# StellaOps Moat Track — Spec Outline v0.3

**Scope of this doc:**
(1) Deterministic Replayable Scans (SRM), (2) Policy Engine & Lattice UI, (3) Sovereign Readiness (CryptoProfile + RootPack), (4) Attestation Observability Graph (AOG), (5) Procurement‑Grade Trust Statement, (6) Third‑Party Proof Channel, (7) Zastava differential SBOM + AI scheduler.

Cross‑cutting principles: offline‑first, cryptographic determinism, evidence‑bound decisions, regional crypto compliance, minimal operational friction.

---

## 0) Shared Concepts (applies to all 7)

* **Artifact identity:** digest-first (OCI image digest, file sha256).
* **Canonicalization:** all structured payloads (SBOM, SRM, Trust Statement JSON, VEX) are normalized via Canonical JSON (RFC‑8785‑like) prior to hashing/signing.
* **Signatures:** DSSE envelopes; **dual‑signing** supported (e.g., FIPS ECDSA + GOST R 34.10; or ECDSA + SM2).
* **Attestation chain:** each decision (scan, VEX merge, policy evaluation) yields a signed, replayable record.
* **Profiles & Packs:** **CryptoProfile** (algorithm + root policy) and **RootPack** (trust anchors + OCSP/CRL/TSA mirrors) are versioned and importable.
* **Policy Unit Tests:** any policy/lattice bundle ships with fixtures expected to pass during CI.

---

## 1) Deterministic Replayable Scans — SRM

### Objective

Make every scan a **provable, re‑executable fact**. Auditors can replay; results are bit‑for‑bit reproducible.

### Deliverables

* **SRM v0.1** schema (YAML/JSON)
* Deterministic executor + `stella replay`
* Replay diffing and result hashing

### SRM (Stella Replay Manifest) — schema (abridged)

```yaml
apiVersion: srm.stellaops.dev/v0.1
scan:
  id: uuid
  timestamp: ISO8601
  engine: { name: "stella-scan", version: "1.7.3", build_sha: "<sha>" }
environment:
  os_image: <digest>
  kernel: { uname: "...", cgroups: "v2" }
  cpu_features: [avx2, sse4.2]
inputs:
  image: { name: "reg/app:1.9.2", digest: "<sha>", layers: ["<sha>", ...] }
  sbom: { type: "cyclonedx@1.5", digest: "<sha>" }
  vex_set: [{ type: "openvex", digest: "<sha>" }]
  lattice_policy: { id: "corp-policy@2025-08-15", digest: "<sha>" }
rules_and_feeds:
  rulesets: [{ name: "vuln-core", version: "2025.08.30", digest: "<sha>" }]
  feeds:
    - { name: "nvd", snapshot_date: "2025-08-30", archive_digest: "<sha>" }
execution:
  mode: deterministic
  random_seed: 314159
  ordering: lexical
  heuristics: { binary_scan: true, secrets: false }
evidence:
  files_hashed: 12873
  samples: [{ path: "/usr/lib/libssl.so.3", sha256: "<sha>" }]
outputs:
  report_digest: "<sha>"   # canonical JSON root hash
  artifacts:
    - { name: "findings.json", sha256: "<sha>" }
signatures:
  - { scheme: "DSSE", CryptoProfile: "FIPS-140-3", signer: "build-ca@corp" }
  - { scheme: "DSSE", CryptoProfile: "GOST-2012",  signer: "ru-ca@corp" }
rekor: { entries: ["<uuid>", ...] }   # optional (offline allowed)
```

### CLI & API

* `stella scan --image reg/app@sha256:... --srm-out srm.yaml --findings findings.json`
* `stella replay srm.yaml --out replay.json --assert-digest <sha>`
* `POST /v1/srm/replay` → returns `ok`, `replay_report_digest`, `diff` (if any).

### Determinism Rules

* Single thread or ordered parallel with stable scheduling; sorted inputs; fixed random seed; pinned rules/feeds/policies from SRM; identical canonicalization routines.

### Acceptance Criteria

* Replaying SRM on a different host returns identical `report_digest`.
* If any feed archive differs by 1 bit, replay fails with a precise diff.
* SRM size ≤ 25 MB for a typical microservice image (excludes large feed archives, which may be referenced by digest and bundled as a side‑car tar).

---

## 2) Policy Engine & Lattice UI

### Objective

Turn VEX merging and severity logic into **programmable, testable algebra** with explainability.

