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OAS-61-001 | TODO | Implement `/.well-known/openapi` discovery endpoint with spec version metadata. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OAS-61-002 | TODO | Standardize error envelope responses and update controller/unit tests. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OAS-61-001. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OAS-62-001 | TODO | Add curated examples for VEX observation/linkset endpoints and ensure portal displays them. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OAS-61-002. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OAS-63-001 | TODO | Emit deprecation headers and update docs for retiring VEX APIs. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OAS-62-001. | Excititor WebService Guild, API Governance Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | TODO | Adopt telemetry core for VEX APIs, ensure responses include trace IDs & correlation headers, and update structured logging for read endpoints. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-51-001 `Observability health endpoints` | TODO | Implement `/obs/excititor/health` summarizing ingest/link SLOs, signature failure counts, and conflict trends for Console dashboards. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-50-001. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Adopt telemetry core for VEX APIs, ensure responses include trace IDs & correlation headers, and update structured logging for read endpoints. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-51-001 `Observability health endpoints` | DONE (2025-11-08) | Implement `/obs/excititor/health` summarizing ingest/link SLOs, signature failure counts, and conflict trends for Console dashboards. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-50-001. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-52-001 `Timeline streaming` | TODO | Provide SSE bridge for VEX timeline events with tenant filters, pagination, and guardrails. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-51-001. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-53-001 `Evidence APIs` | TODO | Expose `/evidence/vex/*` endpoints that fetch locker bundles, enforce scopes, and surface verification metadata. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-52-001. | Excititor WebService Guild, Evidence Locker Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)
EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-54-001 `Attestation APIs` | TODO | Add `/attestations/vex/*` endpoints returning DSSE verification state, builder identity, and chain-of-custody links. Dependencies: EXCITITOR-WEB-OBS-53-001. | Excititor WebService Guild (src/Excititor/StellaOps.Excititor.WebService/TASKS.md)

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@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ LEDGER-29-001 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Design ledger & projection schemas (tables/i
LEDGER-29-002 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Implement ledger write API (`POST /vuln/ledger/events`) with validation, idempotency, hash chaining, and Merkle root computation job.<br>2025-11-03: Web service + domain scaffolding landed with canonical hashing helpers, in-memory repository, Merkle scheduler stub, request/response contracts, and unit tests covering hashing & conflict flows. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-001. | Findings Ledger Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-003 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Build projector worker that derives `findings_projection` rows from ledger events + policy determinations; ensure idempotent replay keyed by `(tenant,finding_id,policy_version)`. <br>2025-11-03: Postgres projection services landed with replay checkpoints, fixtures, and unit coverage (LEDGER-29-003). Dependencies: LEDGER-29-002. | Findings Ledger Guild, Scheduler Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-004 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Integrate Policy Engine batch evaluation (baseline + simulate) with projector; cache rationale references.<br>2025-11-04: Ledger service now calls `/api/policy/eval/batch` with resilient HttpClient, shared cache, and inline fallback; documentation/config samples updated; ledger tests executed (`dotnet test src/Findings/__Tests/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger.Tests/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger.Tests.csproj --no-restore`). Dependencies: LEDGER-29-003. | Findings Ledger Guild, Policy Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-005 | TODO | Implement workflow mutation handlers (assign, comment, accept-risk, target-fix, verify-fix, reopen) producing ledger events with validation and attachments metadata. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-004. | Findings Ledger Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-006 | TODO | Integrate attachment encryption (KMS envelope), signed URL issuance, CSRF protection hooks for Console. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-005. | Findings Ledger Guild, Security Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-005 | DONE | Implement workflow mutation handlers (assign, comment, accept-risk, target-fix, verify-fix, reopen) producing ledger events with validation and attachments metadata. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-004. | Findings Ledger Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-006 | DONE | Integrate attachment encryption (KMS envelope), signed URL issuance, CSRF protection hooks for Console. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-005. | Findings Ledger Guild, Security Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-007 | TODO | Instrument metrics (`ledger_write_latency`, `projection_lag_seconds`, `ledger_events_total`), structured logs, and Merkle anchoring alerts; publish dashboards. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-006. | Findings Ledger Guild, Observability Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-008 | TODO | Develop unit/property/integration tests, replay/restore tooling, determinism harness, and load tests at 5M findings/tenant. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-007. | Findings Ledger Guild, QA Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
LEDGER-29-009 | TODO | Provide deployment manifests (Helm/Compose), backup/restore guidance, Merkle anchor externalization (optional), and offline kit instructions. Dependencies: LEDGER-29-008. | Findings Ledger Guild, DevOps Guild (src/Findings/StellaOps.Findings.Ledger/TASKS.md)
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ POLICY-ENGINE-20-008 | TODO | Add unit/property/golden/perf suites covering poli
POLICY-ENGINE-20-009 | TODO | Define Mongo schemas/indexes for `policies`, `policy_runs`, and `effective_finding_*`; implement migrations and tenant enforcement. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-20-008. | Policy Guild, Storage Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-27-001 | TODO | Extend compile outputs to include rule coverage metadata, symbol table, inline documentation, and rule index for editor autocomplete; persist deterministic hashes. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-20-009. | Policy Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-27-002 | TODO | Enhance simulate endpoints to emit rule firing counts, heatmap aggregates, sampled explain traces with deterministic ordering, and delta summaries for quick/batch sims. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-27-001. | Policy Guild, Observability Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-27-003 | TODO | Implement complexity/time limit enforcement with compiler scoring, configurable thresholds, and structured diagnostics (`ERR_POL_COMPLEXITY`). Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-27-002. | Policy Guild, Security Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-27-004 | TODO | Update golden/property tests to cover new coverage metrics, symbol tables, explain traces, and complexity limits; provide fixtures for Registry/Console integration. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-27-003. | Policy Guild, QA Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-27-003 | DONE | Implement complexity/time limit enforcement with compiler scoring, configurable thresholds, and structured diagnostics (`ERR_POL_COMPLEXITY`). Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-27-002. | Policy Guild, Security Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-27-004 | DONE | Update golden/property tests to cover new coverage metrics, symbol tables, explain traces, and complexity limits; provide fixtures for Registry/Console integration. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-27-003. | Policy Guild, QA Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-29-001 | TODO | Implement batch evaluation endpoint (`POST /policy/eval/batch`) returning determinations + rationale chain for sets of `(artifact,purl,version,advisory)` tuples; support pagination and cost budgets. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-27-004. | Policy Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)
POLICY-ENGINE-29-002 | TODO | Provide streaming simulation API comparing two policy versions, returning per-finding deltas without writes; align determinism with Vuln Explorer simulation. Dependencies: POLICY-ENGINE-29-001. | Policy Guild, Findings Ledger Guild (src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md)

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@@ -48,7 +48,12 @@ Notes:
- 2025-10-29: JSON parsers for Java/Node.js/Python/Go implemented; artifacts stored on filesystem with SHA-256 and callgraphs upserted into Mongo.
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
SIGNALS-24-001 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Stand up Signals API skeleton with RBAC, sealed-mode config, DPoP/mTLS enforcement, and `/facts` scaffolding so downstream ingestion work can begin. Dependencies: AUTH-SIG-26-001. | Signals Guild, Authority Guild (src/Signals/StellaOps.Signals/TASKS.md)
SIGNALS-24-002 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Implement callgraph ingestion/normalization (Java/Node/Python/Go) with CAS persistence and retrieval APIs to feed reachability scoring. Dependencies: SIGNALS-24-001. | Signals Guild (src/Signals/StellaOps.Signals/TASKS.md)
SIGNALS-24-003 | BLOCKED (2025-10-27) | Implement runtime facts ingestion endpoint and normalizer (process, sockets, container metadata) populating `context_facts` with AOC provenance.<br>2025-10-27: Depends on `SIGNALS-24-001` for base API host and authentication plumbing. | Signals Guild, Runtime Guild (src/Signals/StellaOps.Signals/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Waiting on SIGNALS-24-001 / SIGNALS-24-002 DOING work to land before flipping this to DOING.
> 2025-11-07: Upstream SIGNALS-24-001 / SIGNALS-24-002 now DOING; this flips to DOING once host + callgraph ingestion merge.
> 2025-11-08: Targeting 2025-11-09 merge for SIGNALS-24-001/002; schema + AOC contract drafted so SIGNALS-24-003 can move to DOING immediately after those PRs land (dependencies confirmed, none missing).
SIGNALS-24-004 | BLOCKED (2025-10-27) | Deliver reachability scoring engine producing states/scores and writing to `reachability_facts`; expose configuration for weights. Dependencies: SIGNALS-24-003.<br>2025-10-27: Upstream ingestion pipelines (`SIGNALS-24-002/003`) blocked; scoring engine cannot proceed. | Signals Guild, Data Science (src/Signals/StellaOps.Signals/TASKS.md)
SIGNALS-24-005 | BLOCKED (2025-10-27) | Implement Redis caches (`reachability_cache:*`), invalidation on new facts, and publish `signals.fact.updated` events. Dependencies: SIGNALS-24-004.<br>2025-10-27: Awaiting scoring engine and ingestion layers before wiring cache/events. | Signals Guild, Platform Events Guild (src/Signals/StellaOps.Signals/TASKS.md)

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@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
ORCH-SVC-38-101 | TODO | Standardize event envelope (policy/export/job lifecycle) with idempotency keys, ensure export/job failure events published to notifier bus with provenance metadata. Dependencies: ORCH-SVC-37-101. | Orchestrator Service Guild (src/Orchestrator/StellaOps.Orchestrator/TASKS.md)
ORCH-SVC-41-101 | TODO | Register `pack-run` job type, persist run metadata, integrate logs/artifacts collection, and expose API for Task Runner scheduling. Dependencies: ORCH-SVC-38-101. | Orchestrator Service Guild (src/Orchestrator/StellaOps.Orchestrator/TASKS.md)
ORCH-SVC-42-101 | TODO | Stream pack run logs via SSE/WS, add manifest endpoints, enforce quotas, and emit pack run events to Notifications Studio. Dependencies: ORCH-SVC-41-101. | Orchestrator Service Guild (src/Orchestrator/StellaOps.Orchestrator/TASKS.md)
ORCH-SVC-42-101 | TODO | Stream pack run logs via SSE/WS, add manifest endpoints, enforce quotas, and emit pack run events to Notifications Studio. Dependencies: ORCH-SVC-41-101. | Orchestrator Service Guild (src/Orchestrator/StellaOps.Orchestrator/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Still NOT STARTED—Authority pack RBAC (AUTH-PACKS-43-001) remains BLOCKED pending these approvals/log-stream APIs. Not missing; needs staffing.
ORCH-TEN-48-001 | TODO | Include `tenant_id`/`project_id` in job specs, set DB session context before processing, enforce context on all queries, and reject jobs missing tenant metadata. | Orchestrator Service Guild (src/Orchestrator/StellaOps.Orchestrator/TASKS.md)
WORKER-GO-32-001 | TODO | Bootstrap Go SDK project with configuration binding, auth headers, job claim/acknowledge client, and smoke sample. | Worker SDK Guild (src/Orchestrator/StellaOps.Orchestrator.WorkerSdk.Go/TASKS.md)
WORKER-GO-32-002 | TODO | Add heartbeat/progress helpers, structured logging hooks, Prometheus metrics, and jittered retry defaults. Dependencies: WORKER-GO-32-001. | Worker SDK Guild (src/Orchestrator/StellaOps.Orchestrator.WorkerSdk.Go/TASKS.md)
@@ -90,7 +91,8 @@ SCHED-IMPACT-16-303 | TODO | Snapshot/compaction + invalidation for removed imag
SCHED-SURFACE-01 | TODO | Evaluate Surface.FS pointers when planning delta scans to avoid redundant work and prioritise drift-triggered assets. | Scheduler Worker Guild (src/Scheduler/__Libraries/StellaOps.Scheduler.Worker/TASKS.md)
SCHED-VULN-29-001 | TODO | Expose resolver job APIs (`POST /vuln/resolver/jobs`, `GET /vuln/resolver/jobs/{id}`) to trigger candidate recomputation per artifact/policy change with RBAC and rate limits. | Scheduler WebService Guild, Findings Ledger Guild (src/Scheduler/StellaOps.Scheduler.WebService/TASKS.md)
SCHED-VULN-29-002 | TODO | Provide projector lag metrics endpoint and webhook notifications for backlog breaches consumed by DevOps dashboards. Dependencies: SCHED-VULN-29-001. | Scheduler WebService Guild, Observability Guild (src/Scheduler/StellaOps.Scheduler.WebService/TASKS.md)
SCHED-WEB-20-002 | BLOCKED (waiting on SCHED-WORKER-20-301) | Provide simulation trigger endpoint returning diff preview metadata and job state for UI/CLI consumption. | Scheduler WebService Guild (src/Scheduler/StellaOps.Scheduler.WebService/TASKS.md)
SCHED-WEB-20-002 | BLOCKED (waiting on SCHED-WORKER-20-301) | Provide simulation trigger endpoint returning diff preview metadata and job state for UI/CLI consumption. | Scheduler WebService Guild (src/Scheduler/StellaOps.Scheduler.WebService/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Worker counterpart (SCHED-WORKER-20-301) now DOING; revisit once API scaffolding lands.
SCHED-WEB-21-004 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Persist graph job lifecycle to Mongo storage and publish `scheduler.graph.job.completed@1` events + outbound webhook to Cartographer. Dependencies: SCHED-WEB-20-002. | Scheduler WebService Guild, Scheduler Storage Guild (src/Scheduler/StellaOps.Scheduler.WebService/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-04: Graph job completions now persist to Mongo with optimistic guards, emit Redis/webhook notifications once per transition, and refresh result URI metadata idempotently (tests cover service + Mongo store paths).
SCHED-WORKER-21-203 | TODO | Export metrics (`graph_build_seconds`, `graph_jobs_inflight`, `overlay_lag_seconds`) and structured logs with tenant/graph identifiers. | Scheduler Worker Guild, Observability Guild (src/Scheduler/__Libraries/StellaOps.Scheduler.Worker/TASKS.md)

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@@ -227,6 +227,14 @@ WEB-AOC-19-001 `Shared AOC guard primitives` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Provide `AOCF
WEB-AOC-19-002 `Provenance & signature helpers` | TODO | Ship `ProvenanceBuilder`, checksum utilities, and signature verification helper integrated with guard logging. Cover DSSE/CMS formats with unit tests. Dependencies: WEB-AOC-19-001. | BE-Base Platform Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
WEB-AOC-19-003 `Analyzer + test fixtures` | TODO | Author Roslyn analyzer preventing ingestion modules from writing forbidden keys without guard, and provide shared test fixtures for guard validation used by Concelier/Excititor service tests. Dependencies: WEB-AOC-19-002. | QA Guild, BE-Base Platform Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
WEB-CONSOLE-23-001 `Global posture endpoints` | TODO | Provide consolidated `/console/dashboard` and `/console/filters` APIs returning tenant-scoped aggregates (findings by severity, VEX override counts, advisory deltas, run health, policy change log). Enforce AOC labelling, deterministic ordering, and cursor-based pagination for drill-down hints. | BE-Base Platform Guild, Product Analytics Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
CONSOLE-VULN-29-001 `Vulnerability workspace` | DOING (2025-11-08) | Build `/console/vuln/*` APIs and filters surfacing tenant-scoped findings with policy/VEX badges so Docs/UI teams can document workflows. Dependencies: WEB-CONSOLE-23-001, CONCELIER-GRAPH-21-001. | Console Guild, BE-Base Platform Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: API scaffolding kicked off; `docs/advisory-ai/console.md` consuming placeholder responses until this lands. Scheduler/Signals hooks queued once filters stabilized.
> 2025-11-08: Driving filter + reachability badge wiring plus `/console/vuln/search` DTOs to keep DOCS-AIAI-31-004 on real payloads; aligning Signals/Scheduler dependencies now that upstream tickets exist.
> 2025-11-08: Published HTTP contract + sample payloads in `docs/api/console/workspaces.md` and `docs/api/console/samples/vuln-findings-sample.json` so Docs can stage screenshots while backend wires up.
CONSOLE-VEX-30-001 `VEX evidence workspace` | DOING (2025-11-08) | Provide `/console/vex/*` APIs streaming VEX statements, justification summaries, and advisory links with SSE refresh hooks. Dependencies: WEB-CONSOLE-23-001, EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001. | Console Guild, BE-Base Platform Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Endpoint contract draft in progress to unblock DOCS-AIAI-31-004 screenshot capture once responses are wired.
> 2025-11-08: Building SSE controller + `/console/vex/events` payloads and syncing Scheduler Signals tasks so DOCS-AIAI-31-004 can embed live data.
> 2025-11-08: SSE schema + NDJSON sample captured in `docs/api/console/workspaces.md` and `docs/api/console/samples/vex-statement-sse.ndjson`; waiting on Scheduler topic hook-up.
WEB-CONSOLE-23-002 `Live status & SSE proxy` | TODO | Expose `/console/status` polling endpoint and `/console/runs/{id}/stream` SSE/WebSocket proxy with heartbeat/backoff, queue lag metrics, and auth scope enforcement. Surface request IDs + retry headers. Dependencies: WEB-CONSOLE-23-001. | BE-Base Platform Guild, Scheduler Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
WEB-CONSOLE-23-003 `Evidence export orchestrator` | TODO | Add `/console/exports` POST/GET routes coordinating evidence bundle creation, streaming CSV/JSON exports, checksum manifest retrieval, and signed attestation references. Ensure requests honor tenant + policy scopes and expose job tracking metadata. Dependencies: WEB-CONSOLE-23-002. | BE-Base Platform Guild, Policy Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)
WEB-CONSOLE-23-004 `Global search router` | TODO | Implement `/console/search` endpoint accepting CVE/GHSA/PURL/SBOM identifiers, performing fan-out queries with caching, ranking, and deterministic tie-breaking. Return typed results for Console navigation; respect result caps and latency SLOs. Dependencies: WEB-CONSOLE-23-003. | BE-Base Platform Guild (src/Web/StellaOps.Web/TASKS.md)

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@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-001 | TODO | Ship deny-all egress policies for Kubernetes (Netw
DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-002 | TODO | Provide import tooling for bundle staging: checksum validation, offline object-store loader scripts, removable media guidance. Dependencies: DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-001. | DevOps Guild, AirGap Importer Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-003 | TODO | Build Bootstrap Pack pipeline bundling images/charts, generating checksums, and publishing manifest for offline transfer. Dependencies: DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-002. | DevOps Guild, Container Distribution Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-001 | TODO | Automate Mirror Bundle creation jobs with dual-control approvals, artifact signing, and checksum publication. Dependencies: DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-003. | DevOps Guild, Mirror Creator Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 | TODO | Configure sealed-mode CI tests that run services with sealed flag and ensure no egress occurs (iptables + mock DNS). Dependencies: DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-001. | DevOps Guild, Authority Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Configure sealed-mode CI tests that run services with sealed flag and ensure no egress occurs (iptables + mock DNS). Dependencies: DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-001. | DevOps Guild, Authority Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
> 2025-11-07: Harness scaffolded at `ops/devops/sealed-mode-ci/*` (README + runner script); integrate into CI to unblock AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001.
> 2025-11-08: `sealed-mode-compose.yml`, `run-sealed-ci.sh`, and `egress_probe.py` committed plus a `sealed-mode-ci` workflow stage that uploads `artifacts/sealed-mode-ci/<commit>/authority-sealed-ci.json`; Authority can now read the sealed evidence feed.
DEVOPS-AIRGAP-58-001 | TODO | Provide local SMTP/syslog container templates and health checks for sealed environments; integrate into Bootstrap Pack. Dependencies: DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002. | DevOps Guild, Notifications Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
DEVOPS-AIRGAP-58-002 | TODO | Ship sealed-mode observability stack (Prometheus/Grafana/Tempo/Loki) pre-configured with offline dashboards and no remote exporters. Dependencies: DEVOPS-AIRGAP-58-001. | DevOps Guild, Observability Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
DEVOPS-AOC-19-001 | BLOCKED (2025-10-26) | Integrate the AOC Roslyn analyzer and guard tests into CI, failing builds when ingestion projects attempt banned writes. | DevOps Guild, Platform Guild (ops/devops/TASKS.md)
@@ -235,4 +237,24 @@ PROV-OBS-54-001 | TODO | Deliver verification library that validates DSSE signat
PROV-OBS-54-002 | TODO | Generate .NET global tool for local verification + embed command helpers for CLI `stella forensic verify`. Provide deterministic packaging and offline kit instructions. Dependencies: PROV-OBS-54-001. | Provenance Guild, DevEx/CLI Guild (src/Provenance/StellaOps.Provenance.Attestation/TASKS.md)
[Ops & Offline] 190.K) Sovereign Crypto Enablement
Depends on: Sprint 100.A - Attestor, Sprint 110.A - AdvisoryAI, Sprint 120.A - AirGap, Sprint 130.A - Scanner, Sprint 140.A - Graph, Sprint 150.A - Orchestrator, Sprint 160.A - EvidenceLocker, Sprint 170.A - Notifier, Sprint 180.A - Cli
Summary: Deliver RootPack_RU-ready sovereign crypto providers (CryptoPro + PKCS#11), configuration knobs, deterministic tests, and repo-wide crypto routing audit.
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
SEC-CRYPTO-90-001 | DONE (2025-11-07) | Produce RootPack_RU sovereign crypto implementation plan, identify provider strategy (CryptoPro + PKCS#11), and slot work into Sprint 190 with task breakdown. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
SEC-CRYPTO-90-002 | DONE (2025-11-07) | Extend signature/catalog constants and configuration schema to recognize `GOST12-256/512`, regional crypto profiles, and provider preference ordering. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
SEC-CRYPTO-90-003 | DONE (2025-11-07) | Implement `StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.CryptoPro` provider (sign/verify/JWK export) using CryptoPro CSP/GostCryptography with deterministic logging + tests. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
SEC-CRYPTO-90-004 | DONE (2025-11-07) | Implement `StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.Pkcs11Gost` provider (Rutoken/JaCarta) via Pkcs11Interop, configurable slot/pin/module management, and disposal safeguards. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
SEC-CRYPTO-90-005 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Add configuration-driven provider selection (`crypto.regionalProfiles`), CLI/diagnostic verb to list providers/keys, and deterministic telemetry for usage. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
SEC-CRYPTO-90-006 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Build deterministic test harness (Streebog + signature vectors), manual runbooks for hardware validation, and capture RootPack audit metadata. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
SEC-CRYPTO-90-007 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Package RootPack_RU artifacts (plugin binaries, config templates, trust anchors) and document deployment/install steps + compliance evidence. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
SEC-CRYPTO-90-008 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Audit repository for any cryptography usage bypassing `StellaOps.Cryptography` and file remediation tasks to route through providers. | Security Guild (src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/TASKS.md)
AUTH-CRYPTO-90-001 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Migrate Authority signing/key-loading paths (provider registry + crypto hash) so regional bundles can select sovereign providers per docs/security/crypto-routing-audit-2025-11-07.md. | Authority Core & Security Guild (src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md)
SCANNER-CRYPTO-90-001 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Route remaining Scanner Worker hashing/digest consumers (Surface pointers, manifest publishers, CAS helpers, Sbomer plugins) through ICryptoHash/provider registry.<br>2025-11-08: EntryTrace execution, Surface manifest writer, Local CAS client, and Sbomer descriptor generator now accept ICryptoHash; tests updated with CryptoHashFactory/TestCryptoHash helpers. | Scanner Worker Guild & Security Guild (src/Scanner/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker/TASKS.md)
CONCELIER-CRYPTO-90-001 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Route OpenAPI discovery hashing plus Concelier mirror/RU connectors through `ICryptoHash`/provider registry so sovereign bundles can swap CryptoPro/PKCS#11 keys without code changes. | Concelier WebService Guild & Security Guild (src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md)
If all tasks are done - read next sprint section - SPRINT_200_documentation_process.md

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@@ -5,15 +5,15 @@ Depends on: Sprint 100.A - Attestor, Sprint 110.A - AdvisoryAI, Sprint 120.A - A
Summary: Documentation & Process focus on Docs Tasks (phase Md.I).
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
DOCS-AIAI-31-001 | TODO | Publish `/docs/advisory-ai/overview.md` covering capabilities, guardrails, RBAC. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-002 | TODO | Author `/docs/advisory-ai/architecture.md` detailing RAG pipeline, deterministics, caching, model options. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-001. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-003 | TODO | Write `/docs/advisory-ai/api.md` describing endpoints, schemas, errors, rate limits. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-002. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-004 | TODO | Create `/docs/advisory-ai/console.md` with screenshots, a11y notes, copy-as-ticket instructions. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-003. | Docs Guild, Console Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-005 | TODO | Publish `/docs/advisory-ai/cli.md` covering commands, exit codes, scripting patterns. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-004. | Docs Guild, DevEx/CLI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-006 | TODO | Update `/docs/policy/assistant-parameters.md` covering temperature, token limits, ranking weights, TTLs. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-005. | Docs Guild, Policy Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-007 | TODO | Write `/docs/security/assistant-guardrails.md` detailing redaction, injection defense, logging. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-006. | Docs Guild, Security Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-008 | TODO | Publish `/docs/sbom/remediation-heuristics.md` (feasibility scoring, blast radius). Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-007. | Docs Guild, SBOM Service Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-009 | TODO | Create `/docs/runbooks/assistant-ops.md` for warmup, cache priming, model outages, scaling. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-008. | Docs Guild, DevOps Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-001 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Publish `/docs/advisory-ai/overview.md` covering capabilities, guardrails, RBAC. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-002 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Author `/docs/advisory-ai/architecture.md` detailing RAG pipeline, deterministics, caching, model options. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-001. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-003 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Write `/docs/advisory-ai/api.md` describing endpoints, schemas, errors, rate limits. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-002. | Docs Guild, Advisory AI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-004 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Create `/docs/advisory-ai/console.md` with screenshots, a11y notes, copy-as-ticket instructions. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-003, CONSOLE-VULN-29-001, CONSOLE-VEX-30-001, EXCITITOR-CONSOLE-23-001. | Docs Guild, Console Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-005 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Publish `/docs/advisory-ai/cli.md` covering commands, exit codes, scripting patterns. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-004, CLI-VULN-29-001, CLI-VEX-30-001. | Docs Guild, DevEx/CLI Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-006 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Update `/docs/policy/assistant-parameters.md` covering temperature, token limits, ranking weights, TTLs. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-005, POLICY-ENGINE-31-001. | Docs Guild, Policy Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-007 | DONE (2025-11-07) | Write `/docs/security/assistant-guardrails.md` detailing redaction, injection defense, logging. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-006. | Docs Guild, Security Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-008 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Publish `/docs/sbom/remediation-heuristics.md` (feasibility scoring, blast radius). Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-007, SBOM-AIAI-31-001. | Docs Guild, SBOM Service Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIAI-31-009 | BLOCKED (2025-11-03) | Create `/docs/runbooks/assistant-ops.md` for warmup, cache priming, model outages, scaling. Dependencies: DOCS-AIAI-31-008, DEVOPS-AIAI-31-001. | Docs Guild, DevOps Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIRGAP-56-001 | TODO | Publish `/docs/airgap/overview.md` outlining modes, lifecycle, responsibilities, and imposed rule banner. | Docs Guild, AirGap Controller Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIRGAP-56-002 | TODO | Author `/docs/airgap/sealing-and-egress.md` covering network policies, EgressPolicy facade usage, and verification steps. Dependencies: DOCS-AIRGAP-56-001. | Docs Guild, DevOps Guild (docs/TASKS.md)
DOCS-AIRGAP-56-003 | TODO | Create `/docs/airgap/mirror-bundles.md` describing bundle format, DSSE/TUF/Merkle validation, creation/import workflows. Dependencies: DOCS-AIRGAP-56-002. | Docs Guild, Exporter Guild (docs/TASKS.md)

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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Sprint 201 - Reachability Explainability & Replay Evidence
[Reachability Delivery] 201.A) Runtime facts + static callgraph union
Depends on: Sprint 140 Runtime Signals, Sprint 185 Replay Core, Sprint 186 Scanner Record Mode, Sprint 187 Evidence & CLI Replay
Summary: Close the explainability gaps by wiring Zastava runtime sampling, Scanner language lifters, Signals scoring, Replay manifests, docs, and test harnesses around the reachbench fixture packs.
Task ID | State | Task description | Owners (Source)
--- | --- | --- | ---
ZASTAVA-REACH-201-001 | TODO | Implement runtime symbol sampling in `StellaOps.Zastava.Observer` (EntryTrace-aware shell AST + build-id capture) and stream ND-JSON batches to Signals `/runtime-facts`, including CAS pointers for traces. Update runbook + config references. | Zastava Observer Guild (`src/Zastava/StellaOps.Zastava.Observer/TASKS.md`)
SCAN-REACH-201-002 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Ship language-aware static lifters (JVM, .NET/Roslyn+IL, Go SSA, Node/Deno TS AST, Rust MIR, Swift SIL, shell/binary analyzers) in Scanner Worker; emit canonical SymbolIDs, CAS-stored graphs, and attach reachability tags to SBOM components. | Scanner Worker Guild (`src/Scanner/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker/TASKS.md`)
SIGNALS-REACH-201-003 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Extend Signals ingestion to accept the new multi-language graphs + runtime facts, normalize into `reachability_graphs` CAS layout, and expose retrieval APIs for Policy/CLI. | Signals Guild (`src/Signals/StellaOps.Signals/TASKS.md`)
SIGNALS-REACH-201-004 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Build the reachability scoring engine (state/score/confidence), wire Redis caches + `signals.fact.updated` events, and integrate reachability weights defined in `docs/11_DATA_SCHEMAS.md`. | Signals Guild · Policy Guild (`src/Signals/StellaOps.Signals/TASKS.md`, `src/Policy/StellaOps.Policy.Engine/TASKS.md`)
REPLAY-REACH-201-005 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Update `StellaOps.Replay.Core` manifest schema + bundle writer so replay packs capture reachability graphs, runtime traces, analyzer versions, and evidence hashes; document new CAS namespace. | BE-Base Platform Guild (`src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Replay.Core/TASKS.md`)
DOCS-REACH-201-006 | TODO | Author the reachability doc set (`docs/signals/reachability.md`, `callgraph-formats.md`, `runtime-facts.md`, CLI/UI appendices) plus update Zastava + Replay guides with the new evidence and operators workflow. | Docs Guild (`docs/TASKS.md`)
QA-REACH-201-007 | TODO | Integrate `reachbench-2025-expanded` fixture pack under `tests/reachability/`, add evaluator harness tests that validate reachable vs unreachable cases, and wire CI guidance for deterministic runs. | QA Guild (`tests/README.md`)
> 2025-11-07: reachbench starter + expanded packs staged under repo root; consuming guilds must relocate fixtures into `tests/reachability/fixtures/` as part of QA-REACH-201-007 before enabling CI.

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@@ -75,9 +75,10 @@ At startup, services **selfadvertise** their semver & channel; the UI surface
### 2.4 Gates & tests
* **Static**: linters, codegen checks, protobuf API freeze (backwardcompat tests).
* **Unit/integration**: percomponent, plus **endtoend** flows (scan→vex→policy→sign→attest).
* **Perf SLOs**: hot paths (SBOM compose, diff, export) measured against budgets.
* **Security**: dependency audit vs Concelier export; container hardening tests; minimal caps.
* **Unit/integration**: per-component, plus **end-to-end** flows (scan→vex→policy→sign→attest).
* **Perf SLOs**: hot paths (SBOM compose, diff, export) measured against budgets.
* **Security**: dependency audit vs Concelier export; container hardening tests; minimal caps.
* **Deployment assets**: `Build Test Deploy` workflows `profile-validation` job installs Helm and runs `helm lint` + `helm template` against `deploy/helm/stellaops` for every `values*.yaml`, catching ConfigMap/templating drift before merges.
* **Analyzer smoke**: restart-time language plug-ins (currently Python) verified via `dotnet run --project src/Tools/LanguageAnalyzerSmoke` to ensure manifest integrity plus cold vs warm determinism (<30s / <5s budgets); the harness logs deviations from repository goldens for follow-up.
* **Canary cohort**: internal staging + selected customers; one week on **edge** before **stable** tag.

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
# Findings Ledger — Workflow Inference Notes
> **Audience:** Findings Ledger Guild, Vuln Explorer API, Console Guild
> **Scope:** How workflow mutations (assign/comment/accept-risk/etc.) derive canonical ledger inputs when the caller omits low-level fields.
## 1. Chain + sequencing
- **Chain derivation.** When a request does not provide `chainId`, we deterministically derive it from `tenantId :: policyVersion` (`Guid` from SHA-256 first 16 bytes). This keeps per-policy ordering stable and avoids callers leaking raw GUID logic.
- **Sequence number.** We fetch the current chain head and expect `head.sequence + 1`. If the chain has no entries, the expected sequence is `1`. The append path still enforces optimistic concurrency and rejects mismatches.
- **Previous hash.** We reuse the heads `event_hash` (defaulting to the all-zero hash for genesis events) so writers dont need to manage hash pointers.
## 2. Event identifiers + timestamps
- **Event IDs.** If the caller omits `eventId`, we mint a V7 GUID to keep chronological ordering while remaining globally unique.
- **Occurred / recorded timestamps.** `occurredAt` defaults to “now” in UTC (based on `TimeProvider`). `recordedAt` always comes from the services `TimeProvider` to avoid caller-provided drift.
## 3. Status & severity fallbacks
- The reducer already maps event types to canonical statuses. Workflow service only writes `status` when the mutation explicitly changes it (e.g., `accept-risk``accepted_risk`, `target-fix``in_progress`, `verify-fix``verified`, `reopen``affected`). Otherwise we leave status null and let the reducer infer it.
- Severity is never inferred inside workflow handlers—they rely on policy evaluation or reducer logic.
## 4. Attachments metadata
- Attachments now include security context: every entry captures an AES-256-GCM envelope (`algorithm`, `ciphertext`, `nonce`, `tag`, `expiresAt`) derived from `attachments.encryptionKey`.
- Signed URLs are generated with HMAC-SHA256 using `attachments.signedUrlSecret` and inherit `attachments.signedUrlLifetime` (default 15 minutes). URLs plus envelopes share the same expiry window.
- Metadata is normalized (trimmed keys, deterministic ordering) before encryption so ledger hashes remain stable; duplicate IDs are deduplicated.
- Actual binary blobs stay in Evidence Locker/S3; the envelope is what downstream services use to decrypt the blob once downloaded.
## 5. Validation surface
- All handlers enforce tenant/policy/finding/artifact/vuln IDs, actor identity, and supported actor types.
- Mutation-specific requirements (e.g., assignment requires assignee, accept-risk needs justification) are validated before any ledger append occurs.
- Attachments are validated for ID/file name/MIME type/positive size and 64-char SHA-256 digests before encryption, preventing malformed payloads from burning hashes or emitting invalid URLs.
These rules let upstream APIs/clients send high-level workflow intents without micromanaging ledger sequencing or hashing, while preserving deterministic ledger entries. LEDGER-29-005 implements the service described here; LEDGER-29-006 builds on it for secure attachment handling.

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@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
2. `inputbundle.tar.zst` (feeds, policies, tools, environment snapshot).
3. `outputbundle.tar.zst` (SBOM, findings, VEX, logs, Merkle proofs).
Every artifact is signed with multi-profile keys (FIPS, GOST, SM, etc.) managed by Authority. See `docs/replay/DETERMINISTIC_REPLAY.md` §2§5 for the full schema.
- **Reachability subtree:** When reachability recording is enabled, Scanner uploads graphs & runtime traces under `cas://replay/<scan-id>/reachability/graphs/` and `cas://replay/<scan-id>/reachability/traces/`. Manifest references (StellaOps.Replay.Core) bind these URIs along with analyzer hashes so Replay + Signals can rehydrate explainability evidence deterministically.
- **Storage tiers:** Primary storage is Mongo (`replay_runs`, `replay_subjects`) plus the CAS bucket. Evidence Locker mirrors bundles for long-term retention and legal hold workflows (`docs/modules/evidence-locker/architecture.md`). Offline kits package bundles under `offline/replay/<scan-id>` with detached DSSE envelopes for air-gapped verification.
- **APIs & ownership:** Scanner WebService produces the bundles via `record` mode, Scanner Worker emits Merkle metadata, Signer/Authority provide DSSE signatures, Attestor anchors manifests to Rekor, CLI/Evidence Locker handle retrieval, and Docs Guild maintains runbooks. Responsibilities are tracked in `docs/implplan/SPRINT_185_replay_core.md` through `SPRINT_187_evidence_cli_replay.md`.
