feat(docs): Add comprehensive documentation for Vexer, Vulnerability Explorer, and Zastava modules
- Introduced AGENTS.md, README.md, TASKS.md, and implementation_plan.md for Vexer, detailing mission, responsibilities, key components, and operational notes. - Established similar documentation structure for Vulnerability Explorer and Zastava modules, including their respective workflows, integrations, and observability notes. - Created risk scoring profiles documentation outlining the core workflow, factor model, governance, and deliverables. - Ensured all modules adhere to the Aggregation-Only Contract and maintain determinism and provenance in outputs.
This commit is contained in:
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docs/modules/concelier/AGENTS.md
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# Concelier agent guide
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## Mission
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Concelier ingests signed advisories from dozens of sources and converts them into immutable observations plus linksets under the Aggregation-Only Contract (AOC).
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## Key docs
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- [Module README](./README.md)
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- [Architecture](./architecture.md)
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- [Implementation plan](./implementation_plan.md)
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- [Task board](./TASKS.md)
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## How to get started
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1. Open ../../implplan/SPRINTS.md and locate the stories referencing this module.
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2. Review ./TASKS.md for local follow-ups and confirm status transitions (TODO → DOING → DONE/BLOCKED).
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3. Read the architecture and README for domain context before editing code or docs.
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4. Coordinate cross-module changes in the main /AGENTS.md description and through the sprint plan.
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## Guardrails
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- Honour the Aggregation-Only Contract where applicable (see ../../ingestion/aggregation-only-contract.md).
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- Preserve determinism: sort outputs, normalise timestamps (UTC ISO-8601), and avoid machine-specific artefacts.
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- Keep Offline Kit parity in mind—document air-gapped workflows for any new feature.
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- Update runbooks/observability assets when operational characteristics change.
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docs/modules/concelier/README.md
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docs/modules/concelier/README.md
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# StellaOps Concelier
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Concelier ingests signed advisories from dozens of sources and converts them into immutable observations plus linksets under the Aggregation-Only Contract (AOC).
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## Responsibilities
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- Fetch and normalise vulnerability advisories via restart-time connectors.
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- Persist observations and correlation linksets without precedence decisions.
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- Emit deterministic exports (JSON, Trivy DB) for downstream policy evaluation.
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- Coordinate offline/air-gap updates via Offline Kit bundles.
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## Key components
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- `StellaOps.Concelier.WebService` orchestration host.
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- Connector libraries under `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.*`.
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- Exporter packages (`StellaOps.Concelier.Exporter.*`).
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## Integrations & dependencies
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- MongoDB for canonical observations and schedules.
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- Policy Engine / Export Center / CLI for evidence consumption.
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- Notify and UI for advisory deltas.
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## Operational notes
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- Connector runbooks in ./operations/connectors/.
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- Mirror operations for Offline Kit parity.
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- Grafana dashboards for connector health.
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## Related resources
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- ./operations/conflict-resolution.md
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- ./operations/mirror.md
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## Backlog references
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- DOCS-LNM-22-001, DOCS-LNM-22-007 in ../../TASKS.md.
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- Connector-specific TODOs in `src/Concelier/**/TASKS.md`.
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## Epic alignment
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- **Epic 1 – AOC enforcement:** uphold raw observation invariants, provenance requirements, linkset-only enrichment, and AOC verifier guardrails across every connector.
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- **Epic 10 – Export Center:** expose deterministic advisory exports and metadata required by JSON/Trivy/mirror bundles.
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docs/modules/concelier/TASKS.md
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docs/modules/concelier/TASKS.md
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# Task board — Concelier
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> Local tasks should link back to ./AGENTS.md and mirror status updates into ../../TASKS.md when applicable.
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| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Description | Notes |
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|----|--------|----------|-------------|-------|
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| CONCELIER-DOCS-0001 | DOING (2025-10-29) | Docs Guild | Validate that ./README.md aligns with the latest release notes. | See ./AGENTS.md |
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| CONCELIER-OPS-0001 | TODO | Ops Guild | Review runbooks/observability assets after next sprint demo. | Sync outcomes back to ../../TASKS.md |
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| CONCELIER-ENG-0001 | TODO | Module Team | Cross-check implementation plan milestones against ../../implplan/SPRINTS.md. | Update status via ./AGENTS.md workflow |
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docs/modules/concelier/architecture.md
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docs/modules/concelier/architecture.md
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# component_architecture_concelier.md — **Stella Ops Concelier** (Sprint 22)
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> Derived from Epic 1 – AOC enforcement and aligned with the Export Center evidence interfaces first scoped in Epic 10.
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> **Scope.** Implementation-ready architecture for **Concelier**: the advisory ingestion and Link-Not-Merge (LNM) observation pipeline that produces deterministic raw observations, correlation linksets, and evidence events consumed by Policy Engine, Console, CLI, and Export centers. Covers domain models, connectors, observation/linkset builders, storage schema, events, APIs, performance, security, and test matrices.
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---
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## 0) Mission & boundaries
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**Mission.** Acquire authoritative **vulnerability advisories** (vendor PSIRTs, distros, OSS ecosystems, CERTs), persist them as immutable **observations** under the Aggregation-Only Contract (AOC), construct **linksets** that correlate observations without merging or precedence, and export deterministic evidence bundles (JSON, Trivy DB, Offline Kit) for downstream policy evaluation and operator tooling.
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**Boundaries.**
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* Concelier **does not** sign with private keys. When attestation is required, the export artifact is handed to the **Signer**/**Attestor** pipeline (out‑of‑process).
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* Concelier **does not** decide PASS/FAIL; it provides data to the **Policy** engine.
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* Online operation is **allowlist‑only**; air‑gapped deployments use the **Offline Kit**.
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---
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## 1) Aggregation-Only Contract guardrails
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**Epic 1 distilled** — the service itself is the enforcement point for AOC. The guardrail checklist is embedded in code (`AOCWriteGuard`) and must be satisfied before any advisory hits Mongo:
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1. **No derived semantics in ingestion.** The DTOs produced by connectors cannot contain severity, consensus, reachability, merged status, or fix hints. Roslyn analyzers (`StellaOps.AOC.Analyzers`) scan connectors and fail builds if forbidden properties appear.
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2. **Immutable raw docs.** Every upstream advisory is persisted in `advisory_raw` with append-only semantics. Revisions produce new `_id`s via version suffix (`:v2`, `:v3`), linking back through `supersedes`.
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3. **Mandatory provenance.** Collectors record `source`, `upstream` metadata (`document_version`, `fetched_at`, `received_at`, `content_hash`), and signature presence before writing.
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4. **Linkset only.** Derived joins (aliases, PURLs, CPEs, references) are stored inside `linkset` and never mutate `content.raw`.
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5. **Deterministic canonicalisation.** Writers use canonical JSON (sorted object keys, lexicographic arrays) ensuring identical inputs yield the same hashes/diff-friendly outputs.
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6. **Idempotent upserts.** `(source.vendor, upstream.upstream_id, upstream.content_hash)` uniquely identify a document. Duplicate hashes short-circuit; new hashes create a new version.
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7. **Verifier & CI.** `StellaOps.AOC.Verifier` processes observation batches in CI and at runtime, rejecting writes lacking provenance, introducing unordered collections, or violating the schema.
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### 1.1 Advisory raw document shape
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```json
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{
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"_id": "advisory_raw:osv:GHSA-xxxx-....:v3",
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"source": {
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"vendor": "OSV",
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"stream": "github",
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"api": "https://api.osv.dev/v1/.../GHSA-...",
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"collector_version": "concelier/1.7.3"
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},
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"upstream": {
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"upstream_id": "GHSA-xxxx-....",
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"document_version": "2025-09-01T12:13:14Z",
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"fetched_at": "2025-09-01T13:04:05Z",
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"received_at": "2025-09-01T13:04:06Z",
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"content_hash": "sha256:...",
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"signature": {
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"present": true,
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"format": "dsse",
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"key_id": "rekor:.../key/abc",
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"sig": "base64..."
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}
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},
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"content": {
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"format": "OSV",
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"spec_version": "1.6",
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"raw": { /* unmodified upstream document */ }
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},
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"identifiers": {
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"cve": ["CVE-2025-12345"],
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"ghsa": ["GHSA-xxxx-...."],
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"aliases": ["CVE-2025-12345", "GHSA-xxxx-...."]
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},
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"linkset": {
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"purls": ["pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21"],
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"cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:lodash:lodash:4.17.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],
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"references": [
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{"type":"advisory","url":"https://..."},
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{"type":"fix","url":"https://..."}
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],
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"reconciled_from": ["content.raw.affected.ranges", "content.raw.pkg"]
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},
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"supersedes": "advisory_raw:osv:GHSA-xxxx-....:v2",
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"tenant": "default"
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}
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```
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### 1.2 Connector lifecycle
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1. **Snapshot stage** — connectors fetch signed feeds or use offline mirrors keyed by `{vendor, stream, snapshot_date}`.
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2. **Parse stage** — upstream payloads are normalised into strongly-typed DTOs with UTC timestamps.
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3. **Guard stage** — DTOs run through `AOCWriteGuard` performing schema validation, forbidden-field checks, provenance validation, deterministic sorting, and `_id` computation.
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4. **Write stage** — append-only Mongo insert; duplicate hash is ignored, changed hash creates a new version and emits `supersedes` pointer.
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5. **Event stage** — DSSE-backed events `advisory.observation.updated` and `advisory.linkset.updated` notify downstream services (Policy, Export Center, CLI).
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### 1.3 Export readiness
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Concelier feeds Export Center profiles (Epic 10) by:
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- Maintaining canonical JSON exports with deterministic manifests (`export.json`) listing content hashes, counts, and `supersedes` chains.
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- Producing Trivy DB-compatible artifacts (SQLite + metadata) packaged under `db/` with hash manifests.
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- Surfacing mirror manifests that reference Mongo snapshot digests, enabling Offline Kit bundle verification.
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Running the same export job twice against the same snapshot must yield byte-identical archives and manifest hashes.
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---
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## 2) Topology & processes
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**Process shape:** single ASP.NET Core service `StellaOps.Concelier.WebService` hosting:
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* **Scheduler** with distributed locks (Mongo backed).
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* **Connectors** (fetch/parse/map) that emit immutable observation candidates.
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* **Observation writer** enforcing AOC invariants via `AOCWriteGuard`.
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* **Linkset builder** that correlates observations into `advisory_linksets` and annotates conflicts.
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* **Event publisher** emitting `advisory.observation.updated` and `advisory.linkset.updated` messages.
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* **Exporters** (JSON, Trivy DB, Offline Kit slices) fed from observation/linkset stores.
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* **Minimal REST** for health/status/trigger/export and observation/linkset reads.
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**Scale:** HA by running N replicas; **locks** prevent overlapping jobs per source/exporter.
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---
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## 3) Canonical domain model
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> Stored in MongoDB (database `concelier`), serialized with a **canonical JSON** writer (stable order, camelCase, normalized timestamps).
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### 2.1 Core entities
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#### AdvisoryObservation
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```jsonc
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observationId // deterministic id: {tenant}:{source.vendor}:{upstreamId}:{revision}
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tenant // issuing tenant (lower-case)
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source{
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vendor, stream, api, collectorVersion
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}
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upstream{
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upstreamId, documentVersion, fetchedAt, receivedAt,
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contentHash, signature{present, format?, keyId?, signature?}
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}
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content{
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format, specVersion, raw, metadata?
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}
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identifiers{
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cve?, ghsa?, vendorIds[], aliases[]
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}
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linkset{
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purls[], cpes[], aliases[], references[{type,url}],
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reconciledFrom[]
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}
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createdAt // when Concelier recorded the observation
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attributes // optional provenance metadata (batch ids, ingest cursor)
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```jsonc
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#### AdvisoryLinkset
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```jsonc
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linksetId // sha256 over sorted (tenant, product/vuln tuple, observation ids)
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tenant
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key{
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vulnerabilityId,
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productKey,
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confidence // low|medium|high
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}
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observations[] = [
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{
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observationId,
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sourceVendor,
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statement{
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status?, severity?, references?, notes?
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},
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collectedAt
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}
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]
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aliases{
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primary,
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others[]
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}
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purls[]
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cpes[]
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conflicts[]? // see AdvisoryLinksetConflict
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createdAt
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updatedAt
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```jsonc
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#### AdvisoryLinksetConflict
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```jsonc
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conflictId // deterministic hash
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type // severity-mismatch | affected-range-divergence | reference-clash | alias-inconsistency | metadata-gap
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field? // optional JSON pointer (e.g., /statement/severity/vector)
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observations[] // per-source values contributing to the conflict
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confidence // low|medium|high (heuristic weight)
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detectedAt
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```jsonc
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#### ObservationEvent / LinksetEvent
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```jsonc
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eventId // ULID
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tenant
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type // advisory.observation.updated | advisory.linkset.updated
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key{
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observationId? // on observation event
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linksetId? // on linkset event
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vulnerabilityId?,
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productKey?
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}
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delta{
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added[], removed[], changed[] // normalized summary for consumers
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}
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hash // canonical hash of serialized delta payload
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occurredAt
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```jsonc
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#### ExportState
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```jsonc
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exportKind // json | trivydb
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baseExportId? // last full baseline
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baseDigest? // digest of last full baseline
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lastFullDigest? // digest of last full export
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lastDeltaDigest? // digest of last delta export
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cursor // per-kind incremental cursor
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files[] // last manifest snapshot (path → sha256)
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```jsonc
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Legacy `Advisory`, `Affected`, and merge-centric entities remain in the repository for historical exports and replay but are being phased out as Link-Not-Merge takes over. New code paths must interact with `AdvisoryObservation` / `AdvisoryLinkset` exclusively and emit conflicts through the structured payloads described above.
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### 2.2 Product identity (`productKey`)
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* **Primary:** `purl` (Package URL).
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* **OS packages:** RPM (NEVRA→purl:rpm), DEB (dpkg→purl:deb), APK (apk→purl:alpine), with **EVR/NVRA** preserved.
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* **Secondary:** `cpe` retained for compatibility; advisory records may carry both.
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* **Image/platform:** `oci:<registry>/<repo>@<digest>` for image‑level advisories (rare).
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* **Unmappable:** if a source is non‑deterministic, keep native string under `productKey="native:<provider>:<id>"` and mark **non‑joinable**.
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---
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## 4) Source families & precedence
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### 3.1 Families
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* **Vendor PSIRTs**: Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, Adobe, Apple, VMware, Chromium…
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* **Linux distros**: Red Hat, SUSE, Ubuntu, Debian, Alpine…
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* **OSS ecosystems**: OSV, GHSA (GitHub Security Advisories), PyPI, npm, Maven, NuGet, Go.
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* **CERTs / national CSIRTs**: CISA (KEV, ICS), JVN, ACSC, CCCS, KISA, CERT‑FR/BUND, etc.
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### 3.2 Precedence (when claims conflict)
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1. **Vendor PSIRT** (authoritative for their product).
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2. **Distro** (authoritative for packages they ship, including backports).
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3. **Ecosystem** (OSV/GHSA) for library semantics.