### Model

* **Domain:** partial order over vulnerability states:
  `unknown < under_investigation < affected || not_affected < fixed`.
  Cross‑product with *scope*: `{runtime_path, build_path, optional_path}` and *confidence*: `{low, med, high}`.
* **Merge semantics:** monotonic lattice joins; conflict resolution rules prioritized by signed source trust and policy precedence.

### DSL (sketch)

```hocon
policy "corp-runtime" version "2025.08.15" {
  sources {
    trust_order = ["vendor:redhat", "internal:appsec", "public:nvd"]
    require_signatures = true
  }

  rules {
    when vex.statement == "not_affected"
      and evidence.entrypoint_exposes == false
      then state := not_affected with confidence := high;

    when package.is_dev_dependency == true
      then scope := optional_path;

    when cvss >= 9.0 and reachable == true
      then priority := "block";
  }

  guards {
    forbid unsigned_sources;
    forbid downgrade_of_state_below previous_state;
  }
}
```

### UI (“Trust Algebra Studio”)

* Drag‑and‑drop rule blocks, precedence editor, **simulation mode** on sample SBOM/VEX; **policy unit tests**.
* Export **signed** `.lattice.json`; importable into CI.

### CLI & API

* `stella policy lint corp-runtime.lattice.json`
* `stella policy test --fixtures fixtures/`
* `POST /v1/policy/evaluate` → normalized decision + proof trail.

### Acceptance Criteria

* Given same inputs, policy evaluation yields identical decision + proof trail hash.
* UI can round‑trip DSL ⇄ JSON with no semantic drift.
* Policy pack signature required to run in “enforced” mode.

---

## 3) Sovereign Readiness — CryptoProfile + RootPack

### Objective

**Drop‑in regional cryptography** (Russia/China/EU/US) with offline operation.

### CryptoProfile (attached to every signature/attestation)

```json
{
  "id": "GOST-2012@v1",
  "algorithms": {"sign":"GOST R 34.10-2012","hash":"GOST R 34.11-2012","cipher":"GOST 34.12-2015"},
  "key_policy": {"curve":"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256","hsm_required": true},
  "time_stamping": {"tsa": "rootpack://ru/tsa1"},
  "roots": ["rootpack://ru/trustanchors/gost-ca1"]
}
```

### RootPack

* Tarball containing: trust anchors, intermediate CAs, OCSP/CRL snapshots, TSA profiles, policy constraints (e.g., no cross‑sign with foreign roots), and region metadata.
* Installed via: `stella rootpack import rootpack_ru_v1.tar.gz`.

### Dual‑Signing & Guardrails

* Policy flags like `allow_dual_signing FIPS+GOST`, `forbid_sm2_for_us_exports` (example only).
* Enforcement happens at signing time and verification time.

### Acceptance Criteria

* Offline verification using RootPack succeeds; online OCSP disabled per policy.
* Mis‑profiled signatures are rejected with explicit reason codes.
* Dual‑signed DSSE verifies under both profiles when allowed.

---

## 4) Attestation Observability Graph (AOG)

### Objective

Make trust **observable**. Expose SLIs/SLOs for cryptographic posture & policy compliance.

### Data Model

* Nodes: `{artifact, sbom, policy, vex, srm, signature, rootpack, runtime_instance}`
* Edges: `derived_from`, `signed_by`, `evaluated_by`, `replayed_by`, `runs_as`

### Metrics (OpenTelemetry/Prometheus)

* `stella_trust_sli{service,env}` = fraction of running pods whose image has a valid SRM‑backed attestation chain under the active policy.
* `stella_attestation_latency_seconds` (P50/P95) from build to verified‑ready.
* `stella_policy_drift_events_total` (increment when running policy != signed policy).
* `stella_exception_without_proof_total` (must be 0).
* `stella_replay_success_ratio` (per week).

**SLO Example**

* **Trust SLO ≥ 99.9%** measured hourly; error budget resets monthly.

### Interfaces

* `stella aog export --format otlp`
* `GET /v1/aog/graph?artifactDigest=...` → subgraph JSON (with signed edge proofs).
* Grafana dashboards (packaged).

### Acceptance Criteria

* AOG can reconstruct the full trust lineage for any running pod in ≤ 2s (p95) on a 1k‑service cluster.
* Metrics cardinality bounded (service/env/policy only).

---

## 5) Procurement‑Grade “Trust Statement”

### Objective

One **board‑ready** artifact that unifies security posture across vendors; machine‑readable twin for ERP/GRC.