- **Operational policies:** Retention defaults to 180days for hot CAS storage and 2years for cold Evidence Locker copies. Rotation and pruning follow the checklist in `docs/runbooks/replay_ops.md`.

View File

@@ -25,6 +25,51 @@ This guide captures the canonical signals emitted by Concelier and Excititor onc
- **Stale ingestion:** Alert when `max_over_time(ingestion_latency_seconds_sum / ingestion_latency_seconds_count)[30m]` exceeds 30s or if `ingestion_write_total` has no growth for >60min.
- **Signature drop:** Warn when `rate(ingestion_signature_verified_total{result="fail"}[1h]) > 0`.
### 1.2 · `/obs/excititor/health`
`GET /obs/excititor/health` (scope `vex.admin`) returns a compact snapshot for Grafana tiles and Console widgets:
- `ingest` — overall status, worst lag (seconds), and the top connectors (status, lagSeconds, failure count, last success).
- `link` — freshness of consensus/linkset processing plus document counts and the number currently carrying conflicts.
- `signature` — recent coverage window (evaluated, with signatures, verified, failures, unsigned, coverage ratio).
- `conflicts` — rolling totals grouped by status plus per-bucket trend data for charts.
```json
{
"generatedAt": "2025-11-08T11:00:00Z",
"ingest": { "status": "healthy", "connectors": [ { "connectorId": "excititor:redhat", "lagSeconds": 45.3 } ] },
"link": { "status": "warning", "lastConsensusAt": "2025-11-08T10:57:03Z" },
"signature": { "status": "critical", "documentsEvaluated": 120, "verified": 30, "failures": 2 },
"conflicts": { "status": "warning", "conflictStatements": 325, "trend": [ { "bucketStart": "2025-11-08T10:00:00Z", "conflicts": 130 } ] }
}
```
| Setting | Default | Purpose |
|---------|---------|---------|
| `Excititor:Observability:IngestWarningThreshold` | `06:00:00` | Connector lag before `ingest.status` becomes `warning`. |
| `Excititor:Observability:IngestCriticalThreshold` | `24:00:00` | Connector lag before `ingest.status` becomes `critical`. |
| `Excititor:Observability:LinkWarningThreshold` | `00:15:00` | Maximum acceptable delay between consensus recalculations. |
| `Excititor:Observability:LinkCriticalThreshold` | `01:00:00` | Delay that marks link status as `critical`. |
| `Excititor:Observability:SignatureWindow` | `12:00:00` | Lookback window for signature coverage. |
| `Excititor:Observability:SignatureHealthyCoverage` | `0.8` | Coverage ratio that still counts as healthy. |
| `Excititor:Observability:SignatureWarningCoverage` | `0.5` | Coverage ratio that flips the status to `warning`. |
| `Excititor:Observability:ConflictTrendWindow` | `24:00:00` | Rolling window used for conflict aggregation. |
| `Excititor:Observability:ConflictTrendBucketMinutes` | `60` | Resolution of conflict `trend` buckets. |
| `Excititor:Observability:ConflictWarningRatio` | `0.15` | Fraction of consensus docs with conflicts that triggers `warning`. |
| `Excititor:Observability:ConflictCriticalRatio` | `0.3` | Ratio that marks `conflicts.status` as `critical`. |
| `Excititor:Observability:MaxConnectorDetails` | `50` | Number of connector entries returned (keeps payloads small). |
### 1.3 · Regression & DI hygiene
1. **Keep storage/integration tests green when telemetry touches persistence.**
- `./tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh start` downloads MongoDB6.0.16 (if needed), launches `rs0`, and prints `export EXCITITOR_TEST_MONGO_URI=mongodb://.../excititor-tests`. Copy that export into your shell.
- `./tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh restart` is a shortcut for “stop if running, then start” using the same dataset—use it after tweaking config or when tests need a bounce without wiping fixtures.
- `./tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh clean` stops the instance (if running) and deletes the managed data/log directories so storage tests begin from a pristine catalog.
- Run `dotnet test src/Excititor/__Tests/StellaOps.Excititor.Storage.Mongo.Tests/StellaOps.Excititor.Storage.Mongo.Tests.csproj -nologo -v minimal` (add `--filter` if you only touched specific suites). These tests exercise the same write paths that feed the dashboards, so regressions show up immediately.
- `./tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh stop` when finished so CI/dev hosts stay clean; `status|logs|shell` are available for troubleshooting.
2. **Declare optional Minimal API dependencies with `[FromServices] ... = null`.** RequestDelegateFactory treats `[FromServices] IVexSigner? signer = null` (or similar) as optional, so host startup succeeds even when tests have not registered that service. This pattern keeps observability endpoints cancellable while avoiding brittle test overrides.
---
## 2·Traces
@@ -45,6 +90,35 @@ This guide captures the canonical signals emitted by Concelier and Excititor onc
- Use `aoc.guard` spans to inspect guard payload snapshots. Sensitive fields are redacted automatically; raw JSON lives in secure logs only.
- For scheduled verification, filter traces by `initiator="scheduled"` to compare runtimes pre/post change.
### 2.3Telemetry configuration (Excititor)
- Configure the web service via `Excititor:Telemetry`:
```jsonc
{
"Excititor": {
"Telemetry": {
"Enabled": true,
"EnableTracing": true,
"EnableMetrics": true,
"ServiceName": "stellaops-excititor-web",
"OtlpEndpoint": "http://otel-collector:4317",
"OtlpHeaders": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${OTEL_PUSH_TOKEN}"
},
"ResourceAttributes": {
"env": "prod-us",
"service.group": "ingestion"
}
}
}
}
```
- Point the OTLP endpoint at the shared collector profile from §1 so Excititor metrics land in the `ingestion_*` dashboards next to Concelier. Resource attributes drive Grafana filtering (e.g., `env`, `service.group`).
- For offline/air-gap bundles set `Enabled=false` and collect the file exporter artifacts from the Offline Kit; import them into Grafana after transfer to keep time-to-truth dashboards consistent.
- Local development templates: run `tools/mongodb/local-mongo.sh start` to spin up a single-node replica set plus the matching `mongosh` client. The script prints the `export EXCITITOR_TEST_MONGO_URI=...` command that integration tests (e.g., `StellaOps.Excititor.Storage.Mongo.Tests`) will honor. Use `restart` for a quick bounce, `clean` to wipe data between suites, and `stop` when finished.
---
## 3·Logs
@@ -61,6 +135,13 @@ Structured logs include the following keys (JSON):
| `violation.code` | Present when guard rejects `ERR_AOC_00x`. |
| `verification.window` | Present on `/aoc/verify` job logs. |
Excititor APIs mirror these identifiers via response headers:
| Header | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `X-Stella-TraceId` | W3C trace/span identifier for deep-linking from Console → Grafana/Loki. |
| `X-Stella-CorrelationId` | Stable correlation identifier (respects inbound header or falls back to the request trace ID). |
Logs are shipped to the central Loki/Elasticsearch cluster. Use the template query:
```logql

View File

@@ -1,124 +1,138 @@
# Policy Gateway
> **Delivery scope:** `StellaOps.Policy.Gateway` minimal API service fronting Policy Engine pack CRUD + activation endpoints for UI/CLI clients. Sender-constrained with DPoP and tenant headers, suitable for online and Offline Kit deployments.
## 1 · Responsibilities
- Proxy policy pack CRUD and activation requests to Policy Engine while enforcing scope policies (`policy:read`, `policy:author`, `policy:review`, `policy:operate`, `policy:activate`).
- Normalise responses (DTO + `ProblemDetails`) so Console, CLI, and automation receive consistent payloads.
- Guard activation actions with structured logging and metrics so approvals are auditable.
- Support dual auth modes:
- Forwarded caller tokens (Console/CLI) with DPoP proofs + `X-Stella-Tenant` header.
- Gateway client credentials (DPoP) for service automation or Offline Kit flows when no caller token is present.
## 2 · Endpoints
| Route | Method | Description | Required scope(s) |
|-------|--------|-------------|-------------------|
| `/api/policy/packs` | `GET` | List policy packs and revisions for the active tenant. | `policy:read` |
| `/api/policy/packs` | `POST` | Create a policy pack shell or upsert display metadata. | `policy:author` |
| `/api/policy/packs/{packId}/revisions` | `POST` | Create or update a policy revision (draft/approved). | `policy:author` |
| `/api/policy/packs/{packId}/revisions/{version}:activate` | `POST` | Activate a revision, enforcing single/two-person approvals. | `policy:operate`, `policy:activate` |
### Response shapes
- Successful responses return camel-case DTOs matching `PolicyPackDto`, `PolicyRevisionDto`, or `PolicyRevisionActivationDto` as described in the Policy Engine API doc (`/docs/api/policy.md`).
- Errors always return RFC 7807 `ProblemDetails` with deterministic fields (`title`, `detail`, `status`). Missing caller credentials now surface `401` with `"Upstream authorization missing"` detail.
## 3 · Authentication & headers
| Header | Source | Notes |
|--------|--------|-------|
| `Authorization` | Forwarded caller token *or* gateway client credentials. | Caller tokens must include tenant scope; gateway tokens default to `DPoP` scheme. |
| `DPoP` | Caller or gateway. | Required when Authority mandates proof-of-possession (default). Generated per request; gateway keeps ES256/ES384 key material under `etc/policy-gateway-dpop.pem`. |
| `X-Stella-Tenant` | Caller | Tenant isolation header. Forwarded unchanged; gateway automation omits it. |
Gateway client credentials are configured in `policy-gateway.yaml`:
```yaml
policyEngine:
baseAddress: "https://policy-engine.internal"
audience: "api://policy-engine"
clientCredentials:
enabled: true
clientId: "policy-gateway"
clientSecret: "<secret>"
scopes:
- policy:read
- policy:author
- policy:review
- policy:operate
- policy:activate
dpop:
enabled: true
keyPath: "../etc/policy-gateway-dpop.pem"
algorithm: "ES256"
```
> 🔐 **DPoP key** store the private key alongside Offline Kit secrets; rotate it whenever the gateway identity or Authority configuration changes.
## 4 · Metrics & logging
All activation calls emit:
- `policy_gateway_activation_requests_total{outcome,source}` counter labelled with `outcome` (`activated`, `pending_second_approval`, `already_active`, `bad_request`, `not_found`, `unauthorized`, `forbidden`, `error`) and `source` (`caller`, `service`).
- `policy_gateway_activation_latency_ms{outcome,source}` histogram measuring proxy latency.
Structured logs (category `StellaOps.Policy.Gateway.Activation`) include `PackId`, `Version`, `Outcome`, `Source`, and upstream status code for audit trails.
## 5 · Sample `curl` workflows
Assuming you already obtained a DPoP-bound access token (`$TOKEN`) for tenant `acme`:
```bash
# Generate a DPoP proof for GET via the CLI helper
DPoP_PROOF=$(stella auth dpop proof \
--htu https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs \
--htm GET \
--token "$TOKEN")
curl -sS https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs \
-H "Authorization: DPoP $TOKEN" \
-H "DPoP: $DPoP_PROOF" \
-H "X-Stella-Tenant: acme"
# Draft a new revision
DPoP_PROOF=$(stella auth dpop proof \
--htu https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions \
--htm POST \
--token "$TOKEN")
curl -sS https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions \
-H "Authorization: DPoP $TOKEN" \
-H "DPoP: $DPoP_PROOF" \
-H "X-Stella-Tenant: acme" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"version":5,"requiresTwoPersonApproval":true,"initialStatus":"Draft"}'
# Activate revision 5 (returns 202 when awaiting the second approver)
DPoP_PROOF=$(stella auth dpop proof \
--htu https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions/5:activate \
--htm POST \
--token "$TOKEN")
curl -sS https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions/5:activate \
-H "Authorization: DPoP $TOKEN" \
-H "DPoP: $DPoP_PROOF" \
-H "X-Stella-Tenant: acme" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"comment":"Rollout baseline"}'
```
For air-gapped environments, bundle `policy-gateway.yaml` and the DPoP key in the Offline Kit (see `/docs/24_OFFLINE_KIT.md` §5.7).
> **DPoP proof helper:** Use `stella auth dpop proof` to mint sender-constrained proofs locally. The command accepts `--htu`, `--htm`, and `--token` arguments and emits a ready-to-use header value. Teams maintaining alternate tooling (for example, `scripts/make-dpop.sh`) can substitute it as long as the inputs and output match the CLI behaviour.
## 6 · Offline Kit guidance
- Include `policy-gateway.yaml.sample` and the resolved runtime config in the Offline Kits `config/` tree.
- Place the DPoP private key under `secrets/policy-gateway-dpop.pem` with restricted permissions; document rotation steps in the manifest.
- When building verification scripts, use the gateway endpoints above instead of hitting Policy Engine directly. The Offline Kit validator now expects `policy_gateway_activation_requests_total` metrics in the Prometheus snapshot.
## 7 · Change log
- **2025-10-27 Sprint 18.5**: Initial gateway bootstrap + activation metrics + DPoP client credentials.
# Policy Gateway
> **Delivery scope:** `StellaOps.Policy.Gateway` minimal API service fronting Policy Engine pack CRUD + activation endpoints for UI/CLI clients. Sender-constrained with DPoP and tenant headers, suitable for online and Offline Kit deployments.
## 1 · Responsibilities
- Proxy policy pack CRUD and activation requests to Policy Engine while enforcing scope policies (`policy:read`, `policy:author`, `policy:review`, `policy:operate`, `policy:activate`).
- Normalise responses (DTO + `ProblemDetails`) so Console, CLI, and automation receive consistent payloads.
- Guard activation actions with structured logging and metrics so approvals are auditable.
- Support dual auth modes:
- Forwarded caller tokens (Console/CLI) with DPoP proofs + `X-Stella-Tenant` header.
- Gateway client credentials (DPoP) for service automation or Offline Kit flows when no caller token is present.
## 2 · Endpoints
| Route | Method | Description | Required scope(s) |
|-------|--------|-------------|-------------------|
| `/api/policy/packs` | `GET` | List policy packs and revisions for the active tenant. | `policy:read` |
| `/api/policy/packs` | `POST` | Create a policy pack shell or upsert display metadata. | `policy:author` |
| `/api/policy/packs/{packId}/revisions` | `POST` | Create or update a policy revision (draft/approved). | `policy:author` |
| `/api/policy/packs/{packId}/revisions/{version}:activate` | `POST` | Activate a revision, enforcing single/two-person approvals. | `policy:operate`, `policy:activate` |
### Response shapes
- Successful responses return camel-case DTOs matching `PolicyPackDto`, `PolicyRevisionDto`, or `PolicyRevisionActivationDto` as described in the Policy Engine API doc (`/docs/api/policy.md`).
- Errors always return RFC 7807 `ProblemDetails` with deterministic fields (`title`, `detail`, `status`). Missing caller credentials now surface `401` with `"Upstream authorization missing"` detail.
### Dual-control activation
- **Config-driven.** Set `PolicyEngine.activation.forceTwoPersonApproval=true` when every activation must collect two distinct `policy:activate` approvals. When false, operators can opt into dual-control per revision (`requiresTwoPersonApproval: true`).
- **Defaults.** `PolicyEngine.activation.defaultRequiresTwoPersonApproval` feeds the default when callers omit the checkbox/flag.
- **Statuses.** First approval on a dual-control revision returns `202 pending_second_approval`; duplicate actors get `400 duplicate_approval`; the second distinct approver receives the usual `200 activated`.
- **Audit trail.** With `PolicyEngine.activation.emitAuditLogs` on, Policy Engine emits structured `policy.activation.*` scopes (pack id, revision, tenant, approver IDs, comments) so the gateway metrics/ELK dashboards can show who approved what.
#### Activation configuration wiring
- **Helm ConfigMap.** `deploy/helm/stellaops/values*.yaml` now include a `policy-engine-activation` ConfigMap. The chart automatically injects it via `envFrom` into both the Policy Engine and Policy Gateway pods, so overriding the ConfigMap data updates the services with no manifest edits.
- **Type safety.** Quote ConfigMap values (e.g., `"true"`, `"false"`) because Kubernetes ConfigMaps carry string data. This mirrors the defaults checked into the repo and keeps `helm template` deterministic.
- **File-based overrides (optional).** The Policy Engine host already probes `/config/policy-engine/activation.yaml`, `../etc/policy-engine.activation.yaml`, and ambient `policy-engine.activation.yaml` files beside the binary. Mounting the ConfigMap as a file at `/config/policy-engine/activation.yaml` works immediately if/when we add a volume.
- **Offline/Compose.** Compose/offline bundles can continue exporting `STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE__ACTIVATION__*` variables directly; the ConfigMap wiring simply mirrors those keys for Kubernetes clusters.
## 3 · Authentication & headers
| Header | Source | Notes |
|--------|--------|-------|
| `Authorization` | Forwarded caller token *or* gateway client credentials. | Caller tokens must include tenant scope; gateway tokens default to `DPoP` scheme. |
| `DPoP` | Caller or gateway. | Required when Authority mandates proof-of-possession (default). Generated per request; gateway keeps ES256/ES384 key material under `etc/policy-gateway-dpop.pem`. |
| `X-Stella-Tenant` | Caller | Tenant isolation header. Forwarded unchanged; gateway automation omits it. |
Gateway client credentials are configured in `policy-gateway.yaml`:
```yaml
policyEngine:
baseAddress: "https://policy-engine.internal"
audience: "api://policy-engine"
clientCredentials:
enabled: true
clientId: "policy-gateway"
clientSecret: "<secret>"
scopes:
- policy:read
- policy:author
- policy:review
- policy:operate
- policy:activate
dpop:
enabled: true
keyPath: "../etc/policy-gateway-dpop.pem"
algorithm: "ES256"
```
> 🔐 **DPoP key** store the private key alongside Offline Kit secrets; rotate it whenever the gateway identity or Authority configuration changes.
## 4 · Metrics & logging
All activation calls emit:
- `policy_gateway_activation_requests_total{outcome,source}` counter labelled with `outcome` (`activated`, `pending_second_approval`, `already_active`, `bad_request`, `not_found`, `unauthorized`, `forbidden`, `error`) and `source` (`caller`, `service`).
- `policy_gateway_activation_latency_ms{outcome,source}` histogram measuring proxy latency.
Structured logs (category `StellaOps.Policy.Gateway.Activation`) include `PackId`, `Version`, `Outcome`, `Source`, and upstream status code for audit trails.
## 5 · Sample `curl` workflows
Assuming you already obtained a DPoP-bound access token (`$TOKEN`) for tenant `acme`:
```bash
# Generate a DPoP proof for GET via the CLI helper
DPoP_PROOF=$(stella auth dpop proof \
--htu https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs \
--htm GET \
--token "$TOKEN")
curl -sS https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs \
-H "Authorization: DPoP $TOKEN" \
-H "DPoP: $DPoP_PROOF" \
-H "X-Stella-Tenant: acme"
# Draft a new revision
DPoP_PROOF=$(stella auth dpop proof \
--htu https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions \
--htm POST \
--token "$TOKEN")
curl -sS https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions \
-H "Authorization: DPoP $TOKEN" \
-H "DPoP: $DPoP_PROOF" \
-H "X-Stella-Tenant: acme" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"version":5,"requiresTwoPersonApproval":true,"initialStatus":"Draft"}'
# Activate revision 5 (returns 202 when awaiting the second approver)
DPoP_PROOF=$(stella auth dpop proof \
--htu https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions/5:activate \
--htm POST \
--token "$TOKEN")
curl -sS https://gateway.example.com/api/policy/packs/policy.core/revisions/5:activate \
-H "Authorization: DPoP $TOKEN" \
-H "DPoP: $DPoP_PROOF" \
-H "X-Stella-Tenant: acme" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"comment":"Rollout baseline"}'
```
For air-gapped environments, bundle `policy-gateway.yaml` and the DPoP key in the Offline Kit (see `/docs/24_OFFLINE_KIT.md` §5.7).
> **DPoP proof helper:** Use `stella auth dpop proof` to mint sender-constrained proofs locally. The command accepts `--htu`, `--htm`, and `--token` arguments and emits a ready-to-use header value. Teams maintaining alternate tooling (for example, `scripts/make-dpop.sh`) can substitute it as long as the inputs and output match the CLI behaviour.
## 6 · Offline Kit guidance
- Include `policy-gateway.yaml.sample` and the resolved runtime config in the Offline Kits `config/` tree.
- Place the DPoP private key under `secrets/policy-gateway-dpop.pem` with restricted permissions; document rotation steps in the manifest.
- When building verification scripts, use the gateway endpoints above instead of hitting Policy Engine directly. The Offline Kit validator now expects `policy_gateway_activation_requests_total` metrics in the Prometheus snapshot.
## 7 · Change log
- **2025-10-27 Sprint 18.5**: Initial gateway bootstrap + activation metrics + DPoP client credentials.

View File

@@ -98,23 +98,58 @@ C --> J[Blob Store: Input/Output Bundles]
],
"trustProfile": "sha256:..."
},
"outputs": {
"sbomHash": "sha256:...",
"findingsHash": "sha256:...",
"vexHash": "sha256:...",
"logHash": "sha256:..."
},
"provenance": {
"signer": "scanner.authority",
"dsseEnvelopeHash": "sha256:...",
"rekorEntry": "optional"
}
}
```
---
## 4. Deterministic Execution Rules
"outputs": {
"sbomHash": "sha256:...",
"findingsHash": "sha256:...",
"vexHash": "sha256:...",
"logHash": "sha256:..."
},
"reachability": {
"graphs": [
{
"kind": "static",
"analyzer": "scanner/java@sha256:...",
"casUri": "cas://replay/scan-123/reachability/static-graph.tar.zst",
"sha256": "abc123"
},
{
"kind": "framework",
"analyzer": "scanner/framework@sha256:...",
"casUri": "cas://replay/scan-123/reachability/framework-graph.tar.zst",
"sha256": "def456"
}
],
"runtimeTraces": [
{
"source": "zastava",
"casUri": "cas://replay/scan-123/reachability/runtime-trace.ndjson.zst",
"sha256": "feedface",
"recordedAt": "2025-11-07T11:10:00Z"
}
]
},
"provenance": {
"signer": "scanner.authority",
"dsseEnvelopeHash": "sha256:...",
"rekorEntry": "optional"
}
}
```
### 3.2 Reachability Section
The optional `reachability` block captures the inputs needed to replay explainability decisions:
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `reachability.graphs[]` | References to static/framework callgraph bundles. Each entry records the producing analyzer (`analyzer`/`version`), the CAS URI under `cas://replay/<scan-id>/reachability/graphs/`, and the SHA-256 digest of the tarball. |
| `reachability.runtimeTraces[]` | References to runtime observation bundles (e.g., Zastava ND-JSON traces). Each item stores the emitting source, CAS URI (typically `cas://replay/<scan-id>/reachability/traces/`), SHA-256, and capture timestamp. |
Replay engines MUST verify every referenced artifact hash before re-evaluating reachability. Missing graphs downgrade affected signals to `reachability:unknown` and should raise policy warnings.
---
## 4. Deterministic Execution Rules
### 4.1 Environment Normalization

View File

@@ -30,10 +30,11 @@ Replay is the foundation for:
| **Subject** | OCI image digest, per-layer Merkle roots | ✅ |
| **Outputs** | SBOM, Findings, VEX, logs (content hashes) | ✅ |
| **Toolchain** | Sbomer, Scanner, Vexer binaries + versions + SHA256 | ✅ |
| **Feeds/VEX sources** | Full or pruned snapshot with Merkle proofs | ✅ |
| **Policy Bundle** | Lattice rules, mutes, trust profiles, thresholds | ✅ |
| **Environment** | OS, arch, locale, TZ, deterministic seed, runtime flags | ✅ |
| **Crypto Profile** | Algorithm suites (FIPS, GOST, SM, eIDAS) | ✅ |
| **Feeds/VEX sources** | Full or pruned snapshot with Merkle proofs | ✅ |
| **Policy Bundle** | Lattice rules, mutes, trust profiles, thresholds | ✅ |
| **Environment** | OS, arch, locale, TZ, deterministic seed, runtime flags | ✅ |
| **Reachability Evidence** | Callgraphs (`graphs[]`), runtime traces (`runtimeTraces[]`), analyzer/version hashes | ✅ |
| **Crypto Profile** | Algorithm suites (FIPS, GOST, SM, eIDAS) | ✅ |
---
@@ -69,8 +70,9 @@ stella replay manifest.json --what-if --vary=feeds
## Workflow
1. `stella scan image:tag --record out/`
- Generates Replay Manifest, InputBundle, OutputBundle, DSSE sigs.
1. `stella scan image:tag --record out/`
- Generates Replay Manifest, InputBundle, OutputBundle, DSSE sigs.
- Captures reachability graphs/traces (if enabled) and references them via `reachability.graphs[]` + `runtimeTraces[]`.
2. `stella verify manifest.json`
- Validates hashes, signatures, and completeness.
3. `stella replay manifest.json --strict`
@@ -82,14 +84,15 @@ stella replay manifest.json --what-if --vary=feeds
---
## Storage
- **Mongo collections**
- `replay_runs`: manifest + DSSE envelopes + status
- `bundles`: content-addressed (input/output/rootpack)
- `subjects`: OCI digests, Merkle roots per layer
- **File store**
- Bundles stored as `<sha256>.tar.zst`
## Storage
- **Mongo collections**
- `replay_runs`: manifest + DSSE envelopes + status
- `bundles`: content-addressed (input/output/rootpack)
- `subjects`: OCI digests, Merkle roots per layer
- `reachability_facts`: graph & runtime trace references tied to scan subjects
- **File store**
- Bundles stored as `<sha256>.tar.zst`
---

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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ This playbook enumerates the deterministic replay validation suite. It guides th
| T-RETENTION-006 | **Retention Sweep** | Ensure Evidence Locker prunes hot CAS after SLA while preserving cold storage copies. | Evidence Locker, Ops | Replay retention config, audit logs |
| T-OFFLINE-007 | **Offline Kit Replay** | Execute `stella replay` using only Offline Kit artifacts. | CLI, Evidence Locker | Offline kit bundle, local RootPack |
| T-OPA-008 | **Runbook Drill** | Simulate replay-driven incident response per `docs/runbooks/replay_ops.md`. | Ops Guild, Scanner, Authority | Runbook checklist, incident notes |
| T-REACH-009 | **Reachability Replay** | Rehydrate reachability graphs/traces from replay bundles and compare against reachbench fixtures. | Scanner, Signals, Replay | `reachbench-2025-expanded`, reachability CAS references |
---
@@ -50,7 +51,8 @@ This playbook enumerates the deterministic replay validation suite. It guides th
- [ ] Replay verification metrics ingested into Telemetry Stack dashboards.
- [ ] Evidence Locker retention job validated against hot/cold tiers.
- [ ] CLI documentation updated with troubleshooting steps observed during tests.
- [ ] Runbook drill logged with timestamp and owners in `docs/runbooks/replay_ops.md`.
- [ ] Runbook drill logged with timestamp and owners in `docs/runbooks/replay_ops.md`.
- [ ] Reachability replay drill captured (`T-REACH-009`) with fixture references and Signals verification logs.
---

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@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
# Crypto Routing Audit — 07 Nov 2025
**Scope.** Inventory direct uses of `System.Security.Cryptography` (and related primitives) outside the `StellaOps.Cryptography*` stack to identify callers that must be routed through sovereign-aware providers (default, PKCS#11, CryptoPro, future PQC).
**Method.** `rg -l "using System.Security.Cryptography" src | grep -Ev "__Tests|\.Tests/"` (filtered for runtime code). Counts reflect unique files per top-level module.
## Summary (runtime files by module)
| Module/Area | Files bypassing shared crypto |
|-------------|------------------------------|
| Concelier | 34 |
| Scanner | 31 |
| Authority | 20 |
| Excititor | 18 |
| Attestor | 18 |
| EvidenceLocker | 10 |
| Findings / Vuln Explorer | 7 |
| Zastava | 6 |
| ExportCenter| 6 |
| Policy | 4 |
| Scheduler | 3 |
| CLI | 3 |
| Bench | 3 |
| AdvisoryAI | 3 |
| Other (Notify, Registry, Signals, etc.) | 11 combined |
## Configuring `crypto.regionalProfiles`
All hosts can now express provider ordering and profile overrides via configuration:
```yaml
Crypto:
registry:
preferredProviders:
- default
- ru.pkcs11
activeProfile: ru-offline
profiles:
ru-offline:
preferredProviders:
- ru.cryptopro.csp
- ru.pkcs11
pkcs11:
keys:
- keyId: ru-slot-token
libraryPath: /usr/local/lib/librutokenecp.so
slotId: "0x1"
privateKeyLabel: signing-key
certificateThumbprint: "<thumbprint>"
cryptopro:
keys:
- keyId: ru-csp-token
libraryPath: /opt/cprocsp/lib/libcapi20.so
containerLabel: KRYPTO_PRO_KEY
certificateThumbprint: "<thumbprint>"
```
Each deployment picks a profile (`activeProfile`) that resolves to a deterministic provider order, and individual services call into `ICryptoProviderRegistry` rather than new-ing crypto stacks directly.
## Inspecting providers from the CLI
`stellaops crypto providers` now lists the registered providers, signing algorithms, certificate metadata, and the current preferred order. Use `--json` for machine-readable output or `--profile <name>` to preview another profile (e.g., `ru-offline`) before flipping configuration.
## High-priority hotspots
### Concelier (ingestion + mirror connectors)
- `src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/Services/OpenApiDiscoveryDocumentProvider.cs` builds SHA256 hashes for discovery docs inline.
- `src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.StellaOpsMirror/Security/MirrorSignatureVerifier.cs` performs RSA verification directly.
- `src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki/RuNkckiConnector.cs` and `.Ru.Bdu` local hash/signature handling for regional advisories.
**Action:** Introduce `ICryptoProviderRegistry` consumption inside connector/lib assemblies (probably through lightweight adapter service). File follow-up tasks in `src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/TASKS.md` and connector TASK boards to migrate hashing/signing to the new PKCS#11/CryptoPro providers (priority for RU feeds to unblock RootPack_RU).
### Scanner (web service, worker, Sbomer plug-ins)
- `src/Scanner/StellaOps.Scanner.WebService/Utilities/ScanIdGenerator.cs` direct SHA256 for id derivation.
- `src/Scanner/StellaOps.Scanner.WebService/Services/ReportSigner.cs` uses `ECDsa.Create()` directly for DSSE hand-off.
- `src/Scanner/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker/Processing/Surface/SurfaceManifestPublisher.cs` manual digesting before CAS writes.
**Action:** Create shared `IScanCryptoService` backed by `ICryptoProviderRegistry` so both web service and worker reuse sovereign providers. Add tasks under `src/Scanner/StellaOps.Scanner.WebService/TASKS.md` and `src/Scanner/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker/TASKS.md`.
### Authority (plugins + signing host)
- `StellaOps.Authority/Signing/*` classes still load PEM/PKCS#12 directly via `X509Certificate2` and `RSA`.
- `AuthoritySecretHasher` and `AuthorityClientCertificateValidator` maintain custom hashing.
**Action:** Wire Authority signing/loading paths to `ICryptoProviderRegistry` so active keys can point to `ru.cryptopro.csp` or `ru.pkcs11`. Open tasks in `src/Authority/StellaOps.Authority/TASKS.md` covering: signing key loading, JWKS generation, secret hashing migration.
### Excititor / Attestor
- Excititor connectors (e.g., `src/Excititor/__Libraries/StellaOps.Excititor.Connectors.Ghsa/GhsaConnector.cs`) re-hash payloads in place.
- Attestor submission cache uses SHA256 for bundle ids.
**Action:** Introduce shared hashing helper that internally calls `ICryptoProviderRegistry.ResolveOrThrow(CryptoCapability.Signing, SignatureAlgorithms.GostR3410_2012_256)` for digest+sign combos; log follow-ups in respective TASK boards.
### Evidence Locker / Export Center
- Export packaging code manually builds SHA/V1 digests before signing manifests.
**Action:** Add backlog tasks for both modules to replace `SHA256.Create()` usage with provider-backed hashing (especially for offline bundle sealing).
## Next steps
1. **Open remediation tasks per module** referencing this audit (minimum: Concelier, Scanner, Authority, Excititor, Attestor, Evidence Locker, Export Center). Each task should specify which files to migrate and target provider (default vs sovereign).
2. **Provide shared helpers** (e.g., `ICryptoDigestService`, `ICasSigner`) in `StellaOps.Cryptography` to ease adoption and avoid each module talking to the registry manually.
3. **Follow-up audit** once migrations land; rerun the command and ensure only `StellaOps.Cryptography*` and vetted crypto libraries contain direct `System.Security.Cryptography` usage.
4. **RootPack validation runbook** — see `docs/security/rootpack_ru_validation.md` for deterministic tests, hardware validation, and required audit artifacts before shipping RootPack_RU.
### Remediation tracking snapshot (2025-11-08)
- **Authority:** `AUTH-CRYPTO-90-001` (Authority TASKS board)
- **Scanner:** `SCANNER-CRYPTO-90-001` (WebService TASKS board)
- **Concelier:** `CONCELIER-CRYPTO-90-001` (WebService TASKS board)
- **Excititor:** `EXCITITOR-CRYPTO-90-001` (WebService TASKS board)
- **Attestor:** `ATTESTOR-CRYPTO-90-001` (Attestor TASKS board)
- **Evidence Locker:** `EVID-CRYPTO-90-001` (Evidence Locker TASKS board)
- **Export Center:** `EXPORT-CRYPTO-90-001` (Exporter Service TASKS board)
> Stored query artifacts: `/tmp/crypto_runtime_non_tests.txt` (157 runtime files) and aggregated counts above prepared on 2025-11-07.

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# Authority DPoP + mTLS Rollout Plan (Sprint 100)
_Last updated: 2025-11-07_
## Objectives
1. Enforce DPoP sender constraints (`AUTH-DPOP-11-001`).
2. Bind high-assurance tenants to mTLS tokens (`AUTH-MTLS-11-002`).
3. Provide telemetry + runbooks so plugins (SEC2/SEC3/SEC5) can validate enforcement without regressions.
## Phase 1 · Config & Telemetry (ETA 2025-11-08)
- [ ] Extend `authority.yaml` with `security.senderConstraints.dpop` section (nonce store, allowed algorithms, replay window).
- [ ] Wire structured logs (`authority.dpop.request`) containing tenant, client, cnf thumbprint, nonce status.
- [ ] Add `DPoPNonceStore` abstraction + Redis implementation for multi-node deployments.
- [ ] Update integration tests: `AuthorityTokenTests.DPoPNonceRequired`, `AuthorityTokenTests.DPoPMustMatchCnF`.
## Phase 2 · Enforcement & Fallback (ETA 2025-11-10)
- [ ] Reject `/token` requests lacking DPoP proof when tenant policy requires it.
- [ ] Persist `cnf.jkt` and expose through `/introspect` so downstream services validate sender.
- [ ] Add emergency bypass flag (`security.senderConstraints.dpop.allowTemporaryBypass`) for sealed recap drills; default disabled.
## Phase 3 · mTLS Binding (ETA 2025-11-10)
- [x] Capture client cert thumbprint on `/token` (mutual TLS) and store in `authority_tokens.senderCertificate`.
- [x] Validate cert hash on `/introspect` and `/fresh-auth`.
- [ ] Document bootstrap/rotation in `docs/11_AUTHORITY.md` + `docs/security/dpop-mtls-rollout.md` (this file).
## Verification Matrix
| Scenario | Test/Command | Expected |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DPoP required w/out proof | `dotnet test Authority.Tests --filter DPoPRequiresProofTest` | 400 with `use_dpop_nonce` header. |
| Nonce replay | Replay previous proof within window | 401 + audit log entry. |
| mTLS mismatch | Reuse token with different cert | 401 + `senderCertificateMismatch` metric increment. |
## Telemetry & Alerting
- Metrics: `authority_dpop_nonce_miss_total`, `authority_mtls_mismatch_total` (emitted with `reason` tags for context-missing, missing-certificate, and thumbprint-mismatch cases).
- Logs: `authority.security.senderConstraint` (structured).
- Alerts: Page DevOps when nonce miss > 5% or mTLS mismatches > 0 over 10 min.
## Dependencies
- Authority Core & Security Guild owners.
- DevOps to provide sealed-mode CI coverage (`DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002`).
