# Security Model

## Overview

This document describes the security model for the eBPF reachability evidence system, including threat model, trust boundaries, and mitigations.

## Trust Boundaries

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Untrusted Zone                                │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  │            Monitored Workloads                           │    │
│  │  (containers, processes generating events)               │    │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                    ══════════╪══════════  Trust Boundary 1
                              │
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Kernel Space (Trusted)                        │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  │  eBPF Verifier (enforces safety)                        │    │
│  │  ├─ Memory bounds checking                              │    │
│  │  ├─ No unbounded loops                                  │    │
│  │  └─ Restricted kernel API access                        │    │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  │  eBPF Programs (verified safe)                          │    │
│  │  └─ Ring buffer output only                             │    │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                    ══════════╪══════════  Trust Boundary 2
                              │
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Collector (Trusted Component)                 │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  │  RuntimeSignalCollector                                  │    │
│  │  ├─ Privileged (CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)   │    │
│  │  ├─ Reads ring buffer                                    │    │
│  │  └─ Writes signed evidence                               │    │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
                    ══════════╪══════════  Trust Boundary 3
                              │
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Evidence Storage                              │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  │  Signed NDJSON Chunks                                    │    │
│  │  ├─ DSSE signatures (Fulcio/KMS)                        │    │
│  │  ├─ Rekor inclusion proofs                              │    │
│  │  └─ Chain linkage (previous_chunk_id)                   │    │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

## Threat Model

### Threat 1: Malicious Workload Evasion

**Description:** Attacker attempts to hide malicious activity from evidence collection.

**Attack Vectors:**
- Disable/bypass eBPF probes
- Use syscalls not monitored
- Operate from unmonitored namespaces

**Mitigations:**
- Collector runs with elevated privileges, not accessible to workloads
- Comprehensive probe coverage (syscalls + uprobes)
- Namespace filtering ensures coverage of target workloads
- Kernel-level capture cannot be bypassed from user space

**Residual Risk:** Novel syscalls or kernel exploits may evade monitoring.

---

### Threat 2: Evidence Tampering

**Description:** Attacker attempts to modify evidence after collection.

**Attack Vectors:**
- Modify NDJSON files on disk
- Delete evidence chunks
- Break chain linkage

**Mitigations:**
- DSSE signatures on each chunk (Fulcio ephemeral keys or KMS)
- Rekor transparency log provides tamper-evident timestamps
- Chain linkage (previous_chunk_id) detects deletions/insertions
- Verification CLI detects any modifications

**Residual Risk:** Attacker with Signer key access could forge valid signatures (mitigated by Fulcio/OIDC).

---

### Threat 3: Collector Compromise

**Description:** Attacker gains control of the collector process.

**Attack Vectors:**
- Exploit vulnerability in collector code
- Compromise host and access collector credentials
- Supply chain attack on collector binary

**Mitigations:**
- Minimal attack surface (single-purpose daemon)
- Capability-based privileges (not full root)
- Signed releases with provenance attestations
- Collector cannot modify already-signed chunks

**Residual Risk:** Zero-day in collector could allow evidence manipulation before signing.

---

### Threat 4: Denial of Service

**Description:** Attacker overwhelms evidence collection system.

**Attack Vectors:**
- Generate excessive events to overflow ring buffer
- Exhaust disk space with evidence
- CPU exhaustion through complex enrichment

**Mitigations:**
- Ring buffer backpressure (events dropped, not crash)
- Rate limiting configurable
- Disk space monitoring with rotation
- Bounded caches prevent memory exhaustion

**Residual Risk:** Sustained attack could cause evidence gaps (documented in chain).

---

### Threat 5: Privacy/Data Exfiltration

**Description:** Evidence contains sensitive information exposed to unauthorized parties.

**Attack Vectors:**
- File paths reveal sensitive locations
- Command arguments contain secrets
- Network destinations reveal infrastructure

**Mitigations:**
- Path filtering (denylist sensitive paths)
- Argument truncation and filtering
- Network CIDR filtering
- Evidence access controlled by filesystem permissions
- Encryption at rest (optional)