### Outputs

* **PDF** (human): signed, watermark, controlled fields for vendor name/version/date, summary graphs, SLOs, exceptions with PCE (proof‑carrying exceptions).
* **JSON** (machine): normalized schema below; DSSE‑signed; includes SRM and policy references.

```json
{
  "schema": "trust-statement.stellaops.dev/v1",
  "vendor": {"name": "Acme","product":"Payments API","version":"1.9.2"},
  "build": {"image_digest":"sha256:...","srm_digest":"sha256:..."},
  "policy": {"id":"corp-runtime@2025-08-15","digest":"sha256:..."},
  "summary": {
    "trust_sli": 0.9992,
    "exceptions": 1,
    "open_findings": {"critical":0,"high":2,"medium":4,"low":12}
  },
  "exceptions": [{
    "id":"EXC-2025-0912",
    "reason":"not_affected-via-vex",
    "proof_digest":"sha256:...",
    "expiry":"2026-01-15"
  }],
  "signatures": [{ "CryptoProfile":"FIPS-140-3" }]
}
```

### Integrations

* Push connectors: **SAP Ariba, ServiceNow, Archer, Jira** (webhooks or SFTP in offline flows).
* CLI: `stella trust-statement generate --srm srm.yaml --policy corp-runtime.lattice.json --out acme-1.9.2.trust.json --pdf`.

### Acceptance Criteria

* JSON validates against schema; PDF and JSON hashes match the DSSE statement.
* ERP ingest POC: Ariba/ServiceNow field mapping validated.

---

## 6) Third‑Party Proof Channel

### Objective

Create a **publisher ecosystem** for upstream proofs: SBOM, VEX, and **VDR (Vulnerability Derivation Reason)**.

### Publisher Model

* **Identity:** publishers obtain a **Publisher Certificate** (could be verified via RootPack‑anchored CA or cross‑signed).
* **Submission:** `stella ledger publish --type {sbom|vex|vdr} --artifact <digest> --file proof.json --sign`.
* **Moderation & Revocation:** CRL‑like **Proof Revocation List (PRL)** with signed reasons.

### VDR (schema sketch)

```json
{
  "schema":"vdr.stellaops.dev/v1",
  "artifact":"sha256:...",
  "cve":"CVE-2025-12345",
  "claim":"not_affected",
  "method":"entrypoint_unreachable|abi_mismatch|dead_code",
  "evidence_refs":[{"type":"symbol_map","digest":"sha256:..."}],
  "publisher":"redhat://rhel",
  "signatures":[...]
}
```

### Consumption

* Policies can **prioritize** publisher channels by trust level.
* AOG shows which proofs originated from which publishers.

### Acceptance Criteria

* At least one upstream (e.g., base image vendor) can publish and your policy can consume & rank it.
* PRL revokes a proof and AOG reflects the change within 5 minutes.

---

## 7) Zastava — differential SBOM + AI enrichment scheduler

### Objective

Produce **entrypoint‑aware differential SBOMs** and continually **re‑enrich** new/old SBOMs with AI context and exposure‑aware prioritization.

### Concepts

* **dSBOM:** SBOM that reflects effective dependency set for a specific `ENTRYPOINT/CMD` and runtime flags (e.g., `--server.urls`, `DOTNET_...`).
* **Scheduler:** rescans **old SBOMs** when: (a) new CVE feeds arrive, (b) new VEX/VDR appear, (c) policy changes, or (d) AI models learn new exploitability signals.

### Pipeline

1. **Static slice:** infer reachable packages from entrypoint (e.g., `.NET Kestrel` vs CLI tool).
2. **Runtime slice (optional):** collect process tree, open sockets, and imported modules at startup in a **shadow run** or mirrored traffic.
3. **Diff:** `dSBOM = SBOM ∩ (static_reachable ∪ runtime_observed)`.
4. **AI Enrichment:** Zastava annotates each finding with *context weights* (exposed/not exposed, network scope, RBAC, secrets proximity).
5. **Plan:** produce PRs (Dockerfile base bump, package pin, k8s Service change).
6. **Scheduler:**

   * `stella zastava schedule --query 'service=payments AND env=prod' --interval 6h`
   * Triggers re‑evaluation and emits updated SRM + Trust deltas.

