Here’s a compact blueprint for two high‑leverage Stella Ops capabilities that cut false positives and make audits portable across jurisdictions.

# 1) Patch‑aware backport detector (no humans in loop)

**Goal:** Stop flagging CVEs when a distro backported the fix but kept the old version string.

**How it works—in plain terms**

* **Compile equivalence maps per distro:**

  * BuildID → symbol ranges → hunk hashes for core libraries/kernels.
  * For each upstream CVE fix, store the minimal “hunk signature” (function, file path, before/after diff hash).
* **Auto‑diff at scan time:**

  * From a container/VM, collect ELF BuildIDs and symbol tables (or BTF for kernels).
  * Match against the equivalence map; if patched hunks are present, mark the artifact “fixed‑by‑backport”.
* **Emit proof‑carrying VEX:**

  * Generate a signed VEX entry with `status:not_affected`, `justification: patched-backport`, and attach a **proof blob**: (artifact BuildIDs, matched hunk IDs, upstream commit refs, deterministic diff snippet).
* **Release‑gate policy:**

  * Gate only passes if (a) VEX is signed by an approved issuer, (b) proof blob verifies against our equivalence map, (c) CVE scoring policy is met.

**Minimal data model**

* `EquivalenceMap{ distro, package, version_like, build_id, [HunkSig{file,func, pre_hash, post_hash, upstream_commit}] }`
* `ProofBlob{ artifact_build_ids, matched_hunks[], verifier_log }`
* `VEX{ subject=digest/ref, cve, status, justification, issued_by, dsse_sig, proof_ref }`

**Pipeline sketch (where to run what)**

* **Feedser**: pulls upstream CVE patches → extracts HunkSig.
* **Sbomer**: captures BuildIDs for binaries in SBOM.
* **Vexer**: matches hunks → emits VEX + proof.
* **Authority/Attestor**: DSSE‑signs; stores in OCI referrers.
* **Policy Engine**: enforces “accept only if proof verifies”.

**Testing targets (fast ROI)**

* glibc, openssl, zlib, curl, libxml2, Linux kernel LTS (common backports).

**Why it’s a moat**

* Precision jump without humans; reproducible proof beats “trust me” advisories.

---

# 2) Regional crypto & offline audit packs

**Goal:** Hand an auditor a single, sealed bundle that **replays identically** anywhere—while satisfying local crypto regimes.

**What’s inside the bundle**

* **Evidence:** SBOM (CycloneDX 1.6/SPDX 3.0.1), VEX set, reachability subgraph (source+post‑build), policy ledger with decisions.
* **Attestations:** DSSE/in‑toto for each step.
* **Replay manifest:** feed snapshots + rule versions + hashing seeds so a third party can re‑execute and get the same verdicts.

**Dual‑stack signing profiles**

* eIDAS / ETSI (EU), FIPS (US), GOST/SM (RU/CN regional), plus optional PQC (Dilithium/Falcon) profile.
* Same content; different signature suites → auditor picks the locally valid one.

**Operating modes**

* **Connected:** push to an OCI registry with referrers and timestamping (Rekor‑compatible mirror).
* **Air‑gapped:** tar+CAR archive with embedded TUF root, CRLs, and time‑stamped notary receipts.

**Verification UX (auditor‑friendly)**

* One command: `stella verify --bundle bundle.car` → prints
  (1) signature set validated, (2) replay hash match, (3) policy outcomes, (4) exceptions trail.

---

## Lightweight implementation plan (90‑day cut)

* **Weeks 1–3:**

  * Extract HunkSig from upstream patches (git diff parser + normalizer).
  * Build ELF symbol/BuildID collector; store per‑distro maps.
* **Weeks 4–6:**

  * VEXer: matching engine + `not_affected: patched-backport` schema + ProofBlob.
  * DSSE signing with pluggable crypto providers; start with eIDAS+FIPS.
* **Weeks 7–9:**

  * Offline bundle format (CAR/TAR) + replay manifest + verifier CLI.
  * Policy gate: “accept if backport proof verifies”.
* **Weeks 10–12:**

  * Reachability subgraph export/import; deterministic re‑execution harness.
  * Docs + sample audits (openssl CVEs across Debian/Ubuntu/RHEL).