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4. **CERTs/aggregators** for enrichment (KEV/known exploited).
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> Precedence affects **Affected** ranges and **fixed** info; **severity** is normalized to the **maximum** credible severity unless policy overrides. Conflicts are retained with **source provenance**.
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---
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## 5) Connectors & normalization
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### 4.1 Connector contract
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```csharp
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public interface IFeedConnector {
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string SourceName { get; }
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Task FetchAsync(IServiceProvider sp, CancellationToken ct); // -> document collection
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Task ParseAsync(IServiceProvider sp, CancellationToken ct); // -> dto collection (validated)
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Task MapAsync(IServiceProvider sp, CancellationToken ct); // -> advisory/alias/affected/reference
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}
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```jsonc
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* **Fetch**: windowed (cursor), conditional GET (ETag/Last‑Modified), retry/backoff, rate limiting.
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* **Parse**: schema validation (JSON Schema, XSD/CSAF), content type checks; write **DTO** with normalized casing.
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* **Map**: build canonical records; all outputs carry **provenance** (doc digest, URI, anchors).
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### 4.2 Version range normalization
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* **SemVer** ecosystems (npm, pypi, maven, nuget, golang): normalize to `introduced`/`fixed` semver ranges (use `~`, `^`, `<`, `>=` canonicalized to intervals).
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* **RPM EVR**: `epoch:version-release` with `rpmvercmp` semantics; store raw EVR strings and also **computed order keys** for query.
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* **DEB**: dpkg version comparison semantics mirrored; store computed keys.
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* **APK**: Alpine version semantics; compute order keys.
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* **Generic**: if provider uses text, retain raw; do **not** invent ranges.
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### 4.3 Severity & CVSS
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* Normalize **CVSS v2/v3/v4** where available (vector, baseScore, severity).
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* If multiple CVSS sources exist, track them all; **effective severity** defaults to **max** by policy (configurable).
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* **ExploitKnown** toggled by KEV and equivalent sources; store **evidence** (source, date).
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---
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## 6) Observation & linkset pipeline
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> **Goal:** deterministically ingest raw documents into immutable observations, correlate them into evidence-rich linksets, and broadcast changes without precedence or mutation.
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### 5.1 Observation flow
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1. **Connector fetch/parse/map** — connectors download upstream payloads, validate signatures, and map to DTOs (identifiers, references, raw payload, provenance).
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2. **AOC guard** — `AOCWriteGuard` verifies forbidden keys, provenance completeness, tenant claims, timestamp normalization, and content hash idempotency. Violations raise `ERR_AOC_00x` mapped to structured logs and metrics.
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3. **Append-only write** — observations insert into `advisory_observations`; duplicates by `(tenant, source.vendor, upstream.upstreamId, upstream.contentHash)` become no-ops; new content for same upstream id creates a supersedes chain.
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4. **Change feed + event** — Mongo change streams trigger `advisory.observation.updated@1` events with deterministic payloads (IDs, hash, supersedes pointer, linkset summary). Policy Engine, Offline Kit builder, and guard dashboards subscribe.
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### 5.2 Linkset correlation
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||||
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1. **Queue** — observation deltas enqueue correlation jobs keyed by `(tenant, vulnerabilityId, productKey)` candidates derived from identifiers + alias graph.
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2. **Canonical grouping** — builder resolves aliases using Concelier’s alias store and deterministic heuristics (vendor > distro > cert), deriving normalized product keys (purl preferred) and confidence scores.
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||||
3. **Linkset materialization** — `advisory_linksets` documents store sorted observation references, alias sets, product keys, range metadata, and conflict payloads. Writes are idempotent; unchanged hashes skip updates.
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||||
4. **Conflict detection** — builder emits structured conflicts (`severity-mismatch`, `affected-range-divergence`, `reference-clash`, `alias-inconsistency`, `metadata-gap`). Conflicts carry per-observation values for explainability.
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5. **Event emission** — `advisory.linkset.updated@1` summarizes deltas (`added`, `removed`, `changed` observation IDs, conflict updates, confidence changes) and includes a canonical hash for replay validation.
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||||
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||||
### 5.3 Event contract
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||||
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||||
| Event | Schema | Notes |
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||||
|-------|--------|-------|
|
||||
| `advisory.observation.updated@1` | `events/advisory.observation.updated@1.json` | Fired on new or superseded observations. Includes `observationId`, source metadata, `linksetSummary` (aliases/purls), supersedes pointer (if any), SHA-256 hash, and `traceId`. |
|
||||
| `advisory.linkset.updated@1` | `events/advisory.linkset.updated@1.json` | Fired when correlation changes. Includes `linksetId`, `key{vulnerabilityId, productKey, confidence}`, observation deltas, conflicts, `updatedAt`, and canonical hash. |
|
||||
|
||||
Events are emitted via NATS (primary) and Redis Stream (fallback). Consumers acknowledge idempotently using the hash; duplicates are safe. Offline Kit captures both topics during bundle creation for air-gapped replay.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7) Storage schema (MongoDB)
|
||||
|
||||
### Collections & indexes (LNM path)
|
||||
|
||||
* `concelier.sources` `{_id, type, baseUrl, enabled, notes}` — connector catalog.
|
||||
* `concelier.source_state` `{sourceName(unique), enabled, cursor, lastSuccess, backoffUntil, paceOverrides}` — run-state (TTL indexes on `backoffUntil`).
|
||||
* `concelier.documents` `{_id, sourceName, uri, fetchedAt, sha256, contentType, status, metadata, gridFsId?, etag?, lastModified?}` — raw payload registry.
|
||||
* Indexes: `{sourceName:1, uri:1}` unique; `{fetchedAt:-1}` for recent fetches.
|
||||
* `concelier.dto` `{_id, sourceName, documentId, schemaVer, payload, validatedAt}` — normalized connector DTOs used for replay.
|
||||
* Index: `{sourceName:1, documentId:1}`.
|
||||
* `concelier.advisory_observations`
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{
|
||||
_id: "tenant:vendor:upstreamId:revision",
|
||||
tenant,
|
||||
source: { vendor, stream, api, collectorVersion },
|
||||
upstream: { upstreamId, documentVersion, fetchedAt, receivedAt, contentHash, signature },
|
||||
content: { format, specVersion, raw, metadata? },
|
||||
identifiers: { cve?, ghsa?, vendorIds[], aliases[] },
|
||||
linkset: { purls[], cpes[], aliases[], references[], reconciledFrom[] },
|
||||
supersedes?: "prevObservationId",
|
||||
createdAt,
|
||||
attributes?: object
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Indexes: `{tenant:1, upstream.upstreamId:1}`, `{tenant:1, source.vendor:1, linkset.purls:1}`, `{tenant:1, linkset.aliases:1}`, `{tenant:1, createdAt:-1}`.
|
||||
* `concelier.advisory_linksets`
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{
|
||||
_id: "sha256:...",
|
||||
tenant,
|
||||
key: { vulnerabilityId, productKey, confidence },
|
||||
observations: [
|
||||
{ observationId, sourceVendor, statement, collectedAt }
|
||||
],
|
||||
aliases: { primary, others: [] },
|
||||
purls: [],
|
||||
cpes: [],
|
||||
conflicts: [],
|
||||
createdAt,
|
||||
updatedAt
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Indexes: `{tenant:1, key.vulnerabilityId:1, key.productKey:1}`, `{tenant:1, purls:1}`, `{tenant:1, aliases.primary:1}`, `{tenant:1, updatedAt:-1}`.
|
||||
* `concelier.advisory_events`
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{
|
||||
_id: ObjectId,
|
||||
tenant,
|
||||
type: "advisory.observation.updated" | "advisory.linkset.updated",
|
||||
key,
|
||||
delta,
|
||||
hash,
|
||||
occurredAt
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* TTL index on `occurredAt` (configurable retention), `{type:1, occurredAt:-1}` for replay.
|
||||
* `concelier.export_state` `{_id(exportKind), baseExportId?, baseDigest?, lastFullDigest?, lastDeltaDigest?, cursor, files[]}`
|
||||
* `locks` `{_id(jobKey), holder, acquiredAt, heartbeatAt, leaseMs, ttlAt}` (TTL cleans dead locks)
|
||||
* `jobs` `{_id, type, args, state, startedAt, heartbeatAt, endedAt, error}`
|
||||
|
||||
**Legacy collections** (`advisory`, `alias`, `affected`, `reference`, `merge_event`) remain read-only during the migration window to support back-compat exports. New code must not write to them; scheduled cleanup removes them after Link-Not-Merge GA.
|
||||
|
||||
**GridFS buckets**: `fs.documents` for raw payloads (immutable); `fs.exports` for historical JSON/Trivy archives.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8) Exporters
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1 Deterministic JSON (vuln‑list style)
|
||||
|
||||
* Folder structure mirroring `/<scheme>/<first-two>/<rest>/…` with one JSON per advisory; deterministic ordering, stable timestamps, normalized whitespace.
|
||||
* `manifest.json` lists all files with SHA‑256 and a top‑level **export digest**.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2 Trivy DB exporter
|
||||
|
||||
* Builds Bolt DB archives compatible with Trivy; supports **full** and **delta** modes.
|
||||
* In delta, unchanged blobs are reused from the base; metadata captures:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"mode": "delta|full",
|
||||
"baseExportId": "...",
|
||||
"baseManifestDigest": "sha256:...",
|
||||
"changed": ["path1", "path2"],
|
||||
"removed": ["path3"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
* Optional ORAS push (OCI layout) for registries.
|
||||
* Offline kit bundles include Trivy DB + JSON tree + export manifest.
|
||||
* Mirror-ready bundles: when `concelier.trivy.mirror` defines domains, the exporter emits `mirror/index.json` plus per-domain `manifest.json`, `metadata.json`, and `db.tar.gz` files with SHA-256 digests so Concelier mirrors can expose domain-scoped download endpoints.
|
||||
* Concelier.WebService serves `/concelier/exports/index.json` and `/concelier/exports/mirror/{domain}/…` directly from the export tree with hour-long budgets (index: 60 s, bundles: 300 s, immutable) and per-domain rate limiting; the endpoints honour Stella Ops Authority or CIDR bypass lists depending on mirror topology.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.3 Hand‑off to Signer/Attestor (optional)
|
||||
|
||||
* On export completion, if `attest: true` is set in job args, Concelier **posts** the artifact metadata to **Signer**/**Attestor**; Concelier itself **does not** hold signing keys.
|
||||
* Export record stores returned `{ uuid, index, url }` from **Rekor v2**.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9) REST APIs
|
||||
|
||||
All under `/api/v1/concelier`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Health & status**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
GET /healthz | /readyz
|
||||
GET /status → sources, last runs, export cursors
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Sources & jobs**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
GET /sources → list of configured sources
|
||||
POST /sources/{name}/trigger → { jobId }
|
||||
POST /sources/{name}/pause | /resume → toggle
|
||||
GET /jobs/{id} → job status
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Exports**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
POST /exports/json { full?:bool, force?:bool, attest?:bool } → { exportId, digest, rekor? }
|
||||
POST /exports/trivy { full?:bool, force?:bool, publish?:bool, attest?:bool } → { exportId, digest, rekor? }
|
||||
GET /exports/{id} → export metadata (kind, digest, createdAt, rekor?)
|
||||
GET /concelier/exports/index.json → mirror index describing available domains/bundles
|
||||
GET /concelier/exports/mirror/{domain}/manifest.json
|
||||
GET /concelier/exports/mirror/{domain}/bundle.json
|
||||
GET /concelier/exports/mirror/{domain}/bundle.json.jws
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Search (operator debugging)**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
GET /advisories/{key}
|
||||
GET /advisories?scheme=CVE&value=CVE-2025-12345
|
||||
GET /affected?productKey=pkg:rpm/openssl&limit=100
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**AuthN/Z:** Authority tokens (OpTok) with roles: `concelier.read`, `concelier.admin`, `concelier.export`.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10) Configuration (YAML)
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
mongo: { uri: "mongodb://mongo/concelier" }
|
||||
s3:
|
||||
endpoint: "http://minio:9000"
|
||||
bucket: "stellaops-concelier"
|
||||
scheduler:
|
||||
windowSeconds: 30
|
||||
maxParallelSources: 4
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
- name: redhat
|
||||
kind: csaf
|
||||
baseUrl: https://access.redhat.com/security/data/csaf/v2/
|
||||
signature: { type: pgp, keys: [ "…redhat PGP…" ] }
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
windowDays: 7
|
||||
- name: suse
|
||||
kind: csaf
|
||||
baseUrl: https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf/
|
||||
signature: { type: pgp, keys: [ "…suse PGP…" ] }
|
||||
- name: ubuntu
|
||||
kind: usn-json
|
||||
baseUrl: https://ubuntu.com/security/notices.json
|
||||
signature: { type: none }
|
||||
- name: osv
|
||||
kind: osv
|
||||
baseUrl: https://api.osv.dev/v1/
|
||||
signature: { type: none }
|
||||
- name: ghsa
|
||||
kind: ghsa
|
||||
baseUrl: https://api.github.com/graphql
|
||||
auth: { tokenRef: "env:GITHUB_TOKEN" }
|
||||
exporters:
|
||||
json:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
output: s3://stellaops-concelier/json/
|
||||
trivy:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
mode: full
|
||||
output: s3://stellaops-concelier/trivy/
|
||||
oras:
|
||||
enabled: false
|
||||
repo: ghcr.io/org/concelier
|
||||
precedence:
|
||||
vendorWinsOverDistro: true
|
||||
distroWinsOverOsv: true
|
||||
severity:
|
||||
policy: max # or 'vendorPreferred' / 'distroPreferred'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 11) Security & compliance
|
||||
|
||||
* **Outbound allowlist** per connector (domains, protocols); proxy support; TLS pinning where possible.
|
||||
* **Signature verification** for raw docs (PGP/cosign/x509) with results stored in `document.metadata.sig`. Docs failing verification may still be ingested but flagged; Policy Engine or downstream policy can down-weight them.
|
||||
* **No secrets in logs**; auth material via `env:` or mounted files; HTTP redaction of `Authorization` headers.
|
||||
* **Multi‑tenant**: per‑tenant DBs or prefixes; per‑tenant S3 prefixes; tenant‑scoped API tokens.
|
||||
* **Determinism**: canonical JSON writer; export digests stable across runs given same inputs.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 12) Performance targets & scale
|
||||
|
||||
* **Ingest**: ≥ 5k documents/min on 4 cores (CSAF/OpenVEX/JSON).
|
||||
* **Normalize/map**: ≥ 50k observation statements/min on 4 cores.
|
||||
* **Observation write**: ≤ 5 ms P95 per document (including guard + Mongo write).
|
||||
* **Linkset build**: ≤ 15 ms P95 per `(vulnerabilityId, productKey)` update, even with 20+ contributing observations.
|
||||
* **Export**: 1M advisories JSON in ≤ 90 s (streamed, zstd), Trivy DB in ≤ 60 s on 8 cores.
