// =============================================================================
// A10_SSRF/SsrfTests.cs
// OWASP A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery
// Tests for SSRF vulnerabilities
// =============================================================================

using FluentAssertions;
using StellaOps.Security.Tests.Infrastructure;
using System.Net;

namespace StellaOps.Security.Tests.A10_SSRF;

/// <summary>
/// Tests for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities including:
/// - Internal network access attempts
/// - Cloud metadata endpoint access
/// - URL allowlist bypass attempts
/// - Protocol smuggling
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "Security")]
[Trait("OWASP", "A10")]
[OwaspCategory("A10:2021", "Server-Side Request Forgery")]
public class SsrfTests : SecurityTestBase
{
    [Theory]
    [MemberData(nameof(GetInternalUrlPayloads))]
    public void Should_Block_Internal_URL_Access(string maliciousUrl)
    {
        // Arrange
        var validator = new UrlValidator();

        // Act
        var isAllowed = validator.IsUrlAllowed(maliciousUrl);

        // Assert
        isAllowed.Should().BeFalse($"Internal URL '{maliciousUrl}' should be blocked");
    }

    [Theory]
    [MemberData(nameof(GetCloudMetadataPayloads))]
    public void Should_Block_Cloud_Metadata_Access(string metadataUrl)
    {
        // Arrange
        var validator = new UrlValidator();

        // Act
        var isAllowed = validator.IsUrlAllowed(metadataUrl);

        // Assert
        isAllowed.Should().BeFalse($"Cloud metadata URL '{metadataUrl}' should be blocked");
    }

    [Theory]
    [MemberData(nameof(GetBypassPayloads))]
    public void Should_Block_SSRF_Bypass_Attempts(string bypassUrl)
    {
        // Arrange
        var validator = new UrlValidator();

        // Act
        var isAllowed = validator.IsUrlAllowed(bypassUrl);

        // Assert
        isAllowed.Should().BeFalse($"SSRF bypass URL '{bypassUrl}' should be blocked");
    }

    [Theory]
    [InlineData("file:///etc/passwd")]
    [InlineData("file:///C:/Windows/System32/config/SAM")]
    [InlineData("gopher://localhost:25/")]
    [InlineData("dict://localhost:11211/")]
    public void Should_Block_Dangerous_Protocols(string url)
    {
        // Arrange
        var validator = new UrlValidator();

        // Act
        var isAllowed = validator.IsUrlAllowed(url);

        // Assert
        isAllowed.Should().BeFalse($"Dangerous protocol URL '{url}' should be blocked");
    }

    [Theory]
    [InlineData("https://api.example.com/data", true)]
    [InlineData("https://registry.npmjs.org/package", true)]
    [InlineData("http://127.0.0.1", false)]
    [InlineData("http://localhost:8080", false)]
    public void Should_Enforce_URL_Allowlist(string url, bool expectedAllowed)
    {
        // Arrange
        var validator = new UrlValidator(allowlistMode: true);
        validator.AddToAllowlist("api.example.com");
        validator.AddToAllowlist("registry.npmjs.org");

        // Act
        var isAllowed = validator.IsUrlAllowed(url);

        // Assert
        isAllowed.Should().Be(expectedAllowed, $"URL '{url}' allowlist check failed");
    }

    [Fact]
    public void Should_Resolve_DNS_And_Validate_IP()
    {
        // This tests that DNS resolution is validated, not just hostname checking
        // Attackers can use DNS rebinding or custom DNS to resolve to internal IPs
        var validator = new UrlValidator();
        
        // Even if hostname looks external, resolved IP must be validated
        var externalLookingUrl = "http://attacker-controlled.example.com";
        
        // Simulate DNS resolving to internal IP
        var resolvedIp = IPAddress.Parse("127.0.0.1");
        var isIpAllowed = validator.IsIpAllowed(resolvedIp);
        
        isIpAllowed.Should().BeFalse("Resolved internal IP should be blocked even with external hostname");
    }

    [Fact]
    public void Should_Block_Redirects_To_Internal_URLs()
    {
        // Arrange
        var validator = new UrlValidator();
        var initialUrl = "https://attacker.com/redirect";
        var redirectTarget = "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/";

        // Act - Check if redirect target is safe
        var isRedirectSafe = validator.IsUrlAllowed(redirectTarget);

        // Assert
        isRedirectSafe.Should().BeFalse("Redirect to metadata endpoint should be blocked");
    }

