# StellaOps Disaster Recovery Guide

> Sprint: SPRINT_20260125_003 - WORKFLOW-003
> Last updated: 2026-01-25

## Overview

This guide covers disaster recovery procedures for StellaOps trust
infrastructure, including Rekor outages, key compromise, and TUF repository
failures.

## Scenario 1: Rekor Service Outage

### Symptoms
- Attestation submissions failing
- Verification requests timing out
- Circuit breaker reporting OPEN state

### Immediate Actions

1. **Verify the outage**
   ```bash
   # Check Rekor health
   curl -sf https://rekor.sigstore.dev/api/v1/log | jq .

   # Check circuit breaker state
   stella trust status --show-circuit-breaker
   ```

2. **Check if mirror is active**
   ```bash
   # If mirror failover is enabled, verify it's working
   stella trust status --show-backends
   ```

3. **If mirror is not available, swap endpoints via TUF**
   ```bash
   # On TUF repository admin system
   ./devops/scripts/disaster-swap-endpoint.sh \
     --repo /path/to/tuf \
     --new-rekor-url https://rekor-mirror.internal:8080 \
     --note "Emergency: Production Rekor outage $(date -u)"
   ```

4. **Publish the update**
   ```bash
   cd /path/to/tuf
   ./scripts/sign-metadata.sh  # Sign updated metadata
   ./scripts/publish.sh        # Deploy to TUF server
   ```

5. **Force client sync (optional, for immediate effect)**
   ```bash
   stella trust sync --force
   ```

### Key Principle

**No client reconfiguration required.** Endpoint changes flow through TUF.
Clients discover new endpoints within their configured refresh interval.

### Recovery

Once the primary Rekor is restored:

1. **Swap back to primary**
   ```bash
   ./devops/scripts/disaster-swap-endpoint.sh \
     --repo /path/to/tuf \
     --new-rekor-url https://rekor.sigstore.dev \
     --note "Recovery: Primary Rekor restored"
   ```

2. **Verify service map published**
   ```bash
   stella trust sync --force
   stella trust status --show-endpoints
   ```

3. **Reset circuit breakers**
   ```bash
   stella trust reset-circuits
   ```

## Scenario 2: Rekor Key Compromise

### Symptoms
- Security team reports potential key exposure
- Unusual entries in transparency log
- Third-party security advisory

### Immediate Actions

1. **Assess the compromise scope**
   - When was the key potentially exposed?
   - What entries may be affected?
   - Are there signed entries from the compromised period?

2. **Emergency key rotation**
   ```bash
   # Phase 1: Add new key immediately (no grace period)
   ./devops/scripts/rotate-rekor-key.sh add-key \
     --repo /path/to/tuf \
     --new-key /secure/new-rekor-key-v2.pub

   # Sign and publish immediately
   cd /path/to/tuf
   ./scripts/sign-metadata.sh
   ./scripts/publish.sh
   ```

3. **Force all clients to sync**
   - Announce emergency update to all teams
   - Clients should run: `stella trust sync --force`

4. **Revoke compromised key immediately**
   ```bash
   # Phase 2: Remove old key (skip grace period due to compromise)
   ./devops/scripts/rotate-rekor-key.sh remove-old \
     --repo /path/to/tuf \
     --old-key-name rekor-key-v1

   # Sign and publish
   cd /path/to/tuf
   ./scripts/sign-metadata.sh
   ./scripts/publish.sh
   ```

5. **Document the incident**
   - Log rotation time
   - Affected key ID and fingerprint
   - List of potentially affected entries
   - Remediation steps taken

### Forensics

Identify entries signed during the compromise window:

```bash
# Query entries by time range
stella rekor query \
  --after "2026-01-20T00:00:00Z" \
  --before "2026-01-25T00:00:00Z" \
  --key-id compromised-key-id
```

## Scenario 3: TUF Repository Unavailable

### Symptoms
- Clients cannot sync trust metadata
- `stella trust sync` failing with network errors
- TUF timestamp verification failing

### Immediate Actions

1. **Diagnose the issue**
   ```bash
   # Check TUF repository health
   curl -sf https://trust.example.com/tuf/timestamp.json | jq .

   # Check DNS resolution
   nslookup trust.example.com

   # Check TLS certificate
   openssl s_client -connect trust.example.com:443 -servername trust.example.com
   ```