---

## UI hooks (keep it simple)

* **Finding:** “Backport Proofs” tab on a CVE detail → shows matched hunks and upstream commit links.
* **Deciding:** Release diff view lists CVEs → green badges “Patched via Backport (proof‑verified)”.
* **Auditing:** “Export Audit Pack” button at run level; pick signature profile(s); download bundle.

If you want, I can draft:

* the `HunkSig` extractor spec (inputs/outputs),
* the VEX schema extension and DSSE envelopes,
* the verifier CLI contract and sample CAR layout,
* or the policy snippets to wire this into your release gates.
Below is a developer-grade implementation guide for **patch-aware backport handling** across Alpine, Red Hat, Fedora, Debian, SUSE, Astra Linux, and “all other Linux used as Docker bases”. It is written as if you are building this inside Stella Ops (Feedser/Vexer/Sbomer/Scanner.Webservice, DSSE attestations, deterministic replay, Postgres+Valkey).

The key principle: **do not rely on upstream version strings**. For distros, “fixed” often means “patch backported with same NEVRA/version”. You must determine fix status by **distro patch metadata** plus **binary/source proof**.

---

## 0) What you are building

### Outputs (what must exist after implementation)

1. **DistroFix DB** (authoritative normalized knowledge)

   * For each distro release + package + CVE:

     * status: affected / fixed / not_affected / under_investigation / unknown
     * fixed range expressed in distro terms (epoch/version/release or deb version) and/or advisory IDs
     * proof pointers (errata, patch commit(s), SRPM/deb source, file hashes, build IDs)
2. **Backport Proof Engine**

   * Given an image and its installed packages, produce a **deterministic VEX**:

     * `status=not_affected` with `justification=patched-backport`
     * proof blob: advisory id, package build provenance, patch signatures matched
3. **Policy integration**

   * Gating rules treat “backport proof verified” as first-class evidence.
4. **Replayable scans**

   * Same inputs (feed snapshots + rules + image digest) → same verdicts.

---

## 1) High-level approach (two-layer truth)

### Layer A — Distro intelligence (fast and usually sufficient)

For each distro, ingest its authoritative vulnerability metadata:

* advisory/errata streams
* distro CVE trackers
* security databases (Alpine secdb)
* OVAL / CPE / CSAF if available
* package repositories metadata

This provides “fixed in release X” at distro level.

### Layer B — Proof (needed for precision and audits)

When Layer A says “fixed” but the version looks “old”, prove it:

* **Source proof**: patch set present in source package (SRPM, debian patches, apkbuild git)
* **Binary proof**: vulnerable function/hunk signature is patched in shipped binary (BuildID + symbol/hunk signature match)
* **Build proof**: build metadata ties the binary to the source + patch set deterministically

You will use Layer B to:

* override false positives
* produce auditor-grade evidence
* operate offline with sealed snapshots

---

## 2) Core data model (Postgres schema guidance)

### 2.1 Canonical keys

You must normalize these identifiers:

* **Distro key**: `distro_family` + `distro_name` + `release` + `arch`

  * e.g. `debian:12`, `rhel:9`, `alpine:3.19`, `sles:15sp5`, `astra:??`
* **Package key**: canonical package name plus ecosystem type

  * `apk`, `rpm`, `deb`
* **CVE key**: `CVE-YYYY-NNNN`

### 2.2 Tables (minimum)

* `distro_release(id, family, name, version, codename, arch, eol_at, source)`
* `pkg_name(id, ecosystem, name, normalized_name)`
* `pkg_version(id, ecosystem, version_raw, version_norm, epoch, upstream_ver, release_ver)`
* `advisory(id, distro_release_id, advisory_type, advisory_id, published_at, url, raw_json_hash, snapshot_id)`
* `advisory_pkg(advisory_id, pkg_name_id, fixed_version_id NULL, fixed_range_json NULL, status, notes)`
* `cve(id, cve_id, severity, cwe, description_hash)`
* `cve_pkg_status(id, cve_id, distro_release_id, pkg_name_id, status, fixed_version_id NULL, advisory_id NULL, confidence, last_seen_snapshot_id)`
* `source_artifact(id, type, url, sha256, size, fetched_in_snapshot_id)`