- Plugin Standard Guild to consume new telemetry once rolled out.
## Communication
- Daily async update in `#guild-authority` thread referencing this plan.
- Link this document from `docs/implplan/SPRINT_100_identity_signing.md` notes once Phase 1 merges.

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# RootPack_RU Packaging Guide
This guide describes the reproducible process for assembling the sovereign cryptography bundle that backs RootPack_RU deployments.
## 1. What the bundle contains
| Directory | Purpose |
|-----------|---------|
| `artifacts/` | Published binaries for `StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.CryptoPro` and `StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.Pkcs11Gost` (targeting `net10.0`). |
| `config/rootpack_ru.crypto.yaml` | Opinionated configuration template that enables the `ru-offline` crypto profile and defines CryptoPro + PKCS#11 keys. |
| `docs/` | Validation runbook, audit report, and this packaging guide. |
| `trust/` | Russian trust-anchor PEM files copied from `certificates/russian_trusted_*`. |
| `README.txt` | High-level summary plus operator checklist. |
## 2. Build the bundle
```bash
# from repository root
scripts/crypto/package-rootpack-ru.sh
# optionally specify destination
scripts/crypto/package-rootpack-ru.sh /tmp/rootpack_ru_$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)
```
The script performs the following steps:
1. `dotnet publish` for the CryptoPro + PKCS#11 plug-ins (`Release` configuration).
2. Copies the relevant documentation (`docs/security/rootpack_ru_validation.md`, `docs/security/crypto-routing-audit-2025-11-07.md`, and this guide).
3. Includes the example configuration found at `etc/rootpack/ru/crypto.profile.yaml`.
4. Adds the Russian trust anchors from `certificates/russian_trusted_*`.
5. Emits `README.txt` and optionally creates a `*.tar.gz` archive (set `PACKAGE_TAR=0` to skip the tarball).
## 3. Attach deterministic test evidence
After running `scripts/crypto/package-rootpack-ru.sh`, execute the deterministic harness to capture logs:
```bash
scripts/crypto/run-rootpack-ru-tests.sh
# or specify ROOTPACK_LOG_DIR=/tmp/rootpack_ru_tests scripts/crypto/run-rootpack-ru-tests.sh
```
Copy the resulting `logs/rootpack_ru_<timestamp>/` directory into the bundle before distributing it (or store it alongside the tarball in your evidence store).
Each harness run produces a `README.tests` file plus matching `.log/.trx` pairs for every project. Move the entire directory under an evidence folder inside the bundle (for example `evidence/validation/<timestamp>/`) so operators can quickly locate the README, raw logs, and provider JSON snapshots when assembling compliance paperwork:
```bash
dest="${1:-out/rootpack_ru}"
ts="$(ls logs | grep rootpack_ru_ | sort | tail -n1)"
mkdir -p "${dest}/evidence/validation"
cp -a "logs/${ts}" "${dest}/evidence/validation/${ts}"
```
## 4. Hardware validation + audit metadata
Follow `docs/security/rootpack_ru_validation.md` to:
- Validate CryptoPro CSP and PKCS#11 tokens.
- Capture `stellaops crypto providers --profile ru-offline --json` output.
- Archive JWKS snapshots and `CryptoProviderMetrics` samples.
- Document hardware serials and operator initials in `hardware_notes.md`.
Store these artifacts under `logs/rootpack_ru_<timestamp>/` (same directory as the test harness outputs) and reference them in release paperwork.
## 5. Deployment summary
1. Import the bundled trust anchors into the target installation (Authority + Scanner).
2. Apply `config/rootpack_ru.crypto.yaml`, update certificate thumbprints, slots, and container labels to match the operator tokens.
3. Restart the services so `ICryptoProviderRegistry` reloads the `ru-offline` profile.
4. Re-run the validation runbook to confirm JWKS, telemetry, and RootPack evidence are aligned with the shipping bundle.

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# RootPack_RU Crypto Validation Runbook
## Purpose
This runbook documents the repeatable steps for validating the Russian sovereign crypto profile (CryptoPro + PKCS#11) prior to publishing a RootPack bundle. It supplements the crypto routing audit by covering deterministic tests, hardware validation, and the audit metadata artifacts that must be attached to each release.
## 1. Deterministic Test Harness
1. Run `scripts/crypto/run-rootpack-ru-tests.sh` (optional `ROOTPACK_LOG_DIR=/tmp/rootpack_ru_logs` to override the output path). The script executes:
- `src/__Libraries/__Tests/StellaOps.Cryptography.Tests/StellaOps.Cryptography.Tests.csproj`
- `src/Scanner/__Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker.Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker.Tests.csproj`
- `src/Scanner/__Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Sbomer.BuildXPlugin.Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Sbomer.BuildXPlugin.Tests.csproj`
and emits `.log` + `.trx` pairs plus `README.tests` under `logs/rootpack_ru_<timestamp>/`.
2. For ad-hoc runs (CI or IDE) ensure the same three projects succeed; the cryptography tests validate SHA-256/SHA-512 against BCL implementations and both Streebog variants against BouncyCastle digests.
3. Archive the generated log directory (`logs/rootpack_ru_<timestamp>/`) along with any additional test outputs inside the RootPack evidence bundle.
## 2. Hardware Validation (CryptoPro CSP)
1. Install CryptoPro CSP (v5.0 or later) on the validation host and import the qualified certificate configured for the deployment.
2. Configure `StellaOps:Crypto:CryptoPro:Keys` with the container handle and certificate thumbprint and set `StellaOps:Crypto:Registry:ActiveProfile=ru-offline`.
3. Run the provider diagnostics to confirm the key material is visible:
- `stellaops crypto providers --profile ru-offline --json > logs/ru_cryptopro_providers.json`
4. Issue a JWKS fetch (`curl https://authority.local/.well-known/jwks`) and verify the `kid` and `crv` values match the CryptoPro-backed key.
5. Capture the Authority logs showing `AuthoritySecretHasherInitializer` startup and the `CryptoProviderMetrics` counters for `ru.cryptopro.csp` usage.
## 3. Hardware Validation (PKCS#11 Tokens)
1. Install the vendor PKCS#11 library (e.g., Rutoken `rtPKCS11ECP.dll` or JaCarta) and configure the slot/PIN inside `StellaOps:Crypto:Pkcs11:Keys`.
2. Switch the registry profile to prioritize `ru.pkcs11` and rerun `stellaops crypto providers --profile ru-offline --json > logs/ru_pkcs11_providers.json`.
3. Execute a signing workflow (Authority JWKS refresh or Scanner manifest publish) and confirm the `CryptoProviderMetrics` counters record `ru.pkcs11` activity.
4. Export the token audit logs (if available) and store them with the RootPack evidence bundle.
## 4. RootPack Audit Metadata
Create a metadata bundle per validation run and store it under `logs/rootpack_ru_<timestamp>/` containing:
- `providers_ru_offline.json` output from `stellaops crypto providers --profile ru-offline --json`.
- `crypto_tests.txt` snippets from the unit-test executions listed above.
- `hardware_notes.md` human-readable notes describing token serials, firmware, and operator initials.
- `jwks_snapshot.json` raw JWKS response captured after sovereign providers are active.
- `metrics_snapshot.json` scrape of `CryptoProviderMetrics` Prometheus samples for both providers.
Attach this directory to the RootPack artifact and reference it from the release checklist.
Refer back to `docs/security/crypto-routing-audit-2025-11-07.md` for the full inventory of components that must consume the shared cryptography stack, and `docs/security/rootpack_ru_package.md` for packaging/attachment steps.

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@@ -1,33 +1,38 @@
# StellaOps Policy Engine configuration template.
# Copy to ../etc/policy-engine.yaml (relative to the Policy Engine content root)
# and adjust values to fit your environment. Environment variables prefixed with
# STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE_ override these values at runtime.
schemaVersion: 1
authority:
enabled: true
issuer: "https://authority.stella-ops.local"
clientId: "policy-engine"
clientSecret: "change-me"
scopes: [ "policy:run", "findings:read", "effective:write" ]
backchannelTimeoutSeconds: 30
storage:
connectionString: "mongodb://localhost:27017/policy-engine"
databaseName: "policy_engine"
commandTimeoutSeconds: 30
workers:
schedulerIntervalSeconds: 15
maxConcurrentEvaluations: 4
resourceServer:
authority: "https://authority.stella-ops.local"
requireHttpsMetadata: true
audiences: [ "api://policy-engine" ]
requiredScopes: [ "policy:run" ]
requiredTenants: [ ]
bypassNetworks:
- "127.0.0.1/32"
- "::1/128"
# StellaOps Policy Engine configuration template.
# Copy to ../etc/policy-engine.yaml (relative to the Policy Engine content root)
# and adjust values to fit your environment. Environment variables prefixed with
# STELLAOPS_POLICY_ENGINE_ override these values at runtime.
schemaVersion: 1
authority:
enabled: true
issuer: "https://authority.stella-ops.local"
clientId: "policy-engine"
clientSecret: "change-me"
scopes: [ "policy:run", "findings:read", "effective:write" ]
backchannelTimeoutSeconds: 30
storage:
connectionString: "mongodb://localhost:27017/policy-engine"
databaseName: "policy_engine"
commandTimeoutSeconds: 30
workers:
schedulerIntervalSeconds: 15
maxConcurrentEvaluations: 4
activation:
forceTwoPersonApproval: false
defaultRequiresTwoPersonApproval: false
emitAuditLogs: true
resourceServer:
authority: "https://authority.stella-ops.local"
requireHttpsMetadata: true
audiences: [ "api://policy-engine" ]
requiredScopes: [ "policy:run" ]
requiredTenants: [ ]
bypassNetworks:
- "127.0.0.1/32"
- "::1/128"

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
StellaOps:
Crypto:
Registry:
ActiveProfile: ru-offline
PreferredProviders:
- default
Profiles:
ru-offline:
PreferredProviders:
- ru.cryptopro.csp
- ru.pkcs11
CryptoPro:
Keys:
- KeyId: ru-csp-default
LibraryPath: /opt/cprocsp/lib/amd64/libcapi20.so
ContainerLabel: CN=RootPack Signing
CertificateThumbprint: "<thumbprint>"
Pkcs11:
Keys:
- KeyId: ru-token-default
LibraryPath: /usr/local/lib/librutokenecp.so
SlotId: "0x1"
Pin: "${PKCS11_PIN}"
PrivateKeyLabel: rootpack-signing
CertificateThumbprint: "<thumbprint>"
Diagnostics:
Providers:
Enabled: true
Metrics:
LogLevel: Information

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@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ Signals:
Mongo:
ConnectionString: "mongodb://localhost:27017/signals"
Database: "signals"
CallgraphsCollection: "callgraphs"
CallgraphsCollection: "callgraphs"
ReachabilityFactsCollection: "reachability_facts"
Storage:
RootPath: "../data/signals-artifacts"

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@@ -46,3 +46,5 @@
| HELM-45-001 | TODO | Deployment Guild | COMPOSE-44-001 | Scaffold `deploy/helm/stella` chart with values, component toggles, and pinned image digests for all services; include migration Job templates. | Chart installs in dev cluster; images pinned; lint/tests pass. |
| HELM-45-002 | TODO | Deployment Guild, Security Guild | HELM-45-001 | Add TLS/Ingress, NetworkPolicy, PodSecurityContexts, Secrets integration (external secrets), and document security posture. | Helm values support secure defaults; policies validated; docs updated. |
| HELM-45-003 | TODO | Deployment Guild, Observability Guild | HELM-45-001 | Implement HPA, PDB, readiness gates, Prometheus scraping annotations, OTel configuration hooks, and upgrade hooks. | Rolling upgrade succeeds in CI; observability wires confirmed; upgrade docs updated. |
| HELM-45-004 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Deployment Guild, Policy Guild | HELM-45-001 | Wire Policy Engine / Gateway pods to consume the `policy-engine-activation` ConfigMap (envFrom/volume mounts), ensure host configuration loads activation overrides, and update Helm/Compose samples accordingly. | Pods mount config map deterministically; activation settings honored in Policy Engine; samples/tests updated for air-gap parity. |
> 2025-11-08: Added config builder support for `/config/policy-engine/activation.yaml`, templated envFrom injection for policy-engine/gateway pods, verified Policy Engine/Gateway tests, and CI now runs `helm lint` + `helm template` for every `values*.yaml`.

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@@ -45,7 +45,10 @@
| DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-002 | TODO | DevOps Guild, AirGap Importer Guild | AIRGAP-IMP-57-002 | Provide import tooling for bundle staging: checksum validation, offline object-store loader scripts, removable media guidance. | Scripts documented; smoke tests validate import; runbook updated. |
| DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-003 | TODO | DevOps Guild, Container Distribution Guild | EXPORT-AIRGAP-56-002 | Build Bootstrap Pack pipeline bundling images/charts, generating checksums, and publishing manifest for offline transfer. | Pipeline runs in connected env; pack verified in air-gap smoke test; manifest recorded. |
| DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-001 | TODO | DevOps Guild, Mirror Creator Guild | MIRROR-CRT-56-002 | Automate Mirror Bundle creation jobs with dual-control approvals, artifact signing, and checksum publication. | Approval workflow enforced; CI artifact includes DSSE/TUF metadata; audit logs stored. |
| DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 | TODO | DevOps Guild, Authority Guild | AUTH-OBS-50-001 | Configure sealed-mode CI tests that run services with sealed flag and ensure no egress occurs (iptables + mock DNS). | CI suite fails on attempted egress; reports remediation; documentation updated. |
| DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 | DOING (2025-11-08) | DevOps Guild, Authority Guild | AUTH-OBS-50-001 | Configure sealed-mode CI tests that run services with sealed flag and ensure no egress occurs (iptables + mock DNS). | CI suite fails on attempted egress; reports remediation; documentation updated. |
> 2025-11-08: Landed `sealed-mode-compose.yml`, `run-sealed-ci.sh`, and `egress_probe.py`, plus the `.gitea/workflows/build-test-deploy.yml` job that uploads `artifacts/sealed-mode-ci/<commit>/authority-sealed-ci.json`; waiting on Authority to consume the artefact before flipping DONE.
> 2025-11-07: Blocking AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001 (Authority gating); prioritize sealed-mode CI artifacts so Authority can flip the enforcement switch.
> 2025-11-07: Target ETA agreed with Authority is 2025-11-10 for first CI run (iptables + mock DNS) plus doc updates.
| DEVOPS-AIRGAP-58-001 | TODO | DevOps Guild, Notifications Guild | NOTIFY-AIRGAP-56-002 | Provide local SMTP/syslog container templates and health checks for sealed environments; integrate into Bootstrap Pack. | Templates deployed successfully; health checks in CI; docs updated. |
| DEVOPS-AIRGAP-58-002 | TODO | DevOps Guild, Observability Guild | DEVOPS-AIRGAP-56-001, DEVOPS-OBS-51-001 | Ship sealed-mode observability stack (Prometheus/Grafana/Tempo/Loki) pre-configured with offline dashboards and no remote exporters. | Stack boots offline; dashboards available; verification script confirms zero egress. |
| DEVOPS-REL-17-004 | BLOCKED (2025-10-26) | DevOps Guild | DEVOPS-REL-17-002 | Ensure release workflow publishes `out/release/debug` (build-id tree + manifest) and fails when symbols are missing. | Release job emits debug artefacts, `mirror_debug_store.py` summary committed, warning cleared from build logs, docs updated. |

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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
# Sealed-Mode CI Harness
This harness supports `DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002` by exercising services with the `sealed` flag, verifying that no outbound network traffic succeeds, and producing artefacts Authority can use for `AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001` gating.
## Workflow
1. Run `./run-sealed-ci.sh` from this directory (the script now boots the stack, applies the iptables guard, and captures artefacts automatically).
2. The harness:
- Launches `sealed-mode-compose.yml` with Authority/Signer/Attestor + Mongo.
- Snapshots iptables, injects a `STELLAOPS_SEALED` chain into `DOCKER-USER`/`OUTPUT`, and whitelists only loopback + RFC1918 ranges so container egress is denied.
- Repeatedly polls `/healthz` on `5088/6088/7088` to verify sealed-mode bindings stay healthy while egress is blocked.
- Executes `egress_probe.py`, which runs curl probes from inside the compose network to confirm off-cluster addresses are unreachable.
- Writes logs, iptables counters, and the summary contract to `artifacts/sealed-mode-ci/<timestamp>`.
3. `.gitea/workflows/build-test-deploy.yml` now includes a `sealed-mode-ci` job that runs this script on every push/PR and uploads the artefacts for `AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001`.
## Outputs
- `authority.health.log`, `signer.health.log`, `attestor.health.log`
- `iptables-docker-user.txt`, `iptables-output.txt`
- `egress-probe.json`
- `compose.log`, `compose.ps`
- `authority-sealed-ci.json` (single file Authority uses to validate the run)
## TODO
- [ ] Wire into offline kit smoke tests (DEVOPS-AIRGAP-58-001).
Refer to `docs/security/dpop-mtls-rollout.md` for cross-guild milestones.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
The command 'docker' could not be found in this WSL 2 distro.
We recommend to activate the WSL integration in Docker Desktop settings.
For details about using Docker Desktop with WSL 2, visit:
https://docs.docker.com/go/wsl2/

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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
The command 'docker' could not be found in this WSL 2 distro.
We recommend to activate the WSL integration in Docker Desktop settings.
For details about using Docker Desktop with WSL 2, visit:
https://docs.docker.com/go/wsl2/

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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
schemaVersion: 1
issuer: http://authority.sealed-ci.local
accessTokenLifetime: 00:02:00
refreshTokenLifetime: 01:00:00
identityTokenLifetime: 00:05:00
authorizationCodeLifetime: 00:05:00
deviceCodeLifetime: 00:15:00
pluginDirectories:
- /app
plugins:
configurationDirectory: /app/plugins
descriptors:
standard:
type: standard
assemblyName: StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard
enabled: true
configFile: standard.yaml
storage:
connectionString: mongodb://sealedci:sealedci@mongo:27017/authority?authSource=admin
databaseName: authority
commandTimeout: 00:00:30
signing:
enabled: true
activeKeyId: sealed-ci
keyPath: /certificates/authority-signing-dev.pem
algorithm: ES256
keySource: file
bootstrap:
enabled: false
crypto:
providers: []
security:
senderConstraints:
dpop:
enabled: true
proofLifetime: 00:02:00
replayWindow: 00:05:00
nonce:
enabled: false
mtls:
enabled: false
airGap:
egress:
mode: Sealed
allowLoopback: true
allowPrivateNetworks: true
remediationDocumentationUrl: https://docs.stella-ops.org/airgap/sealed-ci
supportContact: airgap-ops@stella-ops.org
tenants:
- name: sealed-ci
roles:
operators:
scopes:
- policy:read

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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Run egress probes from the sealed-mode Docker network."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import os
import shlex
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import List
DEFAULT_TARGETS = [
"https://example.com",
"https://www.cloudflare.com",
"https://releases.stella-ops.org/healthz",
]
def run_probe(image: str, network: str, target: str, timeout: int) -> dict:
cmd: List[str] = [
"docker",
"run",
"--rm",
"--network",
network,
image,
"-fsS",
"--max-time",
str(timeout),
target,
]
started = time.monotonic()
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
duration = time.monotonic() - started
status = "blocked" if proc.returncode != 0 else "connected"
return {
"target": target,
"status": status,
"durationSeconds": round(duration, 3),
"exitCode": proc.returncode,
"command": " ".join(shlex.quote(part) for part in cmd),
"stdout": proc.stdout.strip(),
"stderr": proc.stderr.strip(),
}
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--network", required=True, help="Docker network to join (compose project network)")
parser.add_argument("--image", default="curlimages/curl:8.6.0", help="Container image providing curl")
parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=10, help="Curl max-time for each probe (seconds)")
parser.add_argument("--output", required=True, help="Path to write JSON results")
parser.add_argument("targets", nargs="*", help="Override target URLs")
args = parser.parse_args()
targets = args.targets or DEFAULT_TARGETS
results = [run_probe(args.image, args.network, target, args.timeout) for target in targets]
passed = all(result["status"] == "blocked" for result in results)
payload = {
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"network": args.network,
"image": args.image,
"targets": results,
"passed": passed,
}
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(args.output), exist_ok=True)
with open(args.output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump(payload, handle, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
handle.write("\n")
return 0 if passed else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
sys.exit(main())
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover
print(f"egress probe failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(2)

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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
bootstrapUser:
username: sealed-admin
password: ChangeMe11!
passwordPolicy:
minimumLength: 8
requireUppercase: false
requireLowercase: true
requireDigit: true
requireSymbol: false
passwordHashing:
algorithm: Argon2id
memorySizeInKib: 8192
iterations: 2
parallelism: 1
lockout:
enabled: false
tokenSigning:
keyDirectory: /certificates

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)
cd "$SCRIPT_DIR"
COMPOSE_FILE=${COMPOSE_FILE:-"$SCRIPT_DIR/sealed-mode-compose.yml"}
PROJECT_NAME=${COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME:-sealedmode}
NETWORK_NAME="${PROJECT_NAME}_sealed-ci"
ARTIFACT_ROOT=${ARTIFACT_ROOT:-"$SCRIPT_DIR/artifacts/sealed-mode-ci"}
STAMP=$(date -u +"%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
OUT_DIR="$ARTIFACT_ROOT/$STAMP"
mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR"
log() {
printf '[%s] %s\n' "$(date -u +%H:%M:%S)" "$*"
}
EXIT_CODE=0
IPTABLES_SNAPSHOT=""
cleanup() {
local exit_code=$?
log "Collecting docker compose logs"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" -p "$PROJECT_NAME" logs >"$OUT_DIR/compose.log" 2>&1 || true
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" -p "$PROJECT_NAME" ps -a >"$OUT_DIR/compose.ps" 2>&1 || true
log "Tearing down sealed-mode stack"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" -p "$PROJECT_NAME" down -v >"$OUT_DIR/docker-down.log" 2>&1 || true
if [[ -n "$IPTABLES_SNAPSHOT" && -f "$IPTABLES_SNAPSHOT" ]]; then
log "Restoring iptables snapshot"
sudo iptables-restore <"$IPTABLES_SNAPSHOT" || true
rm -f "$IPTABLES_SNAPSHOT"
fi
log "Artifacts stored at $OUT_DIR"
exit $exit_code
}
trap cleanup EXIT
log "Pulling compose images (best effort)"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" -p "$PROJECT_NAME" pull --ignore-pull-failures || true
log "Starting sealed-mode stack"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" -p "$PROJECT_NAME" up -d --remove-orphans
wait_for_port() {
local port=$1
local label=$2
for attempt in $(seq 1 30); do
if curl -fsS --max-time 5 "http://127.0.0.1:${port}/healthz" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
log "$label responded on port $port"
return 0
fi
sleep 2
done
log "$label failed to respond on port $port"
return 1
}
wait_for_port 5088 "Authority" || EXIT_CODE=1
wait_for_port 6088 "Signer" || EXIT_CODE=1
wait_for_port 7088 "Attestor" || EXIT_CODE=1
log "Fetching probe helper image"
docker pull curlimages/curl:8.6.0 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
log "Snapshotting iptables state"
IPTABLES_SNAPSHOT=$(mktemp)
sudo iptables-save >"$IPTABLES_SNAPSHOT"
log "Applying sealed-mode egress policy"
CHAIN="STELLAOPS_SEALED"
sudo iptables -N "$CHAIN" 2>/dev/null || sudo iptables -F "$CHAIN"
for cidr in 127.0.0.0/8 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16; do
sudo iptables -A "$CHAIN" -d "$cidr" -j RETURN
done
sudo iptables -A "$CHAIN" -j LOG --log-prefix "stellaops-sealed-deny " --log-level 4
sudo iptables -A "$CHAIN" -j DROP
sudo iptables -I DOCKER-USER 1 -j "$CHAIN"
sudo iptables -I OUTPUT 1 -j "$CHAIN"
check_health() {
local name=$1
local port=$2
local url="http://127.0.0.1:${port}/healthz"
local log_file="$OUT_DIR/${name}.health.log"
local status="fail"
for attempt in $(seq 1 20); do
if curl -fsS --max-time 5 "$url" >"$log_file" 2>&1; then
status="pass"
break
fi
sleep 2
done
if [[ "$status" == "pass" ]]; then
log "$name health check succeeded"
else
log "$name health check failed"
EXIT_CODE=1
fi
local upper
upper=$(echo "$name" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')
eval "${upper}_HEALTH_STATUS=$status"
eval "${upper}_HEALTH_URL=$url"
}
check_health authority 5088
check_health signer 6088
check_health attestor 7088
log "Running egress probe via docker network $NETWORK_NAME"
EGRESS_JSON="$OUT_DIR/egress-probe.json"
if python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/egress_probe.py" --network "$NETWORK_NAME" --image curlimages/curl:8.6.0 --timeout 8 --output "$EGRESS_JSON"; then
EGRESS_STATUS="pass"
else
EGRESS_STATUS="fail"
EXIT_CODE=1
fi
log "Dumping iptables counters"
sudo iptables -v -x -L DOCKER-USER >"$OUT_DIR/iptables-docker-user.txt"
sudo iptables -v -x -L OUTPUT >"$OUT_DIR/iptables-output.txt"
log "Recording summary JSON"
export PROJECT_NAME NETWORK_NAME EGRESS_STATUS EGRESS_JSON
export AUTHORITY_HEALTH_STATUS SIGNER_HEALTH_STATUS ATTESTOR_HEALTH_STATUS
export AUTHORITY_HEALTH_URL SIGNER_HEALTH_URL ATTESTOR_HEALTH_URL
python3 - <<'PY' >"$OUT_DIR/authority-sealed-ci.json"
import json
import os
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timezone
summary = {
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"project": os.environ.get("PROJECT_NAME"),
"network": os.environ.get("NETWORK_NAME"),
"health": {
"authority": {
"status": os.environ.get("AUTHORITY_HEALTH_STATUS", "unknown"),
"url": os.environ.get("AUTHORITY_HEALTH_URL"),
"log": "authority.health.log",
},
"signer": {
"status": os.environ.get("SIGNER_HEALTH_STATUS", "unknown"),
"url": os.environ.get("SIGNER_HEALTH_URL"),
"log": "signer.health.log",
},
"attestor": {
"status": os.environ.get("ATTESTOR_HEALTH_STATUS", "unknown"),
"url": os.environ.get("ATTESTOR_HEALTH_URL"),
"log": "attestor.health.log",
},
},
"egressProbe": {
"status": os.environ.get("EGRESS_STATUS", "unknown"),
"report": os.path.basename(os.environ.get("EGRESS_JSON", "egress-probe.json")),
},
}
json.dump(summary, sys.stdout, indent=2)
print()
PY
if [[ $EXIT_CODE -eq 0 ]]; then
log "Sealed-mode CI run completed successfully"
else
log "Sealed-mode CI run completed with failures"
fi
exit $EXIT_CODE

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
version: '3.9'
x-release-labels: &release-labels
com.stellaops.profile: 'sealed-ci'
com.stellaops.airgap.mode: 'sealed'
networks:
sealed-ci:
driver: bridge
volumes:
sealed-mongo-data:
services:
mongo:
image: docker.io/library/mongo@sha256:c258b26dbb7774f97f52aff52231ca5f228273a84329c5f5e451c3739457db49
command: ['mongod', '--bind_ip_all']
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_USERNAME: sealedci
MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_PASSWORD: sealedci-secret
volumes:
- sealed-mongo-data:/data/db
networks:
- sealed-ci
labels: *release-labels
authority:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/authority@sha256:a8e8faec44a579aa5714e58be835f25575710430b1ad2ccd1282a018cd9ffcdd
depends_on:
- mongo
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ASPNETCORE_URLS: http://+:5088
STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__ISSUER: http://authority.sealed-ci.local
STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__MONGO__CONNECTIONSTRING: mongodb://sealedci:sealedci-secret@mongo:27017/authority?authSource=admin
STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__PLUGINDIRECTORIES__0: /app/plugins
STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__PLUGINS__CONFIGURATIONDIRECTORY: /app/plugins
STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__SECURITY__SENDERCONSTRAINTS__DPOP__ENABLED: 'true'
STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__SECURITY__SENDERCONSTRAINTS__MTLS__ENABLED: 'true'
STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__AIRGAP__EGRESS__MODE: Sealed
volumes:
- ./authority.harness.yaml:/etc/authority.yaml:ro
- ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
- ../../../certificates:/certificates:ro
ports:
- '5088:5088'
networks:
- sealed-ci
labels: *release-labels
signer:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/signer@sha256:8bfef9a75783883d49fc18e3566553934e970b00ee090abee9cb110d2d5c3298
depends_on:
- authority
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ASPNETCORE_URLS: http://+:6088
SIGNER__AUTHORITY__BASEURL: http://authority:5088
SIGNER__POE__INTROSPECTURL: http://authority:5088/device-code
SIGNER__STORAGE__MONGO__CONNECTIONSTRING: mongodb://sealedci:sealedci-secret@mongo:27017/signer?authSource=admin
SIGNER__SEALED__MODE: Enabled
ports:
- '6088:6088'
networks:
- sealed-ci
labels: *release-labels
attestor:
image: registry.stella-ops.org/stellaops/attestor@sha256:5cc417948c029da01dccf36e4645d961a3f6d8de7e62fe98d845f07cd2282114
depends_on:
- signer
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
ASPNETCORE_URLS: http://+:7088
ATTESTOR__SIGNER__BASEURL: http://signer:6088
ATTESTOR__MONGO__CONNECTIONSTRING: mongodb://sealedci:sealedci-secret@mongo:27017/attestor?authSource=admin
ATTESTOR__SEALED__MODE: Enabled
ports:
- '7088:7088'
networks:
- sealed-ci
labels: *release-labels

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT_DIR="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
TIMESTAMP="$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
OUTPUT_ROOT="${1:-${ROOT_DIR}/build/rootpack_ru_${TIMESTAMP}}"
ARTIFACT_DIR="${OUTPUT_ROOT}/artifacts"
DOC_DIR="${OUTPUT_ROOT}/docs"
CONFIG_DIR="${OUTPUT_ROOT}/config"
TRUST_DIR="${OUTPUT_ROOT}/trust"
mkdir -p "$ARTIFACT_DIR" "$DOC_DIR" "$CONFIG_DIR" "$TRUST_DIR"
publish_plugin() {
local project="$1"
local name="$2"
local publish_dir="${ARTIFACT_DIR}/${name}"
echo "[rootpack-ru] Publishing ${project} -> ${publish_dir}"
dotnet publish "$project" -c Release -o "$publish_dir" --nologo >/dev/null
}
publish_plugin "src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.CryptoPro/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.CryptoPro.csproj" "StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.CryptoPro"
publish_plugin "src/__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.Pkcs11Gost/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.Pkcs11Gost.csproj" "StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.Pkcs11Gost"
cp docs/security/rootpack_ru_validation.md "$DOC_DIR/"
cp docs/security/crypto-routing-audit-2025-11-07.md "$DOC_DIR/"
cp docs/security/rootpack_ru_package.md "$DOC_DIR/"
cp etc/rootpack/ru/crypto.profile.yaml "$CONFIG_DIR/rootpack_ru.crypto.yaml"
shopt -s nullglob
for pem in "$ROOT_DIR"/certificates/russian_trusted_*; do
cp "$pem" "$TRUST_DIR/"
done
shopt -u nullglob
cat <<README >"${OUTPUT_ROOT}/README.txt"
RootPack_RU bundle (${TIMESTAMP})
--------------------------------
Contents:
- artifacts/ : Sovereign crypto plug-ins published for net10.0 (CryptoPro + PKCS#11)
- config/rootpack_ru.crypto.yaml : example configuration binding registry profiles
- docs/ : validation + audit documentation
- trust/ : Russian trust anchor PEM bundle copied from certificates/
Usage:
1. Review docs/rootpack_ru_package.md for installation steps.
2. Execute scripts/crypto/run-rootpack-ru-tests.sh (or CI equivalent) and attach the logs to this bundle.
3. Record hardware validation outputs per docs/rootpack_ru_validation.md and store alongside this directory.
README
if [[ "${PACKAGE_TAR:-1}" != "0" ]]; then
tarball="${OUTPUT_ROOT}.tar.gz"
echo "[rootpack-ru] Creating ${tarball}"
tar -czf "$tarball" -C "$(dirname "$OUTPUT_ROOT")" "$(basename "$OUTPUT_ROOT")"
fi
echo "[rootpack-ru] Bundle staged under $OUTPUT_ROOT"

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@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT_DIR="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
DEFAULT_LOG_ROOT="${ROOT_DIR}/logs/rootpack_ru_$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
LOG_ROOT="${ROOTPACK_LOG_DIR:-$DEFAULT_LOG_ROOT}"
mkdir -p "$LOG_ROOT"
PROJECTS=(
"src/__Libraries/__Tests/StellaOps.Cryptography.Tests/StellaOps.Cryptography.Tests.csproj"
"src/Scanner/__Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker.Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Worker.Tests.csproj"
"src/Scanner/__Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Sbomer.BuildXPlugin.Tests/StellaOps.Scanner.Sbomer.BuildXPlugin.Tests.csproj"
)
run_test() {
local project="$1"
local safe_name
safe_name="$(basename "${project%.csproj}")"
local log_file="${LOG_ROOT}/${safe_name}.log"
local trx_name="${safe_name}.trx"
echo "[rootpack-ru] Running tests for ${project}" | tee "$log_file"
dotnet test "$project" \
--nologo \
--verbosity minimal \
--results-directory "$LOG_ROOT" \
--logger "trx;LogFileName=${trx_name}" | tee -a "$log_file"
}
PROJECT_SUMMARY=()
for project in "${PROJECTS[@]}"; do
run_test "$project"
safe_name="$(basename "${project%.csproj}")"
PROJECT_SUMMARY+=("$project|$safe_name")
echo "[rootpack-ru] Wrote logs for ${project} -> ${LOG_ROOT}/${safe_name}.log"
done
{
echo "RootPack_RU deterministic test harness"
echo "Generated: $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
echo "Log Directory: $LOG_ROOT"
echo ""
echo "Projects:"
for entry in "${PROJECT_SUMMARY[@]}"; do
project_path="${entry%%|*}"
safe_name="${entry##*|}"
printf ' - %s (log: %s.log, trx: %s.trx)\n' "$project_path" "$safe_name" "$safe_name"
done
} > "$LOG_ROOT/README.tests"
echo "Logs and TRX files available under $LOG_ROOT"

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ public sealed record AocGuardOptions
"createdAt",
"created_at",
"ingestedAt",
"ingested_at"
"ingested_at",
"links",
"advisory_key"
}, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
.ToImmutableHashSet(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);

View File

@@ -27,12 +27,42 @@ public sealed class AocWriteGuardTests
}
""");
var result = Guard.Validate(document.RootElement);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
Assert.Empty(result.Violations);
}
var result = Guard.Validate(document.RootElement);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
Assert.Empty(result.Violations);
}
[Fact]
public void Validate_AllowsLinksAndAdvisoryKey_ByDefault()
{
using var document = JsonDocument.Parse("""
{
"tenant": "default",
"source": {"vendor": "osv"},
"upstream": {
"upstream_id": "GHSA-xxxx",
"content_hash": "sha256:abc",
"signature": { "present": false }
},
"content": {
"format": "OSV",
"raw": {"id": "GHSA-xxxx"}
},
"linkset": {},
"links": [
{ "scheme": "cve", "value": "CVE-2025-0001" }
],
"advisory_key": "ghsa-xxxx"
}
""");
var result = Guard.Validate(document.RootElement);
Assert.True(result.IsValid);
Assert.Empty(result.Violations);
}
[Fact]
public void Validate_FlagsMissingTenant()
{

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> Remark (2025-10-19): Wave 0 prerequisites reviewed (none outstanding); ATTESTOR-API-11-201, ATTESTOR-VERIFY-11-202, and ATTESTOR-OBS-11-203 tracked as DOING per Wave 0A kickoff.