|
||||
* **Memory**: hard cap per job; chunked streaming writers; backpressure to avoid GC spikes.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scale pattern**: add Concelier replicas; Mongo scaling via indices and read/write concerns; GridFS only for oversized docs.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 13) Observability
|
||||
|
||||
* **Metrics**
|
||||
|
||||
* `concelier.fetch.docs_total{source}`
|
||||
* `concelier.fetch.bytes_total{source}`
|
||||
* `concelier.parse.failures_total{source}`
|
||||
* `concelier.map.statements_total{source}`
|
||||
* `concelier.observations.write_total{result=ok|noop|error}`
|
||||
* `concelier.linksets.updated_total{result=ok|skip|error}`
|
||||
* `concelier.linksets.conflicts_total{type}`
|
||||
* `concelier.export.bytes{kind}`
|
||||
* `concelier.export.duration_seconds{kind}`
|
||||
* **Tracing** around fetch/parse/map/observe/linkset/export.
|
||||
* **Logs**: structured with `source`, `uri`, `docDigest`, `advisoryKey`, `exportId`.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 14) Testing matrix
|
||||
|
||||
* **Connectors:** fixture suites for each provider/format (happy path; malformed; signature fail).
|
||||
* **Version semantics:** EVR vs dpkg vs semver edge cases (epoch bumps, tilde versions, pre‑releases).
|
||||
* **Linkset correlation:** multi-source conflicts (severity, range, alias) produce deterministic conflict payloads; ensure confidence scoring stable.
|
||||
* **Export determinism:** byte‑for‑byte stable outputs across runs; digest equality.
|
||||
* **Performance:** soak tests with 1M advisories; cap memory; verify backpressure.
|
||||
* **API:** pagination, filters, RBAC, error envelopes (RFC 7807).
|
||||
* **Offline kit:** bundle build & import correctness.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 15) Failure modes & recovery
|
||||
|
||||
* **Source outages:** scheduler backs off with exponential delay; `source_state.backoffUntil`; alerts on staleness.
|
||||
* **Schema drifts:** parse stage marks DTO invalid; job fails with clear diagnostics; connector version flags track supported schema ranges.
|
||||
* **Partial exports:** exporters write to temp prefix; **manifest commit** is atomic; only then move to final prefix and update `export_state`.
|
||||
* **Resume:** all stages idempotent; `source_state.cursor` supports window resume.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 16) Operator runbook (quick)
|
||||
|
||||
* **Trigger all sources:** `POST /api/v1/concelier/sources/*/trigger`
|
||||
* **Force full export JSON:** `POST /api/v1/concelier/exports/json { "full": true, "force": true }`
|
||||
* **Force Trivy DB delta publish:** `POST /api/v1/concelier/exports/trivy { "full": false, "publish": true }`
|
||||
* **Inspect observation:** `GET /api/v1/concelier/observations/{observationId}`
|
||||
* **Query linkset:** `GET /api/v1/concelier/linksets?vulnerabilityId=CVE-2025-12345&productKey=pkg:rpm/redhat/openssl`
|
||||
* **Pause noisy source:** `POST /api/v1/concelier/sources/osv/pause`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 17) Rollout plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. **MVP**: Red Hat (CSAF), SUSE (CSAF), Ubuntu (USN JSON), OSV; JSON export.
|
||||
2. **Add**: GHSA GraphQL, Debian (DSA HTML/JSON), Alpine secdb; Trivy DB export.
|
||||
3. **Attestation hand‑off**: integrate with **Signer/Attestor** (optional).
|
||||
4. **Scale & diagnostics**: provider dashboards, staleness alerts, export cache reuse.
|
||||
5. **Offline kit**: end‑to‑end verified bundles for air‑gap.
|
||||
67
docs/modules/concelier/implementation_plan.md
Normal file
67
docs/modules/concelier/implementation_plan.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
||||
# Implementation plan — Concelier
|
||||
|
||||
## Delivery timeline
|
||||
- **Phase 1 — Guardrails & schema**
|
||||
Stand up Mongo JSON validators for `advisory_raw` and `vex_raw`, wire the `AOCWriteGuard` repository interceptor, and seed deterministic linkset builders. Freeze legacy normalisation paths and migrate callers to the new raw schema.
|
||||
- **Phase 2 — API & observability**
|
||||
Publish ingestion and verification endpoints (`POST /ingest/*`, `GET /advisories.raw`, `POST /aoc/verify`) with Authority scopes, expose telemetry (`aoc_violation_total`, guard spans, structured logs), and ensure Offline Kit packaging captures validator deployment steps.
|
||||
- **Phase 3 — Experience polish**
|
||||
Ship CLI/Console affordances (`stella sources ingest --dry-run`, dashboard tiles, violation drill-downs), finish Export Center hand-off metadata, and close out CI enforcement (`stella aoc verify` preflight, AST lint, seeded fixtures).
|
||||
|
||||
## Work breakdown by component
|
||||
- **Concelier WebService & worker**
|
||||
- Add Mongo validators and unique indexes over `(tenant, source.vendor, upstream.upstream_id, upstream.content_hash)`.
|
||||
- Implement write interceptors rejecting forbidden fields, missing provenance, or merge attempts.
|
||||
- Deterministically compute linksets and persist canonical JSON payloads.
|
||||
- Introduce `/ingest/advisory`, `/advisories/raw*`, and `/aoc/verify` surfaces guarded by `advisory:*` and `aoc:verify` scopes.
|
||||
- Emit guard metrics/traces and surface supersedes/violation audit logs.
|
||||
- **Excititor (shared ingestion contract)**
|
||||
- Mirror Concelier guard and schema changes for `vex_raw`.
|
||||
- Maintain restart-time plug-in determinism and linkset extraction parity.
|
||||
- **Shared libraries**
|
||||
- Publish `StellaOps.Ingestion.AOC` (forbidden key catalog, guard middleware, provenance helpers, signature verification).
|
||||
- Share error codes (`ERR_AOC_00x`) and deterministic hashing utilities.
|
||||
- **Policy Engine integration**
|
||||
- Enforce `effective_finding_*` write exclusivity.
|
||||
- Consume only raw documents + linksets, removing any implicit normalisation.
|
||||
- **Authority scopes**
|
||||
- Provision `advisory:ingest|read`, `vex:ingest|read`, `aoc:verify`; propagate tenant claims to ingestion services.
|
||||
- **CLI & Console**
|
||||
- Implement `stella sources ingest --dry-run` and `stella aoc verify` (with exit codes mapped to `ERR_AOC_00x`).
|
||||
- Surface AOC dashboards, violation drill-down, and verification shortcuts in the Console.
|
||||
- **CI/CD**
|
||||
- Add Roslyn analyzer / AST lint to block forbidden writes.
|
||||
- Seed fixtures and run `stella aoc verify` against snapshots in pipeline gating.
|
||||
|
||||
## Documentation deliverables
|
||||
- Update `docs/ingestion/aggregation-only-contract.md` with guard invariants, schemas, error codes, and migration guidance.
|
||||
- Refresh `docs/modules/concelier/operations/*.md` (mirror, conflict-resolution, authority audit) with validator rollouts and observability dashboards.
|
||||
- Cross-link Authority scope definitions, CLI reference, Console sources guide, and observability runbooks to the AOC guard changes.
|
||||
- Ensure Offline Kit documentation captures validator bootstrap and verify workflows.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance criteria
|
||||
- Mongo validators and runtime guards reject forbidden fields and missing provenance with the documented `ERR_AOC_00x` codes.
|
||||
- Linksets and supersedes chains are deterministic; rerunning ingestion over identical payloads yields byte-identical documents.
|
||||
- CLI `stella aoc verify` exits non-zero on seeded violations and zero on clean datasets; Console dashboards show real-time guard status.
|
||||
- Export Center consumes advisory datasets without relying on legacy normalised fields.
|
||||
- CI fails if lint rules detect forbidden writes or if seeded guard tests regress.
|
||||
|
||||
## Risks & mitigations
|
||||
- **Collector drift introduces new forbidden keys.** Mitigated by guard middleware + CI lint + schema validation; RFC required for linkset changes.
|
||||
- **Migration complexity from legacy normalisation.** Staged cutover with `_backup_*` copies and temporary views to keep Policy Engine parity.
|
||||
- **Performance overhead during ingest.** Guard remains O(number of keys); index review ensures insert latency stays within warm (<5 s) / cold (<30 s) targets.
|
||||
- **Tenancy leakage.** `tenant` required in schema, Authority-supplied claims enforced per request, observability alerts fire on missing tenant identifiers.
|
||||
|
||||
## Test strategy
|
||||
- **Unit**: guard rejection paths, provenance enforcement, idempotent insertions, linkset determinism.
|
||||
- **Property**: fuzz upstream payloads to guarantee no forbidden fields emerge.
|
||||
- **Integration**: batch ingest (50k advisories, mixed VEX fixtures), verifying zero guard violations and consistent supersedes.
|
||||
- **Contract**: Policy Engine consumers verify raw-only reads; Export Center consumes canonical datasets.
|
||||
- **End-to-end**: ingest/verify flow with CLI + Console actions to confirm observability and guard reporting.
|
||||
|
||||
## Definition of done
|
||||
- Validators deployed and verified in staging/offline environments.
|
||||
- Runtime guards, CLI/Console workflows, and CI linting all active.
|
||||
- Observability dashboards and runbooks updated; metrics visible.
|
||||
- Documentation updates merged; Offline Kit instructions published.
|
||||
- ./TASKS.md reflects status transitions; cross-module dependencies acknowledged in ../../TASKS.md.
|
||||
159
docs/modules/concelier/operations/authority-audit-runbook.md
Normal file
159
docs/modules/concelier/operations/authority-audit-runbook.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
|
||||
# Concelier Authority Audit Runbook
|
||||
|
||||
_Last updated: 2025-10-22_
|
||||
|
||||
This runbook helps operators verify and monitor the StellaOps Concelier ⇆ Authority integration. It focuses on the `/jobs*` surface, which now requires StellaOps Authority tokens, and the corresponding audit/metric signals that expose authentication and bypass activity.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- Authority integration is enabled in `concelier.yaml` (or via `CONCELIER_AUTHORITY__*` environment variables) with a valid `clientId`, secret, audience, and required scopes.
|
||||
- OTLP metrics/log exporters are configured (`concelier.telemetry.*`) or container stdout is shipped to your SIEM.
|
||||
- Operators have access to the Concelier job trigger endpoints via CLI or REST for smoke tests.
|
||||
- The rollout table in `docs/10_CONCELIER_CLI_QUICKSTART.md` has been reviewed so stakeholders align on the staged → enforced toggle timeline.
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuration snippet
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
authority:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
allowAnonymousFallback: false # keep true only during initial rollout
|
||||
issuer: "https://authority.internal"
|
||||
audiences:
|
||||
- "api://concelier"
|
||||
requiredScopes:
|
||||
- "concelier.jobs.trigger"
|
||||
- "advisory:read"
|
||||
- "advisory:ingest"
|
||||
requiredTenants:
|
||||
- "tenant-default"
|
||||
bypassNetworks:
|
||||
- "127.0.0.1/32"
|
||||
- "::1/128"
|
||||
clientId: "concelier-jobs"
|
||||
clientSecretFile: "/run/secrets/concelier_authority_client"
|
||||
tokenClockSkewSeconds: 60
|
||||
resilience:
|
||||
enableRetries: true
|
||||
retryDelays:
|
||||
- "00:00:01"
|
||||
- "00:00:02"
|
||||
- "00:00:05"
|
||||
allowOfflineCacheFallback: true
|
||||
offlineCacheTolerance: "00:10:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> Store secrets outside source control. Concelier reads `clientSecretFile` on startup; rotate by updating the mounted file and restarting the service.
|
||||
|
||||
### Resilience tuning
|
||||
|
||||
- **Connected sites:** keep the default 1 s / 2 s / 5 s retry ladder so Concelier retries transient Authority hiccups but still surfaces outages quickly. Leave `allowOfflineCacheFallback=true` so cached discovery/JWKS data can bridge short Pathfinder restarts.
|
||||
- **Air-gapped/Offline Kit installs:** extend `offlineCacheTolerance` (15–30 minutes) to keep the cached metadata valid between manual synchronisations. You can also disable retries (`enableRetries=false`) if infrastructure teams prefer to handle exponential backoff at the network layer; Concelier will fail fast but keep deterministic logs.
|
||||
- Concelier resolves these knobs through `IOptionsMonitor<StellaOpsAuthClientOptions>`. Edits to `concelier.yaml` are applied on configuration reload; restart the container if you change environment variables or do not have file-watch reloads enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Key Signals
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 Audit log channel
|
||||
|
||||
Concelier emits structured audit entries via the `Concelier.Authorization.Audit` logger for every `/jobs*` request once Authority enforcement is active.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Concelier authorization audit route=/jobs/definitions status=200 subject=ops@example.com clientId=concelier-cli scopes=concelier.jobs.trigger advisory:ingest bypass=False remote=10.1.4.7
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Sample value | Meaning |
|
||||
|--------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| `route` | `/jobs/definitions` | Endpoint that processed the request. |
|
||||
| `status` | `200` / `401` / `409` | Final HTTP status code returned to the caller. |
|
||||
| `subject` | `ops@example.com` | User or service principal subject (falls back to `(anonymous)` when unauthenticated). |
|
||||
| `clientId` | `concelier-cli` | OAuth client ID provided by Authority (`(none)` if the token lacked the claim). |
|
||||
| `scopes` | `concelier.jobs.trigger advisory:ingest advisory:read` | Normalised scope list extracted from token claims; `(none)` if the token carried none. |
|
||||
| `tenant` | `tenant-default` | Tenant claim extracted from the Authority token (`(none)` when the token lacked it). |
|
||||
| `bypass` | `True` / `False` | Indicates whether the request succeeded because its source IP matched a bypass CIDR. |
|
||||
| `remote` | `10.1.4.7` | Remote IP recorded from the connection / forwarded header test hooks. |
|
||||
|
||||
Use your logging backend (e.g., Loki) to index the logger name and filter for suspicious combinations:
|
||||
|
||||
- `status=401 AND bypass=True` – bypass network accepted an unauthenticated call (should be temporary during rollout).
|
||||
- `status=202 AND scopes="(none)"` – a token without scopes triggered a job; tighten client configuration.
|
||||
- `status=202 AND NOT contains(scopes,"advisory:ingest")` – ingestion attempted without the new AOC scopes; confirm the Authority client registration matches the sample above.
|
||||
- `tenant!=(tenant-default)` – indicates a cross-tenant token was accepted. Ensure Concelier `requiredTenants` is aligned with Authority client registration.
|
||||
- Spike in `clientId="(none)"` – indicates upstream Authority is not issuing `client_id` claims or the CLI is outdated.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Metrics
|
||||
|
||||
Concelier publishes counters under the OTEL meter `StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Jobs`. Tags: `job.kind`, `job.trigger`, `job.outcome`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Metric name | Description | PromQL example |
|
||||
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------|
|
||||
| `web.jobs.triggered` | Accepted job trigger requests. | `sum by (job_kind) (rate(web_jobs_triggered_total[5m]))` |
|
||||
| `web.jobs.trigger.conflict` | Rejected triggers (already running, disabled…). | `sum(rate(web_jobs_trigger_conflict_total[5m]))` |
|
||||
| `web.jobs.trigger.failed` | Server-side job failures. | `sum(rate(web_jobs_trigger_failed_total[5m]))` |
|
||||
|
||||
> Prometheus/OTEL collectors typically surface counters with `_total` suffix. Adjust queries to match your pipeline’s generated metric names.