  * SRPM, `.dsc`, `.orig.tar`, `apkbuild`, patch files
* `patch_signature(id, cve_id, upstream_commit, file_path, function, pre_hash, post_hash, algo_version)`
* `build_provenance(id, distro_release_id, pkg_nevra_or_debver, build_id, source_artifact_id, buildinfo_artifact_id, signer, signed_at)`
* `binary_fingerprint(id, artifact_digest, path, elf_build_id, sha256, debuglink, arch)`
* `proof_blob(id, subject_digest, cve_id, pkg_name_id, distro_release_id, proof_type, proof_json, sha256)`

### 2.3 Version comparison engines

Implement **three comparators**:

* `rpmvercmp` (RPM EVR rules)
* `dpkg --compare-versions` equivalent (Debian version algorithm)
* Alpine `apk` version rules (similar to semver-ish but not semver; implement per apk-tools logic)

Do not “approximate”. Implement exact comparators or call system libraries inside controlled container images.

---

## 3) Feed ingestion per distro (Layer A)

### 3.1 Alpine (apk)

**Primary data**

* Alpine secdb repository (per branch) mapping CVEs ↔ packages, fixed versions.

**Ingestion**

* Pull secdb for each supported Alpine branch (3.x).
* Parse entries into `cve_pkg_status` with `fixed_version`.

**Package metadata**

* Pull `APKINDEX.tar.gz` for each repo (main/community) and arch.
* Store package version + checksum.

**Notes**

* Alpine often explicitly lists fixed versions; backports are less “opaque” than enterprise distros, but still validate.

### 3.2 Red Hat Enterprise Linux (rhel) & UBI

**Primary data**

* Red Hat Security Data: CVE ↔ packages, errata, states.
* Errata stream provides authoritative “fixed in RHSA-…”.

**Ingestion**

* For each RHEL major/minor you support (8, 9; optionally 7), pull:

  * CVE objects + affected products + package states
  * Errata (RHSA) objects and their fixed package NEVRAs
* Populate `advisory` + `advisory_pkg`.
* Derive `cve_pkg_status` from errata.

**Package metadata**

* Use repository metadata (repomd.xml + primary.xml.gz) for BaseOS/AppStream/CRB, etc.
* Record NEVRA and checksums.

**Enterprise backport reality**

* RHEL frequently backports fixes while keeping old upstream version. Your engine must prefer **errata fixed NEVRA** over upstream version meaning.

### 3.3 Fedora (rpm)

Fedora is closer to upstream; still ingest advisories.
**Primary data**

* Fedora security advisories / updateinfo (often via repository updateinfo.xml.gz)
* OVAL may exist for some streams.

**Ingestion**

* Parse updateinfo to map CVE → fixed NEVRA.
* For Fedora rawhide/rolling, treat as high churn; snapshots must be time-bounded.

### 3.4 Debian (deb)

**Primary data**

* Debian Security Tracker (CVE status per release + package, fixed versions)
* DSA advisories.

**Ingestion**

* Pull Debian security tracker data, parse per release (stable, oldstable).
* Normalize Debian versions exactly.
* Store “fixed in” version.

**Package metadata**

* Parse `Packages.gz` from security + main repos.
* Optionally `Sources.gz` for source package mapping.

### 3.5 SUSE (SLES / openSUSE) (rpm)

**Primary data**

* SUSE security advisories (often published as CSAF; also SUSE OVAL historically)
* Updateinfo in repos.

**Ingestion**

* Prefer CSAF/official advisory feed when available; otherwise parse `updateinfo.xml.gz`.
* Map CVE → fixed packages.

### 3.6 Astra Linux (deb-family, often)

Astra is niche and may have bespoke advisories/mirrors.
**Primary data**

* Astra security bulletins and repository metadata.
* If they publish a tracker or advisories in a machine-readable format, ingest it; otherwise:

  * treat repo metadata + changelogs as the canonical signal.