### dSBOM format (addon)

```json
{
  "schema":"cyclonedx+stella-diff@1.0",
  "base_sbom":"sha256:...",
  "entrypoint": ["/app/bin/Release/net8.0/app.dll"],
  "cmd": ["--urls","http://127.0.0.1:8080"], 
  "static_reachable": ["pkg:nuget/Kestrel@*", "pkg:nuget/System.Data@*"],
  "runtime_observed": ["pkg:rpm/openssl@3.0.9"],
  "excluded_paths": ["/usr/share/docs/**"],
  "digest":"sha256:..."
}
```

### Kestrel example (priority logic)

* If Kestrel present but Service is `ClusterIP` and no Ingress, **deprioritize**; if `LoadBalancer`/`NodePort` with 0‑RTT TLS disabled, **prioritize**.
* Zastava produces an **explainable card**: “Priority lowered due to non‑exposed runtime path; evidence: `kubectl get svc`, `netstat`, policy rule #42.”

### Acceptance Criteria

* Changing `ENTRYPOINT` produces a different, signed dSBOM and updated priorities.
* Scheduler updates stale SBOMs and issues signed deltas without network access (when RootPacks + feed mirrors are available).

---

## Cross‑Cutting Security & Compliance

* **Sanctions & Guardrails:** per‑profile constraints (e.g., forbid dual‑signing across certain jurisdictions). Policy‑enforced at sign/verify time.
* **HSM Integrations:** PKCS#11 providers for each profile (FIPS, GOST, SM2).
* **Data handling:** SRMs and Trust Statements may contain paths and hashes; optional redaction profiles for vendor sharing.

---

## Interfaces Summary (CLI)

```bash
# Scans / Replay
stella scan --image <digest> --srm-out srm.yaml
stella replay srm.yaml --assert-digest <sha>

# Policy & Lattice
stella policy lint corp.lattice.json
stella policy test --fixtures fixtures/
stella policy sign --profile FIPS-140-3

# Crypto Sovereign
stella rootpack import rootpack_ru_v1.tar.gz
stella attest sign --profile GOST-2012 --in srm.yaml
stella attest verify --profiles GOST-2012,FIPS-140-3

# AOG
stella aog export --format otlp
stella aog graph --artifact <digest>

# Trust Statement
stella trust-statement generate --srm srm.yaml --policy corp.lattice.json --pdf out.pdf --json out.json

# Third-Party Proof Channel
stella ledger publish --type vdr --artifact <digest> --file vdr.json --sign
stella ledger revoke --id <proof-id> --reason "superseded"

# Zastava
stella zastava diff-sbom --image <digest> --entrypoint "<cmd>" --out dsbom.json
stella zastava enrich --sbom dsbom.json --findings findings.json
stella zastava schedule --query 'env=prod' --interval 6h
```

---

## Success Metrics (per pillar)

* **SRM:** ≥ 99% of production images have SRM attached; **Replay Success Ratio** ≥ 0.99 weekly.
* **Policy/Lattice:** 100% of exceptions carry proof; policy test coverage ≥ 90% on top CVE classes.
* **Sovereign:** RootPacks for RU/CN/EU/US verified; dual‑signing working in CI; offline verification median < 200 ms.
* **AOG:** Trust SLO ≥ 99.9%; lineage lookup p95 ≤ 2s.
* **Trust Statement:** Accepted by at least one ERP (pilot); generation time ≤ 15s.
* **Third‑Party Channel:** ≥ 3 upstream publishers integrated; PRL revocations flow to AOG within 5 minutes.
* **Zastava:** dSBOM reduces non‑reachable high/critical findings by ≥ 35% without raising exposure incidents.

---

## Risks & Mitigations

* **Crypto complexity:** profile misuse → strict guardrails + default safe profiles, strong linting.
* **Cardinality/telemetry blow‑ups:** AOG label hygiene + sampling.
* **Vendor adoption (Proof Channel):** seed with your own base images and internal frameworks; provide SDKs and reference publishers.
* **Determinism regressions:** CI runs replay tests on golden SRMs; any drift fails the build.

---

## 90‑Day Moat‑First Milestones

1. **SRM v0.1**: schema, deterministic executor, CLI replay, golden tests.
2. **Policy Engine MVP**: DSL + evaluator + UI simulation; policy unit tests; signed policy packs.
3. **CryptoProfile/RootPack MVP**: FIPS + GOST working; dual‑signing; offline verify.
4. **AOG MVP**: lineage service + OTLP exporter + Grafana pack; Trust SLI.
5. **Trust Statement MVP**: JSON + PDF; ServiceNow ingest POC.
6. **Proof Channel alpha**: publisher identity + VDR schema + local ledger; PRL.
7. **Zastava α**: `diff-sbom` + exposure heuristics for `.NET Kestrel`; scheduler with offline mirrors.

---