|
||||
|
||||
Correlate audit logs with the following global meter exported via `Concelier.SourceDiagnostics`:
|
||||
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.requests_total{concelier_source="jobs-run"}` – ensures REST/manual triggers route through Authority.
|
||||
- If Grafana dashboards are deployed, extend the “Concelier Jobs” board with the above counters plus a table of recent audit log entries.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Alerting Guidance
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Unauthorized bypass attempt**
|
||||
- Query: `sum(rate(log_messages_total{logger="Concelier.Authorization.Audit", status="401", bypass="True"}[5m])) > 0`
|
||||
- Action: verify `bypassNetworks` list; confirm expected maintenance windows; rotate credentials if suspicious.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Missing scopes**
|
||||
- Query: `sum(rate(log_messages_total{logger="Concelier.Authorization.Audit", scopes="(none)", status="200"}[5m])) > 0`
|
||||
- Action: audit Authority client registration; ensure `requiredScopes` includes `concelier.jobs.trigger`, `advisory:ingest`, and `advisory:read`.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Trigger failure surge**
|
||||
- Query: `sum(rate(web_jobs_trigger_failed_total[10m])) > 0` with severity `warning` if sustained for 10 minutes.
|
||||
- Action: inspect correlated audit entries and `Concelier.Telemetry` traces for job execution errors.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Conflict spike**
|
||||
- Query: `sum(rate(web_jobs_trigger_conflict_total[10m])) > 5` (tune threshold).
|
||||
- Action: downstream scheduling may be firing repetitive triggers; ensure precedence is configured properly.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Authority offline**
|
||||
- Watch `Concelier.Authorization.Audit` logs for `status=503` or `status=500` along with `clientId="(none)"`. Investigate Authority availability before re-enabling anonymous fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Rollout & Verification Procedure
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Pre-checks**
|
||||
- Align with the rollout phases documented in `docs/10_CONCELIER_CLI_QUICKSTART.md` (validation → rehearsal → enforced) and record the target dates in your change request.
|
||||
- Confirm `allowAnonymousFallback` is `false` in production; keep `true` only during staged validation.
|
||||
- Validate Authority issuer metadata is reachable from Concelier (`curl https://authority.internal/.well-known/openid-configuration` from the host).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Smoke test with valid token**
|
||||
- Obtain a token via CLI: `stella auth login --scope "concelier.jobs.trigger advisory:ingest" --scope advisory:read`.
|
||||
- Trigger a read-only endpoint: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://concelier.internal/jobs/definitions`.
|
||||
- Expect HTTP 200/202 and an audit log with `bypass=False`, `scopes=concelier.jobs.trigger advisory:ingest advisory:read`, and `tenant=tenant-default`.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Negative test without token**
|
||||
- Call the same endpoint without a token. Expect HTTP 401, `bypass=False`.
|
||||
- If the request succeeds, double-check `bypassNetworks` and ensure fallback is disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Bypass check (if applicable)**
|
||||
- From an allowed maintenance IP, call `/jobs/definitions` without a token. Confirm the audit log shows `bypass=True`. Review business justification and expiry date for such entries.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Metrics validation**
|
||||
- Ensure `web.jobs.triggered` counter increments during accepted runs.
|
||||
- Exporters should show corresponding spans (`concelier.job.trigger`) if tracing is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Troubleshooting
|
||||
|
||||
| Symptom | Probable cause | Remediation |
|
||||
|---------|----------------|-------------|
|
||||
| Audit log shows `clientId=(none)` for all requests | Authority not issuing `client_id` claim or CLI outdated | Update StellaOps Authority configuration (`StellaOpsAuthorityOptions.Token.Claims.ClientId`), or upgrade the CLI token acquisition flow. |
|
||||
| Requests succeed with `bypass=True` unexpectedly | Local network added to `bypassNetworks` or fallback still enabled | Remove/adjust the CIDR list, disable anonymous fallback, restart Concelier. |
|
||||
| HTTP 401 with valid token | `requiredScopes` missing from client registration or token audience mismatch | Verify Authority client scopes (`concelier.jobs.trigger`) and ensure the token audience matches `audiences` config. |
|
||||
| Metrics missing from Prometheus | Telemetry exporters disabled or filter missing OTEL meter | Set `concelier.telemetry.enableMetrics=true`, ensure collector includes `StellaOps.Concelier.WebService.Jobs` meter. |
|
||||
| Sudden spike in `web.jobs.trigger.failed` | Downstream job failure or Authority timeout mid-request | Inspect Concelier job logs, re-run with tracing enabled, validate Authority latency. |
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. References
|
||||
|
||||
- `docs/21_INSTALL_GUIDE.md` – Authority configuration quick start.
|
||||
- `docs/17_SECURITY_HARDENING_GUIDE.md` – Security guardrails and enforcement deadlines.
|
||||
- `docs/modules/authority/operations/monitoring.md` – Authority-side monitoring and alerting playbook.
|
||||
- `StellaOps.Concelier.WebService/Filters/JobAuthorizationAuditFilter.cs` – source of audit log fields.
|
||||
160
docs/modules/concelier/operations/conflict-resolution.md
Normal file
160
docs/modules/concelier/operations/conflict-resolution.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
|
||||
# Concelier Conflict Resolution Runbook (Sprint 3)
|
||||
|
||||
This runbook equips Concelier operators to detect, triage, and resolve advisory conflicts now that the Sprint 3 merge engine landed (`AdvisoryPrecedenceMerger`, merge-event hashing, and telemetry counters). It builds on the canonical rules defined in `src/DEDUP_CONFLICTS_RESOLUTION_ALGO.md` and the metrics/logging instrumentation delivered this sprint.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Precedence Model (recap)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Default ranking:** `GHSA -> NVD -> OSV`, with distro/vendor PSIRTs outranking ecosystem feeds (`AdvisoryPrecedenceDefaults`). Use `concelier:merge:precedence:ranks` to override per source when incident response requires it.
|
||||
- **Freshness override:** if a lower-ranked source is >= 48 hours newer for a freshness-sensitive field (title, summary, affected ranges, references, credits), it wins. Every override stamps `provenance[].decisionReason = freshness`.
|
||||
- **Tie-breakers:** when precedence and freshness tie, the engine falls back to (1) primary source order, (2) shortest normalized text, (3) lowest stable hash. Merge-generated provenance records set `decisionReason = tie-breaker`.
|
||||
- **Audit trail:** each merged advisory receives a `merge` provenance entry listing the participating sources plus a `merge_event` record with canonical before/after SHA-256 hashes.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Telemetry Shipped This Sprint
|
||||
|
||||
| Instrument | Type | Key Tags | Purpose |
|
||||
|------------|------|----------|---------|
|
||||
| `concelier.merge.operations` | Counter | `inputs` | Total precedence merges executed. |
|
||||
| `concelier.merge.overrides` | Counter | `primary_source`, `suppressed_source`, `primary_rank`, `suppressed_rank` | Field-level overrides chosen by precedence. |
|
||||
| `concelier.merge.range_overrides` | Counter | `advisory_key`, `package_type`, `primary_source`, `suppressed_source`, `primary_range_count`, `suppressed_range_count` | Package range overrides emitted by `AffectedPackagePrecedenceResolver`. |
|
||||
| `concelier.merge.conflicts` | Counter | `type` (`severity`, `precedence_tie`), `reason` (`mismatch`, `primary_missing`, `equal_rank`) | Conflicts requiring operator review. |
|
||||
| `concelier.merge.identity_conflicts` | Counter | `scheme`, `alias_value`, `advisory_count` | Alias collisions surfaced by the identity graph. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Structured logs
|
||||
|
||||
- `AdvisoryOverride` (EventId 1000) - logs merge suppressions with alias/provenance counts.
|
||||
- `PackageRangeOverride` (EventId 1001) - logs package-level precedence decisions.
|
||||
- `PrecedenceConflict` (EventId 1002) - logs mismatched severity or equal-rank scenarios.
|
||||
- `Alias collision ...` (no EventId) - emitted when `concelier.merge.identity_conflicts` increments.
|
||||
|
||||
Expect all logs at `Information`. Ensure OTEL exporters include the scope `StellaOps.Concelier.Merge`.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Detection & Alerting
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Dashboard panels**
|
||||
- `concelier.merge.conflicts` - table grouped by `type/reason`. Alert when > 0 in a 15 minute window.
|
||||
- `concelier.merge.range_overrides` - stacked bar by `package_type`. Spikes highlight vendor PSIRT overrides over registry data.
|
||||
- `concelier.merge.overrides` with `primary_source|suppressed_source` - catches unexpected precedence flips (e.g., OSV overtaking GHSA).
|
||||
- `concelier.merge.identity_conflicts` - single-stat; alert when alias collisions occur more than once per day.
|
||||
2. **Log based alerts**
|
||||
- `eventId=1002` with `reason="equal_rank"` - indicates precedence table gaps; page merge owners.
|
||||
- `eventId=1002` with `reason="mismatch"` - severity disagreement; open connector bug if sustained.
|
||||
3. **Job health**
|
||||
- `stellaops-cli db merge` exit code `1` signifies unresolved conflicts. Pipe to automation that captures logs and notifies #concelier-ops.
|
||||
|
||||
### Threshold updates (2025-10-12)
|
||||
|
||||
- `concelier.merge.conflicts` – Page only when ≥ 2 events fire within 30 minutes; the synthetic conflict fixture run produces 0 conflicts, so the first event now routes to Slack for manual review instead of paging.
|
||||
- `concelier.merge.overrides` – Raise a warning when the 30-minute sum exceeds 10 (canonical triple yields exactly 1 summary override with `primary_source=osv`, `suppressed_source=ghsa`).
|
||||
- `concelier.merge.range_overrides` – Maintain the 15-minute alert at ≥ 3 but annotate dashboards that the regression triple emits a single `package_type=semver` override so ops can spot unexpected spikes.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Triage Workflow
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Confirm job context**
|
||||
- `stellaops-cli db merge` (CLI) or `POST /jobs/merge:reconcile` (API) to rehydrate the merge job. Use `--verbose` to stream structured logs during triage.
|
||||
2. **Inspect metrics**
|
||||
- Correlate spikes in `concelier.merge.conflicts` with `primary_source`/`suppressed_source` tags from `concelier.merge.overrides`.
|
||||
3. **Pull structured logs**
|
||||
- Example (vector output):
|
||||
```
|
||||
jq 'select(.EventId.Name=="PrecedenceConflict") | {advisory: .State[0].Value, type: .ConflictType, reason: .Reason, primary: .PrimarySources, suppressed: .SuppressedSources}' stellaops-concelier.log
|
||||
```
|
||||
4. **Review merge events**
|
||||
- `mongosh`:
|
||||
```javascript
|
||||
use concelier;
|
||||
db.merge_event.find({ advisoryKey: "CVE-2025-1234" }).sort({ mergedAt: -1 }).limit(5);
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Compare `beforeHash` vs `afterHash` to confirm the merge actually changed canonical output.
|
||||
5. **Interrogate provenance**
|
||||
- `db.advisories.findOne({ advisoryKey: "CVE-2025-1234" }, { title: 1, severity: 1, provenance: 1, "affectedPackages.provenance": 1 })`
|
||||
- Check `provenance[].decisionReason` values (`precedence`, `freshness`, `tie-breaker`) to understand why the winning field was chosen.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Conflict Classification Matrix
|
||||
|
||||
| Signal | Likely Cause | Immediate Action |
|
||||
|--------|--------------|------------------|
|
||||
| `reason="mismatch"` with `type="severity"` | Upstream feeds disagree on CVSS vector/severity. | Verify which feed is freshest; if correctness is known, adjust connector mapping or precedence override. |
|
||||
| `reason="primary_missing"` | Higher-ranked source lacks the field entirely. | Backfill connector data or temporarily allow lower-ranked source via precedence override. |
|
||||
| `reason="equal_rank"` | Two feeds share the same precedence rank (custom config or missing entry). | Update `concelier:merge:precedence:ranks` to break the tie; restart merge job. |
|
||||
| Rising `concelier.merge.range_overrides` for a package type | Vendor PSIRT now supplies richer ranges. | Validate connectors emit `decisionReason="precedence"` and update dashboards to treat registry ranges as fallback. |
|
||||
| `concelier.merge.identity_conflicts` > 0 | Alias scheme mapping produced collisions (duplicate CVE <-> advisory pairs). | Inspect `Alias collision` log payload; reconcile the alias graph by adjusting connector alias output. |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Resolution Playbook
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Connector data fix**
|
||||
- Re-run the offending connector stages (`stellaops-cli db fetch --source ghsa --stage map` etc.).
|
||||
- Once fixed, rerun merge and verify `decisionReason` reflects `freshness` or `precedence` as expected.
|
||||
2. **Temporary precedence override**
|
||||
- Edit `etc/concelier.yaml`:
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
merge:
|
||||
precedence:
|
||||
ranks:
|
||||
osv: 1
|
||||
ghsa: 0
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Restart Concelier workers; confirm tags in `concelier.merge.overrides` show the new ranks.
|
||||
- Document the override with expiry in the change log.
|
||||
3. **Alias remediation**
|
||||
- Update connector mapping rules to weed out duplicate aliases (e.g., skip GHSA aliases that mirror CVE IDs).
|
||||
- Flush cached alias graphs if necessary (`db.alias_graph.drop()` is destructive-coordinate with Storage before issuing).
|
||||
4. **Escalation**
|
||||
- If override metrics spike due to upstream regression, open an incident with Security Guild, referencing merge logs and `merge_event` IDs.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Validation Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Merge job rerun returns exit code `0`.
|
||||
- [ ] `concelier.merge.conflicts` baseline returns to zero after corrective action.
|
||||
- [ ] Latest `merge_event` entry shows expected hash delta.
|
||||
- [ ] Affected advisory document shows updated `provenance[].decisionReason`.
|
||||
- [ ] Ops change log updated with incident summary, config overrides, and rollback plan.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Reference Material
|
||||
|
||||
- Canonical conflict rules: `src/DEDUP_CONFLICTS_RESOLUTION_ALGO.md`.
|
||||
- Merge engine internals: `src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge/Services/AdvisoryPrecedenceMerger.cs`.
|
||||
- Metrics definitions: `src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge/Services/AdvisoryMergeService.cs` (identity conflicts) and `AdvisoryPrecedenceMerger`.
|
||||
- Storage audit trail: `src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge/Services/MergeEventWriter.cs`, `src/Concelier/__Libraries/StellaOps.Concelier.Storage.Mongo/MergeEvents`.