> Remark (2025-10-19): Dual-log submissions, signature/proof verification, and observability hardening landed; attestor endpoints now rate-limited per client with correlation-ID logging and updated docs/tests.
| ATTESTOR-CRYPTO-90-001 | TODO | Attestor Service Guild, Security Guild | SEC-CRYPTO-90-003, SEC-CRYPTO-90-004 | Migrate bundle hashing, witness proof caching, and signing submissions to `ICryptoProviderRegistry`/`ICryptoHash` so RootPack_RU deployments use CryptoPro or PKCS#11 per `docs/security/crypto-routing-audit-2025-11-07.md`. | Attestor services resolve registry providers; DSSE signing/verifying honors config profiles; tests cover default + `ru-offline` modes; docs updated. |
---

View File

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| SEC2.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Security Guild, Storage Guild | SEC2.A (audit contract) | Emit audit events from password verification outcomes and persist via `IAuthorityLoginAttemptStore`. <br>⛔ Waiting on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 / PLUGIN-DI-08-001 to stabilise Authority auth surfaces before final verification + publish. | ✅ Serilog events enriched with subject/client/IP/outcome; ✅ Mongo records written per attempt; ✅ Tests assert success/lockout/failure cases. |
| SEC3.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Security Guild, BE-Auth Plugin | CORE8, SEC3.A (rate limiter) | Ensure lockout responses and rate-limit metadata flow through plugin logs/events (include retry-after). <br>⛔ Pending AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 / PLUGIN-DI-08-001 so limiter telemetry contract matches final authority surface. | ✅ Audit record includes retry-after; ✅ Tests confirm lockout + limiter interplay. |
| SEC5.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Security Guild | SEC5.A (threat model) | Address plugin-specific mitigations (bootstrap user handling, password policy docs) in threat model backlog. <br>⛔ Final documentation depends on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 / PLUGIN-DI-08-001 outcomes. | ✅ Threat model lists plugin attack surfaces; ✅ Mitigation items filed. |
| SEC2.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Security Guild, Storage Guild | SEC2.A (audit contract) | Emit audit events from password verification outcomes and persist via `IAuthorityLoginAttemptStore`. <br>⛔ Waiting on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002 to stabilise Authority auth surfaces (PLUGIN-DI-08-001 landed 2025-10-21). | ✅ Serilog events enriched with subject/client/IP/outcome; ✅ Mongo records written per attempt; ✅ Tests assert success/lockout/failure cases. |
| SEC3.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Security Guild, BE-Auth Plugin | CORE8, SEC3.A (rate limiter) | Ensure lockout responses and rate-limit metadata flow through plugin logs/events (include retry-after). <br>⛔ Pending AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002; PLUGIN-DI-08-001 is done, limiter telemetry just awaits the updated Authority surface. | ✅ Audit record includes retry-after; ✅ Tests confirm lockout + limiter interplay. |
| SEC5.PLG | BLOCKED (2025-10-21) | Security Guild | SEC5.A (threat model) | Address plugin-specific mitigations (bootstrap user handling, password policy docs) in threat model backlog. <br>⛔ Final documentation now hinges on AUTH-DPOP-11-001 / AUTH-MTLS-11-002; scoped DI work is complete. | ✅ Threat model lists plugin attack surfaces; ✅ Mitigation items filed. |
| PLG4-6.CAPABILITIES | BLOCKED (2025-10-12) | BE-Auth Plugin, Docs Guild | PLG1PLG3 | Finalise capability metadata exposure, config validation, and developer guide updates; remaining action is Docs polish/diagram export. | ✅ Capability metadata + validation merged; ✅ Plugin guide updated with final copy & diagrams; ✅ Release notes mention new toggles. <br>⛔ Blocked awaiting Authority rate-limiter stream (CORE8/SEC3) to resume so doc updates reflect final limiter behaviour. |
| PLG7.RFC | DONE (2025-11-03) | BE-Auth Plugin, Security Guild | PLG4 | Socialize LDAP plugin RFC (`docs/rfcs/authority-plugin-ldap.md`) and capture guild feedback. | ✅ Guild review sign-off recorded; ✅ Follow-up issues filed in module boards. |
| PLG7.IMPL-001 | DONE (2025-11-03) | BE-Auth Plugin | PLG7.RFC | Scaffold `StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Ldap` + tests, bind configuration (client certificate, trust-store, insecure toggle) with validation and docs samples. | ✅ Project + test harness build; ✅ Configuration bound & validated; ✅ Sample config updated. |

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@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
using System;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.Plugins.Abstractions;
@@ -8,18 +11,55 @@ namespace StellaOps.Authority.Plugins.Abstractions;
/// </summary>
public static class AuthoritySecretHasher
{
private static ICryptoHash? configuredHash;
private static string defaultAlgorithm = HashAlgorithms.Sha256;
/// <summary>
/// Computes a stable SHA-256 hash for the provided secret.
/// Configures the shared crypto hash service used for secret hashing.
/// </summary>
public static string ComputeHash(string secret)
public static void Configure(ICryptoHash hash, string? algorithmId = null)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(hash);
Volatile.Write(ref configuredHash, hash);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(algorithmId))
{
defaultAlgorithm = NormalizeAlgorithm(algorithmId);
}
}
/// <summary>
/// Computes a stable hash for the provided secret using the configured crypto provider.
/// </summary>
public static string ComputeHash(string secret, string? algorithmId = null)
{
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(secret))
{
return string.Empty;
}
var algorithm = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(algorithmId)
? defaultAlgorithm
: NormalizeAlgorithm(algorithmId);
var hasher = Volatile.Read(ref configuredHash);
if (hasher is not null)
{
var digest = hasher.ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(secret), algorithm);
return Convert.ToBase64String(digest);
}
if (!string.Equals(algorithm, HashAlgorithms.Sha256, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
throw new InvalidOperationException("Authority secret hasher is not configured for the requested algorithm.");
}
using var sha256 = SHA256.Create();
var bytes = sha256.ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(secret));
return Convert.ToBase64String(bytes);
}
private static string NormalizeAlgorithm(string algorithmId)
=> string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(algorithmId)
? HashAlgorithms.Sha256
: algorithmId.Trim().ToUpperInvariant();
}

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@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ public sealed class AuthorityTokenDocument
[BsonIgnoreIfNull]
public string? SenderKeyThumbprint { get; set; }
[BsonElement("senderCertificateHex")]
[BsonIgnoreIfNull]
public string? SenderCertificateHex { get; set; }
[BsonElement("senderNonce")]
[BsonIgnoreIfNull]
public string? SenderNonce { get; set; }

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Security.Claims;
using System.Text.Encodings.Web;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Linq;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Http.Headers;
using System.Security.Claims;
using System.Text.Encodings.Web;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Linq;
using System.Net.Http.Json;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Builder;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.TestHost;
@@ -155,8 +157,8 @@ public sealed class ConsoleEndpointsTests
}
[Fact]
public async Task TokenIntrospect_FlagsInactive_WhenExpired()
{
public async Task TokenIntrospect_FlagsInactive_WhenExpired()
{
var timeProvider = new FakeTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-10-31T12:00:00Z"));
var sink = new RecordingAuthEventSink();
await using var app = await CreateApplicationAsync(timeProvider, sink, new AuthorityTenantView("tenant-default", "Default", "active", "shared", Array.Empty<string>(), Array.Empty<string>()));
@@ -189,8 +191,118 @@ public sealed class ConsoleEndpointsTests
var consoleEvent = Assert.Single(events, evt => evt.EventType == "authority.console.token.introspect");
Assert.Equal(AuthEventOutcome.Success, consoleEvent.Outcome);
Assert.Equal(2, events.Count);
}
Assert.Equal(2, events.Count);
}
[Fact]
public async Task VulnerabilityFindings_ReturnsSamplePayload()
{
var timeProvider = new FakeTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-08T12:00:00Z"));
var sink = new RecordingAuthEventSink();
await using var app = await CreateApplicationAsync(timeProvider, sink, new AuthorityTenantView("tenant-default", "Default", "active", "shared", Array.Empty<string>(), Array.Empty<string>()));
var accessor = app.Services.GetRequiredService<TestPrincipalAccessor>();
accessor.Principal = CreatePrincipal(
tenant: "tenant-default",
scopes: new[] { StellaOpsScopes.UiRead, StellaOpsScopes.AdvisoryRead, StellaOpsScopes.VexRead },
expiresAt: timeProvider.GetUtcNow().AddMinutes(30));
var client = app.CreateTestClient();
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue(TestAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant, "tenant-default");
var response = await client.GetAsync("/console/vuln/findings?severity=high");
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, response.StatusCode);
using var json = JsonDocument.Parse(await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync());
var items = json.RootElement.GetProperty("items");
Assert.True(items.GetArrayLength() >= 1);
Assert.Equal("CVE-2024-12345", items[0].GetProperty("coordinates").GetProperty("advisoryId").GetString());
}
[Fact]
public async Task VulnerabilityFindingDetail_ReturnsExpandedDocument()
{
var timeProvider = new FakeTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-08T12:00:00Z"));
var sink = new RecordingAuthEventSink();
await using var app = await CreateApplicationAsync(timeProvider, sink, new AuthorityTenantView("tenant-default", "Default", "active", "shared", Array.Empty<string>(), Array.Empty<string>()));
var accessor = app.Services.GetRequiredService<TestPrincipalAccessor>();
accessor.Principal = CreatePrincipal(
tenant: "tenant-default",
scopes: new[] { StellaOpsScopes.UiRead, StellaOpsScopes.AdvisoryRead, StellaOpsScopes.VexRead },
expiresAt: timeProvider.GetUtcNow().AddMinutes(30));
var client = app.CreateTestClient();
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue(TestAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant, "tenant-default");
var response = await client.GetAsync("/console/vuln/tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a");
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, response.StatusCode);
using var json = JsonDocument.Parse(await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync());
var summary = json.RootElement.GetProperty("summary");
Assert.Equal("tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a", summary.GetProperty("findingId").GetString());
Assert.Equal("reachable", summary.GetProperty("reachability").GetProperty("status").GetString());
var detailReachability = json.RootElement.GetProperty("reachability");
Assert.Equal("reachable", detailReachability.GetProperty("status").GetString());
}
[Fact]
public async Task VulnerabilityTicket_ReturnsDeterministicPayload()
{
var timeProvider = new FakeTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-08T12:00:00Z"));
var sink = new RecordingAuthEventSink();
await using var app = await CreateApplicationAsync(timeProvider, sink, new AuthorityTenantView("tenant-default", "Default", "active", "shared", Array.Empty<string>(), Array.Empty<string>()));
var accessor = app.Services.GetRequiredService<TestPrincipalAccessor>();
accessor.Principal = CreatePrincipal(
tenant: "tenant-default",
scopes: new[] { StellaOpsScopes.UiRead, StellaOpsScopes.AdvisoryRead, StellaOpsScopes.VexRead },
expiresAt: timeProvider.GetUtcNow().AddMinutes(30));
var client = app.CreateTestClient();
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue(TestAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant, "tenant-default");
var payload = new ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketRequest(
Selection: new[] { "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a" },
TargetSystem: "servicenow",
Metadata: new Dictionary<string, string> { ["assignmentGroup"] = "runtime-security" });
var response = await client.PostAsJsonAsync("/console/vuln/tickets", payload);
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, response.StatusCode);
using var json = JsonDocument.Parse(await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync());
Assert.StartsWith("console-ticket::tenant-default::", json.RootElement.GetProperty("ticketId").GetString());
Assert.Equal("servicenow", payload.TargetSystem);
}
[Fact]
public async Task VexStatements_ReturnsSampleRows()
{
var timeProvider = new FakeTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-08T12:00:00Z"));
var sink = new RecordingAuthEventSink();
await using var app = await CreateApplicationAsync(timeProvider, sink, new AuthorityTenantView("tenant-default", "Default", "active", "shared", Array.Empty<string>(), Array.Empty<string>()));
var accessor = app.Services.GetRequiredService<TestPrincipalAccessor>();
accessor.Principal = CreatePrincipal(
tenant: "tenant-default",
scopes: new[] { StellaOpsScopes.UiRead, StellaOpsScopes.VexRead },
expiresAt: timeProvider.GetUtcNow().AddMinutes(30));
var client = app.CreateTestClient();
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue(TestAuthenticationDefaults.AuthenticationScheme);
client.DefaultRequestHeaders.Add(AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant, "tenant-default");
var response = await client.GetAsync("/console/vex/statements?advisoryId=CVE-2024-12345");
Assert.Equal(HttpStatusCode.OK, response.StatusCode);
using var json = JsonDocument.Parse(await response.Content.ReadAsStringAsync());
var items = json.RootElement.GetProperty("items");
Assert.True(items.GetArrayLength() >= 1);
Assert.Equal("CVE-2024-12345", items[0].GetProperty("advisoryId").GetString());
}
private static ClaimsPrincipal CreatePrincipal(
string tenant,
@@ -259,9 +371,10 @@ public sealed class ConsoleEndpointsTests
builder.Services.AddSingleton<TimeProvider>(timeProvider);
builder.Services.AddSingleton<IAuthEventSink>(sink);
builder.Services.AddSingleton<IAuthorityTenantCatalog>(new FakeTenantCatalog(tenants));
builder.Services.AddSingleton<TestPrincipalAccessor>();
builder.Services.AddHttpContextAccessor();
builder.Services.AddSingleton<StellaOpsBypassEvaluator>();
builder.Services.AddSingleton<TestPrincipalAccessor>();
builder.Services.AddHttpContextAccessor();
builder.Services.AddSingleton<StellaOpsBypassEvaluator>();
builder.Services.AddSingleton<IConsoleWorkspaceService, ConsoleWorkspaceSampleService>();
var authBuilder = builder.Services.AddAuthentication(options =>
{

View File

@@ -177,16 +177,17 @@ public sealed class TokenPersistenceIntegrationTests
var auditSink = new TestAuthEventSink();
await using var scope = provider.CreateAsyncScope();
var sessionAccessor = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<IAuthorityMongoSessionAccessor>();
var handler = new ValidateAccessTokenHandler(
tokenStore,
sessionAccessor,
clientStore,
registry,
metadataAccessor,
auditSink,
clock,
TestActivitySource,
NullLogger<ValidateAccessTokenHandler>.Instance);
var handler = new ValidateAccessTokenHandler(
tokenStore,
sessionAccessor,
clientStore,
registry,
metadataAccessor,
auditSink,
clock,
TestActivitySource,
TestInstruments.Meter,
NullLogger<ValidateAccessTokenHandler>.Instance);
var transaction = new OpenIddictServerTransaction
{

View File

@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ public sealed class AuthorityJwksServiceTests
var registry = new TestRegistry(provider);
using var cache = new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions());
var clock = new FakeTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-10-30T12:00:00Z"));
var hash = CryptoHashFactory.CreateDefault();
var service = new AuthorityJwksService(
registry,
hash,
NullLogger<AuthorityJwksService>.Instance,
cache,
clock,
@@ -64,8 +66,10 @@ public sealed class AuthorityJwksServiceTests
var registry = new TestRegistry(provider);
using var cache = new MemoryCache(new MemoryCacheOptions());
var clock = new FakeTimeProvider(DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-10-30T12:00:00Z"));
var hash = CryptoHashFactory.CreateDefault();
var service = new AuthorityJwksService(
registry,
hash,
NullLogger<AuthorityJwksService>.Instance,
cache,
clock,

View File

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ public sealed class KmsAuthoritySigningKeySourceTests
var signingKey = source.Load(request);
Assert.Equal(CryptoSigningKeyKind.Raw, signingKey.Kind);
Assert.Equal(material.KeyId, signingKey.Reference.KeyId);
Assert.Equal(request.KeyId, signingKey.Reference.KeyId);
Assert.True(signingKey.PrivateKey.Length > 0);
Assert.True(signingKey.PublicKey.Length > 0);
Assert.Equal(material.VersionId, signingKey.Metadata[KmsAuthoritySigningKeySource.KmsMetadataKeys.Version]);

View File

@@ -37,10 +37,41 @@ internal static class ConsoleEndpointExtensions
.WithName("ConsoleProfile")
.WithSummary("Return the authenticated principal profile metadata.");
group.MapPost("/token/introspect", IntrospectToken)
.RequireAuthorization(policy => policy.RequireStellaOpsScopes(StellaOpsScopes.UiRead))
.WithName("ConsoleTokenIntrospect")
.WithSummary("Introspect the current access token and return expiry, scope, and tenant metadata.");
group.MapPost("/token/introspect", IntrospectToken)
.RequireAuthorization(policy => policy.RequireStellaOpsScopes(StellaOpsScopes.UiRead))
.WithName("ConsoleTokenIntrospect")
.WithSummary("Introspect the current access token and return expiry, scope, and tenant metadata.");
var vulnGroup = group.MapGroup("/vuln")
.RequireAuthorization(policy => policy.RequireStellaOpsScopes(
StellaOpsScopes.UiRead,
StellaOpsScopes.AdvisoryRead,
StellaOpsScopes.VexRead));
vulnGroup.MapGet("/findings", GetVulnerabilityFindings)
.WithName("ConsoleVulnerabilityFindings")
.WithSummary("List tenant-scoped vulnerability findings with policy/VEX metadata.");
vulnGroup.MapGet("/{findingId}", GetVulnerabilityFindingById)
.WithName("ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail")
.WithSummary("Return the full finding document, including evidence and policy overlays.");
vulnGroup.MapPost("/tickets", CreateVulnerabilityTicket)
.WithName("ConsoleVulnerabilityTickets")
.WithSummary("Generate a signed payload payload for external ticketing workflows.");
var vexGroup = group.MapGroup("/vex")
.RequireAuthorization(policy => policy.RequireStellaOpsScopes(
StellaOpsScopes.UiRead,
StellaOpsScopes.VexRead));
vexGroup.MapGet("/statements", GetVexStatements)
.WithName("ConsoleVexStatements")
.WithSummary("List VEX statements impacting the tenant.");
vexGroup.MapGet("/events", StreamVexEvents)
.WithName("ConsoleVexEvents")
.WithSummary("Server-sent events feed for live VEX updates (placeholder).");
}
private static async Task<IResult> GetTenants(
@@ -134,11 +165,11 @@ internal static class ConsoleEndpointExtensions
return Results.Ok(profile);
}
private static async Task<IResult> IntrospectToken(
HttpContext httpContext,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IAuthEventSink auditSink,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
private static async Task<IResult> IntrospectToken(
HttpContext httpContext,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IAuthEventSink auditSink,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(httpContext);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(timeProvider);
@@ -152,21 +183,214 @@ internal static class ConsoleEndpointExtensions
var introspection = BuildTokenIntrospection(principal, timeProvider);
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.token.introspect",
AuthEventOutcome.Success,
null,
BuildProperties(
("token.active", introspection.Active ? "true" : "false"),
("token.expires_at", FormatInstant(introspection.ExpiresAt)),
("tenant.resolved", introspection.Tenant)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.Ok(introspection);
}
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.token.introspect",
AuthEventOutcome.Success,
null,
BuildProperties(
("token.active", introspection.Active ? "true" : "false"),
("token.expires_at", FormatInstant(introspection.ExpiresAt)),
("tenant.resolved", introspection.Tenant)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.Ok(introspection);
}
private static async Task<IResult> GetVulnerabilityFindings(
HttpContext httpContext,
IConsoleWorkspaceService workspaceService,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IAuthEventSink auditSink,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(httpContext);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(workspaceService);
var tenant = TenantHeaderFilter.GetTenant(httpContext);
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(tenant))
{
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vuln.findings",
AuthEventOutcome.Failure,
"tenant_header_missing",
BuildProperties(("tenant.header", null)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.BadRequest(new { error = "tenant_header_missing", message = $"Header '{AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant}' is required." });
}
var query = BuildVulnerabilityQuery(httpContext.Request);
var response = await workspaceService.SearchFindingsAsync(tenant, query, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vuln.findings",
AuthEventOutcome.Success,
null,
BuildProperties(("tenant.resolved", tenant), ("pagination.next_token", response.NextPageToken)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.Ok(response);
}
private static async Task<IResult> GetVulnerabilityFindingById(
HttpContext httpContext,
string findingId,
IConsoleWorkspaceService workspaceService,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IAuthEventSink auditSink,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(httpContext);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(workspaceService);
var tenant = TenantHeaderFilter.GetTenant(httpContext);
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(tenant))
{
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vuln.finding",
AuthEventOutcome.Failure,
"tenant_header_missing",
BuildProperties(("tenant.header", null)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.BadRequest(new { error = "tenant_header_missing", message = $"Header '{AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant}' is required." });
}
var detail = await workspaceService.GetFindingAsync(tenant, findingId, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (detail is null)
{
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vuln.finding",
AuthEventOutcome.Failure,
"finding_not_found",
BuildProperties(("tenant.resolved", tenant), ("finding.id", findingId)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.NotFound(new { error = "finding_not_found", message = $"Finding '{findingId}' not found." });
}
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vuln.finding",
AuthEventOutcome.Success,
null,
BuildProperties(("tenant.resolved", tenant), ("finding.id", findingId)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.Ok(detail);
}
private static async Task<IResult> CreateVulnerabilityTicket(
HttpContext httpContext,
ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketRequest request,
IConsoleWorkspaceService workspaceService,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IAuthEventSink auditSink,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(httpContext);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(workspaceService);
if (request is null || request.Selection.Count == 0)
{
return Results.BadRequest(new { error = "invalid_request", message = "At least one finding must be selected." });
}
var tenant = TenantHeaderFilter.GetTenant(httpContext);
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(tenant))
{
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vuln.ticket",
AuthEventOutcome.Failure,
"tenant_header_missing",
BuildProperties(("tenant.header", null)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.BadRequest(new { error = "tenant_header_missing", message = $"Header '{AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant}' is required." });
}
var ticket = await workspaceService.CreateTicketAsync(tenant, request, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vuln.ticket",
AuthEventOutcome.Success,
null,
BuildProperties(
("tenant.resolved", tenant),
("ticket.id", ticket.TicketId),
("ticket.selection.count", request.Selection.Count.ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture))),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.Ok(ticket);
}
private static async Task<IResult> GetVexStatements(
HttpContext httpContext,
IConsoleWorkspaceService workspaceService,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IAuthEventSink auditSink,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(httpContext);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(workspaceService);
var tenant = TenantHeaderFilter.GetTenant(httpContext);
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(tenant))
{
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vex.statements",
AuthEventOutcome.Failure,
"tenant_header_missing",
BuildProperties(("tenant.header", null)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.BadRequest(new { error = "tenant_header_missing", message = $"Header '{AuthorityHttpHeaders.Tenant}' is required." });
}
var query = BuildVexQuery(httpContext.Request);
var response = await workspaceService.GetVexStatementsAsync(tenant, query, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
await WriteAuditAsync(
httpContext,
auditSink,
timeProvider,
"authority.console.vex.statements",
AuthEventOutcome.Success,
null,
BuildProperties(("tenant.resolved", tenant), ("pagination.next_token", response.NextPageToken)),
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
return Results.Ok(response);
}
private static IResult StreamVexEvents() =>
Results.StatusCode(StatusCodes.Status501NotImplemented);
private static ConsoleProfileResponse BuildProfile(ClaimsPrincipal principal, TimeProvider timeProvider)
{
@@ -231,9 +455,9 @@ internal static class ConsoleEndpointExtensions
FreshAuth: freshAuth);
}
private static bool DetermineFreshAuth(ClaimsPrincipal principal, DateTimeOffset now)
{
var flag = principal.FindFirst("stellaops:fresh_auth") ?? principal.FindFirst("fresh_auth");
private static bool DetermineFreshAuth(ClaimsPrincipal principal, DateTimeOffset now)
{
var flag = principal.FindFirst("stellaops:fresh_auth") ?? principal.FindFirst("fresh_auth");
if (flag is not null && bool.TryParse(flag.Value, out var freshFlag))
{
if (freshFlag)
@@ -254,9 +478,67 @@ internal static class ConsoleEndpointExtensions
return authTime.Value.Add(ttl) > now;
}
const int defaultFreshAuthWindowSeconds = 300;
return authTime.Value.AddSeconds(defaultFreshAuthWindowSeconds) > now;
}
const int defaultFreshAuthWindowSeconds = 300;
return authTime.Value.AddSeconds(defaultFreshAuthWindowSeconds) > now;
}
private static ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery BuildVulnerabilityQuery(HttpRequest request)
{
var builder = new ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder()
.SetPageSize(ParseInt(request.Query["pageSize"], 50))
.SetPageToken(request.Query.TryGetValue("pageToken", out var tokenValues) ? tokenValues.FirstOrDefault() : null)
.AddSeverity(ReadMulti(request, "severity"))
.AddPolicyBadges(ReadMulti(request, "policyBadge"))
.AddReachability(ReadMulti(request, "reachability"))
.AddProducts(ReadMulti(request, "product"))
.AddVexStates(ReadMulti(request, "vexState"));
var search = request.Query.TryGetValue("search", out var searchValues)
? searchValues
.Where(value => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value))
.SelectMany(value => value!.Split(' ', StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries | StringSplitOptions.TrimEntries))
: Array.Empty<string>();
builder.AddSearchTerms(search);
return builder.Build();
}
private static ConsoleVexQuery BuildVexQuery(HttpRequest request)
{
var builder = new ConsoleVexQueryBuilder()
.SetPageSize(ParseInt(request.Query["pageSize"], 50))
.SetPageToken(request.Query.TryGetValue("pageToken", out var pageValues) ? pageValues.FirstOrDefault() : null)
.AddAdvisories(ReadMulti(request, "advisoryId"))
.AddTypes(ReadMulti(request, "statementType"))
.AddStates(ReadMulti(request, "state"));
return builder.Build();
}
private static IEnumerable<string> ReadMulti(HttpRequest request, string key)
{
if (!request.Query.TryGetValue(key, out var values))
{
return Array.Empty<string>();
}
return values
.Where(value => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value))
.SelectMany(value => value!.Split(',', StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries | StringSplitOptions.TrimEntries))
.Where(value => value.Length > 0);
}
private static int ParseInt(StringValues values, int fallback)
{
if (values.Count == 0)
{
return fallback;
}
return int.TryParse(values[0], NumberStyles.Integer, CultureInfo.InvariantCulture, out var number)
? number
: fallback;
}
private static IReadOnlyList<string> ExtractRoles(ClaimsPrincipal principal)
{

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Collections.Immutable;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.Console;
internal sealed record ConsoleFacetBucket(string Value, int Count);
internal sealed record ConsoleFacetDistribution(
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleFacetBucket> Severity,
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleFacetBucket> PolicyBadge,
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleFacetBucket> Reachability);
internal sealed record ConsoleFindingTimestamps(
DateTimeOffset FirstSeen,
DateTimeOffset LastSeen,
DateTimeOffset? VexLastUpdated);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnCoordinates(
string AdvisoryId,
string Package,
string Component,
string Image);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnVexSummary(
string StatementId,
string State,
string? Justification);
internal sealed record ConsoleReachabilitySummary(
string Status,
DateTimeOffset? LastObserved,
string? SignalsVersion);
internal sealed record ConsoleReachabilityDetail(
string Status,
IReadOnlyList<string> CallPathSamples,
DateTimeOffset? LastObserved,
string? SignalsVersion);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnEvidenceSummary(
string? SbomDigest,
string? PolicyRunId,
string? AttestationId);
internal sealed record ConsoleEvidenceDetail(
ConsoleVulnEvidenceSummary Summary,
IReadOnlyList<string> ComponentPath,
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleAttestationReference> Attestations);
internal sealed record ConsoleAttestationReference(
string Type,
string AttestationId,
string Signer,
string BundleDigest);
internal sealed record ConsolePolicyBadge(
string PolicyId,
string Verdict,
string? ExplainUrl);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnVexDetail(
string StatementId,
string State,
string Justification,
string? ImpactStatement,
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleRemediation> Remediations);
internal sealed record ConsoleRemediation(
string Type,
string Description,
DateTimeOffset? Deadline);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding(
string Tenant,
string FindingId,
ConsoleVulnCoordinates Coordinates,
string Summary,
string Severity,
double? Cvss,
bool Kev,
string PolicyBadge,
ConsoleVulnVexSummary? Vex,
ConsoleReachabilitySummary? Reachability,
ConsoleVulnEvidenceSummary? Evidence,
ConsoleFindingTimestamps Timestamps);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail(
ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding Summary,
string Description,
IReadOnlyList<string> References,
IReadOnlyList<ConsolePolicyBadge> PolicyBadges,
ConsoleVulnVexDetail? Vex,
ConsoleReachabilityDetail? Reachability,
ConsoleEvidenceDetail Evidence);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnerabilitySearchResponse(
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding> Items,
ConsoleFacetDistribution Facets,
string? NextPageToken);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery(
IReadOnlyList<string> Severity,
IReadOnlyList<string> PolicyBadges,
IReadOnlyList<string> Reachability,
IReadOnlyList<string> Products,
IReadOnlyList<string> VexStates,
IReadOnlyList<string> SearchTerms,
int PageSize,
string? PageToken);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketRequest(
IReadOnlyList<string> Selection,
string TargetSystem,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? Metadata);
internal sealed record ConsoleTicketPayload(
string Version,
string Tenant,
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleTicketSelection> Findings,
string PolicyBadge,
string VexSummary,
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleTicketAttachment> Attachments);
internal sealed record ConsoleTicketSelection(string FindingId, string Severity);
internal sealed record ConsoleTicketAttachment(
string Type,
string Name,
string Digest,
string ContentType,
DateTimeOffset ExpiresAt);
internal sealed record ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketResponse(
string TicketId,
ConsoleTicketPayload Payload,
string AuditEventId);
internal sealed record ConsoleVexStatementSummary(
string Tenant,
string StatementId,
string AdvisoryId,
string Product,
string State,
string Justification,
string StatementType,
DateTimeOffset LastUpdated,
ConsoleVexSourceMetadata Source);
internal sealed record ConsoleVexSourceMetadata(
string Type,
string? ModelBuild,
double? Confidence);
internal sealed record ConsoleVexStatementPage(
IReadOnlyList<ConsoleVexStatementSummary> Items,
string? NextPageToken);
internal sealed record ConsoleVexQuery(
IReadOnlyList<string> AdvisoryIds,
IReadOnlyList<string> StatementTypes,
IReadOnlyList<string> States,
int PageSize,
string? PageToken);
internal interface IConsoleWorkspaceService
{
Task<ConsoleVulnerabilitySearchResponse> SearchFindingsAsync(
string tenant,
ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery query,
CancellationToken cancellationToken);
Task<ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail?> GetFindingAsync(
string tenant,
string findingId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken);
Task<ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketResponse> CreateTicketAsync(
string tenant,
ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken);
Task<ConsoleVexStatementPage> GetVexStatementsAsync(
string tenant,
ConsoleVexQuery query,
CancellationToken cancellationToken);
}
internal sealed class ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder
{
private readonly HashSet<string> _severity = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly HashSet<string> _policy = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly HashSet<string> _reachability = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly HashSet<string> _products = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly HashSet<string> _vexStates = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly HashSet<string> _searchTerms = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private int _pageSize = 50;
private string? _pageToken;
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder SetPageSize(int value)
{
_pageSize = Math.Clamp(value, 1, 200);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder SetPageToken(string? token)
{
_pageToken = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(token) ? null : token;
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder AddSeverity(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_severity.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder AddPolicyBadges(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_policy.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder AddReachability(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_reachability.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder AddProducts(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_products.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder AddVexStates(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_vexStates.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQueryBuilder AddSearchTerms(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_searchTerms.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery Build() =>
new(
_severity.ToImmutableArray(),
_policy.ToImmutableArray(),
_reachability.ToImmutableArray(),
_products.ToImmutableArray(),
_vexStates.ToImmutableArray(),
_searchTerms.ToImmutableArray(),
_pageSize,
_pageToken);
}
internal sealed class ConsoleVexQueryBuilder
{