**Ingestion strategy**

* Implement a generic “Debian-family fallback”:

  * ingest `Packages.gz` and `Sources.gz` from Astra repos
  * ingest available security bulletin feed (HTML/JSON); parse with a deterministic extractor
  * if advisories are sparse, rely on Layer B proof more heavily (source patch presence + binary proof)

### 3.7 “All other Linux used on docker repositories”

Handle this by **distro families** plus a plugin pattern:

* Debian family (Ubuntu, Kali, Astra, Mint): use Debian comparator + `Packages/Sources` + their security tracker if exists
* RPM family (RHEL clones: Rocky/Alma/Oracle; Amazon Linux): rpm comparator + updateinfo/OVAL/errata equivalents
* Alpine family (Wolfi/apko-like): their own secdb or APKINDEX equivalents
* Distroless/scratch: no package manager; you must fall back to binary scanning only (Layer B).

**Developer action**

* Create an interface `IDistroProvider` with:

  * `EnumerateReleases()`
  * `FetchAdvisories(snapshot)`
  * `FetchRepoMetadata(snapshot)`
  * `NormalizePackageName(...)`
  * `CompareVersions(a,b)`
  * `ParseInstalledPackages(image)` (if package manager exists)
* Implement providers: `AlpineProvider`, `DebianProvider`, `RpmProvider`, `SuseProvider`, `AstraProvider`, plus “GenericDebianFamilyProvider”, “GenericRpmFamilyProvider”.

---

## 4) Installed package extraction (inside scan)

### 4.1 Determine OS identity

From image filesystem:

* `/etc/os-release` (ID, VERSION_ID)
* distro-specific markers:

  * Alpine: `/etc/alpine-release`
  * Debian: `/etc/debian_version`
  * RHEL: `/etc/redhat-release`

Write a deterministic resolver:

* if `/etc/os-release` missing, fall back to:

  * package DB presence: `/lib/apk/db/installed`, `/var/lib/dpkg/status`, rpmdb paths
  * ELF libc fingerprint heuristics (last resort)

### 4.2 Extract installed packages deterministically

* Alpine: parse `/lib/apk/db/installed`
* Debian: parse `/var/lib/dpkg/status`
* RPM: parse rpmdb (use `rpm` tooling in a controlled helper container, or implement rpmdb reader; prefer tooling for correctness)

Store:

* package name
* version string (raw)
* arch
* source package mapping if available (Debian’s `Source:` fields; RPM’s `Sourcerpm`)

---

## 5) The backport proof engine (Layer B)

This is the “precision jump”. It has three proof modes; implement all three and choose best available.

### Proof mode 1 — Advisory fixed NEVRA/version match (fast)

If the distro’s errata/DSA/updateinfo says fixed in `X`, and installed package version compares ≥ X (using correct comparator):

* mark fixed with `confidence=high`
* attach advisory reference only

This already addresses many cases.

### Proof mode 2 — Source patch presence (best for distros with source repos)

Prove the patch is in the source package even if version looks old.

#### Debian-family

* Determine source package:

  * from `dpkg status` “Source:” if present; otherwise map binary→source via `Sources.gz`
* Fetch source:

  * `.dsc` + referenced tarballs + `debian/patches/*` (or `debian/patches/series`)
* Patch signature verification:

  * For CVE, you maintain `patch_signature` derived from upstream fix commits:

    * identify file/function/hunk; store normalized diff hashes (ignore whitespace/context drift)
  * Apply:

    * check if any distro patch file contains the “post” signature (or the vulnerable code is absent)
* Record in `proof_blob`:

  * source artifact SHA256
  * patch file names
  * matching signature IDs
  * deterministic verifier log

#### RPM-family (RHEL/Fedora/SUSE)

* Determine SRPM from installed RPM metadata (Sourcerpm field).
* Fetch SRPM from source repo (or debug/source channel).
* Extract patches from SRPM spec + sources.
* Verify patch signatures as above.

#### Alpine

* Determine `apkbuild` and patches for the package version (Alpine aports)
* Verify patch signature.