|
||||
|
||||
Keep this runbook synchronized with future sprint notes and update alert thresholds as baseline volumes change.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Synthetic Regression Fixtures
|
||||
|
||||
- **Locations** – Canonical conflict snapshots now live at `src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ghsa.Tests/Fixtures/conflict-ghsa.canonical.json`, `src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Nvd.Tests/Nvd/Fixtures/conflict-nvd.canonical.json`, and `src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Osv.Tests/Fixtures/conflict-osv.canonical.json`.
|
||||
- **Validation commands** – To regenerate and verify the fixtures offline, run:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
dotnet test src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ghsa.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ghsa.Tests.csproj --filter GhsaConflictFixtureTests
|
||||
dotnet test src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Nvd.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Nvd.Tests.csproj --filter NvdConflictFixtureTests
|
||||
dotnet test src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Osv.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Osv.Tests.csproj --filter OsvConflictFixtureTests
|
||||
dotnet test src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Merge.Tests.csproj --filter MergeAsync_AppliesCanonicalRulesAndPersistsDecisions
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **Expected signals** – The triple produces one freshness-driven summary override (`primary_source=osv`, `suppressed_source=ghsa`) and one range override for the npm SemVer package while leaving `concelier.merge.conflicts` at zero. Use these values as the baseline when tuning dashboards or load-testing alert pipelines.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Change Log
|
||||
|
||||
| Date (UTC) | Change | Notes |
|
||||
|------------|--------|-------|
|
||||
| 2025-10-16 | Ops review signed off after connector expansion (CCCS, CERT-Bund, KISA, ICS CISA, MSRC) landed. Alert thresholds from §3 reaffirmed; dashboards updated to watch attachment signals emitted by ICS CISA connector. | Ops sign-off recorded by Concelier Ops Guild; no additional overrides required. |
|
||||
77
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/apple.md
Normal file
77
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/apple.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
||||
# Concelier Apple Security Update Connector Operations
|
||||
|
||||
This runbook covers staging and production rollout for the Apple security updates connector (`source:vndr-apple:*`), including observability checks and fixture maintenance.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- Network egress (or mirrored cache) for `https://gdmf.apple.com/v2/pmv` and the Apple Support domain (`https://support.apple.com/`).
|
||||
- Optional: corporate proxy exclusions for the Apple hosts if outbound traffic is normally filtered.
|
||||
- Updated configuration (environment variables or `concelier.yaml`) with an `apple` section. Example baseline:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
apple:
|
||||
softwareLookupUri: "https://gdmf.apple.com/v2/pmv"
|
||||
advisoryBaseUri: "https://support.apple.com/"
|
||||
localeSegment: "en-us"
|
||||
maxAdvisoriesPerFetch: 25
|
||||
initialBackfill: "120.00:00:00"
|
||||
modifiedTolerance: "02:00:00"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> ℹ️ `softwareLookupUri` and `advisoryBaseUri` must stay absolute and aligned with the HTTP allow-list; Concelier automatically adds both hosts to the connector HttpClient.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Staging Smoke Test
|
||||
|
||||
1. Deploy the configuration and restart the Concelier workers to ensure the Apple connector options are bound.
|
||||
2. Trigger a full connector cycle:
|
||||
- CLI: `stella db jobs run source:vndr-apple:fetch --and-then source:vndr-apple:parse --and-then source:vndr-apple:map`
|
||||
- REST: `POST /jobs/run { "kind": "source:vndr-apple:fetch", "chain": ["source:vndr-apple:parse", "source:vndr-apple:map"] }`
|
||||
3. Validate metrics exported under meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Apple`:
|
||||
- `apple.fetch.items` (documents fetched)
|
||||
- `apple.fetch.failures`
|
||||
- `apple.fetch.unchanged`
|
||||
- `apple.parse.failures`
|
||||
- `apple.map.affected.count` (histogram of affected package counts)
|
||||
4. Cross-check the shared HTTP counters:
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.requests_total{concelier_source="vndr-apple"}` should increase for both index and detail phases.
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.failures_total{concelier_source="vndr-apple"}` should remain flat (0) during a healthy run.
|
||||
5. Inspect the info logs:
|
||||
- `Apple software index fetch … processed=X newDocuments=Y`
|
||||
- `Apple advisory parse complete … aliases=… affected=…`
|
||||
- `Mapped Apple advisory … pendingMappings=0`
|
||||
6. Confirm MongoDB state:
|
||||
- `raw_documents` store contains the HT article HTML with metadata (`apple.articleId`, `apple.postingDate`).
|
||||
- `dtos` store has `schemaVersion="apple.security.update.v1"`.
|
||||
- `advisories` collection includes keys `HTxxxxxx` with normalized SemVer rules.
|
||||
- `source_states` entry for `apple` shows a recent `cursor.lastPosted`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Production Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dashboards** – Add the following expressions to your Concelier Grafana board (OTLP/Prometheus naming assumed):
|
||||
- `rate(apple_fetch_items_total[15m])` vs `rate(concelier_source_http_requests_total{concelier_source="vndr-apple"}[15m])`
|
||||
- `rate(apple_fetch_failures_total[5m])` for error spikes (`severity=warning` at `>0`)
|
||||
- `histogram_quantile(0.95, rate(apple_map_affected_count_bucket[1h]))` to watch affected-package fan-out
|
||||
- `increase(apple_parse_failures_total[6h])` to catch parser drift (alerts at `>0`)
|
||||
- **Alerts** – Page if `rate(apple_fetch_items_total[2h]) == 0` during business hours while other connectors are active. This often indicates lookup feed failures or misconfigured allow-lists.
|
||||
- **Logs** – Surface warnings `Apple document {DocumentId} missing GridFS payload` or `Apple parse failed`—repeated hits imply storage issues or HTML regressions.
|
||||
- **Telemetry pipeline** – `StellaOps.Concelier.WebService` now exports `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Apple` alongside existing Concelier meters; ensure your OTEL collector or Prometheus scraper includes it.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Fixture Maintenance
|
||||
|
||||
Regression fixtures live under `src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Apple.Tests/Apple/Fixtures`. Refresh them whenever Apple reshapes the HT layout or when new platforms appear.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Run the helper script matching your platform:
|
||||
- Bash: `./scripts/update-apple-fixtures.sh`
|
||||
- PowerShell: `./scripts/update-apple-fixtures.ps1`
|
||||
2. Each script exports `UPDATE_APPLE_FIXTURES=1`, updates the `WSLENV` passthrough, and touches `.update-apple-fixtures` so WSL+VS Code test runs observe the flag. The subsequent test execution fetches the live HT articles listed in `AppleFixtureManager`, sanitises the HTML, and rewrites the `.expected.json` DTO snapshots.
|
||||
3. Review the diff for localisation or nav noise. Once satisfied, re-run the tests without the env var (`dotnet test src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Apple.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Apple.Tests.csproj`) to verify determinism.
|
||||
4. Commit fixture updates together with any parser/mapping changes that motivated them.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Known Issues & Follow-up Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
- Apple occasionally throttles anonymous requests after bursts. The connector backs off automatically, but persistent `apple.fetch.failures` spikes might require mirroring the HT content or scheduling wider fetch windows.
|
||||
- Rapid Security Responses may appear before the general patch notes surface in the lookup JSON. When that happens, the fetch run will log `detailFailures>0`. Collect sample HTML and refresh fixtures to confirm parser coverage.
|
||||
- Multi-locale content is still under regression sweep (`src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Apple/TASKS.md`). Capture non-`en-us` snapshots once the fixture tooling stabilises.
|
||||
72
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cccs.md
Normal file
72
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cccs.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
|
||||
# Concelier CCCS Connector Operations
|
||||
|
||||
This runbook covers day‑to‑day operation of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (`source:cccs:*`) connector, including configuration, telemetry, and historical backfill guidance for English/French advisories.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Configuration Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
- Network egress (or mirrored cache) for `https://www.cyber.gc.ca/` and the JSON API endpoints under `/api/cccs/`.
|
||||
- Set the Concelier options before restarting workers. Example `concelier.yaml` snippet:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
cccs:
|
||||
feeds:
|
||||
- language: "en"
|
||||
uri: "https://www.cyber.gc.ca/api/cccs/threats/v1/get?lang=en&content_type=cccs_threat"
|
||||
- language: "fr"
|
||||
uri: "https://www.cyber.gc.ca/api/cccs/threats/v1/get?lang=fr&content_type=cccs_threat"
|
||||
maxEntriesPerFetch: 80 # increase temporarily for backfill runs
|
||||
maxKnownEntries: 512
|
||||
requestTimeout: "00:00:30"
|
||||
requestDelay: "00:00:00.250"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> ℹ️ The `/api/cccs/threats/v1/get` endpoint returns thousands of records per language (≈5 100 rows each as of 2025‑10‑14). The connector honours `maxEntriesPerFetch`, so leave it low for steady‑state and raise it for planned backfills.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Telemetry & Logging
|
||||
|
||||
- **Metrics (Meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cccs`):**
|
||||
- `cccs.fetch.attempts`, `cccs.fetch.success`, `cccs.fetch.failures`
|
||||
- `cccs.fetch.documents`, `cccs.fetch.unchanged`
|
||||
- `cccs.parse.success`, `cccs.parse.failures`, `cccs.parse.quarantine`
|
||||
- `cccs.map.success`, `cccs.map.failures`
|
||||
- **Shared HTTP metrics** via `SourceDiagnostics`:
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.requests{concelier.source="cccs"}`
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.failures{concelier.source="cccs"}`
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.duration{concelier.source="cccs"}`
|
||||
- **Structured logs**
|
||||
- `CCCS fetch completed feeds=… items=… newDocuments=… pendingDocuments=…`
|
||||
- `CCCS parse completed parsed=… failures=…`
|
||||
- `CCCS map completed mapped=… failures=…`
|
||||
- Warnings fire when GridFS payloads/DTOs go missing or parser sanitisation fails.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested Grafana alerts:
|
||||
- `increase(cccs.fetch.failures_total[15m]) > 0`
|
||||
- `rate(cccs.map.success_total[1h]) == 0` while other connectors are active
|
||||
- `histogram_quantile(0.95, rate(concelier_source_http_duration_bucket{concelier_source="cccs"}[1h])) > 5s`
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Historical Backfill Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Snapshot the source** – the API accepts `page=<n>` and `lang=<en|fr>` query parameters. `page=0` returns the full dataset (observed earliest `date_created`: 2018‑06‑08 for EN, 2018‑06‑08 for FR). Mirror those responses into Offline Kit storage when operating air‑gapped.
|
||||
2. **Stage ingestion**:
|
||||
- Temporarily raise `maxEntriesPerFetch` (e.g. 500) and restart Concelier workers.
|
||||
- Run chained jobs until `pendingDocuments` drains:
|
||||
`stella db jobs run source:cccs:fetch --and-then source:cccs:parse --and-then source:cccs:map`
|
||||
- Monitor `cccs.fetch.unchanged` growth; once it approaches dataset size the backfill is complete.
|
||||
3. **Optional pagination sweep** – for incremental mirrors, iterate `page=<n>` (0…N) while `response.Count == 50`, persisting JSON to disk. Store alongside metadata (`language`, `page`, SHA256) so repeated runs detect drift.
|
||||
4. **Language split** – keep EN/FR payloads separate to preserve canonical language fields. The connector emits `Language` directly from the feed entry, so mixed ingestion simply produces parallel advisories keyed by the same serial number.
|
||||
5. **Throttle planning** – schedule backfills during maintenance windows; the API tolerates burst downloads but respect the 250 ms request delay or raise it if mirrored traffic is not available.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Selector & Sanitiser Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- `CccsHtmlParser` now parses the **unsanitised DOM** (via AngleSharp) and only sanitises when persisting `ContentHtml`.
|
||||
- Product extraction walks headings (`Affected Products`, `Produits touchés`, `Mesures recommandées`) and consumes nested lists within `div/section/article` containers.
|
||||
- `HtmlContentSanitizer` allows `<h1>…<h6>` and `<section>` so stored HTML keeps headings for UI rendering and downstream summarisation.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Fixture Maintenance
|
||||
|
||||
- Regression fixtures live in `src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cccs.Tests/Fixtures`.
|
||||
- Refresh via `UPDATE_CCCS_FIXTURES=1 dotnet test src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cccs.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cccs.Tests.csproj`.
|
||||
- Fixtures capture both EN/FR advisories with nested lists to guard against sanitiser regressions; review diffs for heading/list changes before committing.
|
||||
146
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/certbund.md
Normal file
146
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/certbund.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
|
||||
# Concelier CERT-Bund Connector Operations
|
||||
|
||||
_Last updated: 2025-10-17_
|
||||
|
||||
Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) operates the Warn- und Informationsdienst (WID) portal. The Concelier CERT-Bund connector (`source:cert-bund:*`) ingests the public RSS feed, hydrates the portal’s JSON detail endpoint, and maps the result into canonical advisories while preserving the original German content.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Configuration Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
- Allow outbound access (or stage mirrors) for:
|
||||
- `https://wid.cert-bund.de/content/public/securityAdvisory/rss`
|
||||
- `https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/` (session/bootstrap)
|
||||
- `https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/api/securityadvisory` (detail/search/export JSON)
|
||||
- Ensure the HTTP client reuses a cookie container (the connector’s dependency injection wiring already sets this up).
|
||||
|
||||
Example `concelier.yaml` fragment:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
cert-bund:
|
||||
feedUri: "https://wid.cert-bund.de/content/public/securityAdvisory/rss"
|
||||
portalBootstrapUri: "https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/"
|
||||
detailApiUri: "https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/api/securityadvisory"
|
||||
maxAdvisoriesPerFetch: 50
|
||||
maxKnownAdvisories: 512
|
||||
requestTimeout: "00:00:30"
|
||||
requestDelay: "00:00:00.250"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> Leave `maxAdvisoriesPerFetch` at 50 during normal operation. Raise it only for controlled backfills, then restore the default to avoid overwhelming the portal.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Telemetry & Logging
|
||||
|
||||
- **Meter**: `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.CertBund`
|
||||
- **Counters / histograms**:
|
||||
- `certbund.feed.fetch.attempts|success|failures`
|
||||
- `certbund.feed.items.count`
|
||||
- `certbund.feed.enqueued.count`
|
||||
- `certbund.feed.coverage.days`
|
||||
- `certbund.detail.fetch.attempts|success|not_modified|failures{reason}`
|
||||
- `certbund.parse.success|failures{reason}`
|
||||
- `certbund.parse.products.count`, `certbund.parse.cve.count`
|
||||
- `certbund.map.success|failures{reason}`
|
||||
- `certbund.map.affected.count`, `certbund.map.aliases.count`
|
||||
- Shared HTTP metrics remain available through `concelier.source.http.*`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Structured logs** (all emitted at information level when work occurs):
|
||||
|
||||
- `CERT-Bund fetch cycle: … truncated {Truncated}, coverageDays={CoverageDays}`
|
||||
- `CERT-Bund parse cycle: parsed {Parsed}, failures {Failures}, …`
|
||||
- `CERT-Bund map cycle: mapped {Mapped}, failures {Failures}, …`
|
||||
|
||||
Alerting ideas:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `increase(certbund.detail.fetch.failures_total[10m]) > 0`
|
||||
2. `rate(certbund.map.success_total[30m]) == 0`
|
||||
3. `histogram_quantile(0.95, rate(concelier_source_http_duration_bucket{concelier_source="cert-bund"}[15m])) > 5s`
|
||||
|
||||
The WebService now registers the meter so metrics surface automatically once OpenTelemetry metrics are enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Historical Backfill & Export Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Retention snapshot
|
||||
|
||||
- RSS window: ~250 advisories (≈90 days at current cadence).