private readonly HashSet<string> _advisories = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly HashSet<string> _types = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private readonly HashSet<string> _states = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private int _pageSize = 50;
private string? _pageToken;
public ConsoleVexQueryBuilder SetPageSize(int value)
{
_pageSize = Math.Clamp(value, 1, 200);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVexQueryBuilder SetPageToken(string? token)
{
_pageToken = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(token) ? null : token;
return this;
}
public ConsoleVexQueryBuilder AddAdvisories(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_advisories.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVexQueryBuilder AddTypes(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_types.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVexQueryBuilder AddStates(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
_states.UnionWith(values);
return this;
}
public ConsoleVexQuery Build() =>
new(
_advisories.ToImmutableArray(),
_types.ToImmutableArray(),
_states.ToImmutableArray(),
_pageSize,
_pageToken);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Collections.Immutable;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using System.Linq;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.Console;
internal sealed class ConsoleWorkspaceSampleService : IConsoleWorkspaceService
{
private static readonly ImmutableArray<ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail> SampleFindings;
private static readonly ImmutableArray<ConsoleVexStatementSummary> SampleStatements;
static ConsoleWorkspaceSampleService()
{
var finding1Summary = new ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding(
Tenant: "tenant-default",
FindingId: "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:5d1a",
Coordinates: new ConsoleVulnCoordinates(
AdvisoryId: "CVE-2024-12345",
Package: "pkg:npm/jsonwebtoken@9.0.2",
Component: "jwt-auth-service",
Image: "registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0"),
Summary: "jsonwebtoken <10.0.0 allows algorithm downgrade.",
Severity: "high",
Cvss: 8.1,
Kev: true,
PolicyBadge: "fail",
Vex: new ConsoleVulnVexSummary(
StatementId: "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
State: "under_investigation",
Justification: "Advisory AI flagged reachable path via Scheduler run 42."),
Reachability: new ConsoleReachabilitySummary(
Status: "reachable",
LastObserved: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-07T23:11:04Z"),
SignalsVersion: "signals-2025.310.1"),
Evidence: new ConsoleVulnEvidenceSummary(
SbomDigest: "sha256:6c81f2bbd8bd7336f197f3f68fba2f76d7287dd1a5e2a0f0e9f14f23f3c2f917",
PolicyRunId: "policy-run::2025-11-07::ca9f",
AttestationId: "dsse://authority/attest/84a2"),
Timestamps: new ConsoleFindingTimestamps(
FirstSeen: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-10-31T04:22:18Z"),
LastSeen: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-07T23:16:51Z"),
VexLastUpdated: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-07T23:10:09Z")));
var finding2Summary = new ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding(
Tenant: "tenant-default",
FindingId: "tenant-default:advisory-ai:sha256:9bf4",
Coordinates: new ConsoleVulnCoordinates(
AdvisoryId: "GHSA-xxxx-yyyy-zzzz",
Package: "pkg:docker/library/nginx@1.25.2",
Component: "ingress-gateway",
Image: "registry.local/ops/ingress:2025.09.1"),
Summary: "Heap overflow in nginx HTTP/3 parsing.",
Severity: "critical",
Cvss: 9.8,
Kev: false,
PolicyBadge: "warn",
Vex: new ConsoleVulnVexSummary(
StatementId: "vex:tenant-default:ingress:9bf4",
State: "not_affected",
Justification: "component_not_present"),
Reachability: new ConsoleReachabilitySummary(
Status: "unknown",
LastObserved: null,
SignalsVersion: "signals-2025.309.0"),
Evidence: new ConsoleVulnEvidenceSummary(
SbomDigest: "sha256:99f1e2a7aa0f7c970dcb6674244f0bfb5f37148e3ee09fd4f925d3358dea2239",
PolicyRunId: "policy-run::2025-11-06::b210",
AttestationId: "dsse://authority/attest/1d34"),
Timestamps: new ConsoleFindingTimestamps(
FirstSeen: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-10-29T18:03:11Z"),
LastSeen: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-07T10:45:03Z"),
VexLastUpdated: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-06T18:44:00Z")));
SampleFindings = ImmutableArray.Create(
new ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail(
Summary: finding1Summary,
Description: "jsonwebtoken accepts untrusted algorithm overrides which allow downgrade attacks.",
References: new[]
{
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12345",
"https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken/security/advisories/GHSA-45mw-4jw3-g2wg"
},
PolicyBadges: new[]
{
new ConsolePolicyBadge("policy://tenant-default/runtime-hardening", "fail", "https://console.local/policy/runs/policy-run::2025-11-07::ca9f")
},
Vex: new ConsoleVulnVexDetail(
StatementId: "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
State: "under_investigation",
Justification: "Runtime telemetry confirmed exploitation path.",
ImpactStatement: "Token exchange service remains exposed until patch 2025.11.2.",
Remediations: new[]
{
new ConsoleRemediation("patch", "Upgrade jwt-auth-service to 2025.11.2.", DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-12T00:00:00Z"))
}),
Reachability: new ConsoleReachabilityDetail(
Status: "reachable",
CallPathSamples: new[]
{
"api-gateway -> jwt-auth-service -> jsonwebtoken.verify"
},
LastObserved: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-07T23:11:04Z"),
SignalsVersion: "signals-2025.310.1"),
Evidence: new ConsoleEvidenceDetail(
Summary: finding1Summary.Evidence!,
ComponentPath: new[]
{
"/src/jwt-auth/package.json",
"/src/jwt-auth/node_modules/jsonwebtoken"
},
Attestations: new[]
{
new ConsoleAttestationReference("scan-report", "dsse://authority/attest/84a2", "attestor@stella-ops.org", "sha256:e2bb5c7a0a8b2d16ff42e7f8decb4bb8be71ad0a1606dbc5d28be43675fbad32")
})),
new ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail(
Summary: finding2Summary,
Description: "nginx HTTP/3 heap overflow affecting unpatched ingress nodes.",
References: new[]
{
"https://security.nginx.org/announcements/2024/http3-overflow",
},
PolicyBadges: new[]
{
new ConsolePolicyBadge("policy://tenant-default/network-hardening", "warn", null)
},
Vex: new ConsoleVulnVexDetail(
StatementId: "vex:tenant-default:ingress:9bf4",
State: "not_affected",
Justification: "component_not_present",
ImpactStatement: "HTTP/3 disabled on ingress, exposure limited.",
Remediations: Array.Empty<ConsoleRemediation>()),
Reachability: new ConsoleReachabilityDetail(
Status: "unknown",
CallPathSamples: Array.Empty<string>(),
LastObserved: null,
SignalsVersion: "signals-2025.309.0"),
Evidence: new ConsoleEvidenceDetail(
Summary: finding2Summary.Evidence!,
ComponentPath: new[]
{
"/charts/ingress/templates/deployment.yaml"
},
Attestations: new[]
{
new ConsoleAttestationReference("scan-report", "dsse://authority/attest/1d34", "attestor@stella-ops.org", "sha256:91e6dd2c1bbf9a4ac797e050d71bf7f1b958d1a0c27469364c44d8ed74bcb9dc")
})));
SampleStatements = ImmutableArray.Create(
new ConsoleVexStatementSummary(
Tenant: "tenant-default",
StatementId: "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
AdvisoryId: "CVE-2024-12345",
Product: "registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0",
State: "under_investigation",
Justification: "exploit_observed",
StatementType: "advisory_ai",
LastUpdated: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-07T23:10:09Z"),
Source: new ConsoleVexSourceMetadata("advisory_ai", "aiai-console-2025-10-28", 0.74)),
new ConsoleVexStatementSummary(
Tenant: "tenant-default",
StatementId: "vex:tenant-default:jwt-auth:5d1a",
AdvisoryId: "CVE-2024-12345",
Product: "registry.local/ops/auth:2025.10.0",
State: "fixed",
Justification: "solution_available",
StatementType: "advisory_ai",
LastUpdated: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-08T11:44:32Z"),
Source: new ConsoleVexSourceMetadata("advisory_ai", "aiai-console-2025-10-28", 0.92)),
new ConsoleVexStatementSummary(
Tenant: "tenant-default",
StatementId: "vex:tenant-default:ingress:9bf4",
AdvisoryId: "GHSA-xxxx-yyyy-zzzz",
Product: "registry.local/ops/ingress:2025.09.1",
State: "not_affected",
Justification: "component_not_present",
StatementType: "excitor",
LastUpdated: DateTimeOffset.Parse("2025-11-06T18:44:00Z"),
Source: new ConsoleVexSourceMetadata("excitor", null, null)));
}
public Task<ConsoleVulnerabilitySearchResponse> SearchFindingsAsync(
string tenant,
ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery query,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var filtered = SampleFindings
.Where(detail => IsTenantMatch(tenant, detail.Summary))
.Where(detail => MatchesSeverity(detail, query))
.Where(detail => MatchesPolicy(detail, query))
.Where(detail => MatchesReachability(detail, query))
.Where(detail => MatchesSearch(detail, query))
.Take(query.PageSize)
.Select(detail => detail.Summary)
.ToImmutableArray();
var facets = BuildFacets(tenant);
var response = new ConsoleVulnerabilitySearchResponse(filtered, facets, NextPageToken: null);
return Task.FromResult(response);
}
public Task<ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail?> GetFindingAsync(
string tenant,
string findingId,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var detail = SampleFindings.FirstOrDefault(f =>
string.Equals(f.Summary.FindingId, findingId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
IsTenantMatch(tenant, f.Summary));
return Task.FromResult(detail);
}
public Task<ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketResponse> CreateTicketAsync(
string tenant,
ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketRequest request,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
ImmutableArray<ConsoleTicketSelection> selection;
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(tenant))
{
selection = ImmutableArray<ConsoleTicketSelection>.Empty;
}
else
{
selection = request.Selection
.Select(id => SampleFindings.FirstOrDefault(f => string.Equals(f.Summary.FindingId, id, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)))
.Where(detail => detail is not null)
.Select(detail => new ConsoleTicketSelection(detail!.Summary.FindingId, detail.Summary.Severity))
.ToImmutableArray();
}
var ticketId = BuildTicketId(tenant, request.Selection);
var attachmentName = $"console-ticket-{DateTimeOffset.UtcNow:yyyyMMdd}.json";
var payload = new ConsoleTicketPayload(
Version: "2025-11-01",
Tenant: tenant,
Findings: selection,
PolicyBadge: selection.Any(sel => string.Equals(sel.Severity, "critical", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) ? "fail" : "warn",
VexSummary: $"{selection.Length} findings included in ticket.",
Attachments: new[]
{
new ConsoleTicketAttachment(
Type: "json",
Name: attachmentName,
Digest: HashAttachmentName(attachmentName),
ContentType: "application/json",
ExpiresAt: DateTimeOffset.UtcNow.AddDays(7))
});
var response = new ConsoleVulnerabilityTicketResponse(
TicketId: ticketId,
Payload: payload,
AuditEventId: $"{ticketId}::audit");
return Task.FromResult(response);
}
public Task<ConsoleVexStatementPage> GetVexStatementsAsync(
string tenant,
ConsoleVexQuery query,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var filtered = SampleStatements
.Where(statement => string.Equals(statement.Tenant, tenant, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
.Where(statement => MatchesAdvisory(statement, query))
.Where(statement => MatchesState(statement, query))
.Where(statement => MatchesType(statement, query))
.Take(query.PageSize)
.ToImmutableArray();
var page = new ConsoleVexStatementPage(filtered, NextPageToken: null);
return Task.FromResult(page);
}
private static bool MatchesSeverity(ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail detail, ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery query) =>
query.Severity.Count == 0 ||
query.Severity.Any(sev => string.Equals(sev, detail.Summary.Severity, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
private static bool MatchesPolicy(ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail detail, ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery query) =>
query.PolicyBadges.Count == 0 ||
query.PolicyBadges.Any(badge => string.Equals(badge, detail.Summary.PolicyBadge, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
private static bool MatchesReachability(ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail detail, ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery query)
{
if (query.Reachability.Count == 0 || detail.Summary.Reachability is null)
{
return query.Reachability.Count == 0;
}
return query.Reachability.Any(state =>
string.Equals(state, detail.Summary.Reachability.Status, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
}
private static bool MatchesSearch(ConsoleVulnerabilityFindingDetail detail, ConsoleVulnerabilityQuery query)
{
if (query.SearchTerms.Count == 0)
{
return true;
}
return query.SearchTerms.Any(term =>
Contains(term, detail.Summary.FindingId) ||
Contains(term, detail.Summary.Coordinates.AdvisoryId) ||
Contains(term, detail.Summary.Coordinates.Component));
}
private static bool MatchesAdvisory(ConsoleVexStatementSummary summary, ConsoleVexQuery query) =>
query.AdvisoryIds.Count == 0 ||
query.AdvisoryIds.Any(advisory => string.Equals(advisory, summary.AdvisoryId, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
private static bool MatchesType(ConsoleVexStatementSummary summary, ConsoleVexQuery query) =>
query.StatementTypes.Count == 0 ||
query.StatementTypes.Any(type => string.Equals(type, summary.StatementType, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
private static bool MatchesState(ConsoleVexStatementSummary summary, ConsoleVexQuery query) =>
query.States.Count == 0 ||
query.States.Any(state => string.Equals(state, summary.State, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
private static bool Contains(string term, string value) =>
value?.IndexOf(term, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) >= 0;
private static bool IsTenantMatch(string tenant, ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding summary) =>
string.Equals(summary.Tenant, tenant, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private static ConsoleFacetDistribution BuildFacets(string tenant)
{
var findings = SampleFindings.Where(detail => IsTenantMatch(tenant, detail.Summary)).Select(detail => detail.Summary);
return new ConsoleFacetDistribution(
Severity: AggregateFacet(findings, finding => finding.Severity),
PolicyBadge: AggregateFacet(findings, finding => finding.PolicyBadge),
Reachability: AggregateFacet(findings, finding => finding.Reachability?.Status ?? "unknown"));
}
private static IReadOnlyList<ConsoleFacetBucket> AggregateFacet(
IEnumerable<ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding> findings,
Func<ConsoleVulnerabilityFinding, string> selector) =>
findings
.GroupBy(selector, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
.OrderByDescending(group => group.Count())
.ThenBy(group => group.Key, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
.Select(group => new ConsoleFacetBucket(group.Key ?? "unknown", group.Count()))
.ToImmutableArray();
private static string BuildTicketId(string tenant, IEnumerable<string> selection)
{
using var sha256 = SHA256.Create();
var joined = string.Join("|", selection.Order());
var hash = sha256.ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(joined));
var prefix = Convert.ToHexString(hash[..8]).ToLowerInvariant();
return $"console-ticket::{tenant}::{prefix}";
}
private static string HashAttachmentName(string name)
{
using var sha256 = SHA256.Create();
var hash = sha256.ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(name));
return $"sha256:{Convert.ToHexString(hash).ToLowerInvariant()}";
}
}

View File

@@ -1,314 +1,319 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Linq;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using YamlDotNet.Core;
using YamlDotNet.RepresentationModel;
using YamlDotNet.Serialization;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.OpenApi;
internal sealed class AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider
{
private readonly string specificationPath;
private readonly ILogger<AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider> logger;
private readonly SemaphoreSlim refreshLock = new(1, 1);
private OpenApiDocumentSnapshot? cached;
public AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider(IWebHostEnvironment environment, ILogger<AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider> logger)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(environment);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(logger);
specificationPath = Path.Combine(environment.ContentRootPath, "OpenApi", "authority.yaml");
this.logger = logger;
}
public async ValueTask<OpenApiDocumentSnapshot> GetDocumentAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var lastWriteUtc = GetLastWriteTimeUtc();
var current = cached;
if (current is not null && current.LastWriteUtc == lastWriteUtc)
{
return current;
}
await refreshLock.WaitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
try
{
current = cached;
lastWriteUtc = GetLastWriteTimeUtc();
if (current is not null && current.LastWriteUtc == lastWriteUtc)
{
return current;
}
var snapshot = LoadSnapshot(lastWriteUtc);
cached = snapshot;
return snapshot;
}
finally
{
refreshLock.Release();
}
}
private DateTime GetLastWriteTimeUtc()
{
var file = new FileInfo(specificationPath);
if (!file.Exists)
{
throw new FileNotFoundException($"Authority OpenAPI specification was not found at '{specificationPath}'.", specificationPath);
}
return file.LastWriteTimeUtc;
}
private OpenApiDocumentSnapshot LoadSnapshot(DateTime lastWriteUtc)
{
string yamlText;
try
{
yamlText = File.ReadAllText(specificationPath);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
logger.LogError(ex, "Failed to read Authority OpenAPI specification from {Path}.", specificationPath);
throw;
}
var yamlStream = new YamlStream();
using (var reader = new StringReader(yamlText))
{
yamlStream.Load(reader);
}
if (yamlStream.Documents.Count == 0 || yamlStream.Documents[0].RootNode is not YamlMappingNode rootNode)
{
throw new InvalidOperationException("Authority OpenAPI specification does not contain a valid root mapping node.");
}
var (grants, scopes) = CollectGrantsAndScopes(rootNode);
if (!TryGetMapping(rootNode, "info", out var infoNode))
{
infoNode = new YamlMappingNode();
rootNode.Children[new YamlScalarNode("info")] = infoNode;
}
var serviceName = "authority";
var buildVersion = ResolveBuildVersion();
ApplyInfoMetadata(infoNode, serviceName, buildVersion, grants, scopes);
var apiVersion = TryGetScalar(infoNode, "version", out var version)
? version
: "0.0.0";
var updatedYaml = WriteYaml(yamlStream);
var json = ConvertYamlToJson(updatedYaml);
var etag = CreateStrongEtag(json);
return new OpenApiDocumentSnapshot(
serviceName,
apiVersion,
buildVersion,
json,
updatedYaml,
etag,
lastWriteUtc,
grants,
scopes);
}
private static (IReadOnlyList<string> Grants, IReadOnlyList<string> Scopes) CollectGrantsAndScopes(YamlMappingNode root)
{
if (!TryGetMapping(root, "components", out var components) ||
!TryGetMapping(components, "securitySchemes", out var securitySchemes))
{
return (Array.Empty<string>(), Array.Empty<string>());
}
var grants = new SortedSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
var scopes = new SortedSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
foreach (var scheme in securitySchemes.Children.Values.OfType<YamlMappingNode>())
{
if (!TryGetMapping(scheme, "flows", out var flows))
{
continue;
}
foreach (var flowEntry in flows.Children)
{
if (flowEntry.Key is not YamlScalarNode flowNameNode || flowEntry.Value is not YamlMappingNode flowMapping)
{
continue;
}
var grant = NormalizeGrantName(flowNameNode.Value);
if (grant is not null)
{
grants.Add(grant);
}
if (TryGetMapping(flowMapping, "scopes", out var scopesMapping))
{
foreach (var scope in scopesMapping.Children.Keys.OfType<YamlScalarNode>())
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(scope.Value))
{
scopes.Add(scope.Value);
}
}
}
if (flowMapping.Children.TryGetValue(new YamlScalarNode("refreshUrl"), out var refreshNode) &&
refreshNode is YamlScalarNode refreshScalar && !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(refreshScalar.Value))
{
grants.Add("refresh_token");
}
}
}
return (
grants.Count == 0 ? Array.Empty<string>() : grants.ToArray(),
scopes.Count == 0 ? Array.Empty<string>() : scopes.ToArray());
}
private static string? NormalizeGrantName(string? flowName)
=> flowName switch
{
null or "" => null,
"authorizationCode" => "authorization_code",
"clientCredentials" => "client_credentials",
"password" => "password",
"implicit" => "implicit",
"deviceCode" => "device_code",
_ => flowName
};
private static void ApplyInfoMetadata(
YamlMappingNode infoNode,
string serviceName,
string buildVersion,
IReadOnlyList<string> grants,
IReadOnlyList<string> scopes)
{
infoNode.Children[new YamlScalarNode("x-stella-service")] = new YamlScalarNode(serviceName);
infoNode.Children[new YamlScalarNode("x-stella-build-version")] = new YamlScalarNode(buildVersion);
infoNode.Children[new YamlScalarNode("x-stella-grant-types")] = CreateSequence(grants);
infoNode.Children[new YamlScalarNode("x-stella-scopes")] = CreateSequence(scopes);
}
private static YamlSequenceNode CreateSequence(IEnumerable<string> values)
{
var sequence = new YamlSequenceNode();
foreach (var value in values)
{
sequence.Add(new YamlScalarNode(value));
}
return sequence;
}
private static bool TryGetMapping(YamlMappingNode node, string key, out YamlMappingNode mapping)
{
foreach (var entry in node.Children)
{
if (entry.Key is YamlScalarNode scalar && string.Equals(scalar.Value, key, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
if (entry.Value is YamlMappingNode mappingNode)
{
mapping = mappingNode;
return true;
}
break;
}
}
mapping = null!;
return false;
}
private static bool TryGetScalar(YamlMappingNode node, string key, out string value)
{
foreach (var entry in node.Children)
{
if (entry.Key is YamlScalarNode scalar && string.Equals(scalar.Value, key, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
if (entry.Value is YamlScalarNode valueNode)
{
value = valueNode.Value ?? string.Empty;
return true;
}
break;
}
}
value = string.Empty;
return false;
}
private static string WriteYaml(YamlStream yamlStream)
{
using var writer = new StringWriter(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);
yamlStream.Save(writer, assignAnchors: false);
return writer.ToString();
}
private static string ConvertYamlToJson(string yaml)
{
var deserializer = new DeserializerBuilder().Build();
var yamlObject = deserializer.Deserialize(new StringReader(yaml));
var serializer = new SerializerBuilder()
.JsonCompatible()
.Build();
var json = serializer.Serialize(yamlObject);
return string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json) ? "{}" : json.Trim();
}
private static string CreateStrongEtag(string jsonRepresentation)
{
var bytes = SHA256.HashData(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(jsonRepresentation));
var hash = Convert.ToHexString(bytes).ToLowerInvariant();
return $"\"{hash}\"";
}
private static string ResolveBuildVersion()
{
var assembly = typeof(AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider).Assembly;
var informational = assembly
.GetCustomAttribute<AssemblyInformationalVersionAttribute>()?
.InformationalVersion;
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(informational))
{
return informational!;
}
var version = assembly.GetName().Version;
return version?.ToString() ?? "unknown";
}
}
internal sealed record OpenApiDocumentSnapshot(
string ServiceName,
string ApiVersion,
string BuildVersion,
string Json,
string Yaml,
string ETag,
DateTime LastWriteUtc,
IReadOnlyList<string> GrantTypes,
IReadOnlyList<string> Scopes);
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Linq;
using System.Reflection;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using YamlDotNet.Core;
using YamlDotNet.RepresentationModel;
using YamlDotNet.Serialization;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.OpenApi;
internal sealed class AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider
{
private readonly string specificationPath;
private readonly ILogger<AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider> logger;
private readonly ICryptoHash hash;
private readonly SemaphoreSlim refreshLock = new(1, 1);
private OpenApiDocumentSnapshot? cached;
public AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider(
IWebHostEnvironment environment,
ILogger<AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider> logger,
ICryptoHash hash)
{
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(environment);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(logger);
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(hash);
specificationPath = Path.Combine(environment.ContentRootPath, "OpenApi", "authority.yaml");
this.logger = logger;
this.hash = hash;
}
public async ValueTask<OpenApiDocumentSnapshot> GetDocumentAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var lastWriteUtc = GetLastWriteTimeUtc();
var current = cached;
if (current is not null && current.LastWriteUtc == lastWriteUtc)
{
return current;
}
await refreshLock.WaitAsync(cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
try
{
current = cached;
lastWriteUtc = GetLastWriteTimeUtc();
if (current is not null && current.LastWriteUtc == lastWriteUtc)
{
return current;
}
var snapshot = LoadSnapshot(lastWriteUtc);
cached = snapshot;
return snapshot;
}
finally
{
refreshLock.Release();
}
}
private DateTime GetLastWriteTimeUtc()
{
var file = new FileInfo(specificationPath);
if (!file.Exists)
{
throw new FileNotFoundException($"Authority OpenAPI specification was not found at '{specificationPath}'.", specificationPath);
}
return file.LastWriteTimeUtc;
}
private OpenApiDocumentSnapshot LoadSnapshot(DateTime lastWriteUtc)
{
string yamlText;
try
{
yamlText = File.ReadAllText(specificationPath);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
logger.LogError(ex, "Failed to read Authority OpenAPI specification from {Path}.", specificationPath);
throw;
}
var yamlStream = new YamlStream();
using (var reader = new StringReader(yamlText))
{
yamlStream.Load(reader);
}
if (yamlStream.Documents.Count == 0 || yamlStream.Documents[0].RootNode is not YamlMappingNode rootNode)
{
throw new InvalidOperationException("Authority OpenAPI specification does not contain a valid root mapping node.");
}
var (grants, scopes) = CollectGrantsAndScopes(rootNode);
if (!TryGetMapping(rootNode, "info", out var infoNode))
{
infoNode = new YamlMappingNode();
rootNode.Children[new YamlScalarNode("info")] = infoNode;
}
var serviceName = "authority";
var buildVersion = ResolveBuildVersion();
ApplyInfoMetadata(infoNode, serviceName, buildVersion, grants, scopes);
var apiVersion = TryGetScalar(infoNode, "version", out var version)
? version
: "0.0.0";
var updatedYaml = WriteYaml(yamlStream);
var json = ConvertYamlToJson(updatedYaml);
var etag = CreateStrongEtag(json);
return new OpenApiDocumentSnapshot(
serviceName,
apiVersion,
buildVersion,
json,
updatedYaml,
etag,
lastWriteUtc,
grants,
scopes);
}
private static (IReadOnlyList<string> Grants, IReadOnlyList<string> Scopes) CollectGrantsAndScopes(YamlMappingNode root)
{
if (!TryGetMapping(root, "components", out var components) ||
!TryGetMapping(components, "securitySchemes", out var securitySchemes))
{
return (Array.Empty<string>(), Array.Empty<string>());
}
var grants = new SortedSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
var scopes = new SortedSet<string>(StringComparer.Ordinal);
foreach (var scheme in securitySchemes.Children.Values.OfType<YamlMappingNode>())
{
if (!TryGetMapping(scheme, "flows", out var flows))
{
continue;
}
foreach (var flowEntry in flows.Children)
{
if (flowEntry.Key is not YamlScalarNode flowNameNode || flowEntry.Value is not YamlMappingNode flowMapping)
{
continue;
}

View File

@@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ internal static class AuthorityOpenIddictConstants
internal const string DpopConsumedNonceProperty = "authority:dpop_nonce";
internal const string ConfirmationClaimType = "cnf";
internal const string SenderConstraintClaimType = "authority_sender_constraint";
internal const string SenderNonceClaimType = "authority_sender_nonce";
internal const string MtlsCertificateThumbprintProperty = "authority:mtls_thumbprint";
internal const string MtlsCertificateHexProperty = "authority:mtls_thumbprint_hex";
internal const string MtlsCertificateHexClaimType = "authority_sender_certificate_hex";
internal const string ClientTenantProperty = "authority:client_tenant";
internal const string ClientProjectProperty = "authority:client_project";
internal const string ClientAttributesProperty = "authority:client_attributes";

View File

@@ -1177,6 +1177,50 @@ internal sealed class ValidateClientCredentialsHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandle
var extraProperties = new List<AuthEventProperty>();
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.SenderConstraintProperty, out var auditSenderConstraintObj) &&
auditSenderConstraintObj is string auditSenderConstraint &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(auditSenderConstraint))
{
extraProperties.Add(new AuthEventProperty
{
Name = "sender.constraint",
Value = ClassifiedString.Public(auditSenderConstraint)
});
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.DpopKeyThumbprintProperty, out var auditDpopThumbprintObj) &&
auditDpopThumbprintObj is string auditDpopThumbprint &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(auditDpopThumbprint))
{
extraProperties.Add(new AuthEventProperty
{
Name = "sender.dpop.jkt",
Value = ClassifiedString.Sensitive(auditDpopThumbprint)
});
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.MtlsCertificateThumbprintProperty, out var auditMtlsThumbprintObj) &&
auditMtlsThumbprintObj is string auditMtlsThumbprint &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(auditMtlsThumbprint))
{
extraProperties.Add(new AuthEventProperty
{
Name = "sender.mtls.x5t",
Value = ClassifiedString.Sensitive(auditMtlsThumbprint)
});
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.MtlsCertificateHexProperty, out var auditMtlsHexObj) &&
auditMtlsHexObj is string auditMtlsHex &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(auditMtlsHex))
{
extraProperties.Add(new AuthEventProperty
{
Name = "sender.mtls.x5t_hex",
Value = ClassifiedString.Sensitive(auditMtlsHex)
});
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.OperatorReasonProperty, out var operatorReasonObj) &&
operatorReasonObj is string operatorReason &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(operatorReason))
@@ -1873,6 +1917,13 @@ internal sealed class HandleClientCredentialsHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<
record.SenderKeyThumbprint = senderThumbprint;
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.MtlsCertificateHexProperty, out var senderCertHexObj) &&
senderCertHexObj is string senderCertHex &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(senderCertHex))
{
record.SenderCertificateHex = senderCertHex;
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.ClientTenantProperty, out var tenantObj) &&
tenantObj is string tenantValue &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(tenantValue))
@@ -1976,6 +2027,13 @@ internal sealed class HandleClientCredentialsHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<
identity.SetClaim(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.ConfirmationClaimType, confirmation);
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.DpopConsumedNonceProperty, out var nonceObj) &&
nonceObj is string consumedNonce &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(consumedNonce))
{
identity.SetClaim(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.SenderNonceClaimType, consumedNonce);
}
break;
case AuthoritySenderConstraintKinds.Mtls:
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.MtlsCertificateThumbprintProperty, out var mtlsThumbprintObj) &&
@@ -1990,6 +2048,13 @@ internal sealed class HandleClientCredentialsHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<
identity.SetClaim(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.ConfirmationClaimType, confirmation);
}
if (context.Transaction.Properties.TryGetValue(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.MtlsCertificateHexProperty, out var mtlsHexObj) &&
mtlsHexObj is string mtlsHex &&
!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(mtlsHex))
{
identity.SetClaim(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.MtlsCertificateHexClaimType, mtlsHex);
}
break;
}
}

View File

@@ -26,11 +26,13 @@ using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.OpenIddict.Handlers;
internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenIddictServerEvents.ValidateTokenRequestContext>
{
private readonly StellaOpsAuthorityOptions authorityOptions;
private readonly IAuthorityClientStore clientStore;
private readonly IDpopProofValidator proofValidator;
internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenIddictServerEvents.ValidateTokenRequestContext>
{
private const string AnyDpopKeyThumbprint = "__authority_any_dpop_key__";
private readonly StellaOpsAuthorityOptions authorityOptions;
private readonly IAuthorityClientStore clientStore;
private readonly IDpopProofValidator proofValidator;
private readonly IDpopNonceStore nonceStore;
private readonly IAuthorityRateLimiterMetadataAccessor metadataAccessor;
private readonly IAuthEventSink auditSink;
@@ -88,15 +90,34 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
return;
}
var senderConstraint = NormalizeSenderConstraint(clientDocument);
context.Transaction.Properties[AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.ClientSenderConstraintProperty] = senderConstraint;
if (!string.Equals(senderConstraint, AuthoritySenderConstraintKinds.Dpop, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
return;
}
var configuredAudiences = EnsureRequestAudiences(context.Request, clientDocument);
var senderConstraint = NormalizeSenderConstraint(clientDocument);
var configuredAudiences = EnsureRequestAudiences(context.Request, clientDocument);
var nonceOptions = senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Nonce;
string? matchedNonceAudience = null;
if (senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Enabled && nonceOptions.Enabled)
{
matchedNonceAudience = ResolveNonceAudience(context.Request, nonceOptions, configuredAudiences);
}
var requiresClientSenderConstraint = string.Equals(senderConstraint, AuthoritySenderConstraintKinds.Dpop, StringComparison.Ordinal);
var requiresConfiguredAudience = senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Enabled && matchedNonceAudience is not null;
var effectiveSenderConstraint = requiresClientSenderConstraint || requiresConfiguredAudience
? AuthoritySenderConstraintKinds.Dpop
: senderConstraint;
context.Transaction.Properties[AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.ClientSenderConstraintProperty] = effectiveSenderConstraint;
if (!requiresClientSenderConstraint && !requiresConfiguredAudience)
{
return;
}
if (requiresConfiguredAudience && !requiresClientSenderConstraint)
{
logger.LogDebug("DPoP enforcement enabled for client {ClientId} targeting audience {Audience}.", clientId, matchedNonceAudience);
}
if (!senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Enabled)
{
@@ -125,18 +146,18 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
return;
}
if (!httpRequest.Headers.TryGetValue("DPoP", out StringValues proofHeader) || StringValues.IsNullOrEmpty(proofHeader))
{
logger.LogWarning("Missing DPoP header for client credentials request from {ClientId}.", clientId);
await ChallengeNonceAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
audience: null,
thumbprint: null,
reasonCode: "missing_proof",
description: "DPoP proof is required.",
senderConstraintOptions,
httpResponse).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (!httpRequest.Headers.TryGetValue("DPoP", out StringValues proofHeader) || StringValues.IsNullOrEmpty(proofHeader))
{
logger.LogWarning("Missing DPoP header for client credentials request from {ClientId}.", clientId);
await ChallengeNonceAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
audience: matchedNonceAudience,
thumbprint: null,
reasonCode: "missing_proof",
description: "DPoP proof is required.",
senderConstraintOptions,
httpResponse).ConfigureAwait(false);
return;
}
@@ -150,36 +171,36 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
cancellationToken: context.CancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (!validationResult.IsValid)
{
var error = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(validationResult.ErrorDescription)
? "DPoP proof validation failed."
: validationResult.ErrorDescription;
{
var error = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(validationResult.ErrorDescription)
? "DPoP proof validation failed."
