feat: Add DigestUpsertRequest and LockEntity models
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- Introduced DigestUpsertRequest for handling digest upsert requests with properties like ChannelId, Recipient, DigestKey, Events, and CollectUntil. - Created LockEntity to represent a lightweight distributed lock entry with properties such as Id, TenantId, Resource, Owner, ExpiresAt, and CreatedAt. feat: Implement ILockRepository interface and LockRepository class - Defined ILockRepository interface with methods for acquiring and releasing locks. - Implemented LockRepository class with methods to try acquiring a lock and releasing it, using SQL for upsert operations. feat: Add SurfaceManifestPointer record for manifest pointers - Introduced SurfaceManifestPointer to represent a minimal pointer to a Surface.FS manifest associated with an image digest. feat: Create PolicySimulationInputLock and related validation logic - Added PolicySimulationInputLock record to describe policy simulation inputs and expected digests. - Implemented validation logic for policy simulation inputs, including checks for digest drift and shadow mode requirements. test: Add unit tests for ReplayVerificationService and ReplayVerifier - Created ReplayVerificationServiceTests to validate the behavior of the ReplayVerificationService under various scenarios. - Developed ReplayVerifierTests to ensure the correctness of the ReplayVerifier logic. test: Implement PolicySimulationInputLockValidatorTests - Added tests for PolicySimulationInputLockValidator to verify the validation logic against expected inputs and conditions. chore: Add cosign key example and signing scripts - Included a placeholder cosign key example for development purposes. - Added a script for signing Signals artifacts using cosign with support for both v2 and v3. chore: Create script for uploading evidence to the evidence locker - Developed a script to upload evidence to the evidence locker, ensuring required environment variables are set.
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docs/airgap/runbooks/av-scan.md
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docs/airgap/runbooks/av-scan.md
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# AV/YARA Scan Runbook (AIRGAP-AV-510-011)
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Purpose: ensure every offline-kit bundle is scanned pre-publish and post-ingest, with deterministic reports and optional signatures.
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## Inputs
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- Bundle directory containing `manifest.json` and payload files.
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- AV scanner (e.g., ClamAV) and optional YARA rule set available locally (no network).
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## Steps (offline)
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1. Scan all bundle files:
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```bash
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clamscan -r --max-filesize=2G --max-scansize=4G --no-summary bundle/ > reports/av-scan.txt
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```
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2. Convert to structured report:
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```bash
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python - <<'PY'
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import hashlib, json, pathlib, sys
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root = pathlib.Path("bundle")
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report = {
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"scanner": "clamav",
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"scannerVersion": "1.4.1",
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"startedAt": "2025-12-02T00:02:00Z",
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"completedAt": "2025-12-02T00:04:30Z",
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"status": "clean",
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"artifacts": [],
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"errors": []
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}
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for path in root.glob("**/*"):
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if path.is_file():
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h = hashlib.sha256(path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
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report["artifacts"].append({
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"path": str(path.relative_to(root)),
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"sha256": h,
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"result": "clean",
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"yaraRules": []
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})
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json.dump(report, sys.stdout, indent=2)
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PY
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```
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3. Validate report against schema:
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```bash
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jq empty --argfile schema docs/airgap/av-report.schema.json 'input' < docs/airgap/samples/av-report.sample.json >/dev/null
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```
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4. Optionally sign report (detached):
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```bash
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openssl dgst -sha256 -sign airgap-av-key.pem reports/av-report.json > reports/av-report.sig
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```
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5. Update `manifest.json`:
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- Set `avScan.status` to `clean` or `findings`.
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- `avScan.reportPath` and `avScan.reportSha256` must match the generated report.
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## Acceptance checks
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- Report validates against `docs/airgap/av-report.schema.json`.
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- `manifest.json` hashes updated and verified via `src/AirGap/scripts/verify-manifest.sh`.
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- If any artifact result is `malicious`/`suspicious`, bundle must be rejected and re-scanned after remediation.
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## References
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- Manifest schema: `docs/airgap/manifest.schema.json`
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- Sample report: `docs/airgap/samples/av-report.sample.json`
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- Manifest verifier: `src/AirGap/scripts/verify-manifest.sh`
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@@ -1,40 +1,57 @@
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# Offline Kit Import Verification Runbook
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This runbook supports AIRGAP-MANIFEST-510-010/014. It validates bundle integrity before import, fully offline.
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This runbook supports AIRGAP-MANIFEST-510-010, AIRGAP-REPLAY-510-013, and AIRGAP-VERIFY-510-014. It validates bundles fully offline and enforces replay depth.
