stella-ops.org/git.stella-ops.org
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions 1 Releases Wiki Activity

Add Authority Advisory AI and API Lifecycle Configuration

Browse Source 
- Introduced AuthorityAdvisoryAiOptions and related classes for managing advisory AI configurations, including remote inference options and tenant-specific settings.
- Added AuthorityApiLifecycleOptions to control API lifecycle settings, including legacy OAuth endpoint configurations.
- Implemented validation and normalization methods for both advisory AI and API lifecycle options to ensure proper configuration.
- Created AuthorityNotificationsOptions and its related classes for managing notification settings, including ack tokens, webhooks, and escalation options.
- Developed IssuerDirectoryClient and related models for interacting with the issuer directory service, including caching mechanisms and HTTP client configurations.
- Added support for dependency injection through ServiceCollectionExtensions for the Issuer Directory Client.
- Updated project file to include necessary package references for the new Issuer Directory Client library.
This commit is contained in:
master
2025-11-02 13:40:38 +02:00
parent 66cb6c4b8a
commit f98cea3bcf
516 changed files with 68157 additions and 24754 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

247
docs/modules/attestor/workflows.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
# Attestor Verification Workflows
> How StellaOps turns DSSE bundles into verifiable evidence, how the verification API reports outcomes, and how explainability signals surface in UI/CLI flows.
> ⚠️ **2025-11-01 coordination note:** `StellaOps.Attestor.WebService` is failing to compile until downstream fixes land (`Contracts/AttestationBundleContracts.cs` null-coalescing update and scope/token variables restored in `Program.cs`). Verification flows ship in infrastructure/tests, but the WebService hand-off stays blocked — track via `ATTESTOR-73-002` (see Attestor task board).
## 1. Verification flow (API and service contract)
- **Entry point.** `POST /api/v1/rekor/verify` deserialises to `AttestorVerificationRequest`.
- **Resolution order.** The service tries `uuid`, then canonicalised `bundle`, then `artifactSha256`. At least one selector must be present (`invalid_query` otherwise).
- **Optional proof refresh.** `refreshProof=true` forces a Rekor lookup before returning. Proofs are cached in Mongo.
- **Signature replay.** Supplying `bundle` lets the service recompute the canonical hash and re-run signature checks; omitting the bundle skips those steps but still validates Merkle proofs and cached policy decisions.
- **Auth scopes.** Endpoints demand `attestor.verify` (write scope is also accepted); read-only detail/list APIs require `attestor.read` at minimum.
### 1.1 Request properties
| Field | Type | Required | Purpose |
|-------|------|----------|---------|
| `uuid` | string | optional | Rekor V2 UUID to verify and (optionally) refresh. |
| `bundle` | object | optional | DSSE envelope (same shape as submission) for signature re-verification. |
| `artifactSha256` | string | optional | Resolve the most recent entry for an attestable artefact digest. |
| `subject` | string | optional | Logical subject identifier used for cache/telemetry tagging; defaults to the stored artifact digest. |
| `envelopeId` | string | optional | Stable identifier for the DSSE bundle (typically the canonical hash); enables cache lookups. |
| `policyVersion` | string | optional | Policy digest/version driving verification; feeds cache keys and observability dimensions. |
| `refreshProof` | bool | optional (default `false`) | Pull the current inclusion proof and checkpoint from Rekor before evaluating. |
All selectors are mutually compatible; if more than one is set the service uses the first match (`uuid` → `bundle` → `artifactSha256`).
### 1.2 Response schema (`AttestorVerificationResult`)
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `ok` | bool | `true` when the entry status is `included` **and** no issues were recorded. |
| `uuid` | string | Rekor UUID that satisfied the query. Useful for follow-up fetches. |
| `index` | number (int64) | Rekor log index, when supplied by the backend. |
| `logUrl` | string | Fully-qualified Rekor entry URL for operators and auditors. |
| `status` | string | Transparency-log status seen in Mongo (`included`, `pending`, `failed`, …). |
| `checkedAt` | string (ISO-8601 UTC) | Timestamp emitted when the response is created. |
| `issues` | array[string] | Machine-readable explainability codes. Empty when `ok=true`. |
> **Note:** `checkedAt` is recomputed each call; cache hits do not recycle previous timestamps.
