Files
git.stella-ops.org/etc/authority.yaml.sample
root 68da90a11a
Some checks failed
Docs CI / lint-and-preview (push) Has been cancelled
Restructure solution layout by module
2025-10-28 15:10:40 +02:00

338 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext

# StellaOps Authority configuration template.
# Copy to ../etc/authority.yaml (relative to the Authority content root)
# and adjust values to fit your environment. Environment variables
# prefixed with STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY_ override these values at runtime.
# Example: STELLAOPS_AUTHORITY__ISSUER=https://authority.example.com
schemaVersion: 1
# Absolute issuer URI advertised to clients. Use HTTPS for anything
# beyond loopback development.
issuer: "https://authority.stella-ops.local"
# Token lifetimes expressed as HH:MM:SS or DD.HH:MM:SS.
accessTokenLifetime: "00:02:00"
refreshTokenLifetime: "30.00:00:00"
identityTokenLifetime: "00:05:00"
authorizationCodeLifetime: "00:05:00"
deviceCodeLifetime: "00:15:00"
# MongoDB storage connection details.
storage:
connectionString: "mongodb://localhost:27017/stellaops-authority"
# databaseName: "stellaops_authority"
commandTimeout: "00:00:30"
# Signing configuration for revocation bundles and JWKS.
signing:
enabled: true
activeKeyId: "authority-signing-2025-dev"
keyPath: "../certificates/authority-signing-2025-dev.pem"
algorithm: "ES256"
keySource: "file"
# provider: "default"
additionalKeys:
- keyId: "authority-signing-dev"
path: "../certificates/authority-signing-dev.pem"
source: "file"
# Rotation flow:
# 1. Generate a new PEM under ./certificates (e.g. authority-signing-2026-dev.pem).
# 2. Trigger the .gitea/workflows/authority-key-rotation.yml workflow (or run
# ops/authority/key-rotation.sh) with the new keyId/keyPath.
# 3. Update activeKeyId/keyPath above and move the previous key into additionalKeys
# so restarts retain retired material for JWKS consumers.
# Bootstrap administrative endpoints (initial provisioning).
bootstrap:
enabled: false
apiKey: "change-me"
defaultIdentityProvider: "standard"
# Directories scanned for Authority plug-ins. Relative paths resolve
# against the application content root, enabling air-gapped deployments
# that package plug-ins alongside binaries.
pluginDirectories:
- "../StellaOps.Authority.PluginBinaries"
# "/var/lib/stellaops/authority/plugins"
# Plug-in manifests live in descriptors below; per-plugin settings are stored
# in the configurationDirectory (YAML files). Authority will load any enabled
# plugins and surface their metadata/capabilities to the host.
plugins:
configurationDirectory: "../etc/authority.plugins"
descriptors:
standard:
type: "standard"
assemblyName: "StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Standard"
enabled: true
configFile: "standard.yaml"
capabilities:
- password
- bootstrap
- clientProvisioning
metadata:
defaultRole: "operators"
# Example for an external identity provider plugin. Leave disabled unless
# the plug-in package exists under StellaOps.Authority.PluginBinaries.
ldap:
type: "ldap"
assemblyName: "StellaOps.Authority.Plugin.Ldap"
enabled: false
configFile: "ldap.yaml"
capabilities:
- password
- mfa
# OAuth client registrations issued by Authority. These examples cover Notify WebService
# in dev (notify.dev audience) and production (notify audience). Replace the secret files
# with paths to your sealed credentials before enabling bootstrap mode.
clients:
- clientId: "notify-web-dev"
displayName: "Notify WebService (dev)"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "notify.dev" ]
scopes: [ "notify.read", "notify.admin" ]
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/notify-web-dev.secret"
- clientId: "notify-web"
displayName: "Notify WebService"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "notify" ]
scopes: [ "notify.read", "notify.admin" ]
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/notify-web.secret"
- clientId: "concelier-ingest"
displayName: "Concelier Ingestion"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://concelier" ]
scopes: [ "advisory:ingest", "advisory:read" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/concelier-ingest.secret"
- clientId: "excitor-ingest"
displayName: "Excititor VEX Ingestion"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://excitor" ]
scopes: [ "vex:ingest", "vex:read" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/excitor-ingest.secret"
- clientId: "aoc-verifier"
displayName: "AOC Verification Agent"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://concelier", "api://excitor" ]
scopes: [ "aoc:verify", "advisory:read", "vex:read" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/aoc-verifier.secret"
- clientId: "policy-engine"
displayName: "Policy Engine Service"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://policy-engine" ]
scopes: [ "policy:run", "findings:read", "effective:write" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
properties:
serviceIdentity: "policy-engine"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/policy-engine.secret"
- clientId: "policy-cli"
displayName: "Policy Automation CLI"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://policy-engine" ]
scopes: [ "policy:read", "policy:author", "policy:review", "policy:simulate", "findings:read" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/policy-cli.secret"
- clientId: "exceptions-service"
displayName: "Policy Engine Exceptions Worker"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://policy-engine" ]
scopes: [ "exceptions:read", "exceptions:write" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/exceptions-service.secret"
- clientId: "console-web"
displayName: "StellaOps Console"
grantTypes: [ "authorization_code", "refresh_token" ]
audiences: [ "console" ]
scopes: [ "openid", "profile", "email", "ui.read", "authority:tenants.read", "advisory:read", "vex:read", "exceptions:read", "exceptions:approve", "aoc:verify", "findings:read", "orch:read", "vuln:read" ]