### Proof mode 3 — Binary hunk/signature match (works even without source repos)

This is your universal fallback (also for distroless).

#### Build fingerprints

* For each ELF binary in the package or image:

  * compute `sha256`
  * read `ELF BuildID` if present
  * capture `.gnu_debuglink` if present
  * capture symbols (when available)

#### Signature strategy

For each CVE fix, create one or more **binary-checkable predicates**:

* vulnerable function contains a known byte sequence that disappears after fix
* or patched function includes a new basic block pattern
* or a string constant changes (weak, but sometimes useful)
* or the compile-time feature toggles

Implement as `BinaryPredicate` objects:

* `type`: bytepattern | cfghash | symbolrangehash | rodata-string
* `scope`: file path patterns / package name constraints
* `arch`: x86_64/aarch64 etc.
* `algo_version`: so you can evolve without breaking replay

Evaluation:

* locate candidate binaries (package manifest, common library paths)
* apply predicate in a stable order
* if “fixed predicate” matches and “vulnerable predicate” does not:

  * produce proof

#### Evidence quality

Binary proof must include:

* file path + sha256
* BuildID if available
* predicate ID + algorithm version
* extractor/verifier version hashes

---

## 6) Building the patch signature corpus (no humans)

### 6.1 Upstream patch harvesting (Feedser)

For each CVE:

* find upstream fix commits (NVD references, project advisories, distro patch references)
* fetch git diffs
* normalize to `patch_signature`:

  * (file path, function name if detectable, pre hash, post hash)
  * store multiple signatures per CVE if multiple upstream branches

You will not always find perfect fix commits. When missing:

* fall back to distro-specific patch extraction (learn signatures from distro patch itself)
* mark `signature_origin=distro-learned` but keep it auditable

### 6.2 Deterministic normalization rules

* strip diff metadata that varies
* normalize whitespace
* compute hashes over:

  * token stream (C/C++ tokens; for others line-based)
  * include hunk context windows
* store `algo_version` and never change semantics without bumping

---

## 7) Decision algorithm (deterministic, ordered, explainable)

For each `(image_digest, distro_release, pkg, cve)`:

1. **If distro provider has explicit status “not affected”** (e.g., vulnerable code not present in that distro build):

   * emit VEX not_affected with advisory proof
2. **Else if advisory says fixed in version/NEVRA** and installed compares as fixed:

   * emit VEX fixed with advisory proof
3. **Else if source proof succeeds**:

   * emit VEX not_affected / fixed (depending on semantics) with `justification=patched-backport`
4. **Else if binary proof succeeds**:

   * emit VEX not_affected / fixed with binary proof
5. Else:

   * affected/unknown depending on policy, but always attach “why unknown” in evidence.

This order is critical to keep runtime reasonable and proofs consistent.

---

## 8) Engineering constraints for Docker base images

### 8.1 Multi-stage images and removed package DBs

Many production images delete package databases to slim.
Your scan must handle:

* no dpkg status, no rpmdb, no apk db
  In this case:
* try SBOM from build provenance (if you have it)
* otherwise treat as **binary-only**:

  * scan ELF binaries + shared libs
  * map to known package/binary fingerprints where possible
  * rely on Proof mode 3

### 8.2 Minimal images (distroless, scratch)

* There is no OS metadata; don’t pretend.
* Mark distro as `unknown`, skip Layer A, go straight to binary proof.
* Policy should treat unknowns explicitly (your existing “unknown budget” moat).

