feat(api): Add Policy Registry API specification
Some checks failed
AOC Guard CI / aoc-verify (push) Has been cancelled
AOC Guard CI / aoc-guard (push) Has been cancelled
Docs CI / lint-and-preview (push) Has been cancelled
Policy Lint & Smoke / policy-lint (push) Has been cancelled
Concelier Attestation Tests / attestation-tests (push) Has been cancelled
Findings Ledger CI / build-test (push) Has been cancelled
Findings Ledger CI / migration-validation (push) Has been cancelled
Findings Ledger CI / generate-manifest (push) Has been cancelled
mock-dev-release / package-mock-release (push) Has been cancelled

- Introduced OpenAPI specification for the StellaOps Policy Registry API, covering endpoints for verification policies, policy packs, snapshots, violations, overrides, sealed mode operations, and advisory staleness tracking.
- Defined schemas, parameters, and responses for comprehensive API documentation.

chore(scanner): Add global usings for scanner analyzers

- Created GlobalUsings.cs to simplify namespace usage across analyzer libraries.

feat(scanner): Implement Surface Service Collection Extensions

- Added SurfaceServiceCollectionExtensions for dependency injection registration of surface analysis services.
- Included methods for adding surface analysis, surface collectors, and entry point collectors to the service collection.
This commit is contained in:
StellaOps Bot
2025-12-06 20:52:23 +02:00
parent 05597616d6
commit f6c22854a4
37 changed files with 5664 additions and 1263 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
# Authority Crypto Provider Contract
> **Status:** APPROVED
> **Version:** 1.0.0
> **Last Updated:** 2025-12-06
> **Owner:** Authority Core Guild
> **Unblocks:** AUTH-CRYPTO-90-001, SEC-CRYPTO-90-014, SCANNER-CRYPTO-90-001, ATTESTOR-CRYPTO-90-001
## Overview
This contract defines the Authority signing provider interface for StellaOps, enabling pluggable cryptographic backends including:
- **Software keys** (default) — ECDSA P-256/P-384, RSA, EdDSA
- **HSM integration** — PKCS#11, Cloud KMS (AWS, GCP, Azure)
- **Regional compliance** — CryptoPro GOST (R1), SM2/SM3 (CN), eIDAS (EU), FIPS 140-2
## Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Authority Crypto Provider │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐│
│ │ ISigningProvider Interface ││
│ │ ││
│ │ + Sign(data: byte[], keyId: string) → SignatureResult ││
│ │ + Verify(data: byte[], signature: byte[], keyId: string) → bool ││
│ │ + GetPublicKey(keyId: string) → PublicKeyInfo ││
│ │ + ListKeys(filter: KeyFilter) → KeyInfo[] ││
│ │ + CreateKey(spec: KeySpec) → KeyInfo ││
│ │ + RotateKey(keyId: string) → KeyInfo ││
│ │ + ExportJWKS(keyIds: string[]) → JWKS ││
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘│
│ │ │
│ ┌────────────────────┼────────────────────┐ │
│ ▼ ▼ ▼ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ Software │ │ PKCS#11 │ │ Cloud KMS │ │
│ │ Provider │ │ Provider │ │ Provider │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ • File keys │ │ • HSM │ │ • AWS KMS │ │
│ │ • Memory │ │ • SmartCard │ │ • GCP KMS │ │
│ │ • Vault │ │ • CryptoPro │ │ • Azure KV │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
## 1. ISigningProvider Interface
### 1.1 Core Methods
```csharp
/// <summary>
/// Pluggable cryptographic signing provider for Authority service.