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## Inputs
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- Manifest: `offline-kit/manifest.json`
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- Bundle archive: e.g., `offline-kit/bundle.tar.gz`
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- Optional DSSE/JWS signature + public key for the manifest.
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## Replay depth levels (manifest `replayPolicy`)
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- `hash-only`: verify manifest/bundle digests, staleness window, optional signature.
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- `full-recompute`: hash-only + every chunk hash + AV report hash.
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- `policy-freeze`: full-recompute + manifest policies must include the sealed policy hash (prevents imports with drifting policy/graph material).
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## Quick steps (offline)
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## Quick steps
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```bash
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src/AirGap/scripts/verify-manifest.sh offline-kit/manifest.json offline-kit/bundle.tar.gz \
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offline-kit/manifest.sig offline-kit/manifest.pub.pem
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src/AirGap/scripts/verify-kit.sh \
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--manifest offline-kit/manifest.json \
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--bundle offline-kit/bundle.tar.gz \
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--signature offline-kit/manifest.sig --pubkey offline-kit/manifest.pub.pem \
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--av-report offline-kit/reports/av-report.json \
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--receipt offline-kit/receipts/ingress.json \
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--sealed-policy-hash "aa55..." \
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--depth policy-freeze
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```
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What it does:
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1. Computes SHA-256 of manifest and bundle, compares with `hashes.manifestSha256` and `hashes.bundleSha256`.
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2. If signature + pubkey are provided, verifies the manifest signature with OpenSSL.
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## What the script enforces
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1) Manifest & bundle digests match (`hashes.*`).
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2) Optional manifest signature is valid (OpenSSL).
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3) Staleness: `createdAt` must be within `stalenessWindowHours` of `--now` (defaults to UTC now).
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4) AV: `avScan.status` must not be `findings`; if `reportSha256` is present, the provided report hash must match.
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5) Chunks (full-recompute/policy-freeze): every `chunks[].path` exists relative to the manifest and matches its recorded SHA-256.
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6) Policy-freeze: `--sealed-policy-hash` must appear in `policies[].sha256`.
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7) Optional: `--expected-graph-sha` checks the graph chunk hash; `--receipt` reuses `verify-receipt.sh` to bind the receipt to the manifest/bundle hashes.
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## Expected manifest fields
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- `tools[]`, `feeds[]`, `policies[]` with SHA-256.
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- `chunks[]` entries for every payload file (path, sha256, size, kind).
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- `stalenessWindowHours` and `avScan` status.
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- `hashes.manifestSha256` and `hashes.bundleSha256` must match the files on disk.
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- Optional `signatures[]` (dsse/jws-detached) with `envelopeDigest`.
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Exit codes: hash mismatch (3/4), staleness (5), AV issues (6–8), chunk drift (9–10), graph mismatch (11), policy drift (12–13), bad depth (14).
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## Failure handling
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- Hash mismatch → stop; regenerate bundle.
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- Signature failure → stop; re-validate trust roots.
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- Missing AV scan → treat as policy violation; rerun scans and update manifest.
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## Controller verify endpoint (server-side guard)
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## Outputs
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- Exit 0 when all checks pass.
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- Exit 2–5 for missing tools/hash/signature verification issues (see script).
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`POST /system/airgap/verify` (scope `airgap:verify`) expects `VerifyRequest`:
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```jsonc
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{
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"depth": "PolicyFreeze",
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"manifestSha256": "...",
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"bundleSha256": "...",
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"computedManifestSha256": "...", // from offline verifier
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"computedBundleSha256": "...",
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"manifestCreatedAt": "2025-12-02T00:00:00Z",
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"stalenessWindowHours": 168,
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"bundlePolicyHash": "aa55...",
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"sealedPolicyHash": "aa55..." // optional, controller fills from state if omitted
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}
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```
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The controller applies the same replay rules and returns `{ "valid": true|false, "reason": "..." }`.
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## References
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- Schema: `docs/airgap/manifest.schema.json`
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- Sample: `docs/airgap/samples/offline-kit-manifest.sample.json`
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- Script: `src/AirGap/scripts/verify-manifest.sh`
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- Samples: `docs/airgap/samples/offline-kit-manifest.sample.json`, `docs/airgap/samples/av-report.sample.json`, `docs/airgap/samples/receipt.sample.json`
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- Scripts: `src/AirGap/scripts/verify-kit.sh`, `src/AirGap/scripts/verify-manifest.sh`, `src/AirGap/scripts/verify-receipt.sh`
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