|
||||
- Older advisories are accessible through the JSON search/export APIs once the anti-CSRF token is supplied.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 JSON search pagination
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# 1. Bootstrap cookies (client_config + XSRF-TOKEN)
|
||||
curl -s -c cookies.txt "https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/" > /dev/null
|
||||
curl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt \
|
||||
-H "X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest" \
|
||||
"https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/api/security/csrf" > /dev/null
|
||||
|
||||
XSRF=$(awk '/XSRF-TOKEN/ {print $7}' cookies.txt)
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Page search results
|
||||
curl -s -b cookies.txt \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
-H "Accept: application/json" \
|
||||
-H "X-XSRF-TOKEN: ${XSRF}" \
|
||||
-X POST \
|
||||
--data '{"page":4,"size":100,"sort":["published,desc"]}' \
|
||||
"https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/api/securityadvisory/search" \
|
||||
> certbund-page4.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Iterate `page` until the response `content` array is empty. Pages 0–9 currently cover 2014→present. Persist JSON responses (plus SHA256) for Offline Kit parity.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Shortcut** – run `python src/Tools/certbund_offline_snapshot.py --output seed-data/cert-bund`
|
||||
> to bootstrap the session, capture the paginated search responses, and regenerate
|
||||
> the manifest/checksum files automatically. Supply `--cookie-file` and `--xsrf-token`
|
||||
> if the portal requires a browser-derived session (see options via `--help`).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Export bundles
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python src/Tools/certbund_offline_snapshot.py \
|
||||
--output seed-data/cert-bund \
|
||||
--start-year 2014 \
|
||||
--end-year "$(date -u +%Y)"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The helper stores yearly exports under `seed-data/cert-bund/export/`,
|
||||
captures paginated search snapshots in `seed-data/cert-bund/search/`,
|
||||
and generates the manifest + SHA files in `seed-data/cert-bund/manifest/`.
|
||||
Split ranges according to your compliance window (default: one file per
|
||||
calendar year). Concelier can ingest these JSON payloads directly when
|
||||
operating offline.
|
||||
|
||||
> When automatic bootstrap fails (e.g. portal introduces CAPTCHA), run the
|
||||
> manual `curl` flow above, then rerun the helper with `--skip-fetch` to
|
||||
> rebuild the manifest from the existing files.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.4 Connector-driven catch-up
|
||||
|
||||
1. Temporarily raise `maxAdvisoriesPerFetch` (e.g. 150) and reduce `requestDelay`.
|
||||
2. Run `stella db jobs run source:cert-bund:fetch --and-then source:cert-bund:parse --and-then source:cert-bund:map` until the fetch log reports `enqueued=0`.
|
||||
3. Restore defaults and capture the cursor snapshot for audit.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Locale & Translation Guidance
|
||||
|
||||
- Advisories remain in German (`language: "de"`). Preserve wording for provenance and legal accuracy.
|
||||
- UI localisation: enable the translation bundles documented in `docs/15_UI_GUIDE.md` if English UI copy is required. Operators can overlay machine or human translations, but the canonical database stores the source text.
|
||||
- Docs guild is compiling a CERT-Bund terminology glossary under `docs/locale/certbund-glossary.md` so downstream teams can reference consistent English equivalents without altering the stored advisories.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Verification Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
1. Observe `certbund.feed.fetch.success` and `certbund.detail.fetch.success` increments after runs; `certbund.feed.coverage.days` should hover near the observed RSS window.
|
||||
2. Ensure summary logs report `truncated=false` in steady state—`true` indicates the fetch cap was hit.
|
||||
3. During backfills, watch `certbund.feed.enqueued.count` trend to zero.
|
||||
4. Spot-check stored advisories in Mongo to confirm `language="de"` and reference URLs match the portal detail endpoint.
|
||||
5. For Offline Kit exports, validate SHA256 hashes before distribution.
|
||||
94
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cisco.md
Normal file
94
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cisco.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
# Concelier Cisco PSIRT Connector – OAuth Provisioning SOP
|
||||
|
||||
_Last updated: 2025-10-14_
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Scope
|
||||
|
||||
This runbook describes how Ops provisions, rotates, and distributes Cisco PSIRT openVuln OAuth client credentials for the Concelier Cisco connector. It covers online and air-gapped (Offline Kit) environments, quota-aware execution, and escalation paths.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- Active Cisco.com (CCO) account with access to the Cisco API Console.
|
||||
- Cisco PSIRT openVuln API entitlement (visible under “My Apps & Keys” once granted).citeturn3search0
|
||||
- Concelier configuration location (typically `/etc/stella/concelier.yaml` in production) or Offline Kit secret bundle staging directory.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Provisioning workflow
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Register the application**
|
||||
- Sign in at <https://apiconsole.cisco.com>.
|
||||
- Select **Register a New App** → Application Type: `Service`, Grant Type: `Client Credentials`, API: `Cisco PSIRT openVuln API`.citeturn3search0
|
||||
- Record the generated `clientId` and `clientSecret` in the Ops vault.
|
||||
2. **Verify token issuance**
|
||||
- Request an access token with:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -s https://id.cisco.com/oauth2/default/v1/token \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
|
||||
-d "grant_type=client_credentials" \
|
||||
-d "client_id=${CLIENT_ID}" \
|
||||
-d "client_secret=${CLIENT_SECRET}"
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Confirm HTTP 200 and an `expires_in` value of 3600 seconds (tokens live for one hour).citeturn3search0turn3search7
|
||||
- Preserve the response only long enough to validate syntax; do **not** persist tokens.
|
||||
3. **Authorize Concelier runtime**
|
||||
- Update `concelier:sources:cisco:auth` (or the module-specific secret template) with the stored credentials.
|
||||
- For Offline Kit delivery, export encrypted secrets into `offline-kit/secrets/cisco-openvuln.json` using the platform’s sealed secret format.
|
||||
4. **Connectivity validation**
|
||||
- From the Concelier control plane, run `stella db jobs run source:vndr-cisco:fetch --dry-run`.
|
||||
- Ensure the Source HTTP diagnostics record `Bearer` authorization headers and no 401/403 responses.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Rotation SOP
|
||||
|
||||
| Step | Owner | Notes |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| 1. Schedule rotation | Ops (monthly board) | Rotate every 90 days or immediately after suspected credential exposure. |
|
||||
| 2. Create replacement app | Ops | Repeat §3.1 with “-next” suffix; verify token issuance. |
|
||||
| 3. Stage dual credentials | Ops + Concelier On-Call | Publish new credentials to secret store alongside current pair. |
|
||||
| 4. Cut over | Concelier On-Call | Restart connector workers during a low-traffic window (<10 min) to pick up the new secret. |
|
||||
| 5. Deactivate legacy app | Ops | Delete prior app in Cisco API Console once telemetry confirms successful fetch/parse cycles for 2 consecutive hours. |
|
||||
|
||||
**Automation hooks**
|
||||
- Rotation reminders are tracked in OpsRunbookOps board (`OPS-RUN-KEYS` swim lane); add checklist items for Concelier Cisco when opening a rotation task.
|
||||
- Use the secret management pipeline (`ops/secrets/rotate.sh --connector cisco`) to template vault updates; the script renders a redacted diff for audit.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Offline Kit packaging
|
||||
|
||||
1. Generate the credential bundle using the Offline Kit CLI:
|
||||
`offline-kit secrets add cisco-openvuln --client-id … --client-secret …`
|
||||
2. Store the encrypted payload under `offline-kit/secrets/cisco-openvuln.enc`.
|
||||
3. Distribute via the Offline Kit channel; update `offline-kit/MANIFEST.md` with the credential fingerprint (SHA256 of plaintext concatenated with metadata).
|
||||
4. Document validation steps for the receiving site (token request from an air-gapped relay or cached token mirror).
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Quota and throttling guidance
|
||||
|
||||
- Cisco enforces combined limits of 5 requests/second, 30 requests/minute, and 5 000 requests/day per application.citeturn0search0turn3search6
|
||||
- Concelier fetch jobs must respect `Retry-After` headers on HTTP 429 responses; Ops should monitor for sustained quota saturation and consider paging window adjustments.
|
||||
- Telemetry to watch: `concelier.source.http.requests{concelier.source="vndr-cisco"}`, `concelier.source.http.failures{...}`, and connector-specific metrics once implemented.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Telemetry & Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
- **Metrics (Meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Vndr.Cisco`)**
|
||||
- `cisco.fetch.documents`, `cisco.fetch.failures`, `cisco.fetch.unchanged`
|
||||
- `cisco.parse.success`, `cisco.parse.failures`
|
||||
- `cisco.map.success`, `cisco.map.failures`, `cisco.map.affected.packages`
|
||||
- **Shared HTTP metrics** via `SourceDiagnostics`:
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.requests{concelier.source="vndr-cisco"}`
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.failures{concelier.source="vndr-cisco"}`
|
||||
- `concelier.source.http.duration{concelier.source="vndr-cisco"}`
|
||||
- **Structured logs**
|
||||
- `Cisco fetch completed date=… pages=… added=…` (info)
|
||||
- `Cisco parse completed parsed=… failures=…` (info)
|
||||
- `Cisco map completed mapped=… failures=…` (info)
|
||||
- Warnings surface when DTO serialization fails or GridFS payload is missing.
|
||||
- Suggested alerts: non-zero `cisco.fetch.failures` in 15m, or `cisco.map.success` flatlines while fetch continues.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Incident response
|
||||
|
||||
- **Token compromise** – revoke the application in the Cisco API Console, purge cached secrets, rotate immediately per §4.
|
||||
- **Persistent 401/403** – confirm credentials in vault, then validate token issuance; if unresolved, open a Cisco DevNet support ticket referencing the application ID.
|
||||
- **429 spikes** – inspect job scheduler cadence and adjust connector options (`maxRequestsPerWindow`) before requesting higher quotas from Cisco.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. References
|
||||
|
||||
- Cisco PSIRT openVuln API Authentication Guide.citeturn3search0
|
||||
- Accessing the openVuln API using curl (token lifetime).citeturn3search7
|
||||
- openVuln API rate limit documentation.citeturn0search0turn3search6
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"title": "Concelier CVE & KEV Observability",
|
||||
"uid": "concelier-cve-kev",
|
||||
"schemaVersion": 38,
|
||||
"version": 1,
|
||||
"editable": true,
|
||||
"timezone": "",
|
||||
"time": {
|
||||
"from": "now-24h",
|
||||
"to": "now"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"refresh": "5m",
|
||||
"templating": {
|
||||
"list": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "datasource",
|
||||
"type": "datasource",
|
||||
"query": "prometheus",
|
||||
"refresh": 1,
|
||||
"hide": 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"panels": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "timeseries",
|
||||
"title": "CVE fetch success vs failure",
|
||||
"gridPos": { "h": 9, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 0 },
|
||||
"fieldConfig": {
|
||||
"defaults": {
|
||||
"unit": "ops",
|
||||
"custom": {
|
||||
"drawStyle": "line",
|
||||
"lineWidth": 2,
|
||||
"fillOpacity": 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"overrides": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"targets": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "A",
|
||||
"expr": "rate(cve_fetch_success_total[5m])",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" },
|
||||
"legendFormat": "success"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "B",
|
||||
"expr": "rate(cve_fetch_failures_total[5m])",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" },
|
||||
"legendFormat": "failure"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "timeseries",
|
||||
"title": "KEV fetch cadence",
|
||||
"gridPos": { "h": 9, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 0 },
|
||||
"fieldConfig": {
|
||||
"defaults": {
|
||||
"unit": "ops",
|
||||
"custom": {
|
||||
"drawStyle": "line",
|
||||
"lineWidth": 2,
|
||||
"fillOpacity": 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"overrides": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"targets": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "A",
|
||||
"expr": "rate(kev_fetch_success_total[30m])",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" },
|
||||
"legendFormat": "success"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "B",
|
||||
"expr": "rate(kev_fetch_failures_total[30m])",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" },
|
||||
"legendFormat": "failure"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "C",
|
||||
"expr": "rate(kev_fetch_unchanged_total[30m])",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" },
|
||||
"legendFormat": "unchanged"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "table",
|
||||
"title": "KEV parse anomalies (24h)",
|
||||
"gridPos": { "h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 9 },
|
||||
"fieldConfig": {
|
||||
"defaults": {
|
||||
"unit": "short"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"overrides": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"targets": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "A",
|
||||
"expr": "sum by (reason) (increase(kev_parse_anomalies_total[24h]))",
|
||||
"format": "table",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"transformations": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "organize",
|
||||
"options": {
|
||||
"renameByName": {
|
||||
"Value": "count"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"type": "timeseries",
|
||||
"title": "Advisories emitted",
|
||||
"gridPos": { "h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 9 },
|
||||
"fieldConfig": {
|
||||
"defaults": {
|
||||
"unit": "ops",
|
||||
"custom": {
|
||||
"drawStyle": "line",
|
||||
"lineWidth": 2,
|
||||
"fillOpacity": 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"overrides": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"targets": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "A",
|
||||
"expr": "rate(cve_map_success_total[15m])",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" },
|
||||
"legendFormat": "CVE"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"refId": "B",
|
||||
"expr": "rate(kev_map_advisories_total[24h])",
|
||||
"datasource": { "type": "prometheus", "uid": "${datasource}" },
|
||||
"legendFormat": "KEV"
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
143
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cve-kev.md
Normal file
143
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cve-kev.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
|
||||
# Concelier CVE & KEV Connector Operations
|
||||
|
||||
This playbook equips operators with the steps required to roll out and monitor the CVE Services and CISA KEV connectors across environments.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. CVE Services Connector (`source:cve:*`)
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.1 Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- CVE Services API credentials (organisation ID, user ID, API key) with access to the JSON 5 API.
|
||||
- Network egress to `https://cveawg.mitre.org` (or a mirrored endpoint) from the Concelier workers.
|
||||
- Updated `concelier.yaml` (or the matching environment variables) with the following section:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
cve:
|
||||
baseEndpoint: "https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/"
|
||||
apiOrg: "ORG123"
|
||||
apiUser: "user@example.org"
|
||||
apiKeyFile: "/var/run/secrets/concelier/cve-api-key"
|
||||
seedDirectory: "./seed-data/cve"
|
||||
pageSize: 200
|
||||
maxPagesPerFetch: 5
|
||||
initialBackfill: "30.00:00:00"
|
||||
requestDelay: "00:00:00.250"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:10:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> ℹ️ Store the API key outside source control. When using `apiKeyFile`, mount the secret file into the container/host; alternatively supply `apiKey` via `CONCELIER_SOURCES__CVE__APIKEY`.