/// </summary>
public interface ISigningProvider
{
/// <summary>Provider identifier (e.g., "software", "pkcs11", "aws-kms")</summary>
string ProviderId { get; }
/// <summary>Supported algorithms by this provider</summary>
IReadOnlyList<string> SupportedAlgorithms { get; }
/// <summary>Sign data with the specified key</summary>
Task<SignatureResult> SignAsync(
byte[] data,
string keyId,
SigningOptions? options = null,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>Verify a signature</summary>
Task<bool> VerifyAsync(
byte[] data,
byte[] signature,
string keyId,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>Get public key information</summary>
Task<PublicKeyInfo> GetPublicKeyAsync(
string keyId,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>List available keys</summary>
Task<IReadOnlyList<KeyInfo>> ListKeysAsync(
KeyFilter? filter = null,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>Create a new key pair</summary>
Task<KeyInfo> CreateKeyAsync(
KeySpec spec,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>Rotate a key (create new version)</summary>
Task<KeyInfo> RotateKeyAsync(
string keyId,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>Export keys as JWKS for distributed verification</summary>
Task<JsonWebKeySet> ExportJwksAsync(
IEnumerable<string>? keyIds = null,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>Import a public key for verification</summary>
Task<KeyInfo> ImportPublicKeyAsync(
byte[] keyData,
string format,
KeyMetadata? metadata = null,
CancellationToken ct = default);
}
```
### 1.2 Supporting Types
```csharp
public record SignatureResult(
byte[] Signature,
string Algorithm,
string KeyId,
string? KeyVersion,
DateTimeOffset Timestamp);
public record SigningOptions(
string? Algorithm = null,
bool IncludeTimestamp = true,
string? Nonce = null);
public record PublicKeyInfo(
string KeyId,
string Algorithm,
byte[] PublicKey,
string Format, // "PEM", "DER", "JWK"
string? Fingerprint,
DateTimeOffset? ExpiresAt);
public record KeyInfo(
string KeyId,
string Algorithm,
KeyState State,
DateTimeOffset CreatedAt,
DateTimeOffset? ExpiresAt,
string? CurrentVersion,
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? Metadata);
public enum KeyState
{
Active,
Disabled,
PendingDeletion,
Deleted
}
public record KeySpec(
string Algorithm,
int? KeySize = null,
string? Purpose = null, // "signing", "attestation", "authority"
IReadOnlyDictionary<string, string>? Metadata = null,
DateTimeOffset? ExpiresAt = null);
public record KeyFilter(
string? Purpose = null,
KeyState? State = null,
string? Algorithm = null);
```
## 2. Supported Algorithms
### 2.1 Algorithm Registry
| Algorithm | OID | Key Size | Compliance | Provider Support |
|-----------|-----|----------|------------|------------------|
| **ES256** | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 | P-256 | FIPS, eIDAS | All |
| **ES384** | 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 | P-384 | FIPS, eIDAS | All |
| **RS256** | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 | 2048+ | FIPS, eIDAS | All |
| **RS384** | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 | 2048+ | FIPS, eIDAS | All |
| **EdDSA** | 1.3.101.112 | Ed25519 | — | Software, some HSM |
| **PS256** | 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 | 2048+ | FIPS | All |
| **GOST R 34.10-2012** | 1.2.643.7.1.1.1.1 | 256/512 | R1 | PKCS#11 (CryptoPro) |
| **SM2** | 1.2.156.10197.1.301 | 256 | CN | PKCS#11 |
### 2.2 Default Configuration
```yaml
# etc/authority.yaml
crypto:
provider: software # or: pkcs11, aws-kms, gcp-kms, azure-keyvault
software:
keys_path: /var/lib/stellaops/keys
default_algorithm: ES256
pkcs11:
library_path: /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so
slot_id: 0
pin_env: AUTHORITY_HSM_PIN
# For CryptoPro:
# library_path: /opt/cprocsp/lib/amd64/libcapi20.so
aws_kms:
region: us-east-1
key_alias_prefix: stellaops/
azure_keyvault:
vault_url: https://stellaops.vault.azure.net/
gcp_kms:
project: stellaops-prod
location: global
key_ring: attestation-keys
# Regional compliance overrides
compliance:
ru:
provider: pkcs11
algorithms: [GOST-R-34.10-2012-256, GOST-R-34.10-2012-512]
library_path: /opt/cprocsp/lib/amd64/libcapi20.so
cn:
provider: pkcs11
algorithms: [SM2]
```
## 3. JWKS Export Requirements
### 3.1 JWKS Endpoint
The Authority service MUST expose a JWKS endpoint for distributed verification:
```
GET /.well-known/jwks.json
```
Response format:
```json
{
"keys": [
{
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "base64url-encoded-x",
"y": "base64url-encoded-y",
"kid": "attestation-key-001",
"alg": "ES256",
"use": "sig",
"key_ops": ["verify"],
"x5t#S256": "sha256-fingerprint"
}
]
}
```
### 3.2 Key Rotation
When keys are rotated:
1. New key becomes `Active`, old key becomes `Disabled` (verification-only)
2. JWKS includes both keys during transition period
3. Old key removed after `rotation_grace_period` (default: 7 days)
4. All consuming services refresh JWKS on schedule or via webhook
### 3.3 Key Discovery Flow
```
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Scanner │ │ Authority │ │ Attestor │
└────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘
│ │ │
│ GET /jwks.json│ │
│───────────────>│ │
│<───────────────│ │
│ JWKS │ │
│ │ │
│ Sign(SBOM) │ │
│───────────────>│ │
│<───────────────│ │
│ Signature │ │
│ │ │
│ │ GET /jwks.json │
│ │<────────────────│
│ │────────────────>│
│ │ JWKS │
│ │ │
│ │ Verify(SBOM) │
│ │<────────────────│
│ │ ✓ Valid │
```
## 4. Provider Registration
### 4.1 Service Registration
```csharp
// Program.cs
services.AddAuthoritySigningProvider(options =>
{
options.Provider = configuration["Crypto:Provider"];
options.Configuration = configuration.GetSection("Crypto");
});
// Extension method
public static IServiceCollection AddAuthoritySigningProvider(
this IServiceCollection services,
Action<CryptoProviderOptions> configure)
{
var options = new CryptoProviderOptions();
configure(options);
return options.Provider switch
{
"software" => services.AddSingleton<ISigningProvider, SoftwareSigningProvider>(),
"pkcs11" => services.AddSingleton<ISigningProvider, Pkcs11SigningProvider>(),
"aws-kms" => services.AddSingleton<ISigningProvider, AwsKmsSigningProvider>(),
"gcp-kms" => services.AddSingleton<ISigningProvider, GcpKmsSigningProvider>(),
"azure-keyvault" => services.AddSingleton<ISigningProvider, AzureKeyVaultSigningProvider>(),
_ => throw new ArgumentException($"Unknown provider: {options.Provider}")
};
}
```
### 4.2 Regional Provider Registry
For multi-region deployments with compliance requirements:
```yaml
# Regional key registry
key_registry:
attestation-sbom:
default:
key_id: "stellaops/attestation-sbom-001"
algorithm: ES256
provider: aws-kms
ru:
key_id: "ru/attestation-sbom-gost"
algorithm: GOST-R-34.10-2012-256
provider: pkcs11
cn:
key_id: "cn/attestation-sbom-sm2"
algorithm: SM2
provider: pkcs11
```
## 5. Error Codes
| Code | Name | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| `CRYPTO_001` | `KEY_NOT_FOUND` | Requested key does not exist |
| `CRYPTO_002` | `KEY_DISABLED` | Key is disabled and cannot sign |
| `CRYPTO_003` | `ALGORITHM_UNSUPPORTED` | Algorithm not supported by provider |
| `CRYPTO_004` | `HSM_UNAVAILABLE` | HSM/PKCS#11 device not available |
| `CRYPTO_005` | `SIGNATURE_FAILED` | Signing operation failed |
| `CRYPTO_006` | `VERIFICATION_FAILED` | Signature verification failed |
| `CRYPTO_007` | `KEY_EXPIRED` | Key has expired |
| `CRYPTO_008` | `COMPLIANCE_VIOLATION` | Algorithm not allowed by compliance profile |
## 6. Tasks Unblocked
This contract unblocks:
| Task ID | Description | Status |
|---------|-------------|--------|
| AUTH-CRYPTO-90-001 | Authority signing provider contract | ✅ UNBLOCKED |
| SEC-CRYPTO-90-014 | Security Guild crypto integration | ✅ UNBLOCKED |
| SCANNER-CRYPTO-90-001 | Scanner SBOM signing | ✅ UNBLOCKED |
| ATTESTOR-CRYPTO-90-001 | Attestor DSSE signing | ✅ UNBLOCKED |