### 1.3 Success criteria
`ok=true` requires:
1. Entry exists and status equals `included`.
2. Canonical DSSE hash matches the stored bundle hash.
3. Signature re-verification (when a bundle is supplied) succeeds.
4. Inclusion proof validates against the cached or refreshed checkpoint.
Any deviation records at least one issue and flips `ok` to `false`. Consumers **must** inspect `issues` rather than inferring from `status` alone.
## 2. Verification report schema
`AttestorVerificationResult` carries the flattened summary shown above. When callers request the detailed report (`GET /api/v1/rekor/entries/{uuid}?refresh=true` or via SDK) they receive a `VerificationReport` shaped as follows:
```json
{
"overallStatus": "pass",
"succeeded": true,
"policy": { ... },
"issuer": { ... },
"freshness": { ... },
"signatures": { ... },
"transparency": { ... },
"issues": [ "bundle_hash_mismatch" ]
}
```
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `overallStatus` | string (`pass`, `warn`, `fail`, `skipped`) | Aggregated verdict derived from the individual section statuses. |
| `succeeded` | bool | Convenience flag; `true` when `overallStatus ∈ {pass, warn}`. |
| `policy` | object | Results from policy evaluation (see below). |
| `issuer` | object | Identity/result of the signing entity. |
| `freshness` | object | Age analysis relative to policy settings. |
| `signatures` | object | Signature validation summary. |
| `transparency` | object | Inclusion proof / checkpoint evaluation summary. |
| `issues` | array[string] | De-duplicated set drawn from the sections; order is deterministic and stable. |
### 2.1 `policy`
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `status` | Section verdict (`pass`, `warn`, `fail`, `skipped`). |
| `policyId` / `policyVersion` | DSL identifier and revision used for evaluation. |
| `verdict` | Policy outcome (`allow`, `challenge`, `deny`, etc.). |
| `issues` | Policy-specific explainability codes (e.g., `policy_rule_blocked`). |
| `attributes` | Key/value map emitted by the policy for downstream observability (e.g., applicable rules, matched waivers). |
### 2.2 `issuer`
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `status` | Result of issuer validation. |
| `mode` | Signing mode detected (`keyless`, `kms`, `unknown`). |
| `issuer` | Distinguished name / issuer URI recorded during signing. |
| `subjectAlternativeName` | SAN pulled from the Fulcio certificate (keyless) or recorded KMS identity. |
| `keyId` | Logical key identifier associated with the signature. |
| `issues` | Issuer-specific issues (e.g., `issuer_trust_root_mismatch`, `signer_mode_unsupported:kid`). |
### 2.3 `freshness`
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `status` | `fail` when the attestation exceeds `verification.freshnessMaxAgeMinutes`; `warn` when only the warning threshold is hit. |
| `createdAt` | Timestamp embedded in the attestation metadata. |
| `evaluatedAt` | Server-side timestamp used for age calculations. |
| `age` | ISO8601 duration of `evaluatedAt - createdAt`. |
| `maxAge` | Policy-driven ceiling (null when unchecked). |
| `issues` | `freshness_max_age_exceeded`, `freshness_warning`, etc. |
### 2.4 `signatures`
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `status` | Signature validation verdict. |
| `bundleProvided` | `true` when canonical DSSE bytes were supplied. |
| `totalSignatures` | Count observed in the DSSE envelope. |
| `verifiedSignatures` | Number of signatures that validated against trusted keys. |
| `requiredSignatures` | Policy / configuration minimum enforced. |
| `issues` | Signature codes such as `bundle_payload_invalid_base64`, `signature_invalid`, `signer_mode_unknown`. |
### 2.5 `transparency`
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `status` | Inclusion proof / checkpoint verdict. |
| `proofPresent` | Whether a proof document was available. |
| `checkpointPresent` | Indicates the Rekor checkpoint existed and parsed. |
| `inclusionPathPresent` | `true` when the Merkle path array contained nodes. |
| `issues` | Merkle/rekor codes (`proof_missing`, `proof_leafhash_mismatch`, `checkpoint_missing`, `proof_root_mismatch`). |
### 2.6 Issue catalogue (non-exhaustive)
| Code | Trigger | Notes |
|------|---------|-------|
| `bundle_hash_mismatch` | Canonical DSSE hash differs from stored value. | Often indicates tampering or inconsistent canonicalisation. |
| `bundle_payload_invalid_base64` | DSSE payload cannot be base64-decoded. | Validate producer pipeline; the attestation is unusable. |
| `signature_invalid` | At least one signature failed cryptographic verification. | Consider checking key rotation / revocation status. |
| `signer_mode_unknown` / `signer_mode_unsupported:<mode>` | Signing mode not configured for this installation. | Update `attestorOptions.security.signerIdentity.mode`. |
| `issuer_trust_root_mismatch` | Certificate chain does not terminate in configured Fulcio/KMS roots. | Check Fulcio bundle / KMS configuration. |
| `freshness_max_age_exceeded` | Attestation older than permitted maximum. | Regenerate attestation or extend policy window. |
| `proof_missing` | No inclusion proof stored or supplied. | When running offline, import bundles with proofs or allow warn-level policies. |
| `proof_root_mismatch` | Rebuilt Merkle root differs from checkpoint. | Proof may be stale or log compromised; escalate. |
| `checkpoint_missing` | No Rekor checkpoint available. | Configure `RequireCheckpoint=false` to downgrade severity. |
Downstream consumers (UI, CLI, policy studio) should render human-readable messages but must retain the exact issue codes for automation and audit replay.