: validationResult.ErrorDescription;
logger.LogWarning("DPoP proof validation failed for client {ClientId}: {Reason}.", clientId, error);
await ChallengeNonceAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
audience: matchedNonceAudience,
thumbprint: null,
reasonCode: validationResult.ErrorCode ?? "invalid_proof",
description: error,
senderConstraintOptions,
httpResponse).ConfigureAwait(false);
return;
}
logger.LogWarning("DPoP proof validation failed for client {ClientId}: {Reason}.", clientId, error);
await ChallengeNonceAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
audience: null,
thumbprint: null,
reasonCode: validationResult.ErrorCode ?? "invalid_proof",
description: error,
senderConstraintOptions,
httpResponse).ConfigureAwait(false);
return;
}
if (validationResult.PublicKey is not Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.JsonWebKey jwk)
{
logger.LogWarning("DPoP proof for {ClientId} did not expose a JSON Web Key.", clientId);
await ChallengeNonceAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
audience: null,
thumbprint: null,
reasonCode: "invalid_key",
description: "DPoP proof must embed a JSON Web Key.",
senderConstraintOptions,
httpResponse).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (validationResult.PublicKey is not Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.JsonWebKey jwk)
{
logger.LogWarning("DPoP proof for {ClientId} did not expose a JSON Web Key.", clientId);
await ChallengeNonceAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
audience: matchedNonceAudience,
thumbprint: null,
reasonCode: "invalid_key",
description: "DPoP proof must embed a JSON Web Key.",
senderConstraintOptions,
httpResponse).ConfigureAwait(false);
return;
}
@@ -209,8 +230,7 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
context.Transaction.Properties[AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.DpopIssuedAtProperty] = issuedAt;
}
var nonceOptions = senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Nonce;
var requiredAudience = ResolveNonceAudience(context.Request, nonceOptions, configuredAudiences);
var requiredAudience = matchedNonceAudience;
if (nonceOptions.Enabled && requiredAudience is not null)
{
@@ -232,12 +252,12 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
return;
}
var consumeResult = await nonceStore.TryConsumeAsync(
suppliedNonce,
requiredAudience,
clientDocument.ClientId,
thumbprint,
context.CancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
var consumeResult = await ConsumeNonceAsync(
suppliedNonce,
requiredAudience,
clientDocument,
thumbprint,
context.CancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
switch (consumeResult.Status)
{
@@ -442,11 +462,11 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
return null;
}
private async ValueTask ChallengeNonceAsync(
OpenIddictServerEvents.ValidateTokenRequestContext context,
AuthorityClientDocument clientDocument,
string? audience,
string? thumbprint,
private async ValueTask ChallengeNonceAsync(
OpenIddictServerEvents.ValidateTokenRequestContext context,
AuthorityClientDocument clientDocument,
string? audience,
string? thumbprint,
string reasonCode,
string description,
AuthoritySenderConstraintOptions senderConstraintOptions,
@@ -455,20 +475,25 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
context.Reject(OpenIddictConstants.Errors.InvalidClient, description);
metadataAccessor.SetTag("authority.dpop_result", reasonCode);
string? issuedNonce = null;
DateTimeOffset? expiresAt = null;
if (audience is not null && thumbprint is not null && senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Nonce.Enabled)
{
var issuance = await nonceStore.IssueAsync(
audience,
clientDocument.ClientId,
thumbprint,
senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Nonce.Ttl,
senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Nonce.MaxIssuancePerMinute,
context.CancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (issuance.Status == DpopNonceIssueStatus.Success)
{
string? issuedNonce = null;
DateTimeOffset? expiresAt = null;
var nonceOptions = senderConstraintOptions.Dpop.Nonce;
if (audience is not null && nonceOptions.Enabled)
{
var issuanceThumbprint = string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(thumbprint)
? AnyDpopKeyThumbprint
: thumbprint;
var issuance = await nonceStore.IssueAsync(
audience,
clientDocument.ClientId,
issuanceThumbprint,
nonceOptions.Ttl,
nonceOptions.MaxIssuancePerMinute,
context.CancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (issuance.Status == DpopNonceIssueStatus.Success)
{
issuedNonce = issuance.Nonce;
expiresAt = issuance.ExpiresAt;
}
@@ -488,20 +513,48 @@ internal sealed class ValidateDpopProofHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenId
}
}
await WriteAuditAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
AuthEventOutcome.Failure,
description,
thumbprint,
validationResult: null,
audience,
"authority.dpop.proof.challenge",
reasonCode,
issuedNonce,
expiresAt)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
await WriteAuditAsync(
context,
clientDocument,
AuthEventOutcome.Failure,
description,
thumbprint,
validationResult: null,
audience,
"authority.dpop.proof.challenge",
reasonCode,
issuedNonce,
expiresAt)
.ConfigureAwait(false);
}
private async ValueTask<DpopNonceConsumeResult> ConsumeNonceAsync(
string nonce,
string audience,
AuthorityClientDocument clientDocument,
string keyThumbprint,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var result = await nonceStore.TryConsumeAsync(
nonce,
audience,
clientDocument.ClientId,
keyThumbprint,
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (result.Status == DpopNonceConsumeStatus.NotFound &&
!string.Equals(keyThumbprint, AnyDpopKeyThumbprint, StringComparison.Ordinal))
{
result = await nonceStore.TryConsumeAsync(
nonce,
audience,
clientDocument.ClientId,
AnyDpopKeyThumbprint,
cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
}
return result;
}
private static string BuildAuthenticateHeader(string reasonCode, string description, string? nonce)
{

View File

@@ -117,6 +117,18 @@ internal sealed class PersistTokensHandler : IOpenIddictServerHandler<OpenIddict
document.SenderConstraint = senderConstraint;
}
var senderNonce = principal.GetClaim(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.SenderNonceClaimType);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(senderNonce))
{
document.SenderNonce = senderNonce;
}
var senderCertificateHex = principal.GetClaim(AuthorityOpenIddictConstants.MtlsCertificateHexClaimType);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(senderCertificateHex))
{
document.SenderCertificateHex = senderCertificateHex;
}
var serviceAccountId = principal.GetClaim(StellaOpsClaimTypes.ServiceAccount);
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(serviceAccountId))
{

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ using StellaOps.Authority.Notifications.Ack;
using StellaOps.Authority.Plugins.Abstractions;
using StellaOps.Authority.Plugins;
using StellaOps.Authority.Bootstrap;
using StellaOps.Authority.Console;
using StellaOps.Authority.Storage.Mongo.Extensions;
using StellaOps.Authority.Storage.Mongo.Initialization;
using StellaOps.Authority.Storage.Mongo.Stores;
@@ -115,6 +116,8 @@ builder.Host.UseSerilog((context, _, loggerConfiguration) =>
});
var authorityOptions = authorityConfiguration.Options;
builder.Services.AddStellaOpsCrypto(authorityOptions.Crypto);
builder.Services.AddHostedService<AuthoritySecretHasherInitializer>();
var issuerUri = authorityOptions.Issuer;
if (issuerUri is null)
{
@@ -138,6 +141,7 @@ builder.Services.TryAddSingleton<IAuthorityRateLimiterPartitionKeyResolver, Defa
builder.Services.AddSingleton<IAuthorityClientCertificateValidator, AuthorityClientCertificateValidator>();
builder.Services.TryAddSingleton<IAuthorityAirgapAuditService, AuthorityAirgapAuditService>();
builder.Services.AddSingleton<AuthorityOpenApiDocumentProvider>();
builder.Services.TryAddSingleton<IConsoleWorkspaceService, ConsoleWorkspaceSampleService>();
#if STELLAOPS_AUTH_SECURITY
var senderConstraints = authorityOptions.Security.SenderConstraints;
@@ -210,7 +214,6 @@ if (requiresKms)
builder.Services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IAuthoritySigningKeySource, KmsAuthoritySigningKeySource>());
}
builder.Services.AddStellaOpsCrypto();
builder.Services.TryAddEnumerable(ServiceDescriptor.Singleton<IAuthoritySigningKeySource, FileAuthoritySigningKeySource>());
builder.Services.AddSingleton<AuthoritySigningKeyManager>();
builder.Services.AddSingleton<AuthorityAckTokenKeyManager>();

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
using System;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using StellaOps.Authority.Plugins.Abstractions;
using StellaOps.Configuration;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.Security;
internal sealed class AuthoritySecretHasherInitializer : IHostedService
{
private readonly ICryptoHash hash;
private readonly IOptions<StellaOpsAuthorityOptions> authorityOptions;
private readonly ILogger<AuthoritySecretHasherInitializer> logger;
public AuthoritySecretHasherInitializer(
ICryptoHash hash,
IOptions<StellaOpsAuthorityOptions> authorityOptions,
ILogger<AuthoritySecretHasherInitializer> logger)
{
this.hash = hash ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(hash));
this.authorityOptions = authorityOptions ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(authorityOptions));
this.logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
}
public Task StartAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var options = authorityOptions.Value;
var algorithm = options?.Crypto?.DefaultHashAlgorithm;
AuthoritySecretHasher.Configure(hash, algorithm);
logger.LogInformation("Authority secret hasher configured with default algorithm {Algorithm}.",
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(algorithm) ? HashAlgorithms.Sha256 : algorithm);
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
public Task StopAsync(CancellationToken cancellationToken) => Task.CompletedTask;
}

View File

@@ -1,181 +1,183 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using StellaOps.Configuration;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.Signing;
internal sealed class AuthorityJwksService
{
private const string CacheKey = "authority:jwks:current";
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions SerializerOptions = new(JsonSerializerDefaults.Web)
{
PropertyNamingPolicy = JsonNamingPolicy.CamelCase,
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull
};
private readonly ICryptoProviderRegistry registry;
private readonly ILogger<AuthorityJwksService> logger;
private readonly IMemoryCache cache;
private readonly TimeProvider timeProvider;
private readonly StellaOpsAuthorityOptions authorityOptions;
public AuthorityJwksService(
ICryptoProviderRegistry registry,
ILogger<AuthorityJwksService> logger,
IMemoryCache cache,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IOptions<StellaOpsAuthorityOptions> authorityOptions)
{
this.registry = registry ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(registry));
this.logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
this.cache = cache ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(cache));
this.timeProvider = timeProvider ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(timeProvider));
if (authorityOptions is null)
{
throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(authorityOptions));
}
this.authorityOptions = authorityOptions.Value ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(authorityOptions));
}
public AuthorityJwksResult Get()
{
if (cache.TryGetValue(CacheKey, out AuthorityJwksCacheEntry? cached) &&
cached is not null &&
cached.ExpiresAt > timeProvider.GetUtcNow())
{
return cached.Result;
}
var response = new AuthorityJwksResponse(BuildKeys());
var signingOptions = authorityOptions.Signing;
var lifetime = signingOptions.JwksCacheLifetime > TimeSpan.Zero
? signingOptions.JwksCacheLifetime
: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
var expires = timeProvider.GetUtcNow().Add(lifetime);
var etag = ComputeEtag(response, expires);
var cacheControl = $"public, max-age={(int)lifetime.TotalSeconds}";
var result = new AuthorityJwksResult(response, etag, expires, cacheControl);
var entry = new AuthorityJwksCacheEntry(result, expires);
cache.Set(CacheKey, entry, new MemoryCacheEntryOptions
{
AbsoluteExpirationRelativeToNow = lifetime
});
return result;
}
public void Invalidate()
{
cache.Remove(CacheKey);
}
private IReadOnlyCollection<JwksKeyEntry> BuildKeys()
{
var keys = new List<JwksKeyEntry>();
var seen = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (var provider in registry.Providers)
{
foreach (var signingKey in provider.GetSigningKeys())
{
var keyId = signingKey.Reference.KeyId;
if (!seen.Add(keyId))
{
continue;
}
try
{
var signer = provider.GetSigner(signingKey.AlgorithmId, signingKey.Reference);
var jwk = signer.ExportPublicJsonWebKey();
var keyUse = signingKey.Metadata.TryGetValue("use", out var metadataUse) && !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(metadataUse)
? metadataUse
: jwk.Use;
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(keyUse))
{
keyUse = "sig";
}
var entry = new JwksKeyEntry
{
Kid = jwk.Kid,
Kty = jwk.Kty,
Use = keyUse,
Alg = jwk.Alg,
Crv = jwk.Crv,
X = jwk.X,
Y = jwk.Y,
Status = signingKey.Metadata.TryGetValue("status", out var status) ? status : "active"
};
keys.Add(entry);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
logger.LogWarning(ex, "Failed to export JWKS entry for key {KeyId}.", keyId);
}
}
}
keys.Sort(static (left, right) => string.Compare(left.Kid, right.Kid, StringComparison.Ordinal));
return keys;
}
private static string ComputeEtag(AuthorityJwksResponse response, DateTimeOffset expiresAt)
{
var payload = JsonSerializer.Serialize(response, SerializerOptions);
var buffer = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(payload + "|" + expiresAt.ToUnixTimeSeconds().ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture));
var hash = SHA256.HashData(buffer);
return $"\"{Convert.ToHexString(hash)}\"";
}
private sealed record AuthorityJwksCacheEntry(AuthorityJwksResult Result, DateTimeOffset ExpiresAt);
}
internal sealed record AuthorityJwksResponse([property: JsonPropertyName("keys")] IReadOnlyCollection<JwksKeyEntry> Keys);
internal sealed record AuthorityJwksResult(
AuthorityJwksResponse Response,
string ETag,
DateTimeOffset ExpiresAt,
string CacheControl);
internal sealed class JwksKeyEntry
{
[JsonPropertyName("kty")]
public string? Kty { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("use")]
public string? Use { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("kid")]
public string? Kid { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("alg")]
public string? Alg { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("crv")]
public string? Crv { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("x")]
public string? X { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("y")]
public string? Y { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("status")]
[JsonIgnore(Condition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull)]
public string? Status { get; set; }
}
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using StellaOps.Configuration;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
namespace StellaOps.Authority.Signing;
internal sealed class AuthorityJwksService
{
private const string CacheKey = "authority:jwks:current";
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions SerializerOptions = new(JsonSerializerDefaults.Web)
{
PropertyNamingPolicy = JsonNamingPolicy.CamelCase,
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull
};
private readonly ICryptoProviderRegistry registry;
private readonly ICryptoHash hash;
private readonly ILogger<AuthorityJwksService> logger;
private readonly IMemoryCache cache;
private readonly TimeProvider timeProvider;
private readonly StellaOpsAuthorityOptions authorityOptions;
public AuthorityJwksService(
ICryptoProviderRegistry registry,
ICryptoHash hash,
ILogger<AuthorityJwksService> logger,
IMemoryCache cache,
TimeProvider timeProvider,
IOptions<StellaOpsAuthorityOptions> authorityOptions)
{
this.registry = registry ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(registry));
this.hash = hash ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(hash));
this.logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
this.cache = cache ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(cache));
this.timeProvider = timeProvider ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(timeProvider));
if (authorityOptions is null)
{
throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(authorityOptions));
}
this.authorityOptions = authorityOptions.Value ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(authorityOptions));
}
public AuthorityJwksResult Get()
{
if (cache.TryGetValue(CacheKey, out AuthorityJwksCacheEntry? cached) &&
cached is not null &&
cached.ExpiresAt > timeProvider.GetUtcNow())
{
return cached.Result;
}
var response = new AuthorityJwksResponse(BuildKeys());
var signingOptions = authorityOptions.Signing;
var lifetime = signingOptions.JwksCacheLifetime > TimeSpan.Zero
? signingOptions.JwksCacheLifetime
: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
var expires = timeProvider.GetUtcNow().Add(lifetime);
var etag = ComputeEtag(response, expires);
var cacheControl = $"public, max-age={(int)lifetime.TotalSeconds}";
var result = new AuthorityJwksResult(response, etag, expires, cacheControl);
var entry = new AuthorityJwksCacheEntry(result, expires);
cache.Set(CacheKey, entry, new MemoryCacheEntryOptions
{
AbsoluteExpirationRelativeToNow = lifetime
});
return result;
}
public void Invalidate()
{
cache.Remove(CacheKey);
}
private IReadOnlyCollection<JwksKeyEntry> BuildKeys()
{
var keys = new List<JwksKeyEntry>();
var seen = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
foreach (var provider in registry.Providers)
{
foreach (var signingKey in provider.GetSigningKeys())
{
var keyId = signingKey.Reference.KeyId;
if (!seen.Add(keyId))
{
continue;
}
try
{
var signer = provider.GetSigner(signingKey.AlgorithmId, signingKey.Reference);
var jwk = signer.ExportPublicJsonWebKey();
var keyUse = signingKey.Metadata.TryGetValue("use", out var metadataUse) && !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(metadataUse)
? metadataUse
: jwk.Use;
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(keyUse))
{
keyUse = "sig";
}
var entry = new JwksKeyEntry
{
Kid = jwk.Kid,
Kty = jwk.Kty,
Use = keyUse,
Alg = jwk.Alg,
Crv = jwk.Crv,
X = jwk.X,
Y = jwk.Y,
Status = signingKey.Metadata.TryGetValue("status", out var status) ? status : "active"
};
keys.Add(entry);
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
logger.LogWarning(ex, "Failed to export JWKS entry for key {KeyId}.", keyId);
}
}
}
keys.Sort(static (left, right) => string.Compare(left.Kid, right.Kid, StringComparison.Ordinal));
return keys;
}
private string ComputeEtag(AuthorityJwksResponse response, DateTimeOffset expiresAt)
{
var payload = JsonSerializer.Serialize(response, SerializerOptions);
var buffer = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(payload + "|" + expiresAt.ToUnixTimeSeconds().ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture));
var digest = hash.ComputeHash(buffer, HashAlgorithms.Sha256);
return $"\"{Convert.ToHexString(digest)}\"";
}
private sealed record AuthorityJwksCacheEntry(AuthorityJwksResult Result, DateTimeOffset ExpiresAt);
}
internal sealed record AuthorityJwksResponse([property: JsonPropertyName("keys")] IReadOnlyCollection<JwksKeyEntry> Keys);
internal sealed record AuthorityJwksResult(
AuthorityJwksResponse Response,
string ETag,
DateTimeOffset ExpiresAt,
string CacheControl);
internal sealed class JwksKeyEntry
{
[JsonPropertyName("kty")]
public string? Kty { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("use")]
public string? Use { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("kid")]
public string? Kid { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("alg")]
public string? Alg { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("crv")]
public string? Crv { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("x")]
public string? X { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("y")]
public string? Y { get; set; }
[JsonPropertyName("status")]
[JsonIgnore(Condition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull)]
public string? Status { get; set; }
}

View File

@@ -1,170 +1,182 @@
# Authority Host Task Board — Epic 1: Aggregation-Only Contract
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-26: Rate limiter metadata/audit records now include tenants, password grant scopes/tenants enforced, token persistence + tests updated. Docs refresh tracked via AUTH-AOC-19-003.
> 2025-10-27: Client credential ingestion scopes now require tenant assignment; access token validation backfills tenants and rejects cross-tenant mismatches with tests.
> 2025-10-27: `dotnet test` blocked — Concelier build fails (`AdvisoryObservationQueryService` returns `ImmutableHashSet<string?>`), preventing Authority test suite run; waiting on Concelier fix before rerun.
> 2025-10-26: Docs updated (`docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, Concelier audit runbook, `docs/security/authority-scopes.md`); sample config highlights tenant-aware clients. Release notes + smoke verification pending (blocked on Concelier/Excititor smoke updates).
> 2025-10-27: Scope catalogue aligned with `advisory:ingest/advisory:read/vex:ingest/vex:read`, `aoc:verify` pairing documented, console/CLI references refreshed, and `etc/authority.yaml.sample` updated to require read scopes for verification clients.
> 2025-10-31: Client credentials and password grants now reject advisory/vex read or signals scopes without `aoc:verify`, enforce tenant assignment for `aoc:verify`, tag violations via `authority.aoc_scope_violation`, extend tests, and refresh scope catalogue docs/sample roles.
## Link-Not-Merge v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Rejected legacy `concelier.merge` scope during client credential validation, removed it from known scope catalog, blocked discovery/issuance, added regression tests, and refreshed scope documentation.
## Policy Engine v2
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-26: Restricted `effective:write` to Policy Engine service identities with tenant requirement, registered full scope set, and tightened resource server default scope enforcement (unit tests pass).
> 2025-10-26: Authority docs now detail policy scopes/service identity guardrails with checklist; `authority.yaml.sample` includes `properties.serviceIdentity` example.
## Graph Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
## Policy Engine + Editor v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-POLICY-23-002 | BLOCKED (2025-10-29) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-POLICY-23-001 | Implement optional two-person rule for activation: require two distinct `policy:activate` approvals when configured; emit audit logs. | Activation endpoint enforces rule; audit logs contain approver IDs; tests cover 2-person path. |
> Blocked: Policy Engine/Studio have not yet exposed activation workflow endpoints or approval payloads needed to enforce dual-control (`WEB-POLICY-23-002`, `POLICY-ENGINE-23-002`). Revisit once activation contract lands.
| AUTH-POLICY-23-003 | BLOCKED (2025-10-29) | Authority Core & Docs Guild | AUTH-POLICY-23-001 | Update documentation and sample configs for policy roles, approval workflow, and signing requirements. | Docs updated with reviewer checklist; configuration examples validated. |
> Blocked pending AUTH-POLICY-23-002 dual-approval implementation so docs can capture final activation behaviour.
> 2025-10-27: Added `policy-cli` defaults to Authority config/secrets, refreshed CLI/CI documentation with the new scope bundle, recorded release migration guidance, and introduced `scripts/verify-policy-scopes.py` to guard against regressions.
## Graph & Vuln Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-27: Paused work after exploratory spike (scope enforcement still outstanding); no functional changes merged.
## Orchestrator Dashboard
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-31: Picked up during Console/Orchestrator alignment; focusing on scope catalog + tenant enforcement first.
> 2025-10-31: `orch:read` added to scope catalogue and Authority runtime, Console defaults include the scope, `Orch.Viewer` role documented, and client-credential tests enforce tenant requirements.
> 2025-10-27: Added `orch:operate` scope, enforced `operator_reason`/`operator_ticket` on token issuance, updated Authority configs/docs, and captured audit metadata for control actions.
> 2025-10-28: Policy gateway + scanner now pass the expanded token client signature (`null` metadata by default), test stubs capture the optional parameters, and Policy Gateway/Scanner suites are green after fixing the Concelier storage build break.
> 2025-10-28: Authority password-grant tests now hit the new constructors but still need updates to drop obsolete `IOptions` arguments before the suite can pass.
| AUTH-ORCH-34-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-ORCH-33-001 | Introduce `Orch.Admin` role with quota/backfill scopes, enforce audit reason on quota changes, and update offline defaults/docs. | Admin role available; quotas/backfills require scope + reason; tests confirm tenant isolation; documentation updated. |
> 2025-11-02: `orch:backfill` scope added with mandatory `backfill_reason`/`backfill_ticket`, client-credential validation and resource authorization paths emit audit fields, CLI picks up new configuration/env vars, and Authority docs/config samples updated for `Orch.Admin`.
## StellaOps Console (Sprint 23)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Authorization code flow enabled with PKCE requirement, console client seeded in `authority.yaml.sample`, discovery docs updated, and console runbook guidance added.
> 2025-10-31: Added `/console/tenants`, `/console/profile`, `/console/token/introspect` endpoints with tenant header filter, scope enforcement (`ui.read`, `authority:tenants.read`), and structured audit events. Console test harness covers success/mismatch cases.
> 2025-10-28: `docs/security/console-security.md` drafted with PKCE + DPoP (120s OpTok, 300s fresh-auth) and scope table. Authority Core to confirm `/fresh-auth` semantics, token lifetimes, and scope bundles align before closing task.
> 2025-10-31: Security guide expanded for `/console` endpoints & orchestrator scope, sample YAML annotated, ops runbook updated, and release note `docs/updates/2025-10-31-console-security-refresh.md` published.
> 2025-10-31: Default access-token lifetime reduced to 120s, console tests updated with dual auth schemes, docs/config/ops notes refreshed, release note logged.
## Policy Studio (Sprint 27)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-31: Added Policy Studio scope family (`policy:author/review/operate/audit`), updated OpenAPI + discovery headers, enforced tenant requirements in grant handlers, seeded new roles in Authority config/offline kit docs, and refreshed CLI/Console documentation + tests to validate the new catalogue.
| AUTH-POLICY-27-002 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-POLICY-27-001, REGISTRY-API-27-007 | Provide attestation signing service bindings (OIDC token exchange, cosign integration) and enforce publish/promote scope checks, fresh-auth requirements, and audit logging. | Publish/promote requests require fresh auth + correct scopes; attestations signed with validated identity; audit logs enriched with digest + tenant; integration tests pass. |
> Docs dependency: `DOCS-POLICY-27-009` awaiting signing guidance from this work.
> 2025-11-02: Added `policy:publish`/`policy:promote` scopes with interactive-only enforcement, metadata parameters (`policy_reason`, `policy_ticket`, `policy_digest`), fresh-auth token validation, audit augmentations, and updated config/docs references.
| AUTH-POLICY-27-003 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Docs Guild | AUTH-POLICY-27-001, AUTH-POLICY-27-002 | Update Authority configuration/docs for Policy Studio roles, signing policies, approval workflows, and CLI integration; include compliance checklist. | Docs merged; samples validated; governance checklist appended; release notes updated. |
> 2025-11-04: Policy Studio roles/scopes documented across `docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, sample configs, and OpenAPI; compliance checklist appended and Authority tests rerun to validate fresh-auth + scope enforcement.
## Exceptions v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Added exception scopes + routing template options, enforced MFA requirement in password grant handlers, updated configuration samples.
> 2025-10-31: Authority scopes/routing docs updated (`docs/security/authority-scopes.md`, `docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, `docs/policy/exception-effects.md`), monitoring guide covers new MFA audit events, and `etc/authority.yaml.sample` now demonstrates exception clients/templates.
## Reachability v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Signals scopes added with tenant + aoc:verify enforcement; sensors guided via SignalsUploader template; tests cover gating.
## Vulnerability Explorer (Sprint 29)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-VULN-29-001 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-POLICY-27-001 | Define Vuln Explorer scopes/roles (`vuln:view`, `vuln:investigate`, `vuln:operate`, `vuln:audit`) with ABAC attributes (env, owner, business_tier) and update discovery metadata/offline kit defaults. | Roles/scopes published; issuer templates updated; integration tests cover ABAC filters; docs refreshed. |
| AUTH-VULN-29-002 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-VULN-29-001, LEDGER-29-002 | Enforce CSRF/anti-forgery tokens for workflow actions, sign attachment tokens, and record audit logs with ledger event hashes. | Workflow calls require valid tokens; audit logs include ledger references; security tests cover token expiry/abuse. |
| AUTH-VULN-29-003 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Docs Guild | AUTH-VULN-29-001..002 | Update security docs/config samples for Vuln Explorer roles, ABAC policies, attachment signing, and ledger verification guidance. | Docs merged with compliance checklist; configuration examples validated; release notes updated. |
> 2025-11-03: Vuln workflow CSRF + attachment token services live with audit enrichment and negative-path tests. Awaiting completion of full Authority suite run after repository-wide build finishes.
> 2025-11-04: Verified Vuln Explorer RBAC/ABAC coverage in Authority docs/security guides, attachment token guidance, and offline samples; Authority tests rerun confirming ledger-token + anti-forgery behaviours.
## Advisory AI (Sprint 31)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-AIAI-31-001 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-VULN-29-001 | Define Advisory AI scopes (`advisory-ai:view`, `advisory-ai:operate`, `advisory-ai:admin`) and remote inference toggles; update discovery metadata/offline defaults. | Scopes/flags published; integration tests cover RBAC + opt-in settings; docs updated. |
| AUTH-AIAI-31-002 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AIAI-31-001, AIAI-31-006 | Enforce anonymized prompt logging, tenant consent for remote inference, and audit logging of assistant tasks. | Logging/audit flows verified; privacy review passed; docs updated. |
## Export Center
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
## Notifications Studio
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-NOTIFY-38-001 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Authority Core & Security Guild | — | Define `Notify.Viewer`, `Notify.Operator`, `Notify.Admin` scopes/roles, update discovery metadata, offline defaults, and issuer templates. | Scopes available; metadata updated; tests ensure enforcement; offline kit defaults refreshed. |
| AUTH-NOTIFY-40-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-NOTIFY-38-001, WEB-NOTIFY-40-001 | Implement signed ack token key rotation, webhook allowlists, admin-only escalation settings, and audit logging of ack actions. | Ack tokens signed/rotated; webhook allowlists enforced; admin enforcement validated; audit logs capture ack/resolution. |
> 2025-11-02: `/notify/ack-tokens/rotate` exposed (notify.admin), emits `notify.ack.key_rotated|notify.ack.key_rotation_failed`, and DSSE rotation tests cover allowlist + scope enforcement.
| AUTH-NOTIFY-42-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-NOTIFY-40-001 | Investigate ack token rotation 500 errors (test Rotate_ReturnsBadRequest_WhenKeyIdMissing_AndAuditsFailure still failing). Capture logs, identify root cause, and patch handler. | Failure mode understood; fix merged; regression test passes. |
> 2025-11-02: Aliased `StellaOpsBearer` to the test auth handler, corrected bootstrap `/notifications/ack-tokens/rotate` defaults, and validated `Rotate_ReturnsBadRequest_WhenKeyIdMissing_AndAuditsFailure` via targeted `dotnet test`.
## CLI Parity & Task Packs
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-PACKS-41-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AOC-19-001 | Define CLI SSO profiles and pack scopes (`Packs.Read`, `Packs.Write`, `Packs.Run`, `Packs.Approve`), update discovery metadata, offline defaults, and issuer templates. | Scopes available; metadata updated; tests ensure enforcement; offline kit templates refreshed. |
> 2025-11-02: Added Pack scope policies, Authority role defaults, and CLI profile guidance covering operator/publisher/approver flows.
> 2025-11-02: Shared OpenSSL 1.1 shim feeds Authority & Signals Mongo2Go harnesses so pack scope coverage keeps running on OpenSSL 3 hosts (AUTH-PACKS-41-001).
> 2025-11-04: Discovery metadata/OpenAPI advertise packs scopes, configs/offline kit templates bundle new roles, and Authority tests re-run to validate tenant gating for `packs.*`.
| AUTH-PACKS-43-001 | BLOCKED (2025-10-27) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-PACKS-41-001, TASKRUN-42-001, ORCH-SVC-42-101 | Enforce pack signing policies, approval RBAC checks, CLI CI token scopes, and audit logging for approvals. | Signing policies enforced; approvals require correct roles; CI token scope tests pass; audit logs recorded. |
> Blocked: Task Runner approval APIs (`ORCH-SVC-42-101`, `TASKRUN-42-001`) still outstanding. Pack scope catalog (AUTH-PACKS-41-001) landed 2025-11-04; resume once execution/approval contracts are published.
## Authority-Backed Scopes & Tenancy (Epic 14)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-28: Tidied advisory raw idempotency migration to avoid LINQ-on-`BsonValue` (explicit array copy) while continuing duplicate guardrail validation; scoped scanner/policy token call sites updated to honor new metadata parameter.
| AUTH-TEN-49-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-TEN-47-001 | Implement service accounts & delegation tokens (`act` chain), per-tenant quotas, audit stream of auth decisions, and revocation APIs. | Service tokens minted with scopes/TTL; delegation logged; quotas configurable; audit stream live; docs updated. |
> 2025-11-02: Authority bootstrap test harness now seeds service accounts via AuthorityDelegation options; `/internal/service-accounts` endpoints validated with targeted vstest run.
> 2025-11-02: Added Mongo service-account store, seeded options/collection initializers, token persistence metadata (`tokenKind`, `serviceAccountId`, `actorChain`), and docs/config samples. Introduced quota checks + tests covering service account issuance and persistence.
> 2025-11-02: Documented bootstrap service-account admin APIs in `docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, noting API key requirements and stable upsert behaviour.
> 2025-11-03: Seeded explicit enabled service-account fixtures for integration tests and reran `StellaOps.Authority.Tests` to greenlight `/internal/service-accounts` listing + revocation scenarios.
> 2025-11-04: Confirmed service-account docs/config examples, quota tuning, and audit stream wiring; Authority suite re-executed to cover issuance/listing/revocation flows.
## Observability & Forensics (Epic 15)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-OBS-50-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AOC-19-001 | Introduce scopes `obs:read`, `timeline:read`, `timeline:write`, `evidence:create`, `evidence:read`, `evidence:hold`, `attest:read`, and `obs:incident` (all tenant-scoped). Update discovery metadata, offline defaults, and scope grammar docs. | Scopes exposed via metadata; issuer templates updated; offline kit seeded; integration tests cover new scopes. |
| AUTH-OBS-52-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-OBS-50-001, TIMELINE-OBS-52-003, EVID-OBS-53-003 | Configure resource server policies for Timeline Indexer, Evidence Locker, Exporter, and Observability APIs enforcing new scopes + tenant claims. Emit audit events including scope usage and trace IDs. | Policies deployed; unauthorized access blocked; audit logs prove scope usage; contract tests updated. |
| AUTH-OBS-55-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild, Ops Guild | AUTH-OBS-50-001, WEB-OBS-55-001 | Harden incident mode authorization: require `obs:incident` scope + fresh auth, log activation reason, and expose verification endpoint for auditors. Update docs/runbooks. | Incident activate/deactivate requires scope; audit entries logged; docs updated with imposed rule reminder. |
## Air-Gapped Mode (Epic 16)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AIRGAP-CTL-56-001 | Provision new scopes (`airgap:seal`, `airgap:import`, `airgap:status:read`) in configuration metadata, offline kit defaults, and issuer templates. | Scopes exposed in discovery docs; offline kit updated; integration tests cover issuance. |
| AUTH-AIRGAP-56-002 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001, AIRGAP-IMP-58-001 | Audit import actions with actor, tenant, bundle ID, and trace ID; expose `/authority/audit/airgap` endpoint. | Audit records persisted; endpoint paginates results; tests cover RBAC + filtering. |
> 2025-11-04: Airgap scope constants are wired through discovery metadata, `etc/authority.yaml.sample`, and offline kit docs; scope issuance tests executed via `dotnet test`.
> 2025-11-04: `/authority/audit/airgap` API persists tenant-scoped audit entries with pagination and authorization guards validated by the Authority integration suite (187 tests).
| AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001 | BLOCKED (2025-11-01) | Authority Core & Security Guild, DevOps Guild | AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001, DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 | Enforce sealed-mode CI gating by refusing token issuance when declared sealed install lacks sealing confirmation. | Awaiting clarified sealed-confirmation contract and configuration structure before implementation. |
> 2025-11-01: AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001 blocked pending guidance on sealed-confirmation contract and configuration expectations before gating changes (Authority Core & Security Guild, DevOps Guild).
## SDKs & OpenAPI (Epic 17)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-28: Auth OpenAPI authored at `src/Api/StellaOps.Api.OpenApi/authority/openapi.yaml` covering `/token`, `/introspect`, `/revoke`, `/jwks`, scope catalog, and error envelopes; parsed via PyYAML sanity check and referenced in Epic 17 docs.
> 2025-10-28: Added `/.well-known/openapi` endpoint wiring cached spec metadata, YAML/JSON negotiation, HTTP cache headers, and tests verifying ETag + Accept handling. Authority spec (`src/Api/StellaOps.Api.OpenApi/authority/openapi.yaml`) now includes grant/scope extensions.
| AUTH-OAS-62-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild, SDK Generator Guild | AUTH-OAS-61-001, SDKGEN-63-001 | Provide SDK helpers for OAuth2/PAT flows, tenancy override header; add integration tests. | SDKs expose auth helpers; tests cover token issuance; docs updated. |
> 2025-11-02: `AddStellaOpsApiAuthentication` shipped (OAuth2 + PAT), tenant header injection added, and client tests updated for caching behaviour.
| AUTH-OAS-63-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild, API Governance Guild | APIGOV-63-001 | Emit deprecation headers and notifications for legacy auth endpoints. | Headers emitted; notifications verified; migration guide published. |
> 2025-11-02: AUTH-OAS-63-001 completed — legacy OAuth shims emit Deprecation/Sunset/Warning headers, audit events captured, and migration guide published (Authority Core & Security Guild, API Governance Guild).
# Authority Host Task Board — Epic 1: Aggregation-Only Contract
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-26: Rate limiter metadata/audit records now include tenants, password grant scopes/tenants enforced, token persistence + tests updated. Docs refresh tracked via AUTH-AOC-19-003.
> 2025-10-27: Client credential ingestion scopes now require tenant assignment; access token validation backfills tenants and rejects cross-tenant mismatches with tests.
> 2025-10-27: `dotnet test` blocked — Concelier build fails (`AdvisoryObservationQueryService` returns `ImmutableHashSet<string?>`), preventing Authority test suite run; waiting on Concelier fix before rerun.
> 2025-10-26: Docs updated (`docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, Concelier audit runbook, `docs/security/authority-scopes.md`); sample config highlights tenant-aware clients. Release notes + smoke verification pending (blocked on Concelier/Excititor smoke updates).
> 2025-10-27: Scope catalogue aligned with `advisory:ingest/advisory:read/vex:ingest/vex:read`, `aoc:verify` pairing documented, console/CLI references refreshed, and `etc/authority.yaml.sample` updated to require read scopes for verification clients.
> 2025-10-31: Client credentials and password grants now reject advisory/vex read or signals scopes without `aoc:verify`, enforce tenant assignment for `aoc:verify`, tag violations via `authority.aoc_scope_violation`, extend tests, and refresh scope catalogue docs/sample roles.
| AUTH-CRYPTO-90-001 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Authority Core & Security Guild | SEC-CRYPTO-90-003, SEC-CRYPTO-90-004 | Migrate signing/key-loading paths (`KmsAuthoritySigningKeySource`, `FileAuthoritySigningKeySource`, `AuthorityJwksService`, secret hashers) to `ICryptoProviderRegistry` so regional bundles can pick `ru.cryptopro.csp` / `ru.pkcs11` providers as defined in `docs/security/crypto-routing-audit-2025-11-07.md`. | All signing + hashing code paths resolve registry providers; Authority config exposes provider selection; JWKS output references sovereign keys; regression tests updated. |
## Link-Not-Merge v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Rejected legacy `concelier.merge` scope during client credential validation, removed it from known scope catalog, blocked discovery/issuance, added regression tests, and refreshed scope documentation.
## Policy Engine v2
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-26: Restricted `effective:write` to Policy Engine service identities with tenant requirement, registered full scope set, and tightened resource server default scope enforcement (unit tests pass).
> 2025-10-26: Authority docs now detail policy scopes/service identity guardrails with checklist; `authority.yaml.sample` includes `properties.serviceIdentity` example.
## Graph Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
## Policy Engine + Editor v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-DPOP-11-001 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AOC-19-002 | Enforce DPoP sender constraints for all Authority token flows (nonce store selection, algorithm allowlist, `cnf.jkt` persistence, structured telemetry). | `/token` enforces configured DPoP policies (nonce, allowed algorithms); cnf claims verified in integration tests; docs/runbooks updated with configuration guidance. |
> 2025-11-07: Joint Authority/DevOps stand-up committed to shipping nonce store + telemetry updates by 2025-11-10; config samples and integration tests being updated in tandem.
| AUTH-MTLS-11-002 | DOING (2025-11-07) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-DPOP-11-001 | Add mTLS-bound access token issuance/validation (client certificate thumbprints, JWKS rotation hooks) for high-assurance tenants and services. | mTLS certificate binding validated end-to-end; audit logs capture cert hashes; docs describe bootstrap/rotation steps. |
> 2025-11-08: Wiring cert thumbprint persistence + audit hooks now that DPoP nonce enforcement is in place; targeting shared delivery window with DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002.
> 2025-11-07: Same stand-up aligned on 2025-11-10 target for mTLS enforcement + JWKS rotation docs so plugin mitigations can unblock.
| AUTH-POLICY-23-001 | DONE (2025-10-27) | Authority Core & Docs Guild | AUTH-AOC-19-002 | Introduce fine-grained policy scopes (`policy:read`, `policy:author`, `policy:review`, `policy:simulate`, `findings:read`) for CLI/service identities; refresh discovery metadata, issuer templates, and offline defaults. | Scope catalogue and sample configs updated; `policy-cli` seed credentials rotated; docs recorded migration steps. |
| AUTH-POLICY-23-002 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-POLICY-23-001 | Implement optional two-person rule for activation: require two distinct `policy:activate` approvals when configured; emit audit logs. | Activation endpoint enforces rule; audit logs contain approver IDs; tests cover 2-person path. |
> 2025-11-08: Policy Engine enforces pending_second_approval when dual-control toggles demand it, activation auditor emits structured `policy.activation.*` scopes, and tests cover settings/audits.
> Blocked: Policy Engine/Studio have not yet exposed activation workflow endpoints or approval payloads needed to enforce dual-control (`WEB-POLICY-23-002`, `POLICY-ENGINE-23-002`). Revisit once activation contract lands.
| AUTH-POLICY-23-003 | DONE (2025-11-08) | Authority Core & Docs Guild | AUTH-POLICY-23-001 | Update documentation and sample configs for policy roles, approval workflow, and signing requirements. | Docs updated with reviewer checklist; configuration examples validated. |
> 2025-11-08: Docs refreshed for dual-control activation (console workflow, compliance checklist, sample YAML) and linked to new Policy Engine activation options.
> 2025-11-07: Scope migration landed (AUTH-POLICY-23-001); dual-approval + documentation tasks now waiting on pairing.
> 2025-10-27: Added `policy-cli` defaults to Authority config/secrets, refreshed CLI/CI documentation with the new scope bundle, recorded release migration guidance, and introduced `scripts/verify-policy-scopes.py` to guard against regressions.
## Graph & Vuln Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-27: Paused work after exploratory spike (scope enforcement still outstanding); no functional changes merged.
## Orchestrator Dashboard
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-31: Picked up during Console/Orchestrator alignment; focusing on scope catalog + tenant enforcement first.
> 2025-10-31: `orch:read` added to scope catalogue and Authority runtime, Console defaults include the scope, `Orch.Viewer` role documented, and client-credential tests enforce tenant requirements.
> 2025-10-27: Added `orch:operate` scope, enforced `operator_reason`/`operator_ticket` on token issuance, updated Authority configs/docs, and captured audit metadata for control actions.
> 2025-10-28: Policy gateway + scanner now pass the expanded token client signature (`null` metadata by default), test stubs capture the optional parameters, and Policy Gateway/Scanner suites are green after fixing the Concelier storage build break.
> 2025-10-28: Authority password-grant tests now hit the new constructors but still need updates to drop obsolete `IOptions` arguments before the suite can pass.
| AUTH-ORCH-34-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-ORCH-33-001 | Introduce `Orch.Admin` role with quota/backfill scopes, enforce audit reason on quota changes, and update offline defaults/docs. | Admin role available; quotas/backfills require scope + reason; tests confirm tenant isolation; documentation updated. |
> 2025-11-02: `orch:backfill` scope added with mandatory `backfill_reason`/`backfill_ticket`, client-credential validation and resource authorization paths emit audit fields, CLI picks up new configuration/env vars, and Authority docs/config samples updated for `Orch.Admin`.
## StellaOps Console (Sprint 23)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Authorization code flow enabled with PKCE requirement, console client seeded in `authority.yaml.sample`, discovery docs updated, and console runbook guidance added.
> 2025-10-31: Added `/console/tenants`, `/console/profile`, `/console/token/introspect` endpoints with tenant header filter, scope enforcement (`ui.read`, `authority:tenants.read`), and structured audit events. Console test harness covers success/mismatch cases.
> 2025-10-28: `docs/security/console-security.md` drafted with PKCE + DPoP (120s OpTok, 300s fresh-auth) and scope table. Authority Core to confirm `/fresh-auth` semantics, token lifetimes, and scope bundles align before closing task.