    [Theory]
    [InlineData("0x7f.0x0.0x0.0x1")] // Hex encoded localhost
    [InlineData("0177.0.0.1")] // Octal encoded localhost
    [InlineData("2130706433")] // Decimal encoded 127.0.0.1
    [InlineData("127.1")] // Short form localhost
    public void Should_Block_IP_Obfuscation_Attempts(string obfuscatedIp)
    {
        // Arrange
        var validator = new UrlValidator();
        var url = $"http://{obfuscatedIp}/";

        // Act
        var isAllowed = validator.IsUrlAllowed(url);

        // Assert
        isAllowed.Should().BeFalse($"Obfuscated IP '{obfuscatedIp}' should be blocked");
    }

    public static TheoryData<string> GetInternalUrlPayloads()
    {
        var data = new TheoryData<string>();
        foreach (var url in MaliciousPayloads.Ssrf.InternalUrls)
        {
            data.Add(url);
        }
        return data;
    }

    public static TheoryData<string> GetCloudMetadataPayloads()
    {
        var data = new TheoryData<string>();
        foreach (var url in MaliciousPayloads.Ssrf.CloudMetadata)
        {
            data.Add(url);
        }
        return data;
    }

    public static TheoryData<string> GetBypassPayloads()
    {
        var data = new TheoryData<string>();
        foreach (var url in MaliciousPayloads.Ssrf.Bypass)
        {
            data.Add(url);
        }
        return data;
    }
}

/// <summary>
/// URL validator for SSRF prevention.
/// In production, this would be the actual URL validation service.
/// </summary>
file class UrlValidator
{
    private readonly bool _allowlistMode;
    private readonly HashSet<string> _allowlist = new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
    
    private static readonly string[] BlockedHosts = 
    [
        "localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0", "[::1]",
        "169.254.169.254", "metadata.google.internal"
    ];
    
    private static readonly string[] BlockedSchemes = 
    [
        "file", "gopher", "dict", "ldap", "tftp"
    ];

    public UrlValidator(bool allowlistMode = false)
    {
        _allowlistMode = allowlistMode;
    }

    public void AddToAllowlist(string host)
    {
        _allowlist.Add(host);
    }

    public bool IsUrlAllowed(string url)
    {
        if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(url)) return false;

        try
        {
            var uri = new Uri(url, UriKind.Absolute);

            // Block dangerous schemes
            if (BlockedSchemes.Contains(uri.Scheme.ToLowerInvariant()))
            {
                return false;
            }

            // Block known internal hosts
            if (BlockedHosts.Any(h => uri.Host.Equals(h, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)))
            {
                return false;
            }

            // Block private IP ranges
            if (IPAddress.TryParse(uri.Host, out var ip))
            {
                if (!IsIpAllowed(ip)) return false;
            }

            // Check for IP obfuscation
            if (IsObfuscatedIp(uri.Host))
            {
                return false;
            }

            // Check for metadata patterns
            if (uri.Host.Contains("metadata", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) ||
                uri.Host.Contains("169.254", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
            {
                return false;
            }

            // In allowlist mode, only allow explicitly listed hosts
            if (_allowlistMode)
            {
                return _allowlist.Contains(uri.Host);
            }

            return true;
        }
        catch
        {
            return false;
        }
    }

    public bool IsIpAllowed(IPAddress ip)
    {
        var bytes = ip.GetAddressBytes();

        if (bytes.Length == 4)
        {
            // Block loopback
            if (bytes[0] == 127) return false;
            // Block 10.0.0.0/8
            if (bytes[0] == 10) return false;
            // Block 172.16.0.0/12
            if (bytes[0] == 172 && bytes[1] >= 16 && bytes[1] <= 31) return false;
            // Block 192.168.0.0/16
            if (bytes[0] == 192 && bytes[1] == 168) return false;
            // Block link-local
            if (bytes[0] == 169 && bytes[1] == 254) return false;
            // Block 0.0.0.0
            if (bytes.All(b => b == 0)) return false;
        }

        return true;
    }

    private static bool IsObfuscatedIp(string host)
    {
        // Check for hex notation
        if (host.StartsWith("0x", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) return true;
        
        // Check for octal notation (leading zeros)
        if (host.StartsWith("0") && host.Contains('.') && 
            host.Split('.').Any(p => p.StartsWith('0') && p.Length > 1)) return true;
        
        // Check for decimal notation (single large number)
        if (long.TryParse(host, out var decimalIp) && decimalIp > 0) return true;
        
        // Check for short form
        if (host.Split('.').Length < 4 && host.Split('.').All(p => int.TryParse(p, out _))) return true;

        return false;
    }
}