# exceptions:approve is elevated via fresh-auth and requires an MFA-capable identity provider.
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
redirectUris:
- "https://console.stella-ops.local/oidc/callback"
postLogoutRedirectUris:
- "https://console.stella-ops.local/"
# Gateway must forward X-Stella-Tenant for /console endpoints; fresh-auth window (300s)
# returned by /console/profile governs admin actions in the Console UI.
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/console-web.secret"
- clientId: "cartographer-service"
displayName: "Cartographer Service"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://cartographer" ]
scopes: [ "graph:write", "graph:read" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
properties:
serviceIdentity: "cartographer"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/cartographer-service.secret"
- clientId: "graph-api"
displayName: "Graph API Gateway"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://graph-api" ]
scopes: [ "graph:read", "graph:export", "graph:simulate" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/graph-api.secret"
- clientId: "export-center-operator"
displayName: "Export Center Operator"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://export-center" ]
scopes: [ "export.viewer", "export.operator" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/export-center-operator.secret"
- clientId: "export-center-admin"
displayName: "Export Center Admin"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://export-center" ]
scopes: [ "export.viewer", "export.operator", "export.admin" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/export-center-admin.secret"
- clientId: "vuln-explorer-ui"
displayName: "Vuln Explorer UI"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://vuln-explorer" ]
scopes: [ "vuln:read" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/vuln-explorer-ui.secret"
# Signals sensors must request aoc:verify alongside write scope.
- clientId: "signals-uploader"
displayName: "Signals Sensor"
grantTypes: [ "client_credentials" ]
audiences: [ "api://signals" ]
scopes: [ "signals:write", "signals:read", "aoc:verify" ]
tenant: "tenant-default"
senderConstraint: "dpop"
auth:
type: "client_secret"
secretFile: "../secrets/signals-uploader.secret"
tenants:
- name: "tenant-default"
roles:
orch-viewer:
scopes: [ "orch:read" ]
orch-operator:
scopes: [ "orch:read", "orch:operate" ]
policy-author:
scopes: [ "policy:author", "policy:read", "policy:simulate", "findings:read" ]
policy-reviewer:
scopes: [ "policy:review", "policy:read", "policy:simulate", "findings:read" ]
policy-approver:
scopes: [ "policy:approve", "policy:review", "policy:read", "policy:simulate", "findings:read" ]
policy-operator:
scopes: [ "policy:operate", "policy:run", "policy:activate", "policy:read", "policy:simulate", "findings:read" ]
policy-auditor:
scopes: [ "policy:audit", "policy:read", "policy:simulate", "findings:read" ]
export-viewer:
scopes: [ "export.viewer" ]
export-operator:
scopes: [ "export.viewer", "export.operator" ]
export-admin:
scopes: [ "export.viewer", "export.operator", "export.admin" ]
# Exception approval routing templates used by Policy Engine and Console.
exceptions:
routingTemplates:
- id: "secops"
authorityRouteId: "approvals/secops"
requireMfa: true
description: "Security Operations approval chain"
- id: "governance"
authorityRouteId: "approvals/governance"
requireMfa: false
description: "Governance review (non-production)"
# CIDR ranges that bypass network-sensitive policies (e.g. on-host cron jobs).
# Keep the list tight: localhost is sufficient for most air-gapped installs.
bypassNetworks:
- "127.0.0.1/32"
- "::1/128"
# Security posture (rate limiting + sender constraints).
security:
rateLimiting:
token:
enabled: true
permitLimit: 30
window: "00:01:00"
queueLimit: 0
authorize:
enabled: true
permitLimit: 60
window: "00:01:00"
queueLimit: 10
internal:
enabled: false
permitLimit: 5
window: "00:01:00"
queueLimit: 0
senderConstraints:
dpop:
enabled: true
allowedAlgorithms: [ "ES256", "ES384" ]
proofLifetime: "00:02:00"
allowedClockSkew: "00:00:30"
replayWindow: "00:05:00"
nonce:
enabled: true
ttl: "00:10:00"
maxIssuancePerMinute: 120
store: "memory" # Set to "redis" for multi-node Authority deployments.
requiredAudiences:
- "signer"
- "attestor"
# redisConnectionString: "redis://authority-redis:6379?ssl=false"
mtls:
enabled: false
requireChainValidation: true
rotationGrace: "00:15:00"
enforceForAudiences:
- "signer" # Requests for these audiences force mTLS sender constraints
allowedSanTypes:
- "dns"
- "uri"
allowedCertificateAuthorities: [ ]
allowedSubjectPatterns: [ ]