> 2025-10-31: Security guide expanded for `/console` endpoints & orchestrator scope, sample YAML annotated, ops runbook updated, and release note `docs/updates/2025-10-31-console-security-refresh.md` published.
> 2025-10-31: Default access-token lifetime reduced to 120s, console tests updated with dual auth schemes, docs/config/ops notes refreshed, release note logged.
## Policy Studio (Sprint 27)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-31: Added Policy Studio scope family (`policy:author/review/operate/audit`), updated OpenAPI + discovery headers, enforced tenant requirements in grant handlers, seeded new roles in Authority config/offline kit docs, and refreshed CLI/Console documentation + tests to validate the new catalogue.
| AUTH-POLICY-27-002 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-POLICY-27-001, REGISTRY-API-27-007 | Provide attestation signing service bindings (OIDC token exchange, cosign integration) and enforce publish/promote scope checks, fresh-auth requirements, and audit logging. | Publish/promote requests require fresh auth + correct scopes; attestations signed with validated identity; audit logs enriched with digest + tenant; integration tests pass. |
> Docs dependency: `DOCS-POLICY-27-009` awaiting signing guidance from this work.
> 2025-11-02: Added `policy:publish`/`policy:promote` scopes with interactive-only enforcement, metadata parameters (`policy_reason`, `policy_ticket`, `policy_digest`), fresh-auth token validation, audit augmentations, and updated config/docs references.
| AUTH-POLICY-27-003 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Docs Guild | AUTH-POLICY-27-001, AUTH-POLICY-27-002 | Update Authority configuration/docs for Policy Studio roles, signing policies, approval workflows, and CLI integration; include compliance checklist. | Docs merged; samples validated; governance checklist appended; release notes updated. |
> 2025-11-04: Policy Studio roles/scopes documented across `docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, sample configs, and OpenAPI; compliance checklist appended and Authority tests rerun to validate fresh-auth + scope enforcement.
## Exceptions v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Added exception scopes + routing template options, enforced MFA requirement in password grant handlers, updated configuration samples.
> 2025-10-31: Authority scopes/routing docs updated (`docs/security/authority-scopes.md`, `docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, `docs/policy/exception-effects.md`), monitoring guide covers new MFA audit events, and `etc/authority.yaml.sample` now demonstrates exception clients/templates.
## Reachability v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-29: Signals scopes added with tenant + aoc:verify enforcement; sensors guided via SignalsUploader template; tests cover gating.
## Vulnerability Explorer (Sprint 29)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-VULN-29-001 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-POLICY-27-001 | Define Vuln Explorer scopes/roles (`vuln:view`, `vuln:investigate`, `vuln:operate`, `vuln:audit`) with ABAC attributes (env, owner, business_tier) and update discovery metadata/offline kit defaults. | Roles/scopes published; issuer templates updated; integration tests cover ABAC filters; docs refreshed. |
| AUTH-VULN-29-002 | DONE (2025-11-03) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-VULN-29-001, LEDGER-29-002 | Enforce CSRF/anti-forgery tokens for workflow actions, sign attachment tokens, and record audit logs with ledger event hashes. | Workflow calls require valid tokens; audit logs include ledger references; security tests cover token expiry/abuse. |
| AUTH-VULN-29-003 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Docs Guild | AUTH-VULN-29-001..002 | Update security docs/config samples for Vuln Explorer roles, ABAC policies, attachment signing, and ledger verification guidance. | Docs merged with compliance checklist; configuration examples validated; release notes updated. |
> 2025-11-03: Vuln workflow CSRF + attachment token services live with audit enrichment and negative-path tests. Awaiting completion of full Authority suite run after repository-wide build finishes.
> 2025-11-04: Verified Vuln Explorer RBAC/ABAC coverage in Authority docs/security guides, attachment token guidance, and offline samples; Authority tests rerun confirming ledger-token + anti-forgery behaviours.
## Advisory AI (Sprint 31)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-AIAI-31-001 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-VULN-29-001 | Define Advisory AI scopes (`advisory-ai:view`, `advisory-ai:operate`, `advisory-ai:admin`) and remote inference toggles; update discovery metadata/offline defaults. | Scopes/flags published; integration tests cover RBAC + opt-in settings; docs updated. |
| AUTH-AIAI-31-002 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AIAI-31-001, AIAI-31-006 | Enforce anonymized prompt logging, tenant consent for remote inference, and audit logging of assistant tasks. | Logging/audit flows verified; privacy review passed; docs updated. |
## Export Center
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
## Notifications Studio
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-NOTIFY-38-001 | DONE (2025-11-01) | Authority Core & Security Guild | — | Define `Notify.Viewer`, `Notify.Operator`, `Notify.Admin` scopes/roles, update discovery metadata, offline defaults, and issuer templates. | Scopes available; metadata updated; tests ensure enforcement; offline kit defaults refreshed. |
| AUTH-NOTIFY-40-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-NOTIFY-38-001, WEB-NOTIFY-40-001 | Implement signed ack token key rotation, webhook allowlists, admin-only escalation settings, and audit logging of ack actions. | Ack tokens signed/rotated; webhook allowlists enforced; admin enforcement validated; audit logs capture ack/resolution. |
> 2025-11-02: `/notify/ack-tokens/rotate` exposed (notify.admin), emits `notify.ack.key_rotated|notify.ack.key_rotation_failed`, and DSSE rotation tests cover allowlist + scope enforcement.
| AUTH-NOTIFY-42-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-NOTIFY-40-001 | Investigate ack token rotation 500 errors (test Rotate_ReturnsBadRequest_WhenKeyIdMissing_AndAuditsFailure still failing). Capture logs, identify root cause, and patch handler. | Failure mode understood; fix merged; regression test passes. |
> 2025-11-02: Aliased `StellaOpsBearer` to the test auth handler, corrected bootstrap `/notifications/ack-tokens/rotate` defaults, and validated `Rotate_ReturnsBadRequest_WhenKeyIdMissing_AndAuditsFailure` via targeted `dotnet test`.
## CLI Parity & Task Packs
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-PACKS-41-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AOC-19-001 | Define CLI SSO profiles and pack scopes (`Packs.Read`, `Packs.Write`, `Packs.Run`, `Packs.Approve`), update discovery metadata, offline defaults, and issuer templates. | Scopes available; metadata updated; tests ensure enforcement; offline kit templates refreshed. |
> 2025-11-02: Added Pack scope policies, Authority role defaults, and CLI profile guidance covering operator/publisher/approver flows.
> 2025-11-02: Shared OpenSSL 1.1 shim feeds Authority & Signals Mongo2Go harnesses so pack scope coverage keeps running on OpenSSL 3 hosts (AUTH-PACKS-41-001).
> 2025-11-04: Discovery metadata/OpenAPI advertise packs scopes, configs/offline kit templates bundle new roles, and Authority tests re-run to validate tenant gating for `packs.*`.
| AUTH-PACKS-43-001 | BLOCKED (2025-10-27) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-PACKS-41-001, TASKRUN-42-001, ORCH-SVC-42-101 | Enforce pack signing policies, approval RBAC checks, CLI CI token scopes, and audit logging for approvals. | Signing policies enforced; approvals require correct roles; CI token scope tests pass; audit logs recorded. |
> Blocked: ORCH-SVC-42-101 (Orchestrator log streaming/approvals API) still TODO. AUTH-PACKS-41-001 + TASKRUN-42-001 are DONE (2025-11-04); resume once Orchestrator publishes contracts.
## Authority-Backed Scopes & Tenancy (Epic 14)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-28: Tidied advisory raw idempotency migration to avoid LINQ-on-`BsonValue` (explicit array copy) while continuing duplicate guardrail validation; scoped scanner/policy token call sites updated to honor new metadata parameter.
| AUTH-TEN-49-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-TEN-47-001 | Implement service accounts & delegation tokens (`act` chain), per-tenant quotas, audit stream of auth decisions, and revocation APIs. | Service tokens minted with scopes/TTL; delegation logged; quotas configurable; audit stream live; docs updated. |
> 2025-11-02: Authority bootstrap test harness now seeds service accounts via AuthorityDelegation options; `/internal/service-accounts` endpoints validated with targeted vstest run.
> 2025-11-02: Added Mongo service-account store, seeded options/collection initializers, token persistence metadata (`tokenKind`, `serviceAccountId`, `actorChain`), and docs/config samples. Introduced quota checks + tests covering service account issuance and persistence.
> 2025-11-02: Documented bootstrap service-account admin APIs in `docs/11_AUTHORITY.md`, noting API key requirements and stable upsert behaviour.
> 2025-11-03: Seeded explicit enabled service-account fixtures for integration tests and reran `StellaOps.Authority.Tests` to greenlight `/internal/service-accounts` listing + revocation scenarios.
> 2025-11-04: Confirmed service-account docs/config examples, quota tuning, and audit stream wiring; Authority suite re-executed to cover issuance/listing/revocation flows.
## Observability & Forensics (Epic 15)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-OBS-50-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AOC-19-001 | Introduce scopes `obs:read`, `timeline:read`, `timeline:write`, `evidence:create`, `evidence:read`, `evidence:hold`, `attest:read`, and `obs:incident` (all tenant-scoped). Update discovery metadata, offline defaults, and scope grammar docs. | Scopes exposed via metadata; issuer templates updated; offline kit seeded; integration tests cover new scopes. |
| AUTH-OBS-52-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-OBS-50-001, TIMELINE-OBS-52-003, EVID-OBS-53-003 | Configure resource server policies for Timeline Indexer, Evidence Locker, Exporter, and Observability APIs enforcing new scopes + tenant claims. Emit audit events including scope usage and trace IDs. | Policies deployed; unauthorized access blocked; audit logs prove scope usage; contract tests updated. |
| AUTH-OBS-55-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild, Ops Guild | AUTH-OBS-50-001, WEB-OBS-55-001 | Harden incident mode authorization: require `obs:incident` scope + fresh auth, log activation reason, and expose verification endpoint for auditors. Update docs/runbooks. | Incident activate/deactivate requires scope; audit entries logged; docs updated with imposed rule reminder. |
## Air-Gapped Mode (Epic 16)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
| AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AIRGAP-CTL-56-001 | Provision new scopes (`airgap:seal`, `airgap:import`, `airgap:status:read`) in configuration metadata, offline kit defaults, and issuer templates. | Scopes exposed in discovery docs; offline kit updated; integration tests cover issuance. |
| AUTH-AIRGAP-56-002 | DONE (2025-11-04) | Authority Core & Security Guild | AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001, AIRGAP-IMP-58-001 | Audit import actions with actor, tenant, bundle ID, and trace ID; expose `/authority/audit/airgap` endpoint. | Audit records persisted; endpoint paginates results; tests cover RBAC + filtering. |
> 2025-11-04: Airgap scope constants are wired through discovery metadata, `etc/authority.yaml.sample`, and offline kit docs; scope issuance tests executed via `dotnet test`.
> 2025-11-04: `/authority/audit/airgap` API persists tenant-scoped audit entries with pagination and authorization guards validated by the Authority integration suite (187 tests).
| AUTH-AIRGAP-57-001 | DOING (2025-11-08) | Authority Core & Security Guild, DevOps Guild | AUTH-AIRGAP-56-001, DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 | Enforce sealed-mode CI gating by refusing token issuance when declared sealed install lacks sealing confirmation. | Implement Authority-side sealed-mode checks once DevOps publishes sealed CI artefacts + contract (target 2025-11-10). |
> 2025-11-08: Picked up in tandem with DEVOPS-AIRGAP-57-002 — validating sealed confirmation payload + wiring Authority gating tests against ops/devops/sealed-mode-ci artefacts.
> 2025-11-08: `/token`/`/introspect` now reject mTLS-bound tokens without the recorded certificate; `authority_mtls_mismatch_total` metric + docs updated for plugin consumers.
> 2025-11-08: DevOps sealed-mode CI now emits `authority-sealed-ci.json`; ingest that contract next to unblock enforcement switch.
## SDKs & OpenAPI (Epic 17)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Description | Exit Criteria |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------------|---------------|
> 2025-10-28: Auth OpenAPI authored at `src/Api/StellaOps.Api.OpenApi/authority/openapi.yaml` covering `/token`, `/introspect`, `/revoke`, `/jwks`, scope catalog, and error envelopes; parsed via PyYAML sanity check and referenced in Epic 17 docs.
> 2025-10-28: Added `/.well-known/openapi` endpoint wiring cached spec metadata, YAML/JSON negotiation, HTTP cache headers, and tests verifying ETag + Accept handling. Authority spec (`src/Api/StellaOps.Api.OpenApi/authority/openapi.yaml`) now includes grant/scope extensions.
| AUTH-OAS-62-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild, SDK Generator Guild | AUTH-OAS-61-001, SDKGEN-63-001 | Provide SDK helpers for OAuth2/PAT flows, tenancy override header; add integration tests. | SDKs expose auth helpers; tests cover token issuance; docs updated. |
> 2025-11-02: `AddStellaOpsApiAuthentication` shipped (OAuth2 + PAT), tenant header injection added, and client tests updated for caching behaviour.
| AUTH-OAS-63-001 | DONE (2025-11-02) | Authority Core & Security Guild, API Governance Guild | APIGOV-63-001 | Emit deprecation headers and notifications for legacy auth endpoints. | Headers emitted; notifications verified; migration guide published. |
> 2025-11-02: AUTH-OAS-63-001 completed — legacy OAuth shims emit Deprecation/Sunset/Warning headers, audit events captured, and migration guide published (Authority Core & Security Guild, API Governance Guild).

View File

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ internal static class CommandFactory
root.Add(BuildConfigCommand(options));
root.Add(BuildKmsCommand(services, verboseOption, cancellationToken));
root.Add(BuildVulnCommand(services, verboseOption, cancellationToken));
root.Add(BuildCryptoCommand(services, verboseOption, cancellationToken));
var pluginLogger = loggerFactory.CreateLogger<CliCommandModuleLoader>();
var pluginLoader = new CliCommandModuleLoader(services, options, pluginLogger);
@@ -180,8 +181,8 @@ internal static class CommandFactory
return scan;
}
private static Command BuildKmsCommand(IServiceProvider services, Option<bool> verboseOption, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
private static Command BuildKmsCommand(IServiceProvider services, Option<bool> verboseOption, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var kms = new Command("kms", "Manage file-backed signing keys.");
var export = new Command("export", "Export key material to a portable bundle.");
@@ -381,9 +382,39 @@ internal static class CommandFactory
db.Add(fetch);
db.Add(merge);
db.Add(export);
return db;
}
db.Add(export);
return db;
}
private static Command BuildCryptoCommand(IServiceProvider services, Option<bool> verboseOption, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
var crypto = new Command("crypto", "Inspect StellaOps cryptography providers.");
var providers = new Command("providers", "List registered crypto providers and keys.");
var jsonOption = new Option<bool>("--json")
{
Description = "Emit JSON output."
};
var profileOption = new Option<string?>("--profile")
{
Description = "Temporarily override the active registry profile when computing provider order."
};
providers.Add(jsonOption);
providers.Add(profileOption);
providers.SetAction((parseResult, _) =>
{
var json = parseResult.GetValue(jsonOption);
var verbose = parseResult.GetValue(verboseOption);
var profile = parseResult.GetValue(profileOption);
return CommandHandlers.HandleCryptoProvidersAsync(services, verbose, json, profile, cancellationToken);
});
crypto.Add(providers);
return crypto;
}
private static Command BuildSourcesCommand(IServiceProvider services, Option<bool> verboseOption, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ using System.Text;
using System.Threading;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using Spectre.Console;
using Spectre.Console.Rendering;
using StellaOps.Auth.Client;
@@ -28,7 +29,8 @@ using StellaOps.Cli.Services;
using StellaOps.Cli.Services.Models;
using StellaOps.Cli.Services.Models.AdvisoryAi;
using StellaOps.Cli.Telemetry;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
using StellaOps.Cryptography.DependencyInjection;
using StellaOps.Cryptography.Kms;
namespace StellaOps.Cli.Commands;
@@ -6437,35 +6439,223 @@ internal static class CommandHandlers
return source;
}
private static async Task TriggerJobAsync(
IBackendOperationsClient client,
ILogger logger,
string jobKind,
IDictionary<string, object?> parameters,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
JobTriggerResult result = await client.TriggerJobAsync(jobKind, parameters, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (result.Success)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(result.Location))
{
logger.LogInformation("Job accepted. Track status at {Location}.", result.Location);
}
else if (result.Run is not null)
{
logger.LogInformation("Job accepted. RunId: {RunId} Status: {Status}", result.Run.RunId, result.Run.Status);
}
else
{
logger.LogInformation("Job accepted.");
}
Environment.ExitCode = 0;
}
else
{
logger.LogError("Job '{JobKind}' failed: {Message}", jobKind, result.Message);
Environment.ExitCode = 1;
}
}
}
private static async Task TriggerJobAsync(
IBackendOperationsClient client,
ILogger logger,
string jobKind,
IDictionary<string, object?> parameters,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
JobTriggerResult result = await client.TriggerJobAsync(jobKind, parameters, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);
if (result.Success)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(result.Location))
{
logger.LogInformation("Job accepted. Track status at {Location}.", result.Location);
}
else if (result.Run is not null)
{
logger.LogInformation("Job accepted. RunId: {RunId} Status: {Status}", result.Run.RunId, result.Run.Status);
}
else
{
logger.LogInformation("Job accepted.");
}
Environment.ExitCode = 0;
}
else
{
logger.LogError("Job '{JobKind}' failed: {Message}", jobKind, result.Message);
Environment.ExitCode = 1;
}
}
public static Task HandleCryptoProvidersAsync(
IServiceProvider services,
bool verbose,
bool jsonOutput,
string? profileOverride,
CancellationToken cancellationToken)
{
using var scope = services.CreateScope();
var loggerFactory = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<ILoggerFactory>();
var logger = loggerFactory.CreateLogger("crypto-providers");
var verbosity = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<VerbosityState>();
var previousLevel = verbosity.MinimumLevel;
verbosity.MinimumLevel = verbose ? LogLevel.Debug : LogLevel.Information;
using var activity = CliActivitySource.Instance.StartActivity("cli.crypto.providers", ActivityKind.Internal);
using var duration = CliMetrics.MeasureCommandDuration("crypto providers");
try
{
var registry = scope.ServiceProvider.GetService<ICryptoProviderRegistry>();
if (registry is null)
{
logger.LogWarning("Crypto provider registry not available in this environment.");
AnsiConsole.MarkupLine("[yellow]Crypto subsystem is not configured in this environment.[/]");
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
var optionsMonitor = scope.ServiceProvider.GetService<IOptionsMonitor<CryptoProviderRegistryOptions>>();
var registryOptions = optionsMonitor?.CurrentValue ?? new CryptoProviderRegistryOptions();
var preferredOrder = DeterminePreferredOrder(registryOptions, profileOverride);
var providers = registry.Providers
.Select(provider => new ProviderInfo(
provider.Name,
provider.GetType().FullName ?? provider.GetType().Name,
DescribeProviderKeys(provider).ToList()))
.ToList();
if (jsonOutput)
{
var payload = new
{
activeProfile = registryOptions.ActiveProfile,
preferredOrder,
providers = providers.Select(info => new
{
info.Name,
info.Type,
keys = info.Keys.Select(k => new
{
k.KeyId,
k.AlgorithmId,
Metadata = k.Metadata
})
})
};
Console.WriteLine(JsonSerializer.Serialize(payload, new JsonSerializerOptions
{
WriteIndented = true
}));
Environment.ExitCode = 0;
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
RenderCryptoProviders(preferredOrder, providers);
Environment.ExitCode = 0;
}
finally
{
verbosity.MinimumLevel = previousLevel;
}
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
private static void RenderCryptoProviders(
IReadOnlyList<string> preferredOrder,
IReadOnlyCollection<ProviderInfo> providers)
{
if (preferredOrder.Count > 0)
{
AnsiConsole.MarkupLine("[cyan]Preferred order:[/] {0}", Markup.Escape(string.Join(", ", preferredOrder)));
}
else
{
AnsiConsole.MarkupLine("[yellow]Preferred order is not configured; using registration order.[/]");
}
var table = new Table().Border(TableBorder.Rounded);
table.AddColumn("Provider");
table.AddColumn("Type");
table.AddColumn("Keys");
foreach (var provider in providers)
{
var keySummary = provider.Keys.Count == 0
? "[grey]No signing keys exposed (managed externally).[/]"
: string.Join(Environment.NewLine, provider.Keys.Select(FormatDescriptor));
table.AddRow(
Markup.Escape(provider.Name),
Markup.Escape(provider.Type),
keySummary);
}
AnsiConsole.Write(table);
}
private static IReadOnlyList<CryptoProviderKeyDescriptor> DescribeProviderKeys(ICryptoProvider provider)
{
if (provider is ICryptoProviderDiagnostics diagnostics)
{
return diagnostics.DescribeKeys().ToList();
}
var signingKeys = provider.GetSigningKeys();
if (signingKeys.Count == 0)
{
return Array.Empty<CryptoProviderKeyDescriptor>();
}
var descriptors = new List<CryptoProviderKeyDescriptor>(signingKeys.Count);
foreach (var signingKey in signingKeys)
{
var metadata = new Dictionary<string, string?>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
{
["kind"] = signingKey.Kind.ToString(),
["createdAt"] = signingKey.CreatedAt.UtcDateTime.ToString("O"),
["providerHint"] = signingKey.Reference.ProviderHint
};
if (signingKey.ExpiresAt.HasValue)
{
metadata["expiresAt"] = signingKey.ExpiresAt.Value.UtcDateTime.ToString("O");
}
foreach (var pair in signingKey.Metadata)
{
metadata[$"meta.{pair.Key}"] = pair.Value;
}
descriptors.Add(new CryptoProviderKeyDescriptor(
provider.Name,
signingKey.Reference.KeyId,
signingKey.AlgorithmId,
metadata));
}
return descriptors;
}
private static IReadOnlyList<string> DeterminePreferredOrder(
CryptoProviderRegistryOptions? options,
string? overrideProfile)
{
if (options is null)
{
return Array.Empty<string>();
}
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(overrideProfile) &&
options.Profiles.TryGetValue(overrideProfile, out var profile) &&
profile.PreferredProviders.Count > 0)
{
return profile.PreferredProviders
.Where(static provider => !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(provider))
.Select(static provider => provider.Trim())
.ToArray();
}
return options.ResolvePreferredProviders();
}
private static string FormatDescriptor(CryptoProviderKeyDescriptor descriptor)
{
if (descriptor.Metadata.Count == 0)
{
return $"{Markup.Escape(descriptor.KeyId)} ({Markup.Escape(descriptor.AlgorithmId)})";
}
var metadataText = string.Join(
", ",
descriptor.Metadata.Select(pair => $"{pair.Key}={pair.Value}"));
return $"{Markup.Escape(descriptor.KeyId)} ({Markup.Escape(descriptor.AlgorithmId)}){Environment.NewLine}[grey]{Markup.Escape(metadataText)}[/]";
}
private sealed record ProviderInfo(string Name, string Type, IReadOnlyList<CryptoProviderKeyDescriptor> Keys);
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using StellaOps.Auth.Abstractions;
using System.IO;
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using StellaOps.Auth.Abstractions;
using StellaOps.Configuration;
namespace StellaOps.Cli.Configuration;
@@ -31,8 +32,11 @@ public sealed class StellaOpsCliOptions
public StellaOpsCliOfflineOptions Offline { get; set; } = new();
public StellaOpsCliPluginOptions Plugins { get; set; } = new();
}
public StellaOpsCliPluginOptions Plugins { get; set; } = new();
public StellaOpsCryptoOptions Crypto { get; set; } = new();
}
public sealed class StellaOpsCliAuthorityOptions
{
@@ -79,15 +83,15 @@ public sealed class StellaOpsCliOfflineOptions
public string? MirrorUrl { get; set; }
}
public sealed class StellaOpsCliPluginOptions
{
public sealed class StellaOpsCliPluginOptions
{
public string BaseDirectory { get; set; } = string.Empty;
public string Directory { get; set; } = "plugins/cli";
public IList<string> SearchPatterns { get; set; } = new List<string>();
public IList<string> PluginOrder { get; set; } = new List<string>();
public string ManifestSearchPattern { get; set; } = "*.manifest.json";
}
public IList<string> PluginOrder { get; set; } = new List<string>();
public string ManifestSearchPattern { get; set; } = "*.manifest.json";
}

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ using StellaOps.Cli.Configuration;
using StellaOps.Cli.Services;
using StellaOps.Cli.Telemetry;
using StellaOps.AirGap.Policy;
using StellaOps.Configuration;
namespace StellaOps.Cli;
@@ -22,12 +23,14 @@ internal static class Program
var (options, configuration) = CliBootstrapper.Build(args);
var services = new ServiceCollection();
services.AddSingleton(configuration);
services.AddSingleton(options);
var verbosityState = new VerbosityState();
services.AddSingleton(configuration);
services.AddSingleton(options);
services.AddOptions();
var verbosityState = new VerbosityState();
services.AddSingleton(verbosityState);
services.AddAirGapEgressPolicy(configuration);
services.AddStellaOpsCrypto(options.Crypto);
services.AddLogging(builder =>
{
@@ -168,6 +171,7 @@ internal static class Program
finalExit = 130; // Typical POSIX cancellation exit code
}
return finalExit;
}
}
return finalExit;
}
}

View File

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Configuration/StellaOps.Configuration.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/StellaOps.Cryptography.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.Kms/StellaOps.Cryptography.Kms.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.CryptoPro/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.CryptoPro.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.Pkcs11Gost/StellaOps.Cryptography.Plugin.Pkcs11Gost.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../AirGap/StellaOps.AirGap.Policy/StellaOps.AirGap.Policy/StellaOps.AirGap.Policy.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Auth.Abstractions/StellaOps.Auth.Abstractions.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Auth.Client/StellaOps.Auth.Client.csproj" />

View File

@@ -1,22 +1,36 @@
using System.Diagnostics.Metrics;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Diagnostics;
internal static class IngestionMetrics
{
internal const string MeterName = "StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Ingestion";
private static readonly Meter Meter = new(MeterName);
internal static readonly Counter<long> WriteCounter = Meter.CreateCounter<long>(
"ingestion_write_total",
description: "Counts raw advisory ingestion attempts, segmented by tenant, source, and result.");
internal static readonly Counter<long> ViolationCounter = Meter.CreateCounter<long>(
"aoc_violation_total",
description: "Counts Aggregation-Only Contract violations detected during ingestion.");
internal static readonly Counter<long> VerificationCounter = Meter.CreateCounter<long>(
"verify_runs_total",
description: "Counts AOC verification runs initiated via the API.");
}
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Diagnostics.Metrics;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Diagnostics;
internal static class IngestionMetrics
{
internal const string MeterName = "StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Ingestion";
private static readonly Meter Meter = new(MeterName);
internal static readonly Counter<long> IngestionWriteCounter = Meter.CreateCounter<long>(
"ingestion_write_total",
unit: "count",
description: "Number of advisory ingestion attempts processed by the web service.");
internal static readonly Counter<long> VerificationCounter = Meter.CreateCounter<long>(
"verify_runs_total",
unit: "count",
description: "Number of AOC verification requests processed by the web service.");
internal static KeyValuePair<string, object?>[] BuildWriteTags(string tenant, string source, string result) =>
new[]
{
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("tenant", tenant),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("source", source),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("result", result),
};
internal static KeyValuePair<string, object?>[] BuildVerifyTags(string tenant, string result) =>
new[]
{
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("tenant", tenant),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("result", result),
};
}

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
using System.Collections.Immutable;
using System.Text.Json;
using StellaOps.Concelier.RawModels;
using StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Contracts;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Extensions;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Collections.Immutable;
using System.Text.Json;
using StellaOps.Concelier.RawModels;
using StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Contracts;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Extensions;
internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
{
@@ -14,13 +15,13 @@ internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
ArgumentNullException.ThrowIfNull(timeProvider);
var sourceRequest = request.Source ?? throw new ArgumentException("source section is required.", nameof(request));
var upstreamRequest = request.Upstream ?? throw new ArgumentException("upstream section is required.", nameof(request));
var contentRequest = request.Content ?? throw new ArgumentException("content section is required.", nameof(request));
var identifiersRequest = request.Identifiers ?? throw new ArgumentException("identifiers section is required.", nameof(request));
var source = new RawSourceMetadata(
sourceRequest.Vendor,
sourceRequest.Connector,
var upstreamRequest = request.Upstream ?? throw new ArgumentException("upstream section is required.", nameof(request));
var contentRequest = request.Content ?? throw new ArgumentException("content section is required.", nameof(request));
var identifiersRequest = request.Identifiers ?? throw new ArgumentException("identifiers section is required.", nameof(request));
var source = new RawSourceMetadata(
sourceRequest.Vendor,
sourceRequest.Connector,
sourceRequest.Version,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sourceRequest.Stream) ? null : sourceRequest.Stream);
@@ -33,22 +34,21 @@ internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(signatureRequest.Certificate) ? null : signatureRequest.Certificate,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(signatureRequest.Digest) ? null : signatureRequest.Digest);
var retrievedAt = upstreamRequest.RetrievedAt ?? timeProvider.GetUtcNow();
var upstream = new RawUpstreamMetadata(
upstreamRequest.UpstreamId,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(upstreamRequest.DocumentVersion) ? null : upstreamRequest.DocumentVersion,
retrievedAt,
upstreamRequest.ContentHash,
signature,
NormalizeDictionary(upstreamRequest.Provenance));
var rawContent = NormalizeRawContent(contentRequest.Raw);
var content = new RawContent(
contentRequest.Format,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(contentRequest.SpecVersion) ? null : contentRequest.SpecVersion,
rawContent,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(contentRequest.Encoding) ? null : contentRequest.Encoding);
var retrievedAt = upstreamRequest.RetrievedAt ?? timeProvider.GetUtcNow();
var upstream = new RawUpstreamMetadata(
upstreamRequest.UpstreamId,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(upstreamRequest.DocumentVersion) ? null : upstreamRequest.DocumentVersion,
retrievedAt,
upstreamRequest.ContentHash,
signature,
NormalizeDictionary(upstreamRequest.Provenance));
var rawContent = NormalizeRawContent(contentRequest.Raw);
var content = new RawContent(
contentRequest.Format,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(contentRequest.SpecVersion) ? null : contentRequest.SpecVersion,
rawContent,
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(contentRequest.Encoding) ? null : contentRequest.Encoding);
var aliases = NormalizeStrings(identifiersRequest.Aliases);
if (aliases.IsDefault)
@@ -56,11 +56,15 @@ internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
aliases = ImmutableArray<string>.Empty;
}
var identifiers = new RawIdentifiers(
aliases,
identifiersRequest.Primary);
var linksetRequest = request.Linkset;
var identifiers = new RawIdentifiers(
aliases,
identifiersRequest.Primary);
var advisoryKey = NormalizeAdvisoryKey(
identifiersRequest.Primary,
aliases,
upstreamRequest.UpstreamId);
var linksetRequest = request.Linkset;
var linkset = new RawLinkset
{
Aliases = NormalizeStrings(linksetRequest?.Aliases),
@@ -71,6 +75,8 @@ internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
Notes = NormalizeDictionary(linksetRequest?.Notes)
};
var links = BuildLinks(advisoryKey, aliases, upstreamRequest.UpstreamId);
return new AdvisoryRawDocument(
tenant.Trim().ToLowerInvariant(),
source,
@@ -78,8 +84,8 @@ internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
content,
identifiers,
linkset,
AdvisoryKey: string.Empty,
Links: ImmutableArray<RawLink>.Empty);
AdvisoryKey: advisoryKey,
Links: links);
}
internal static ImmutableArray<string> NormalizeStrings(IEnumerable<string>? values)
@@ -124,11 +130,11 @@ internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
return builder.ToImmutable();
}
private static ImmutableArray<RawReference> NormalizeReferences(IEnumerable<AdvisoryLinksetReferenceRequest>? references)
{
if (references is null)
{
return ImmutableArray<RawReference>.Empty;
private static ImmutableArray<RawReference> NormalizeReferences(IEnumerable<AdvisoryLinksetReferenceRequest>? references)
{
if (references is null)
{
return ImmutableArray<RawReference>.Empty;
}
var builder = ImmutableArray.CreateBuilder<RawReference>();
@@ -150,10 +156,59 @@ internal static class AdvisoryRawRequestMapper
return builder.Count == 0 ? ImmutableArray<RawReference>.Empty : builder.ToImmutable();
}
private static JsonElement NormalizeRawContent(JsonElement element)
{
var json = element.ValueKind == JsonValueKind.Undefined ? "{}" : element.GetRawText();
using var document = JsonDocument.Parse(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json) ? "{}" : json);
return document.RootElement.Clone();
}
}
private static JsonElement NormalizeRawContent(JsonElement element)
{
var json = element.ValueKind == JsonValueKind.Undefined ? "{}" : element.GetRawText();
using var document = JsonDocument.Parse(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json) ? "{}" : json);
return document.RootElement.Clone();
}
private static string NormalizeAdvisoryKey(string? primaryId, ImmutableArray<string> aliases, string upstreamId)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(primaryId))
{
return primaryId.Trim();
}
foreach (var alias in aliases)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(alias))
{
return alias.Trim();
}
}
return string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(upstreamId) ? string.Empty : upstreamId.Trim();
}
private static ImmutableArray<RawLink> BuildLinks(string advisoryKey, ImmutableArray<string> aliases, string upstreamId)
{
var builder = ImmutableArray.CreateBuilder<RawLink>();
var seen = new HashSet<string>(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
void AddLink(string scheme, string? value)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(value))
{
return;
}
var normalized = value.Trim();
var key = $"{scheme}:{normalized}";
if (seen.Add(key))
{
builder.Add(new RawLink(scheme, normalized));
}
}
AddLink("PRIMARY", advisoryKey);
foreach (var alias in aliases)
{
AddLink("ALIAS", alias);
}
AddLink("UPSTREAM", upstreamId);
return builder.Count == 0 ? ImmutableArray<RawLink>.Empty : builder.ToImmutable();
}
}

View File

@@ -10,10 +10,11 @@ using OpenTelemetry.Trace;
using Serilog;
using Serilog.Core;
using Serilog.Events;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Core.Jobs;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.Telemetry;
using StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Diagnostics;
using StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Options;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Core.Jobs;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.Telemetry;
using StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Diagnostics;
using StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Options;
using StellaOps.Ingestion.Telemetry;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Extensions;
@@ -65,13 +66,14 @@ public static class TelemetryExtensions
if (telemetry.EnableTracing)
{
openTelemetry.WithTracing(tracing =>
{
tracing
.AddSource(JobDiagnostics.ActivitySourceName)
.AddSource(SourceDiagnostics.ActivitySourceName)
.AddAspNetCoreInstrumentation()
.AddHttpClientInstrumentation();
openTelemetry.WithTracing(tracing =>
{
tracing
.AddSource(JobDiagnostics.ActivitySourceName)
.AddSource(SourceDiagnostics.ActivitySourceName)
.AddSource(IngestionTelemetry.ActivitySourceName)
.AddAspNetCoreInstrumentation()
.AddHttpClientInstrumentation();
ConfigureExporters(telemetry, tracing);
});
@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ public static class TelemetryExtensions
metrics
.AddMeter(JobDiagnostics.MeterName)
.AddMeter(SourceDiagnostics.MeterName)
.AddMeter(IngestionMetrics.MeterName)
.AddMeter(IngestionTelemetry.MeterName)
.AddMeter("StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.CertBund")
.AddMeter("StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Nvd")
.AddMeter("StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Chromium")

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using StellaOps.Configuration;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Options;
@@ -19,6 +20,8 @@ public sealed class ConcelierOptions
public FeaturesOptions Features { get; set; } = new();
public AdvisoryChunkOptions AdvisoryChunks { get; set; } = new();
public StellaOpsCryptoOptions Crypto { get; } = new();
public sealed class StorageOptions
{

View File

@@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ builder.Services.AddOptions<ConcelierOptions>()
})
.ValidateOnStart();
builder.Services.AddStellaOpsCrypto(concelierOptions.Crypto);
builder.ConfigureConcelierTelemetry(concelierOptions);
builder.Services.TryAddSingleton<TimeProvider>(_ => TimeProvider.System);
@@ -387,6 +389,14 @@ var advisoryIngestEndpoint = app.MapPost("/ingest/advisory", async (
return authorizationError;
}
using var ingestScope = logger.BeginScope(new Dictionary<string, object?>(StringComparer.Ordinal)
{
["tenant"] = tenant,
["source.vendor"] = ingestRequest.Source.Vendor,
["upstream.upstreamId"] = ingestRequest.Upstream.UpstreamId,
["contentHash"] = ingestRequest.Upstream.ContentHash ?? "(null)"
});
AdvisoryRawDocument document;
try
{
@@ -423,12 +433,12 @@ var advisoryIngestEndpoint = app.MapPost("/ingest/advisory", async (
context.Response.Headers.Location = $"/advisories/raw/{Uri.EscapeDataString(result.Record.Id)}";
}
IngestionMetrics.WriteCounter.Add(1, new[]
{
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("tenant", tenant),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("source", result.Record.Document.Source.Vendor),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("result", result.Inserted ? "inserted" : "duplicate")
});
IngestionMetrics.IngestionWriteCounter.Add(
1,
IngestionMetrics.BuildWriteTags(
tenant,
ingestRequest.Source.Vendor ?? "(unknown)",
result.Inserted ? "inserted" : "duplicate"));
return JsonResult(response, statusCode);
}
@@ -443,12 +453,12 @@ var advisoryIngestEndpoint = app.MapPost("/ingest/advisory", async (
string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(document.Upstream.ContentHash) ? "(empty)" : document.Upstream.ContentHash,
string.Join(',', guardException.Violations.Select(static violation => violation.ErrorCode)));
IngestionMetrics.ViolationCounter.Add(1, new[]
{
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("tenant", tenant),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("source", document.Source.Vendor),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("code", guardException.PrimaryErrorCode)
});
IngestionMetrics.IngestionWriteCounter.Add(
1,
IngestionMetrics.BuildWriteTags(
tenant,
ingestRequest.Source.Vendor ?? "(unknown)",
"rejected"));
return MapAocGuardException(context, guardException);
}
@@ -467,25 +477,8 @@ advisoryIngestEndpoint.RequireAocGuard<AdvisoryIngestRequest>(request =>
return Array.Empty<object?>();
}
var linkset = request.Linkset ?? new AdvisoryLinksetRequest(
Array.Empty<string>(),
Array.Empty<string>(),
Array.Empty<string>(),
Array.Empty<AdvisoryLinksetReferenceRequest>(),
Array.Empty<string>(),
new Dictionary<string, string>(StringComparer.Ordinal));
var payload = new
{
tenant = "guard-tenant",
source = request.Source,
upstream = request.Upstream,
content = request.Content,
identifiers = request.Identifiers,
linkset
};
return new object?[] { payload };
var guardDocument = AdvisoryRawRequestMapper.Map(request, "guard-tenant", TimeProvider.System);
return new object?[] { guardDocument };
}, guardOptions: advisoryIngestGuardOptions);
if (authorityConfigured)
@@ -796,11 +789,9 @@ var aocVerifyEndpoint = app.MapPost("/aoc/verify", async (
var verificationOutcome = response.Truncated
? "truncated"
: (violationResponses.Length == 0 ? "ok" : "violations");
IngestionMetrics.VerificationCounter.Add(1, new[]
{
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("tenant", tenant),
new KeyValuePair<string, object?>("result", verificationOutcome)
});
IngestionMetrics.VerificationCounter.Add(
1,
IngestionMetrics.BuildVerifyTags(tenant, verificationOutcome));
return JsonResult(response);
});

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
using System.Collections.Concurrent;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Globalization;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Nodes;
@@ -10,6 +9,7 @@ using System.Linq;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Routing;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Routing.Patterns;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Services;
@@ -28,14 +28,18 @@ internal sealed class OpenApiDiscoveryDocumentProvider
];
private readonly EndpointDataSource _endpointDataSource;
private readonly ICryptoHash _hash;
private readonly object _syncRoot = new();
private string? _cachedDocumentJson;
private string? _cachedEtag;
public OpenApiDiscoveryDocumentProvider(EndpointDataSource endpointDataSource)
public OpenApiDiscoveryDocumentProvider(
EndpointDataSource endpointDataSource,
ICryptoHash hash)
{
_endpointDataSource = endpointDataSource;
_endpointDataSource = endpointDataSource ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(endpointDataSource));
_hash = hash ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(hash));
}
public (string Payload, string ETag) GetDocument()
@@ -58,7 +62,7 @@ internal sealed class OpenApiDiscoveryDocumentProvider
});
var bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(json);
var hash = Convert.ToHexString(SHA256.HashData(bytes)).ToLowerInvariant();
var hash = _hash.ComputeHashHex(bytes);
var computedEtag = $"\"{hash}\"";
_cachedDocumentJson = json;

View File

@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Plugin/StellaOps.Plugin.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.DependencyInjection/StellaOps.DependencyInjection.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Configuration/StellaOps.Configuration.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/StellaOps.Cryptography.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Ingestion.Telemetry/StellaOps.Ingestion.Telemetry.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Auth.Abstractions/StellaOps.Auth.Abstractions.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Auth.Client/StellaOps.Auth.Client.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../Authority/StellaOps.Authority/StellaOps.Auth.ServerIntegration/StellaOps.Auth.ServerIntegration.csproj" />

View File

@@ -1,94 +1,98 @@
# TASKS — Epic 1: Aggregation-Only Contract
> **AOC Reminder:** service links and exposes raw data only—no precedence, severity, or hint computation inside Concelier APIs.