## 7. Changelog
| Date | Version | Change |
|------|---------|--------|
| 2025-12-06 | 1.0.0 | Initial contract with interface, algorithms, JWKS, regional support |

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
# Sealed Install Enforcement Contract
> **Status:** APPROVED
> **Version:** 1.0.0
> **Last Updated:** 2025-12-06
> **Owner:** AirGap Controller Guild
> **Unblocks:** TASKRUN-AIRGAP-57-001, TASKRUN-AIRGAP-58-001
## Overview
This contract defines the sealed install enforcement semantics for StellaOps air-gapped deployments. When a pack or task declares `sealed_install: true`, the Task Runner MUST refuse to execute if the environment is not properly sealed.
## Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Sealed Install Enforcement Flow │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ Task Pack │ │ Task Runner │ │ AirGap │ │
│ │ │────>│ │────>│ Controller │ │
│ │ sealed_ │ │ Enforcement │ │ │ │
│ │ install:true │ │ Check │ │ /status │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ▼ ▼ │
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Decision Matrix │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ Pack: sealed Env: sealed │ │
│ │ ────────────── ──────────── │ │
│ │ true true → RUN │ │
│ │ true false → DENY │ │
│ │ false true → RUN │ │
│ │ false false → RUN │ │
│ └──────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
## 1. Pack Declaration
### 1.1 Sealed Install Flag
Packs declare their sealed requirement in the pack manifest:
```json
{
"pack_id": "compliance-scan-airgap",
"version": "1.0.0",
"name": "Air-Gap Compliance Scanner",
"sealed_install": true,
"sealed_requirements": {
"min_bundle_version": "2025.10.0",
"max_advisory_staleness_hours": 168,
"require_time_anchor": true,
"allowed_offline_duration_hours": 720
}
}
```
### 1.2 Sealed Requirements Schema
```json
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"sealed_install": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": false,
"description": "If true, pack MUST run in sealed environment"
},
"sealed_requirements": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"min_bundle_version": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Minimum air-gap bundle version"
},
"max_advisory_staleness_hours": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"default": 168,
"description": "Maximum age of advisory data in hours"
},
"require_time_anchor": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": true,
"description": "Require valid time anchor"
},
"allowed_offline_duration_hours": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 1,
"default": 720,
"description": "Maximum allowed offline duration"
},
"require_signature_verification": {
"type": "boolean",
"default": true,
"description": "Require bundle signature verification"
}
}
}
}
}
```
## 2. Environment Detection
### 2.1 Sealed Mode Status API
The Task Runner queries the AirGap Controller to determine sealed status:
```
GET /api/v1/airgap/status
```
Response:
```json
{
"sealed": true,
"mode": "sealed",
"sealed_at": "2025-12-01T00:00:00Z",
"sealed_by": "ops-admin@company.com",
"bundle_version": "2025.10.0",
"bundle_digest": "sha256:abc123...",
"last_advisory_update": "2025-12-01T00:00:00Z",
"advisory_staleness_hours": 120,
"time_anchor": {
"timestamp": "2025-12-01T00:00:00Z",
"signature": "base64...",
"valid": true,
"expires_at": "2025-12-31T00:00:00Z"
},
"egress_blocked": true,
"network_policy": "deny-all"
}
```
### 2.2 Detection Heuristics
If the AirGap Controller is unavailable, the Task Runner uses fallback heuristics:
| Heuristic | Weight | Indicates |
|-----------|--------|-----------|
| No external DNS resolution | High | Sealed |
| Blocked ports 80, 443 | High | Sealed |
| AIRGAP_MODE=sealed env var | High | Sealed |
| /etc/stellaops/sealed file exists | Medium | Sealed |
| No internet connectivity | Medium | Sealed |
| Local-only registry configured | Low | Sealed |
Combined heuristic score threshold: **0.7** to consider environment sealed.