|
||||
|
||||
> 🪙 When credentials are not yet available, configure `seedDirectory` to point at mirrored CVE JSON (for example, the repo’s `seed-data/cve/` bundle). The connector will ingest those records and log a warning instead of failing the job; live fetching resumes automatically once `apiOrg` / `apiUser` / `apiKey` are supplied.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.2 Smoke Test (staging)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Deploy the updated configuration and restart the Concelier service so the connector picks up the credentials.
|
||||
2. Trigger one end-to-end cycle:
|
||||
- Concelier CLI: `stella db jobs run source:cve:fetch --and-then source:cve:parse --and-then source:cve:map`
|
||||
- REST fallback: `POST /jobs/run { "kind": "source:cve:fetch", "chain": ["source:cve:parse", "source:cve:map"] }`
|
||||
3. Observe the following metrics (exported via OTEL meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cve`):
|
||||
- `cve.fetch.attempts`, `cve.fetch.success`, `cve.fetch.documents`, `cve.fetch.failures`, `cve.fetch.unchanged`
|
||||
- `cve.parse.success`, `cve.parse.failures`, `cve.parse.quarantine`
|
||||
- `cve.map.success`
|
||||
4. Verify Prometheus shows matching `concelier.source.http.requests_total{concelier_source="cve"}` deltas (list vs detail phases) while `concelier.source.http.failures_total{concelier_source="cve"}` stays flat.
|
||||
5. Confirm the info-level summary log `CVEs fetch window … pages=X detailDocuments=Y detailFailures=Z` appears once per fetch run and shows `detailFailures=0`.
|
||||
6. Verify the MongoDB advisory store contains fresh CVE advisories (`advisoryKey` prefix `cve/`) and that the source cursor (`source_states` collection) advanced.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.3 Production Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dashboards** – Plot `rate(cve_fetch_success_total[5m])`, `rate(cve_fetch_failures_total[5m])`, and `rate(cve_fetch_documents_total[5m])` alongside `concelier_source_http_requests_total{concelier_source="cve"}` to confirm HTTP and connector counters stay aligned. Keep `concelier.range.primitives{scheme=~"semver|vendor"}` on the same board for range coverage. Example alerts:
|
||||
- `rate(cve_fetch_failures_total[5m]) > 0` for 10 minutes (`severity=warning`)
|
||||
- `rate(cve_map_success_total[15m]) == 0` while `rate(cve_fetch_success_total[15m]) > 0` (`severity=critical`)
|
||||
- `sum_over_time(cve_parse_quarantine_total[1h]) > 0` to catch schema anomalies
|
||||
- **Logs** – Monitor warnings such as `Failed fetching CVE record {CveId}` and `Malformed CVE JSON`, and surface the summary info log `CVEs fetch window … detailFailures=0 detailUnchanged=0` on dashboards. A non-zero `detailFailures` usually indicates rate-limit or auth issues on detail requests.
|
||||
- **Grafana pack** – Import `docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cve-kev-grafana-dashboard.json` and filter by panel legend (`CVE`, `KEV`) to reuse the canned layout.
|
||||
- **Backfill window** – Operators can tighten or widen `initialBackfill` / `maxPagesPerFetch` after validating throughput. Update config and restart Concelier to apply changes.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.4 Staging smoke log (2025-10-15)
|
||||
|
||||
While Ops finalises long-lived CVE Services credentials, we validated the connector end-to-end against the recorded CVE-2024-0001 payloads used in regression tests:
|
||||
|
||||
- Command: `dotnet test src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cve.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cve.Tests.csproj -l "console;verbosity=detailed"`
|
||||
- Summary log emitted by the connector:
|
||||
```
|
||||
CVEs fetch window 2024-09-01T00:00:00Z->2024-10-01T00:00:00Z pages=1 listSuccess=1 detailDocuments=1 detailFailures=0 detailUnchanged=0 pendingDocuments=0->1 pendingMappings=0->1 hasMorePages=False nextWindowStart=2024-09-15T12:00:00Z nextWindowEnd=(none) nextPage=1
|
||||
```
|
||||
- Telemetry captured by `Meter` `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Cve`:
|
||||
| Metric | Value |
|
||||
|--------|-------|
|
||||
| `cve.fetch.attempts` | 1 |
|
||||
| `cve.fetch.success` | 1 |
|
||||
| `cve.fetch.documents` | 1 |
|
||||
| `cve.parse.success` | 1 |
|
||||
| `cve.map.success` | 1 |
|
||||
|
||||
The Grafana pack `docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cve-kev-grafana-dashboard.json` has been imported into staging so the panels referenced above render against these counters once the live API keys are in place.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. CISA KEV Connector (`source:kev:*`)
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- Network egress (or mirrored content) for `https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json`.
|
||||
- No credentials are required, but the HTTP allow-list must include `www.cisa.gov`.
|
||||
- Confirm the following snippet in `concelier.yaml` (defaults shown; tune as needed):
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
kev:
|
||||
feedUri: "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json"
|
||||
requestTimeout: "00:01:00"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Schema validation & anomaly handling
|
||||
|
||||
The connector validates each catalog against `Schemas/kev-catalog.schema.json`. Failures increment `kev.parse.failures_total{reason="schema"}` and the document is quarantined (status `Failed`). Additional failure reasons include `download`, `invalidJson`, `deserialize`, `missingPayload`, and `emptyCatalog`. Entry-level anomalies are surfaced through `kev.parse.anomalies_total` with reasons:
|
||||
|
||||
| Reason | Meaning |
|
||||
| --- | --- |
|
||||
| `missingCveId` | Catalog entry omitted `cveID`; the entry is skipped. |
|
||||
| `countMismatch` | Catalog `count` field disagreed with the actual entry total. |
|
||||
| `nullEntry` | Upstream emitted a `null` entry object (rare upstream defect). |
|
||||
|
||||
Treat repeated schema failures or growing anomaly counts as an upstream regression and coordinate with CISA or mirror maintainers.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 Smoke Test (staging)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Deploy the configuration and restart Concelier.
|
||||
2. Trigger a pipeline run:
|
||||
- CLI: `stella db jobs run source:kev:fetch --and-then source:kev:parse --and-then source:kev:map`
|
||||
- REST: `POST /jobs/run { "kind": "source:kev:fetch", "chain": ["source:kev:parse", "source:kev:map"] }`
|
||||
3. Verify the metrics exposed by meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Kev`:
|
||||
- `kev.fetch.attempts`, `kev.fetch.success`, `kev.fetch.unchanged`, `kev.fetch.failures`
|
||||
- `kev.parse.entries` (tag `catalogVersion`), `kev.parse.failures`, `kev.parse.anomalies` (tag `reason`)
|
||||
- `kev.map.advisories` (tag `catalogVersion`)
|
||||
4. Confirm `concelier.source.http.requests_total{concelier_source="kev"}` increments once per fetch and that the paired `concelier.source.http.failures_total` stays flat (zero increase).
|
||||
5. Inspect the info logs `Fetched KEV catalog document … pendingDocuments=…` and `Parsed KEV catalog document … entries=…`—they should appear exactly once per run and `Mapped X/Y… skipped=0` should match the `kev.map.advisories` delta.
|
||||
6. Confirm MongoDB documents exist for the catalog JSON (`raw_documents` & `dtos`) and that advisories with prefix `kev/` are written.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.4 Production Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
- Alert when `rate(kev_fetch_success_total[8h]) == 0` during working hours (daily cadence breach) and when `increase(kev_fetch_failures_total[1h]) > 0`.
|
||||
- Page the on-call if `increase(kev_parse_failures_total{reason="schema"}[6h]) > 0`—this usually signals an upstream payload change. Treat repeated `reason="download"` spikes as networking issues to the mirror.
|
||||
- Track anomaly spikes through `sum_over_time(kev_parse_anomalies_total{reason="missingCveId"}[24h])`. Rising `countMismatch` trends point to catalog publishing bugs.
|
||||
- Surface the fetch/mapping info logs (`Fetched KEV catalog document …` and `Mapped X/Y KEV advisories … skipped=S`) on dashboards; absence of those logs while metrics show success typically means schema validation short-circuited the run.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.5 Known good dashboard tiles
|
||||
|
||||
Add the following panels to the Concelier observability board:
|
||||
|
||||
| Metric | Recommended visualisation |
|
||||
|--------|---------------------------|
|
||||
| `rate(kev_fetch_success_total[30m])` | Single-stat (last 24 h) with warning threshold `>0` |
|
||||
| `rate(kev_parse_entries_total[1h])` by `catalogVersion` | Stacked area – highlights daily release size |
|
||||
| `sum_over_time(kev_parse_anomalies_total[1d])` by `reason` | Table – anomaly breakdown (matches dashboard panel) |
|
||||
| `rate(cve_map_success_total[15m])` vs `rate(kev_map_advisories_total[24h])` | Comparative timeseries for advisories emitted |
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Runbook updates
|
||||
|
||||
- Record staging/production smoke test results (date, catalog version, advisory counts) in your team’s change log.
|
||||
- Add the CVE/KEV job kinds to the standard maintenance checklist so operators can manually trigger them after planned downtime.
|
||||
- Keep this document in sync with future connector changes (for example, new anomaly reasons or additional metrics).
|
||||
- Version-control dashboard tweaks alongside `docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/cve-kev-grafana-dashboard.json` so operations can re-import the observability pack during restores.
|
||||
123
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/ghsa.md
Normal file
123
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/ghsa.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
|
||||
# Concelier GHSA Connector – Operations Runbook
|
||||
|
||||
_Last updated: 2025-10-16_
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Overview
|
||||
The GitHub Security Advisories (GHSA) connector pulls advisory metadata from the GitHub REST API `/security/advisories` endpoint. GitHub enforces both primary and secondary rate limits, so operators must monitor usage and configure retries to avoid throttling incidents.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Rate-limit telemetry
|
||||
The connector now surfaces rate-limit headers on every fetch and exposes the following metrics via OpenTelemetry:
|
||||
|
||||
| Metric | Description | Tags |
|
||||
|--------|-------------|------|
|
||||
| `ghsa.ratelimit.limit` (histogram) | Samples the reported request quota at fetch time. | `phase` = `list` or `detail`, `resource` (e.g., `core`). |
|
||||
| `ghsa.ratelimit.remaining` (histogram) | Remaining requests returned by `X-RateLimit-Remaining`. | `phase`, `resource`. |
|
||||
| `ghsa.ratelimit.reset_seconds` (histogram) | Seconds until `X-RateLimit-Reset`. | `phase`, `resource`. |
|
||||
| `ghsa.ratelimit.headroom_pct` (histogram) | Percentage of the quota still available (`remaining / limit * 100`). | `phase`, `resource`. |
|
||||
| `ghsa.ratelimit.headroom_pct_current` (observable gauge) | Latest headroom percentage reported per resource. | `phase`, `resource`. |
|
||||
| `ghsa.ratelimit.exhausted` (counter) | Incremented whenever GitHub returns a zero remaining quota and the connector delays before retrying. | `phase`. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Dashboards & alerts
|
||||
- Plot `ghsa.ratelimit.remaining` as the latest value to watch the runway. Alert when the value stays below **`RateLimitWarningThreshold`** (default `500`) for more than 5 minutes.
|
||||
- Use `ghsa.ratelimit.headroom_pct_current` to visualise remaining quota % — paging once it sits below **10 %** for longer than a single reset window helps avoid secondary limits.
|
||||
- Raise a separate alert on `increase(ghsa.ratelimit.exhausted[15m]) > 0` to catch hard throttles.
|
||||
- Overlay `ghsa.fetch.attempts` vs `ghsa.fetch.failures` to confirm retries are effective.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Logging signals
|
||||
When `X-RateLimit-Remaining` falls below `RateLimitWarningThreshold`, the connector emits:
|
||||
```
|
||||
GHSA rate limit warning: remaining {Remaining}/{Limit} for {Phase} {Resource} (headroom {Headroom}%)
|
||||
```
|
||||
When GitHub reports zero remaining calls, the connector logs and sleeps for the reported `Retry-After`/`X-RateLimit-Reset` interval (falling back to `SecondaryRateLimitBackoff`).
|
||||
|
||||
After the quota recovers above the warning threshold the connector writes an informational log with the refreshed remaining/headroom, letting operators clear alerts quickly.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Configuration knobs (`concelier.yaml`)
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
ghsa:
|
||||
apiToken: "${GITHUB_PAT}"
|
||||
pageSize: 50
|
||||
requestDelay: "00:00:00.200"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
rateLimitWarningThreshold: 500 # warn below this many remaining calls
|
||||
secondaryRateLimitBackoff: "00:02:00" # fallback delay when GitHub omits Retry-After
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommendations
|
||||
- Increase `requestDelay` in air-gapped or burst-heavy deployments to smooth token consumption.
|
||||
- Lower `rateLimitWarningThreshold` only if your dashboards already page on the new histogram; never set it negative.
|
||||
- For bots using a low-privilege PAT, keep `secondaryRateLimitBackoff` at ≥60 seconds to respect GitHub’s secondary-limit guidance.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Default job schedule
|
||||
|
||||
| Job kind | Cron | Timeout | Lease |
|
||||
|----------|------|---------|-------|
|
||||
| `source:ghsa:fetch` | `1,11,21,31,41,51 * * * *` | 6 minutes | 4 minutes |
|
||||
| `source:ghsa:parse` | `3,13,23,33,43,53 * * * *` | 5 minutes | 4 minutes |
|
||||
| `source:ghsa:map` | `5,15,25,35,45,55 * * * *` | 5 minutes | 4 minutes |
|
||||
|
||||
These defaults spread GHSA stages across the hour so fetch completes before parse/map fire. Override them via `concelier.jobs.definitions[...]` when coordinating multiple connectors on the same runner.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Provisioning credentials
|
||||
|
||||
Concelier requires a GitHub personal access token (classic) with the **`read:org`** and **`security_events`** scopes to pull GHSA data. Store it as a secret and reference it via `concelier.sources.ghsa.apiToken`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Docker Compose (stack operators)
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
services:
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CONCELIER__SOURCES__GHSA__APITOKEN: /run/secrets/ghsa_pat
|
||||
secrets:
|
||||
- ghsa_pat
|
||||
|
||||
secrets:
|
||||
ghsa_pat:
|
||||
file: ./secrets/ghsa_pat.txt # contains only the PAT value
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Helm values (cluster operators)
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
extraEnv:
|
||||
- name: CONCELIER__SOURCES__GHSA__APITOKEN
|
||||
valueFrom:
|
||||
secretKeyRef:
|
||||
name: concelier-ghsa
|
||||
key: apiToken
|
||||
|
||||
extraSecrets:
|
||||
concelier-ghsa:
|
||||
apiToken: "<paste PAT here or source from external secret store>"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
After rotating the PAT, restart the Concelier workers (or run `kubectl rollout restart deployment/concelier`) to ensure the configuration reloads.
|
||||
|
||||
When enabling GHSA the first time, run a staged backfill:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Trigger `source:ghsa:fetch` manually (CLI or API) outside of peak hours.