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Endpoint expectations + scope requirements detailed in `docs/ingestion/aggregation-only-contract.md` and `docs/security/authority-scopes.md`.
> 2025-10-28: Added coverage for pagination, tenancy enforcement, and ingestion/verification metrics; verified guard handling paths end-to-end.
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002 `AOC observability` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Observability Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-001 | Emit `ingestion_write_total`, `aoc_violation_total`, latency histograms, and tracing spans (`ingest.fetch/transform/write`, `aoc.guard`). Wire structured logging to include tenant, source vendor, upstream id, and content hash. |
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Metrics/traces/log schema in `docs/observability/observability.md`.
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-003 `Schema/guard unit tests` | TODO | QA Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-001 | Add unit tests covering schema validation failures, forbidden field rejections (`ERR_AOC_001/002/006/007`), idempotent upserts, and supersedes chains using deterministic fixtures. |
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Guard rules + error codes documented in AOC reference §5 and CLI guide.
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-004 `End-to-end ingest verification` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, QA Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-003, CONCELIER-CORE-AOC-19-002 | Create integration tests ingesting large advisory batches (cold/warm) validating linkset enrichment, metrics emission, and reproducible outputs. Capture load-test scripts + doc notes for Offline Kit dry runs. |
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Offline verification workflow referenced in `docs/deploy/containers.md` §5.
## Policy Engine v2
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-POLICY-20-001 `Policy selection endpoints` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | WEB-POLICY-20-001, CONCELIER-CORE-AOC-19-004 | Add batch advisory lookup APIs (`/policy/select/advisories`, `/policy/select/vex`) optimized for PURL/ID lists with pagination, tenant scoping, and explain metadata. |
## StellaOps Console (Sprint 23)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
# TASKS — Epic 1: Aggregation-Only Contract
> **AOC Reminder:** service links and exposes raw data only—no precedence, severity, or hint computation inside Concelier APIs.
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Endpoint expectations + scope requirements detailed in `docs/ingestion/aggregation-only-contract.md` and `docs/security/authority-scopes.md`.
> 2025-10-28: Added coverage for pagination, tenancy enforcement, and ingestion/verification metrics; verified guard handling paths end-to-end.
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002 `AOC observability` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Concelier WebService Guild, Observability Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-001 | Emit `ingestion_write_total`, `aoc_violation_total`, latency histograms, and tracing spans (`ingest.fetch/transform/write`, `aoc.guard`). Wire structured logging to include tenant, source vendor, upstream id, and content hash. |
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Metrics/traces/log schema in `docs/observability/observability.md`.
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-003 `Schema/guard unit tests` | TODO | QA Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-001 | Add unit tests covering schema validation failures, forbidden field rejections (`ERR_AOC_001/002/006/007`), idempotent upserts, and supersedes chains using deterministic fixtures. |
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Guard rules + error codes documented in AOC reference §5 and CLI guide.
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-004 `End-to-end ingest verification` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, QA Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-003, CONCELIER-CORE-AOC-19-002 | Create integration tests ingesting large advisory batches (cold/warm) validating linkset enrichment, metrics emission, and reproducible outputs. Capture load-test scripts + doc notes for Offline Kit dry runs. |
> Docs alignment (2025-10-26): Offline verification workflow referenced in `docs/deploy/containers.md` §5.
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-005 `Chunk evidence regression` | TODO (2025-11-08) | Concelier WebService Guild, QA Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002 | Fix `/advisories/{key}/chunks` seeded fixtures so AdvisoryChunksEndpoint tests stop returning 404/not-found when raw documents are pre-populated; ensure Mongo migrations no longer emit “Unable to locate advisory_raw documents” during test boot. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-006 `Allowlist ingest auth parity` | TODO (2025-11-08) | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002 | Align WebService auth defaults with the test tokens so the allowlisted tenant can create an advisory before forbidden tenants are rejected in `AdvisoryIngestEndpoint_RejectsTenantOutsideAllowlist`. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-007 `AOC verify violation codes` | TODO (2025-11-08) | Concelier WebService Guild, QA Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AOC-19-002 | Update AOC verify logic/fixtures so guard failures produce the expected `ERR_AOC_001` payload (current regression returns `ERR_AOC_004`) while keeping the mapper/guard parity exercised by the new tests. |
| CONCELIER-CRYPTO-90-001 `Crypto provider adoption` | DOING (2025-11-08) | Concelier WebService Guild, Security Guild | SEC-CRYPTO-90-003, SEC-CRYPTO-90-004 | Route hashing/signing in OpenAPI discovery, Mirror connectors, and RU advisory adapters through `ICryptoProviderRegistry` so RootPack_RU uses CryptoPro/PKCS#11 keys. Reference `docs/security/crypto-routing-audit-2025-11-07.md`. |
## Policy Engine v2
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-POLICY-20-001 `Policy selection endpoints` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | WEB-POLICY-20-001, CONCELIER-CORE-AOC-19-004 | Add batch advisory lookup APIs (`/policy/select/advisories`, `/policy/select/vex`) optimized for PURL/ID lists with pagination, tenant scoping, and explain metadata. |
## StellaOps Console (Sprint 23)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-001 `Advisory aggregation views` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, BE-Base Platform Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-201, CONCELIER-LNM-21-202 | Expose `/console/advisories` endpoints returning aggregation groups (per linkset) with source chips, provider-reported severity columns (no local consensus), and provenance metadata for Console list + dashboard cards. Support filters by source, ecosystem, published/modified window, tenant enforcement. |
| CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-002 `Dashboard deltas API` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-001, CONCELIER-LNM-21-203 | Provide aggregated advisory delta counts (new, modified, conflicting) for Console dashboard + live status ticker; emit structured events for queue lag metrics. Ensure deterministic counts across repeated queries. |
| CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-003 `Search fan-out helpers` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-001 | Deliver fast lookup endpoints for CVE/GHSA/purl search (linksets, observations) returning evidence fragments for Console global search; implement caching + scope guards. |
## Graph Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
## Link-Not-Merge v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-LNM-21-201 `Observation APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, BE-Base Platform Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 | Add REST endpoints for advisory observations (`GET /advisories/observations`) with filters (alias, purl, source), pagination, and tenancy enforcement. |
| CONCELIER-LNM-21-202 `Linkset APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-002, CONCELIER-LNM-21-003 | Implement linkset read/export endpoints (`/advisories/linksets/{id}`, `/advisories/by-purl/{purl}`, `/advisories/linksets/{id}/export`, `/evidence`) with correlation/conflict payloads and `ERR_AGG_*` mapping. |
| CONCELIER-LNM-21-203 `Ingest events` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Platform Events Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-005 | Publish NATS/Redis events for new observations/linksets and ensure idempotent consumer contracts; document event schemas. |
## Graph & Vuln Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-GRAPH-24-101 `Advisory summary API` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-GRAPH-24-001 | Expose `/advisories/summary` returning raw linkset/observation metadata for overlay services; no derived severity or fix hints. |
| CONCELIER-GRAPH-28-102 `Evidence batch API` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-201 | Add batch fetch for advisory observations/linksets keyed by component sets to feed Graph overlay tooltips efficiently. |
## VEX Lens (Sprint 30)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-VEXLENS-30-001 `Advisory rationale bridges` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, VEX Lens Guild | CONCELIER-VULN-29-001, VEXLENS-30-005 | Guarantee advisory key consistency and cross-links for consensus rationale; Label: VEX-Lens. |
## Vulnerability Explorer (Sprint 29)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-002 `Dashboard deltas API` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-001, CONCELIER-LNM-21-203 | Provide aggregated advisory delta counts (new, modified, conflicting) for Console dashboard + live status ticker; emit structured events for queue lag metrics. Ensure deterministic counts across repeated queries. |
| CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-003 `Search fan-out helpers` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-CONSOLE-23-001 | Deliver fast lookup endpoints for CVE/GHSA/purl search (linksets, observations) returning evidence fragments for Console global search; implement caching + scope guards. |
## Graph Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
## Link-Not-Merge v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-LNM-21-201 `Observation APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, BE-Base Platform Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 | Add REST endpoints for advisory observations (`GET /advisories/observations`) with filters (alias, purl, source), pagination, and tenancy enforcement. |
| CONCELIER-LNM-21-202 `Linkset APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-002, CONCELIER-LNM-21-003 | Implement linkset read/export endpoints (`/advisories/linksets/{id}`, `/advisories/by-purl/{purl}`, `/advisories/linksets/{id}/export`, `/evidence`) with correlation/conflict payloads and `ERR_AGG_*` mapping. |
| CONCELIER-LNM-21-203 `Ingest events` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Platform Events Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-005 | Publish NATS/Redis events for new observations/linksets and ensure idempotent consumer contracts; document event schemas. |
## Graph & Vuln Explorer v1
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-GRAPH-24-101 `Advisory summary API` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-GRAPH-24-001 | Expose `/advisories/summary` returning raw linkset/observation metadata for overlay services; no derived severity or fix hints. |
| CONCELIER-GRAPH-28-102 `Evidence batch API` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-201 | Add batch fetch for advisory observations/linksets keyed by component sets to feed Graph overlay tooltips efficiently. |
## VEX Lens (Sprint 30)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-VEXLENS-30-001 `Advisory rationale bridges` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, VEX Lens Guild | CONCELIER-VULN-29-001, VEXLENS-30-005 | Guarantee advisory key consistency and cross-links for consensus rationale; Label: VEX-Lens. |
## Vulnerability Explorer (Sprint 29)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-VULN-29-001 `Advisory key canonicalization` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Concelier WebService Guild, Data Integrity Guild | CONCELIER-LNM-21-001 | Canonicalize (lossless) advisory identifiers (CVE/GHSA/vendor) into `advisory_key`, persist `links[]`, expose raw payload snapshots for Explorer evidence tabs; AOC-compliant: no merge, no derived fields, no suppression. Include migration/backfill scripts. |
| CONCELIER-VULN-29-002 `Evidence retrieval API` | DOING (2025-11-07) | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-VULN-29-001, VULN-API-29-003 | Provide `/vuln/evidence/advisories/{advisory_key}` returning raw advisory docs with provenance, filtering by tenant and source. |
| CONCELIER-VULN-29-004 `Observability enhancements` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Observability Guild | CONCELIER-VULN-29-001 | Instrument metrics/logs for observation + linkset pipelines (identifier collisions, withdrawn flags) and emit events consumed by Vuln Explorer resolver. |
## Advisory AI (Sprint 31)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
## Advisory AI (Sprint 31)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-AIAI-31-001 `Paragraph anchors` | DONE | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-VULN-29-001 | Expose advisory chunk API returning paragraph anchors, section metadata, and token-safe text for Advisory AI retrieval. See docs/updates/2025-11-07-concelier-advisory-chunks.md. |
| CONCELIER-AIAI-31-002 `Structured fields` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-AIAI-31-001 | Ensure observation APIs expose upstream workaround/fix/CVSS fields with provenance; add caching for summary queries. |
| CONCELIER-AIAI-31-003 `Advisory AI telemetry` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Observability Guild | CONCELIER-AIAI-31-001 | Emit metrics/logs for chunk requests, cache hits, and guardrail blocks triggered by advisory payloads. |
## Observability & Forensics (Epic 15)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | TELEMETRY-OBS-50-001, CONCELIER-OBS-50-001 | Adopt telemetry core in web service host, ensure ingest + read endpoints emit trace/log fields (`tenant_id`, `route`, `decision_effect`), and add correlation IDs to responses. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-51-001 `Observability APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001, WEB-OBS-51-001 | Surface ingest health metrics, queue depth, and SLO status via `/obs/concelier/health` endpoint for Console widgets, with caching and tenant partitioning. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-52-001 `Timeline streaming` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001, TIMELINE-OBS-52-003 | Provide SSE stream `/obs/concelier/timeline` bridging to Timeline Indexer with paging tokens, guardrails, and audit logging. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-53-001 `Evidence locker integration` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Evidence Locker Guild | CONCELIER-OBS-53-001, EVID-OBS-53-003 | Add `/evidence/advisories/*` routes invoking evidence locker snapshots, verifying tenant scopes (`evidence:read`), and returning signed manifest metadata. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-54-001 `Attestation exposure` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-OBS-54-001, PROV-OBS-54-001 | Provide `/attestations/advisories/*` read APIs surfacing DSSE status, verification summary, and provenance chain for Console/CLI. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-55-001 `Incident mode toggles` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, DevOps Guild | CONCELIER-OBS-55-001, WEB-OBS-55-001 | Implement incident mode toggle endpoints, propagate to orchestrator/locker, and document cooldown/backoff semantics. |
## Air-Gapped Mode (Epic 16)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-001 `Mirror import APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | AIRGAP-IMP-58-001, CONCELIER-AIRGAP-56-001 | Extend ingestion endpoints to register mirror bundle sources, expose bundle catalog queries, and block external feed URLs in sealed mode. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-002 `Airgap status surfaces` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-AIRGAP-57-002, AIRGAP-CTL-56-002 | Add staleness metadata and bundle provenance to advisory APIs (`/advisories/observations`, `/advisories/linksets`). |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-57-001 `Error remediation` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, AirGap Policy Guild | AIRGAP-POL-56-001 | Map sealed-mode violations to `AIRGAP_EGRESS_BLOCKED` responses with user guidance. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-58-001 `Import timeline emission` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, AirGap Importer Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-001, TIMELINE-OBS-53-001 | Emit timeline events for bundle ingestion operations with bundle ID, scope, and actor metadata. |
## SDKs & OpenAPI (Epic 17)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-AIAI-31-003 `Advisory AI telemetry` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Observability Guild | CONCELIER-AIAI-31-001 | Emit metrics/logs for chunk requests, cache hits, and guardrail blocks triggered by advisory payloads. |
## Observability & Forensics (Epic 15)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001 `Telemetry adoption` | DONE (2025-11-07) | Concelier WebService Guild | TELEMETRY-OBS-50-001, CONCELIER-OBS-50-001 | Adopt telemetry core in web service host, ensure ingest + read endpoints emit trace/log fields (`tenant_id`, `route`, `decision_effect`), and add correlation IDs to responses. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-51-001 `Observability APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001, WEB-OBS-51-001 | Surface ingest health metrics, queue depth, and SLO status via `/obs/concelier/health` endpoint for Console widgets, with caching and tenant partitioning. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-52-001 `Timeline streaming` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-50-001, TIMELINE-OBS-52-003 | Provide SSE stream `/obs/concelier/timeline` bridging to Timeline Indexer with paging tokens, guardrails, and audit logging. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-53-001 `Evidence locker integration` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, Evidence Locker Guild | CONCELIER-OBS-53-001, EVID-OBS-53-003 | Add `/evidence/advisories/*` routes invoking evidence locker snapshots, verifying tenant scopes (`evidence:read`), and returning signed manifest metadata. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-54-001 `Attestation exposure` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-OBS-54-001, PROV-OBS-54-001 | Provide `/attestations/advisories/*` read APIs surfacing DSSE status, verification summary, and provenance chain for Console/CLI. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OBS-55-001 `Incident mode toggles` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, DevOps Guild | CONCELIER-OBS-55-001, WEB-OBS-55-001 | Implement incident mode toggle endpoints, propagate to orchestrator/locker, and document cooldown/backoff semantics. |
## Air-Gapped Mode (Epic 16)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-001 `Mirror import APIs` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | AIRGAP-IMP-58-001, CONCELIER-AIRGAP-56-001 | Extend ingestion endpoints to register mirror bundle sources, expose bundle catalog queries, and block external feed URLs in sealed mode. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-002 `Airgap status surfaces` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-AIRGAP-57-002, AIRGAP-CTL-56-002 | Add staleness metadata and bundle provenance to advisory APIs (`/advisories/observations`, `/advisories/linksets`). |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-57-001 `Error remediation` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, AirGap Policy Guild | AIRGAP-POL-56-001 | Map sealed-mode violations to `AIRGAP_EGRESS_BLOCKED` responses with user guidance. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-58-001 `Import timeline emission` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, AirGap Importer Guild | CONCELIER-WEB-AIRGAP-56-001, TIMELINE-OBS-53-001 | Emit timeline events for bundle ingestion operations with bundle ID, scope, and actor metadata. |
## SDKs & OpenAPI (Epic 17)
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Depends on | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|------------|-------|
| CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-61-001 `/.well-known/openapi` | DONE (2025-11-02) | Concelier WebService Guild | OAS-61-001 | Implement discovery endpoint emitting Concelier spec with version metadata and ETag. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-61-002 `Error envelope migration` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | APIGOV-61-001 | Ensure all API responses use standardized error envelope; update controllers/tests. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-62-001 `Examples expansion` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-OAS-61-002 | Add curated examples for advisory observations/linksets/conflicts; integrate into dev portal. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-63-001 `Deprecation headers` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, API Governance Guild | APIGOV-63-001 | Add Sunset/Deprecation headers for retiring endpoints and update documentation/notifications. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-61-002 `Error envelope migration` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | APIGOV-61-001 | Ensure all API responses use standardized error envelope; update controllers/tests. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-62-001 `Examples expansion` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild | CONCELIER-OAS-61-002 | Add curated examples for advisory observations/linksets/conflicts; integrate into dev portal. |
| CONCELIER-WEB-OAS-63-001 `Deprecation headers` | TODO | Concelier WebService Guild, API Governance Guild | APIGOV-63-001 | Add Sunset/Deprecation headers for retiring endpoints and update documentation/notifications. |

View File

@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ Project("{2150E333-8FDC-42A3-9474-1A3956D46DE8}") = "__Analyzers", "__Analyzers"
EndProject
Project("{FAE04EC0-301F-11D3-BF4B-00C04F79EFBC}") = "StellaOps.Concelier.Analyzers", "__Analyzers\StellaOps.Concelier.Analyzers\StellaOps.Concelier.Analyzers.csproj", "{39C1D44C-389F-4502-ADCF-E4AC359E8F8F}"
EndProject
Project("{FAE04EC0-301F-11D3-BF4B-00C04F79EFBC}") = "StellaOps.Ingestion.Telemetry", "..\__Libraries\StellaOps.Ingestion.Telemetry\StellaOps.Ingestion.Telemetry.csproj", "{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}"
EndProject
Global
GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution
Debug|Any CPU = Debug|Any CPU
@@ -1265,6 +1267,18 @@ Global
{39C1D44C-389F-4502-ADCF-E4AC359E8F8F}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|Any CPU
{39C1D44C-389F-4502-ADCF-E4AC359E8F8F}.Release|x86.ActiveCfg = Release|Any CPU
{39C1D44C-389F-4502-ADCF-E4AC359E8F8F}.Release|x86.Build.0 = Release|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Debug|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = Debug|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Debug|Any CPU.Build.0 = Debug|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Debug|x64.ActiveCfg = Debug|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Debug|x64.Build.0 = Debug|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Debug|x86.ActiveCfg = Debug|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Debug|x86.Build.0 = Debug|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Release|Any CPU.ActiveCfg = Release|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Release|Any CPU.Build.0 = Release|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Release|x86.ActiveCfg = Release|Any CPU
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C}.Release|x86.Build.0 = Release|Any CPU
EndGlobalSection
GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution
HideSolutionNode = FALSE
@@ -1349,5 +1363,6 @@ Global
{9006A5A2-01D8-4A70-AEA7-B7B1987C4A62} = {56BCE1BF-7CBA-7CE8-203D-A88051F1D642}
{664A2577-6DA1-42DA-A213-3253017FA4BF} = {56BCE1BF-7CBA-7CE8-203D-A88051F1D642}
{39C1D44C-389F-4502-ADCF-E4AC359E8F8F} = {176B5A8A-7857-3ECD-1128-3C721BC7F5C6}
{85D215EC-DCFE-4F7F-BB07-540DCF66BE8C} = {41F15E67-7190-CF23-3BC4-77E87134CADD}
EndGlobalSection
EndGlobal

View File

@@ -25,17 +25,18 @@ namespace StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cccs;
public sealed class CccsConnector : IFeedConnector
{
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions RawSerializerOptions = new(JsonSerializerDefaults.Web)
{
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
};
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions DtoSerializerOptions = new(JsonSerializerDefaults.Web)
{
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
};
private const string DtoSchemaVersion = "cccs.dto.v1";
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions RawSerializerOptions = new(JsonSerializerDefaults.Web)
{
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
};
private static readonly JsonSerializerOptions DtoSerializerOptions = new(JsonSerializerDefaults.Web)
{
DefaultIgnoreCondition = JsonIgnoreCondition.WhenWritingNull,
};
private static readonly Uri CanonicalBaseUri = new("https://www.cyber.gc.ca", UriKind.Absolute);
private const string DtoSchemaVersion = "cccs.dto.v1";
private readonly CccsFeedClient _feedClient;
private readonly RawDocumentStorage _rawDocumentStorage;
@@ -482,24 +483,37 @@ public sealed class CccsConnector : IFeedConnector
}
}
private static string BuildDocumentUri(CccsFeedItem item, CccsFeedEndpoint feed)
{
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(item.Url))
{
if (Uri.TryCreate(item.Url, UriKind.Absolute, out var absolute))
{
return absolute.ToString();
}
var baseUri = new Uri("https://www.cyber.gc.ca", UriKind.Absolute);
if (Uri.TryCreate(baseUri, item.Url, out var combined))
{
return combined.ToString();
}
}
return $"https://www.cyber.gc.ca/api/cccs/threats/{feed.Language}/{item.Nid}";
}
private static string BuildDocumentUri(CccsFeedItem item, CccsFeedEndpoint feed)
{
var candidate = item.Url?.Trim();
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(candidate))
{
if (Uri.TryCreate(candidate, UriKind.Absolute, out var absolute))
{
if (IsHttpScheme(absolute.Scheme))
{
return absolute.ToString();
}
candidate = absolute.PathAndQuery;
if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(absolute.Fragment))
{
candidate += absolute.Fragment;
}
}
if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(candidate) && Uri.TryCreate(CanonicalBaseUri, candidate, out var combined))
{
return combined.ToString();
}
}
return new Uri(CanonicalBaseUri, $"/api/cccs/threats/{feed.Language}/{item.Nid}").ToString();
}
private static bool IsHttpScheme(string? scheme)
=> string.Equals(scheme, Uri.UriSchemeHttp, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
|| string.Equals(scheme, Uri.UriSchemeHttps, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
private static CccsRawAdvisoryDocument CreateRawDocument(CccsFeedItem item, CccsFeedEndpoint feed, IReadOnlyDictionary<int, string> taxonomy)
{

View File

@@ -125,11 +125,16 @@ public sealed class CccsFeedEndpoint
throw new InvalidOperationException("Feed endpoint URI must be configured before building taxonomy URI.");
}
var language = Uri.GetQueryParameterValueOrDefault("lang", Language);
var builder = $"https://www.cyber.gc.ca/api/cccs/taxonomy/v1/get?lang={language}&vocabulary=cccs_alert_type";
return new Uri(builder, UriKind.Absolute);
}
}
var language = Uri.GetQueryParameterValueOrDefault("lang", Language);
var taxonomyBuilder = new UriBuilder(Uri)
{
Path = "/api/cccs/taxonomy/v1/get",
Query = $"lang={language}&vocabulary=cccs_alert_type"
};
return taxonomyBuilder.Uri;
}
}
internal static class CccsUriExtensions
{

View File

@@ -348,19 +348,21 @@ public sealed class CccsHtmlParser
private static string? NormalizeReferenceUrl(string? href, Uri? baseUri, string language)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(href))
{
return null;
}
if (!Uri.TryCreate(href, UriKind.Absolute, out var absolute))
{
if (baseUri is null || !Uri.TryCreate(baseUri, href, out absolute))
{
return null;
}
}
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(href))
{
return null;
}
var candidate = href.Trim();
var hasAbsolute = Uri.TryCreate(candidate, UriKind.Absolute, out var absolute);
if (!hasAbsolute || string.Equals(absolute.Scheme, Uri.UriSchemeFile, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
{
if (baseUri is null || !Uri.TryCreate(baseUri, candidate, out absolute))
{
return null;
}
}
var builder = new UriBuilder(absolute)
{
Fragment = string.Empty,

View File

@@ -319,12 +319,19 @@ public sealed class KisaDetailParser
}
var headerRow = labelCell.ParentElement as IHtmlTableRowElement;
var columnIndex = labelCell.CellIndex;
var columnIndex = headerRow is null
? -1
: Array.FindIndex(headerRow.Cells.ToArray(), cell => ReferenceEquals(cell, labelCell));
if (headerRow is null)
{
return null;
}
if (columnIndex < 0)
{
return null;
}
var rows = ownerTable.Rows.ToArray();
var headerIndex = Array.FindIndex(rows, row => ReferenceEquals(row, headerRow));
if (headerIndex < 0)

View File

@@ -2,10 +2,9 @@ using System.Collections.Immutable;
using System.Globalization;
using System.IO;
using System.IO.Compression;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using System.Xml;
using System.Xml.Linq;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
@@ -17,10 +16,11 @@ using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.Fetch;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Bdu.Configuration;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Bdu.Internal;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Advisories;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Documents;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Dtos;
using StellaOps.Plugin;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Advisories;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Documents;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Dtos;
using StellaOps.Plugin;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Bdu;
@@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ public sealed class RuBduConnector : IFeedConnector
private readonly TimeProvider _timeProvider;
private readonly ILogger<RuBduConnector> _logger;
private readonly string _cacheDirectory;
private readonly string _archiveCachePath;
private readonly string _cacheDirectory;
private readonly string _archiveCachePath;
private readonly ICryptoHash _hash;
public RuBduConnector(
SourceFetchService fetchService,
@@ -55,9 +56,10 @@ public sealed class RuBduConnector : IFeedConnector
IAdvisoryStore advisoryStore,
ISourceStateRepository stateRepository,
IOptions<RuBduOptions> options,
RuBduDiagnostics diagnostics,
TimeProvider? timeProvider,
ILogger<RuBduConnector> logger)
RuBduDiagnostics diagnostics,
TimeProvider? timeProvider,
ILogger<RuBduConnector> logger,
ICryptoHash cryptoHash)
{
_fetchService = fetchService ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(fetchService));
_rawDocumentStorage = rawDocumentStorage ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(rawDocumentStorage));
@@ -69,8 +71,9 @@ public sealed class RuBduConnector : IFeedConnector
_options.Validate();
_diagnostics = diagnostics ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(diagnostics));
_timeProvider = timeProvider ?? TimeProvider.System;
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
_cacheDirectory = ResolveCacheDirectory(_options.CacheDirectory);
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
_hash = cryptoHash ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(cryptoHash));
_cacheDirectory = ResolveCacheDirectory(_options.CacheDirectory);
_archiveCachePath = Path.Combine(_cacheDirectory, "vulxml.zip");
EnsureCacheDirectory();
}
@@ -398,7 +401,7 @@ public sealed class RuBduConnector : IFeedConnector
}
var payload = JsonSerializer.SerializeToUtf8Bytes(dto, SerializerOptions);
var sha = Convert.ToHexString(SHA256.HashData(payload)).ToLowerInvariant();
var sha = _hash.ComputeHashHex(payload);
var documentUri = BuildDocumentUri(dto.Identifier);
var existing = await _documentStore.FindBySourceAndUriAsync(SourceName, documentUri, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
<ProjectReference Include="../StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../StellaOps.Concelier.Models/StellaOps.Concelier.Models.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo/StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/StellaOps.Cryptography.csproj" />
</ItemGroup>
</Project>
</Project>

View File

@@ -4,23 +4,23 @@ using System.IO;
using System.IO.Compression;
using System.Net;
using System.Linq;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using AngleSharp.Html.Parser;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using MongoDB.Bson;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.Fetch;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki.Configuration;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki.Internal;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Advisories;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Documents;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Dtos;
using StellaOps.Plugin;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.Json;
using System.Text.Json.Serialization;
using AngleSharp.Html.Parser;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
using MongoDB.Bson;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.Fetch;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki.Configuration;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki.Internal;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Advisories;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Documents;
using StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.Dtos;
using StellaOps.Plugin;
using StellaOps.Cryptography;
namespace StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki;
@@ -55,11 +55,12 @@ public sealed class RuNkckiConnector : IFeedConnector
private readonly ISourceStateRepository _stateRepository;
private readonly RuNkckiOptions _options;
private readonly TimeProvider _timeProvider;
private readonly RuNkckiDiagnostics _diagnostics;
private readonly ILogger<RuNkckiConnector> _logger;
private readonly string _cacheDirectory;
private readonly HtmlParser _htmlParser = new();
private readonly RuNkckiDiagnostics _diagnostics;
private readonly ILogger<RuNkckiConnector> _logger;
private readonly string _cacheDirectory;
private readonly ICryptoHash _hash;
private readonly HtmlParser _htmlParser = new();
public RuNkckiConnector(
SourceFetchService fetchService,
@@ -69,9 +70,10 @@ public sealed class RuNkckiConnector : IFeedConnector
IAdvisoryStore advisoryStore,
ISourceStateRepository stateRepository,
IOptions<RuNkckiOptions> options,
RuNkckiDiagnostics diagnostics,
TimeProvider? timeProvider,
ILogger<RuNkckiConnector> logger)
RuNkckiDiagnostics diagnostics,
TimeProvider? timeProvider,
ILogger<RuNkckiConnector> logger,
ICryptoHash cryptoHash)
{
_fetchService = fetchService ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(fetchService));
_rawDocumentStorage = rawDocumentStorage ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(rawDocumentStorage));
@@ -79,12 +81,13 @@ public sealed class RuNkckiConnector : IFeedConnector
_dtoStore = dtoStore ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(dtoStore));
_advisoryStore = advisoryStore ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(advisoryStore));
_stateRepository = stateRepository ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(stateRepository));
_options = (options ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(options))).Value ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(options));
_options.Validate();
_diagnostics = diagnostics ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(diagnostics));
_timeProvider = timeProvider ?? TimeProvider.System;
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
_cacheDirectory = ResolveCacheDirectory(_options.CacheDirectory);
_options = (options ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(options))).Value ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(options));
_options.Validate();
_diagnostics = diagnostics ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(diagnostics));
_timeProvider = timeProvider ?? TimeProvider.System;
_logger = logger ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(logger));
_hash = cryptoHash ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(cryptoHash));
_cacheDirectory = ResolveCacheDirectory(_options.CacheDirectory);
EnsureCacheDirectory();
}
@@ -597,7 +600,7 @@ public sealed class RuNkckiConnector : IFeedConnector
}
var payload = JsonSerializer.SerializeToUtf8Bytes(dto, SerializerOptions);
var sha = Convert.ToHexString(SHA256.HashData(payload)).ToLowerInvariant();
var sha = _hash.ComputeHashHex(payload);
var documentUri = BuildDocumentUri(dto);
var existing = await _documentStore.FindBySourceAndUriAsync(SourceName, documentUri, cancellationToken).ConfigureAwait(false);

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
<ProjectReference Include="../StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Common.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../StellaOps.Concelier.Models/StellaOps.Concelier.Models.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo/StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo.csproj" />
<ProjectReference Include="../../../__Libraries/StellaOps.Cryptography/StellaOps.Cryptography.csproj" />
</ItemGroup>
</Project>
</Project>

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