## 3. Explainability signals
1. **Canonicalisation.** The service replays DSSE canonicalisation to derive `bundleSha256`. Failures surface as `bundle_hash_mismatch` or decoding errors.
2. **Signature checks.** Mode-aware handling:
- `kms` (HMAC) compares against configured shared secrets.
- `keyless` rebuilds the certificate chain, enforces Fulcio roots, SAN allow-lists, and verifies with the leaf certificate.
- Unknown modes emit `signer_mode_unknown` / `signer_mode_unsupported:<mode>`.
3. **Proof acquisition.** When `refreshProof` is requested the Rekor backend may contribute a textual issue (`Proof refresh failed: …`) without stopping evaluation.
4. **Merkle validation.** Structured helper ensures leaf hash, path orientation, and checkpoint root are consistent; each validation failure has a discrete issue code.
5. **Observability.** The meter `attestor.verify_total` increments with `result=ok|failed`; structured logs and traces carry the same `issues` vector for UI/CLI drill-down.
All issues are appended in detection order to simplify chronological replay in the Console’s chain-of-custody view.
## 3. Issue catalogue
| Code | Trigger | Operator guidance |
|------|---------|-------------------|
| `bundle_hash_mismatch` | Canonicalised DSSE hash differs from stored bundle hash. | Re-download artefact; investigate tampering or submission races. |
| `bundle_payload_invalid_base64` | Payload could not be base64-decoded. | Ensure bundle transport preserved payload; capture original DSSE for forensics. |
| `signature_invalid_kms` | HMAC verification failed for `mode=kms`. | Confirm shared secret alignment with Signer; rotate keys if drift detected. |
| `signer_mode_unknown` | Entry lacks signer mode metadata and bundle omitted it. | Re-ingest bundle or inspect submission pipeline metadata. |
| `signer_mode_unsupported:<mode>` | Signer mode is unsupported by the verifier. | Add support or block unsupported issuers in policy. |
| `kms_key_missing` | No configured KMS secrets to verify `mode=kms`. | Populate `security:signerIdentity:kmsKeys` in Attestor config before retry. |
| `signature_invalid_base64` | One or more signatures were not valid base64. | Bundle corruption; capture raw payload and re-submit. |
| `certificate_chain_missing` | `mode=keyless` bundle lacked any certificates. | Ensure Signer attaches Fulcio chain; review submission pipeline. |
| `certificate_chain_invalid` | Certificates could not be parsed. | Fetch original DSSE bundle for repair; confirm certificate encoding. |
| `certificate_chain_untrusted[:detail]` | Chain failed custom-root validation. | Import correct Fulcio roots or investigate potential impersonation. |
| `certificate_san_untrusted` | Leaf SAN not in configured allow-list. | Update allow-list or revoke offending issuer. |
| `signature_invalid` | No signature validated with supplied public keys. | Treat as tampering; trigger incident response. |
| `proof_missing` | No Merkle proof stored for the entry. | Re-run with `refreshProof=true`; check Rekor availability. |
| `bundle_hash_decode_failed` | Stored bundle hash could not be decoded. | Verify Mongo record integrity; re-enqueue submission if necessary. |
| `proof_inclusion_missing` | Inclusion section absent from proof. | Retry proof refresh; inspect Rekor health. |
| `proof_leafhash_decode_failed` | Leaf hash malformed. | Replay submission; inspect Rekor data corruption. |
| `proof_leafhash_mismatch` | Leaf hash differs from canonical bundle hash. | Raises tamper alert; reconcile Rekor entry vs stored bundle. |
| `proof_path_decode_failed` | Inclusion path entry malformed. | Same action as above; likely Rekor data corruption. |
| `proof_path_orientation_missing` | Inclusion path lacks left/right marker. | File Rekor bug; fallback to mirror log if configured. |
| `checkpoint_missing` | Proof lacks checkpoint metadata. | Retry refresh; ensure Rekor is configured to return checkpoints. |
| `checkpoint_root_decode_failed` | Checkpoint root hash malformed. | Investigate Rekor/mirror integrity before trusting log. |
| `proof_root_mismatch` | Computed root hash != checkpoint root. | Critical alert; assume inclusion proof compromised. |
| `Proof refresh failed: …` | Rekor fetch threw an exception. | Message includes upstream error; surface alongside telemetry for debugging. |
Future explainability flags must follow the same pattern: short, lowercase codes with optional suffix payload (`code:detail`).