---

## 9) Implementation structure in .NET 10 (practical module map)

### 9.1 Services and boundaries

* **Feedser**

  * pulls distro advisories/trackers/repo metadata
  * produces normalized `DistroFix` snapshots
* **Sbomer**

  * produces SBOM + captures file fingerprints, BuildIDs
* **Scanner.Webservice**

  * runs the deterministic evaluation and lattice/policy logic (per your standing rule)
  * does proof verification + emits signed verdicts
* **Vexer**

  * aggregates VEX claims + attaches proof blobs (but evaluation logic stays in Scanner.Webservice)
* **Authority/Attestor**

  * DSSE signing, OCI referrers, audit pack exports

### 9.2 Core libraries

Create a library `StellaOps.Security.Distro`:

* `IDistroProvider`
* `IVersionComparator`
* `IInstalledPackageExtractor`
* `IAdvisoryParser`
* `ISourceProofVerifier`
* `IBinaryProofVerifier`

Each provider implements:

* parsing
* comparator
* extraction for its ecosystem

### 9.3 Determinism rules (must be enforced)

* Every scan references a specific `snapshot_id` for feeds.
* Proof computations are pure functions of:

  * image digest
  * extracted artifacts
  * snapshot content hashes
  * algorithm version hashes
* Logs included in proof blobs must be stable (no timestamps unless separately recorded).

---

## 10) Test strategy (non-negotiable)

### 10.1 Golden corpus images

Build a repo of fixtures:

* `alpine:3.18`, `alpine:3.19`
* `debian:11`, `debian:12`
* `ubuntu:22.04`, `ubuntu:24.04`
* `ubi9`, `ubi8` (or rhel-like equivalents you can legally test)
* `fedora:40+`
* `opensuse/leap`, `sles` if accessible
* Astra base images if you use them internally

For each fixture:

* pick 10 known CVEs across openssl, curl, zlib, glibc, libxml2
* store expected decisions:

  * vulnerable vs fixed, including backported cases
* run in CI with locked snapshots

### 10.2 Comparator test suites

For RPM and Debian version compare:

* ingest official comparator test vectors (or recreate known tricky cases)
* unit tests must include:

  * epoch handling
  * tilde ordering in Debian versions
  * rpm release ordering

### 10.3 Proof verifier tests

* source proof: patch signature detection on extracted SRPM/deb sources
* binary proof: fixed/vulnerable predicate detection on controlled binaries

---

## 11) Practical rollout plan (how developers should implement)

### Phase 1 — Layer A for all major distros (fast coverage)

1. Implement comparators: rpm, deb, apk.
2. Implement providers:

   * Alpine secdb + APKINDEX
   * Debian security tracker + Packages/Sources
   * RHEL errata/CVE feed + repo metadata
   * Fedora updateinfo + repo metadata
   * SUSE advisory/updateinfo
   * Generic Debian/RPM fallback providers
3. Produce `cve_pkg_status` snapshots and basic VEX results using only Layer A.

### Phase 2 — Source proof (removes most false positives)

1. Implement upstream patch harvesting → `patch_signature`.
2. Implement Debian source fetch + verification.
3. Implement SRPM fetch + verification.
4. Wire into decision algorithm, emit proof blobs.

### Phase 3 — Binary proof (covers stripped/minimal images)

1. Implement ELF fingerprint extraction + BuildID store.
2. Implement predicate framework + initial predicates for top libraries.
3. Add caching (Valkey) for predicate results keyed by `(file sha256, predicate_id, algo_version)`.

### Phase 4 — Astra and niche distros hardening

1. Implement Astra provider:

   * repo metadata ingestion
   * advisory parsing if available
   * otherwise rely on source/binary proof
2. Add distro onboarding kit:

   * define endpoints for repo metadata
   * define advisory parsing rules
   * define comparator family

---

## 12) What “done” means (acceptance criteria)

A developer story is “complete” only if:

* For each supported distro family, you can:

  * identify distro release
  * extract installed packages OR fall back to binary-only
  * compute fix status for at least top 50 packages
  * produce VEX with either advisory or proof
* At least 100 backport scenarios across RHEL/Debian/SUSE pass golden tests.
* Scan is replayable:

  * freeze snapshot, rerun, identical verdict hash.

---

If you want this converted into your internal sprintable format (epics/stories/tasks + acceptance tests + file/module layout in a .NET 10 repo), I can output it as:

* `SPECS.md` section “Patch-aware Backport Handling”
* `CONTRACTS.md` (provider interfaces, proof blob schema, DSSE envelopes)
* `DB_REPOSITORIES.md` migrations outline
* `IMPLEMENTATION.md` with step-by-step task breakdown per distro.