**Residual Risk:** Metadata leakage possible even with filtering.

---

### Threat 6: Replay/Injection Attacks

**Description:** Attacker injects fabricated evidence or replays old evidence.

**Attack Vectors:**
- Inject false events into evidence stream
- Replay signed chunks from different time period
- Forge DSSE envelopes

**Mitigations:**
- Ring buffer is kernel-only write
- Timestamps from kernel (monotonic, not settable by user space)
- Chain linkage prevents replay (previous_chunk_id)
- Rekor timestamps provide external time anchor
- DSSE signatures with certificate transparency

**Residual Risk:** Attacker with collector access could inject events before signing.

## Security Controls

### Kernel-Level Controls

| Control | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| eBPF Verifier | Validates program safety before loading |
| BTF | Type-safe kernel access without hardcoded offsets |
| Capability Checks | BPF_PROG_LOAD requires CAP_BPF |
| LSM Hooks | AppArmor/SELinux can restrict BPF operations |

### Collector Controls

| Control | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| Minimal Privileges | Only CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_SYS_PTRACE |
| Sandboxing | Systemd hardening (NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem) |
| Input Validation | Bounds checking on all kernel data |
| Secure Defaults | Signing enabled, Rekor submission enabled |

### Evidence Controls

| Control | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| DSSE Signing | Cryptographic integrity for each chunk |
| Chain Linking | Tamper-evident sequence |
| Rekor Inclusion | Public timestamp and immutability |
| Offline Verification | No trust in online services required |

## Hardening Recommendations

### Collector Hardening

```ini
# /etc/systemd/system/stellaops-signals.service.d/hardening.conf
[Service]
# Prevent privilege escalation
NoNewPrivileges=yes

# Protect system directories
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes

# Allow only necessary capabilities
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_BPF CAP_PERFMON CAP_SYS_PTRACE

# Restrict syscalls
SystemCallFilter=@system-service
SystemCallFilter=~@privileged

# Network isolation (if not needed)
PrivateNetwork=yes

# Read-only evidence directory (write via tmpfs)
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/stellaops/evidence
```

### Access Control

```bash
# Evidence directory permissions
chmod 750 /var/lib/stellaops/evidence
chown stellaops:stellaops-readers /var/lib/stellaops/evidence

# Configuration permissions
chmod 640 /etc/stellaops/signals.yaml
chown root:stellaops /etc/stellaops/signals.yaml
```

### Encryption at Rest

```yaml
# Enable encrypted evidence storage
signals:
  encryption:
    enabled: true
    key_id: arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789:key/abc-123
```

## Compliance Mapping

### SOC 2

| Control | Implementation |
|---------|----------------|
| CC6.1 Logical Access | Capability-based privileges |
| CC6.6 System Boundaries | Trust boundaries documented |
| CC7.2 System Monitoring | Comprehensive event capture |
| CC8.1 Change Management | Signed collector releases |

### NIST 800-53

| Control | Implementation |
|---------|----------------|
| AU-3 Content of Audit Records | Rich event schema |
| AU-9 Protection of Audit Information | DSSE signing, Rekor |
| AU-10 Non-repudiation | Chain linkage, transparency log |
| SI-4 System Monitoring | eBPF-based collection |

### PCI-DSS

| Requirement | Implementation |
|-------------|----------------|
| 10.2 Audit Trails | Syscall/uprobe logging |
| 10.5 Secure Audit Trails | Cryptographic signing |
| 10.7 Audit History | Configurable retention |

## Incident Response

### Evidence Integrity Alert

If chain verification fails:

1. **Isolate** affected evidence chunks
2. **Preserve** surrounding chunks and Rekor proofs
3. **Analyze** verification report for failure cause
4. **Report** gap in audit trail to compliance
5. **Investigate** root cause (crash, attack, bug)

### Collector Compromise

If collector compromise suspected:

1. **Stop** collector immediately
2. **Preserve** last signed chunk for forensics
3. **Rotate** signing keys if KMS-based
4. **Audit** Rekor for unexpected submissions
5. **Reinstall** collector from verified source
6. **Resume** collection with new chain

## Security Contacts

Report security issues to: security@stella.ops

PGP Key: [keys.stella.ops/security.asc](https://keys.stella.ops/security.asc)