## 4. Worked examples
### 4.1 Successful verification
```json
{
"ok": true,
"uuid": "0192fdb4-a82b-7f90-b894-6fd1dd918b85",
"index": 73421,
"logUrl": "https://rekor.stellaops.test/api/v2/log/entries/0192fdb4a82b7f90b8946fd1dd918b85",
"status": "included",
"checkedAt": "2025-11-01T17:06:52.182394Z",
"issues": []
}
```
This mirrors the happy-path asserted in `AttestorVerificationServiceTests.VerifyAsync_ReturnsOk_ForExistingUuid`, which replays the entire submission→verification loop.
### 4.2 Tampered bundle
```json
{
"ok": false,
"uuid": "0192fdb4-a82b-7f90-b894-6fd1dd918b85",
"index": 73421,
"logUrl": "https://rekor.stellaops.test/api/v2/log/entries/0192fdb4a82b7f90b8946fd1dd918b85",
"status": "included",
"checkedAt": "2025-11-01T17:09:05.443218Z",
"issues": [
"bundle_hash_mismatch",
"signature_invalid"
]
}
```
Derived from `AttestorVerificationServiceTests.VerifyAsync_FlagsTamperedBundle`, which flips the DSSE payload and expects both issues to surface. CLI and Console consumers should display these codes verbatim and provide remediation tips from the table above.
## 5. Validating the documentation
- Run `dotnet test src/Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor/StellaOps.Attestor.Tests` to exercise the scenarios behind the examples.
- API integrators can `curl` the verify endpoint and compare responses with the JSON above.
- UI/CLI teams should ensure explainability tooltips and runbooks reference the same issue catalogue.
Keeping the documentation aligned with the test suite guarantees explainability remains deterministic and audit-friendly.
## 6. Offline bundles & air-gapped verification
Stella Ops Attestor now supports packaging attestations for sealed environments and rehydrating them without calling Rekor:
- **Export bundles.** `POST /api/v1/attestations:export` accepts either a list of Rekor UUIDs or filter criteria (`subject`, `type`, `issuer`, `scope`, `createdAfter|Before`, `limit`, `continuationToken`) and returns an `attestor.bundle.v1` document. Each item contains the attestation entry, canonical DSSE payload (base64), optional proof payload, and metadata. Responses include a `continuationToken` so callers can page through large result sets (limits default to 100 and are capped at 200). JSON content is required and requests are gated by the `attestor.read` scope.
- **Import bundles.** `POST /api/v1/attestations:import` ingests the bundle document, upserts attestation metadata, and restores the canonical DSSE/proof into the configured archive store. The S3 archive integration must be enabled; the response reports how many entries were imported versus updated, any skipped items, and issue codes (`bundle_payload_invalid_base64`, `bundle_hash_mismatch`, `archive_disabled`, …).
- **Offline verification.** When replaying verification without log connectivity, submit the DSSE bundle and set `offline=true` on `POST /api/v1/rekor/verify`. The service reuses imported proofs when present and surfaces deterministic explainability codes (`proof_missing`, `proof_inclusion_missing`, …) instead of attempting Rekor fetches.
Tests `AttestorBundleServiceTests.ExportAsync_AppliesFiltersAndContinuation`, `AttestationBundleEndpointsTests`, `AttestorVerificationServiceTests.VerifyAsync_OfflineSkipsProofRefreshWhenMissing`, and `AttestorVerificationServiceTests.VerifyAsync_OfflineUsesImportedProof` exercise the exporter/importer, API contracts, and the offline verification path with and without witness data.