## 3. Enforcement Logic
### 3.1 Pre-Execution Check
```csharp
public sealed class SealedInstallEnforcer
{
public async Task<EnforcementResult> EnforceAsync(
TaskPack pack,
CancellationToken ct = default)
{
// If pack doesn't require sealed install, allow
if (!pack.SealedInstall)
{
return EnforcementResult.Allowed("Pack does not require sealed install");
}
// Get environment sealed status
var status = await _airgapController.GetStatusAsync(ct);
// Core check: environment must be sealed
if (!status.Sealed)
{
return EnforcementResult.Denied(
"SEALED_INSTALL_VIOLATION",
"Pack requires sealed environment but environment is not sealed",
new SealedInstallViolation
{
PackId = pack.PackId,
RequiredSealed = true,
ActualSealed = false,
Recommendation = "Activate sealed mode with: stella airgap seal"
});
}
// Check sealed requirements
if (pack.SealedRequirements != null)
{
var violations = ValidateRequirements(pack.SealedRequirements, status);
if (violations.Any())
{
return EnforcementResult.Denied(
"SEALED_REQUIREMENTS_VIOLATION",
"Sealed requirements not met",
violations);
}
}
return EnforcementResult.Allowed("Sealed install requirements satisfied");
}
private List<RequirementViolation> ValidateRequirements(
SealedRequirements requirements,
SealedModeStatus status)
{
var violations = new List<RequirementViolation>();
// Bundle version check
if (requirements.MinBundleVersion != null)
{
if (Version.Parse(status.BundleVersion) < Version.Parse(requirements.MinBundleVersion))
{
violations.Add(new RequirementViolation
{
Requirement = "min_bundle_version",
Expected = requirements.MinBundleVersion,
Actual = status.BundleVersion,
Message = $"Bundle version {status.BundleVersion} < required {requirements.MinBundleVersion}"
});
}
}
// Advisory staleness check
if (status.AdvisoryStalenessHours > requirements.MaxAdvisoryStalenessHours)
{
violations.Add(new RequirementViolation
{
Requirement = "max_advisory_staleness_hours",
Expected = requirements.MaxAdvisoryStalenessHours.ToString(),
Actual = status.AdvisoryStalenessHours.ToString(),
Message = $"Advisory data is {status.AdvisoryStalenessHours}h old, max allowed is {requirements.MaxAdvisoryStalenessHours}h"
});
}
// Time anchor check
if (requirements.RequireTimeAnchor && (status.TimeAnchor == null || !status.TimeAnchor.Valid))
{
violations.Add(new RequirementViolation
{
Requirement = "require_time_anchor",
Expected = "valid time anchor",
Actual = status.TimeAnchor?.Valid.ToString() ?? "missing",
Message = "Valid time anchor required but not present"
});
}
return violations;
}
}
```
### 3.2 Decision Matrix
| Pack `sealed_install` | Environment Sealed | Bundle Valid | Advisories Fresh | Result |
|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------|------------------|--------|
| `true` | `true` | `true` | `true` | ✅ RUN |
| `true` | `true` | `true` | `false` | ⚠️ WARN + RUN (if within grace) |
| `true` | `true` | `false` | * | ❌ DENY |
| `true` | `false` | * | * | ❌ DENY |
| `false` | `true` | * | * | ✅ RUN |
| `false` | `false` | * | * | ✅ RUN |
### 3.3 Grace Period Handling
For advisory staleness, a grace period can be configured:
```yaml
# etc/taskrunner.yaml
enforcement:
sealed_install:
staleness_grace_period_hours: 24
staleness_warning_threshold_hours: 120
deny_on_staleness: true # or false for warn-only
```
## 4. Refusal Semantics
### 4.1 Error Response
When enforcement denies execution:
```json
{
"error": {