2. **For clients - extend offline tolerance**
   ```bash
   # Temporarily allow stale metadata (use with caution)
   stella trust sync --allow-stale --max-age 7d
   ```

3. **Restore TUF server**
   - Check hosting infrastructure
   - Restore from backup if needed
   - Verify metadata integrity

4. **Deploy mirror (if available)**
   ```bash
   # Update DNS or load balancer to point to mirror
   # Or update clients directly (less preferred)
   stella trust init \
     --tuf-url https://trust-mirror.example.com/tuf/ \
     --force
   ```

## Scenario 4: Signing Key Compromise

### Symptoms
- Security team reports key exposure
- Unauthorized attestations appearing

### Immediate Actions

1. **Revoke the compromised key**
   ```bash
   ./devops/scripts/rotate-signing-key.sh retire \
     --old-key compromised-key-name
   ```

2. **Generate new signing key**
   ```bash
   ./devops/scripts/rotate-signing-key.sh generate \
     --key-type ecdsa-p256
   ```

3. **Update CI/CD immediately**
   - Remove compromised key from all pipelines
   - Add new key
   - Trigger rebuild of recent releases

4. **Notify downstream consumers**
   - Announce key rotation
   - Provide new public key
   - Advise re-verification of recent attestations

## Scenario 5: Root Key Ceremony Required

### When Required
- Scheduled root key rotation (typically annual)
- Root key compromise (emergency)
- Threshold change for root signatures

### Procedure

1. **Schedule ceremony**
   - Require M-of-N key holders present
   - Air-gapped ceremony machine
   - Hardware security modules

2. **Generate new root**
   ```bash
   # On air-gapped ceremony machine
   tuf-ceremony init \
     --threshold 3 \
     --keys 5 \
     --algorithm ed25519
   ```

3. **Sign new root with old keys**
   - Requires old threshold of signatures
   - Ensures continuous trust chain

4. **Distribute new root**
   - Publish to TUF repository
   - Update bootstrap documentation
   - Notify all operators

### Air-Gap Considerations

For air-gapped deployments after root rotation:

```bash
# Export new trust bundle with updated root
stella trust snapshot export \
  --include-root \
  --out post-rotation-bundle.tar.zst

# Transfer and import on air-gapped systems
./devops/scripts/bootstrap-trust-offline.sh \
  post-rotation-bundle.tar.zst \
  --force  # Required due to root change
```

## Communication Templates

### Outage Notification

```
Subject: [StellaOps] Rekor Service Disruption - Failover Active

Status: Service Degradation
Impact: Attestation submissions may be delayed
Mitigation: Automatic failover to mirror active

Action Required: None - clients will auto-discover new endpoint

Updates: Monitor status at https://status.example.com
```

### Key Rotation Notice

```
Subject: [StellaOps] Emergency Key Rotation - Action Required

Reason: Security precaution / Scheduled rotation
Affected Key: rekor-key-v1 (fingerprint: abc123...)
New Key: rekor-key-v2 (fingerprint: def456...)

Action Required:
1. Run: stella trust sync --force
2. Verify: stella trust status --show-keys

Timeline: Old key will be revoked at [DATE/TIME UTC]
```

## Monitoring and Alerting

### Key Metrics

- Circuit breaker state changes
- TUF metadata freshness
- Rekor submission latency
- Verification success rate

### Alert Thresholds

| Metric | Warning | Critical |
|--------|---------|----------|
| TUF metadata age | > 12h | > 24h |
| Circuit breaker opens | > 2/hour | > 5/hour |
| Submission failures | > 5% | > 20% |
| Verification failures | > 1% | > 5% |

## Contacts

| Role | Contact | Escalation |
|------|---------|------------|
| TUF Admin | tuf-admin@example.com | On-call |
| Security Team | security@example.com | Immediate |
| Platform Team | platform@example.com | Business hours |

## Related Documentation

- [Bootstrap Guide](bootstrap-guide.md)
- [Key Rotation Runbook](key-rotation-runbook.md)
- [TUF Integration Guide](../modules/attestor/tuf-integration.md)