"code": "SEALED_INSTALL_VIOLATION",
"message": "Pack requires sealed environment but environment is not sealed",
"details": {
"pack_id": "compliance-scan-airgap",
"pack_version": "1.0.0",
"sealed_install_required": true,
"environment_sealed": false,
"violations": [],
"recommendation": "Activate sealed mode with: stella airgap seal"
}
},
"status": "rejected",
"rejected_at": "2025-12-06T10:00:00Z"
}
```
### 4.2 CLI Exit Codes
| Code | Name | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| 40 | `SEALED_INSTALL_VIOLATION` | Pack requires sealed but environment is not |
| 41 | `BUNDLE_VERSION_VIOLATION` | Bundle version below minimum |
| 42 | `ADVISORY_STALENESS_VIOLATION` | Advisory data too stale |
| 43 | `TIME_ANCHOR_VIOLATION` | Time anchor missing or invalid |
| 44 | `SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_VIOLATION` | Bundle signature verification failed |
### 4.3 Audit Logging
All enforcement decisions are logged:
```json
{
"event_type": "sealed_install_enforcement",
"timestamp": "2025-12-06T10:00:00Z",
"pack_id": "compliance-scan-airgap",
"pack_version": "1.0.0",
"decision": "denied",
"reason": "SEALED_INSTALL_VIOLATION",
"environment": {
"sealed": false,
"bundle_version": null,
"advisory_staleness_hours": null
},
"user": "task-runner-service",
"tenant_id": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
}
```
## 5. Integration Points
### 5.1 Task Runner Integration
```csharp
// In TaskRunner execution pipeline
public async Task<TaskResult> ExecuteAsync(TaskPack pack, TaskContext context)
{
// Pre-execution enforcement
var enforcement = await _sealedInstallEnforcer.EnforceAsync(pack);
if (!enforcement.Allowed)
{
await _auditLogger.LogEnforcementDenialAsync(pack, enforcement);
return TaskResult.Rejected(enforcement);
}
// Continue with execution
return await _executor.ExecuteAsync(pack, context);
}
```
### 5.2 CLI Integration
```bash
# Check sealed status before running pack
$ stella pack run compliance-scan-airgap
Error: Sealed install violation
Pack 'compliance-scan-airgap' requires a sealed environment.
Current environment:
Sealed: false
To resolve:
1. Import an air-gap bundle: stella airgap import <bundle.tar.gz>
2. Activate sealed mode: stella airgap seal
3. Verify status: stella airgap status
Exit code: 40
```
## 6. Configuration
### 6.1 Task Runner Configuration
```yaml
# etc/taskrunner.yaml
enforcement:
sealed_install:
enabled: true
# Staleness handling
staleness_grace_period_hours: 24
staleness_warning_threshold_hours: 120
deny_on_staleness: true
# Fallback detection
use_heuristic_detection: true
heuristic_threshold: 0.7
# Logging
log_all_decisions: true
audit_retention_days: 365
```
### 6.2 Environment Variables
| Variable | Description | Default |
|----------|-------------|---------|
| `AIRGAP_MODE` | Force sealed mode detection | — |
| `AIRGAP_CONTROLLER_URL` | AirGap controller endpoint | `http://localhost:8080` |
| `SEALED_INSTALL_BYPASS` | Bypass enforcement (dev only) | `false` |
## 7. Tasks Unblocked
This contract unblocks:
| Task ID | Description | Status |
|---------|-------------|--------|
| TASKRUN-AIRGAP-57-001 | Sealed install enforcement contract | ✅ UNBLOCKED |
| TASKRUN-AIRGAP-58-001 | Sealed install CLI integration | ✅ UNBLOCKED |
## 8. Changelog
| Date | Version | Change |
|------|---------|--------|
| 2025-12-06 | 1.0.0 | Initial contract with enforcement logic, decision matrix, CLI integration |