|
||||
2. Watch `concelier.jobs.health` for the GHSA jobs until they report `healthy`.
|
||||
3. Allow the scheduled cron cadence to resume once the initial backlog drains (typically < 30 minutes).
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Runbook steps when throttled
|
||||
1. Check `ghsa.ratelimit.exhausted` for the affected phase (`list` vs `detail`).
|
||||
2. Confirm the connector is delaying—logs will show `GHSA rate limit exhausted...` with the chosen backoff.
|
||||
3. If rate limits stay exhausted:
|
||||
- Verify no other jobs are sharing the PAT.
|
||||
- Temporarily reduce `MaxPagesPerFetch` or `PageSize` to shrink burst size.
|
||||
- Consider provisioning a dedicated PAT (GHSA permissions only) for Concelier.
|
||||
4. After the quota resets, reset `rateLimitWarningThreshold`/`requestDelay` to their normal values and monitor the histograms for at least one hour.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Alert integration quick reference
|
||||
- Prometheus: `ghsa_ratelimit_remaining_bucket` (from histogram) – use `histogram_quantile(0.99, ...)` to trend capacity.
|
||||
- VictoriaMetrics: `LAST_over_time(ghsa_ratelimit_remaining_sum[5m])` for simple last-value graphs.
|
||||
- Grafana: stack remaining + used to visualise total limit per resource.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Canonical metric fallback analytics
|
||||
When GitHub omits CVSS vectors/scores, the connector now assigns a deterministic canonical metric id in the form `ghsa:severity/<level>` and publishes it to Merge so severity precedence still resolves against GHSA even without CVSS data.
|
||||
|
||||
- Metric: `ghsa.map.canonical_metric_fallbacks` (counter) with tags `severity`, `canonical_metric_id`, `reason=no_cvss`.
|
||||
- Monitor the counter alongside Merge parity checks; a sudden spike suggests GitHub is shipping advisories without vectors and warrants cross-checking downstream exporters.
|
||||
- Because the canonical id feeds Merge, parity dashboards should overlay this metric to confirm fallback advisories continue to merge ahead of downstream sources when GHSA supplies more recent data.
|
||||
122
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/ics-cisa.md
Normal file
122
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/ics-cisa.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
|
||||
# Concelier CISA ICS Connector Operations
|
||||
|
||||
This runbook documents how to provision, rotate, and validate credentials for the CISA Industrial Control Systems (ICS) connector (`source:ics-cisa:*`). Follow it before enabling the connector in staging or offline installations.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Credential Provisioning
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Create a service mailbox** reachable by the Ops crew (shared mailbox recommended).
|
||||
2. Browse to `https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCISA/subscriber/new` and subscribe the mailbox to the following GovDelivery topics:
|
||||
- `USDHSCISA_16` — ICS-CERT advisories (legacy numbering: `ICSA-YY-###`).
|
||||
- `USDHSCISA_19` — ICS medical advisories (`ICSMA-YY-###`).
|
||||
- `USDHSCISA_17` — ICS alerts (`IR-ALERT-YY-###`) for completeness.
|
||||
3. Complete the verification email. After confirmation, note the **personalised subscription code** included in the “Manage Preferences” link. It has the shape `code=AB12CD34EF`.
|
||||
4. Store the code in the shared secret vault (or Offline Kit secrets bundle) as `concelier/sources/icscisa/govdelivery/code`.
|
||||
|
||||
> ℹ️ GovDelivery does not expose a one-time API key; the personalised code is what authenticates the RSS pull. Never commit it to git.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Feed Validation
|
||||
|
||||
Use the following command to confirm the feed is reachable before wiring it into Concelier (substitute `<CODE>` with the personalised value):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -H "User-Agent: StellaOpsConcelier/ics-cisa" \
|
||||
"https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCISA/topics/ICS-CERT/feed.rss?format=xml&code=<CODE>"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If the endpoint returns HTTP 200 and an RSS payload, record the sample response under `docs/artifacts/icscisa/` (see Task `FEEDCONN-ICSCISA-02-007`). HTTP 403 or 406 usually means the subscription was not confirmed or the code was mistyped.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Configuration Snippet
|
||||
|
||||
Add the connector configuration to `concelier.yaml` (or equivalent environment variables):
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
icscisa:
|
||||
govDelivery:
|
||||
code: "${CONCELIER_ICS_CISA_GOVDELIVERY_CODE}"
|
||||
topics:
|
||||
- "USDHSCISA_16"
|
||||
- "USDHSCISA_19"
|
||||
- "USDHSCISA_17"
|
||||
rssBaseUri: "https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCISA"
|
||||
requestDelay: "00:00:01"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Environment variable example:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
export CONCELIER_SOURCES_ICSCISA_GOVDELIVERY_CODE="AB12CD34EF"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Concelier automatically register the host with the Source.Common HTTP allow-list when the connector assembly is loaded.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Optional tuning keys (set only when needed):
|
||||
|
||||
- `proxyUri` — HTTP/HTTPS proxy URL used when Akamai blocks direct pulls.
|
||||
- `requestVersion` / `requestVersionPolicy` — override HTTP negotiation when the proxy requires HTTP/1.1.
|
||||
- `enableDetailScrape` — toggle HTML detail fallback (defaults to true).
|
||||
- `captureAttachments` — collect PDF attachments from detail pages (defaults to true).
|
||||
- `detailBaseUri` — alternate host for detail enrichment if CISA changes their layout.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Seeding Without GovDelivery
|
||||
|
||||
If credentials are still pending, populate the connector with the community CSV dataset before enabling the live fetch:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Run `./scripts/fetch-ics-cisa-seed.sh` (or `.ps1`) to download the latest `CISA_ICS_ADV_*.csv` files into `seed-data/ics-cisa/`.
|
||||
2. Copy the CSVs (and the generated `.sha256` files) into your Offline Kit staging area so they ship alongside the other feeds.
|
||||
3. Import the kit as usual. The connector can parse the seed data for historical context, but **live GovDelivery credentials are still required** for fresh advisories.
|
||||
4. Once credentials arrive, update `concelier:sources:icscisa:govDelivery:code` and re-trigger `source:ics-cisa:fetch` so the connector switches to the authorised feed.
|
||||
|
||||
> The CSVs are licensed under ODbL 1.0 by the ICS Advisory Project. Preserve the attribution when redistributing them.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Integration Validation
|
||||
|
||||
1. Ensure secrets are in place and restart the Concelier workers.
|
||||
2. Run a dry-run fetch/parse/map chain against an Akamai-protected topic:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
CONCELIER_SOURCES_ICSCISA_GOVDELIVERY_CODE=... \
|
||||
CONCELIER_SOURCES_ICSCISA_ENABLEDETAILSCRAPE=1 \
|
||||
stella db jobs run source:ics-cisa:fetch --and-then source:ics-cisa:parse --and-then source:ics-cisa:map
|
||||
```
|
||||
3. Confirm logs contain `ics-cisa detail fetch` entries and that new documents/DTOs include attachments (see `docs/artifacts/icscisa`). Canonical advisories should expose PDF links as `references.kind == "attachment"` and affected packages should surface `primitives.semVer.exactValue` for single-version hits.
|
||||
4. If Akamai blocks direct fetches, set `concelier:sources:icscisa:proxyUri` to your allow-listed egress proxy and rerun the dry-run.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Rotation & Incident Response
|
||||
|
||||
- Review GovDelivery access quarterly. Rotate the personalised code whenever Ops changes the service mailbox password or membership.
|
||||
- Revoking the subscription in GovDelivery invalidates the code immediately; update the vault and configuration in the same change.
|
||||
- If the code leaks, remove the subscription (`https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCISA/subscriber/manage_preferences?code=<CODE>`), resubscribe, and distribute the new value via the vault.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Offline Kit Handling
|
||||
|
||||
Include the personalised code in `offline-kit/secrets/concelier/icscisa.env`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
CONCELIER_SOURCES_ICSCISA_GOVDELIVERY_CODE=AB12CD34EF
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The Offline Kit deployment script copies this file into the container secret directory mounted at `/run/secrets/concelier`. Ensure permissions are `600` and ownership matches the Concelier runtime user.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Telemetry & Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
The connector emits metrics under the meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ics.Cisa`. They allow operators to track Akamai fallbacks, detail enrichment health, and advisory fan-out.
|
||||
|
||||
- `icscisa.fetch.*` – counters for `attempts`, `success`, `failures`, `not_modified`, and `fallbacks`, plus histogram `icscisa.fetch.documents` showing documents added per topic pull (tags: `concelier.source`, `icscisa.topic`).
|
||||
- `icscisa.parse.*` – counters for `success`/`failures` and histograms `icscisa.parse.advisories`, `icscisa.parse.attachments`, `icscisa.parse.detail_fetches` to monitor enrichment workload per feed document.
|
||||
- `icscisa.detail.*` – counters `success` / `failures` per advisory (tagged with `icscisa.advisory`) to alert when Akamai blocks detail pages.
|
||||
- `icscisa.map.*` – counters for `success`/`failures` and histograms `icscisa.map.references`, `icscisa.map.packages`, `icscisa.map.aliases` capturing canonical fan-out.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested alerts:
|
||||
|
||||
- `increase(icscisa.fetch.failures_total[15m]) > 0` or `increase(icscisa.fetch.fallbacks_total[15m]) > 5` — sustained Akamai or proxy issues.
|
||||
- `increase(icscisa.detail.failures_total[30m]) > 0` — detail enrichment breaking (potential HTML layout change).
|
||||
- `histogram_quantile(0.95, rate(icscisa.map.references_bucket[1h]))` trending sharply higher — sudden advisory reference explosion worth investigating.
|
||||
- Keep an eye on shared HTTP metrics (`concelier.source.http.*{concelier.source="ics-cisa"}`) for request latency and retry patterns.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Related Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
- `FEEDCONN-ICSCISA-02-009` (GovDelivery credential onboarding) — completed once this runbook is followed and secrets are placed in the vault.
|
||||
- `FEEDCONN-ICSCISA-02-007` (document inventory) — archive the first successful RSS response and any attachment URL schema under `docs/artifacts/icscisa/`.
|
||||
74
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/kisa.md
Normal file
74
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/kisa.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
# Concelier KISA Connector Operations
|
||||
|
||||
Operational guidance for the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA / KNVD) connector (`source:kisa:*`). Pair this with the engineering brief in `docs/dev/kisa_connector_notes.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- Outbound HTTPS (or mirrored cache) for `https://knvd.krcert.or.kr/`.
|
||||
- Connector options defined under `concelier:sources:kisa`:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
kisa:
|
||||
feedUri: "https://knvd.krcert.or.kr/rss/securityInfo.do"
|
||||
detailApiUri: "https://knvd.krcert.or.kr/rssDetailData.do"
|
||||
detailPageUri: "https://knvd.krcert.or.kr/detailDos.do"
|
||||
maxAdvisoriesPerFetch: 10
|
||||
requestDelay: "00:00:01"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> Ensure the URIs stay absolute—Concelier adds the `feedUri`/`detailApiUri` hosts to the HttpClient allow-list automatically.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Staging Smoke Test
|
||||
|
||||
1. Restart the Concelier workers so the KISA options bind.
|
||||
2. Run a full connector cycle:
|
||||
- CLI: `stella db jobs run source:kisa:fetch --and-then source:kisa:parse --and-then source:kisa:map`
|
||||
- REST: `POST /jobs/run { "kind": "source:kisa:fetch", "chain": ["source:kisa:parse", "source:kisa:map"] }`
|
||||
3. Confirm telemetry (Meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Kisa`):
|
||||
- `kisa.feed.success`, `kisa.feed.items`
|
||||
- `kisa.detail.success` / `.failures`
|
||||
- `kisa.parse.success` / `.failures`
|
||||
- `kisa.map.success` / `.failures`
|
||||
- `kisa.cursor.updates`
|
||||
4. Inspect logs for structured entries:
|
||||
- `KISA feed returned {ItemCount}`
|
||||
- `KISA fetched detail for {Idx} … category={Category}`
|
||||
- `KISA mapped advisory {AdvisoryId} (severity={Severity})`
|
||||
- Absence of warnings such as `document missing GridFS payload`.
|
||||
5. Validate MongoDB state:
|
||||
- `raw_documents.metadata` has `kisa.idx`, `kisa.category`, `kisa.title`.
|
||||
- DTO store contains `schemaVersion="kisa.detail.v1"`.
|
||||
- Advisories include aliases (`IDX`, CVE) and `language="ko"`.
|
||||
- `source_states` entry for `kisa` shows recent `cursor.lastFetchAt`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Production Monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dashboards** – Add the following Prometheus/OTEL expressions:
|
||||
- `rate(kisa_feed_items_total[15m])` versus `rate(concelier_source_http_requests_total{concelier_source="kisa"}[15m])`
|
||||
- `increase(kisa_detail_failures_total{reason!="empty-document"}[1h])` alert at `>0`
|
||||
- `increase(kisa_parse_failures_total[1h])` for storage/JSON issues
|
||||
- `increase(kisa_map_failures_total[1h])` to flag schema drift
|
||||
- `increase(kisa_cursor_updates_total[6h]) == 0` during active windows → warn
|
||||
- **Alerts** – Page when `rate(kisa_feed_success_total[2h]) == 0` while other connectors are active; back off for maintenance windows announced on `https://knvd.krcert.or.kr/`.
|
||||
- **Logs** – Watch for repeated warnings (`document missing`, `DTO missing`) or errors with reason tags `HttpRequestException`, `download`, `parse`, `map`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Localisation Handling
|
||||
|
||||
- Hangul categories (for example `취약점정보`) flow into telemetry tags (`category=…`) and logs. Dashboards must render UTF‑8 and avoid transliteration.
|
||||
- HTML content is sanitised before storage; translation teams can consume the `ContentHtml` field safely.
|
||||
- Advisory severity remains as provided by KISA (`High`, `Medium`, etc.). Map-level failures include the severity tag for filtering.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Fixture & Regression Maintenance
|
||||
|
||||
- Regression fixtures: `src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Kisa.Tests/Fixtures/kisa-feed.xml` and `kisa-detail.json`.
|
||||
- Refresh via `UPDATE_KISA_FIXTURES=1 dotnet test src/Concelier/__Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Kisa.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Kisa.Tests.csproj`.
|
||||
- The telemetry regression (`KisaConnectorTests.Telemetry_RecordsMetrics`) will fail if counters/log wiring drifts—treat failures as gating.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Known Issues
|
||||
|
||||
- RSS feeds only expose the latest 10 advisories; long outages require replay via archived feeds or manual IDX seeds.
|
||||
- Detail endpoint occasionally throttles; the connector honours `requestDelay` and reports failures with reason `HttpRequestException`. Consider increasing delay for weekend backfills.
|
||||
- If `kisa.category` tags suddenly appear as `unknown`, verify KISA has not renamed RSS elements; update the parser fixtures before production rollout.
|
||||
86
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/msrc.md
Normal file
86
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/msrc.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
# Concelier MSRC Connector – Azure AD Onboarding Brief
|
||||
|
||||
_Drafted: 2025-10-15_
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. App registration requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- **Tenant**: shared StellaOps production Azure AD.
|
||||
- **Application type**: confidential client (web/API) issuing client credentials.
|
||||
- **API permissions**: `api://api.msrc.microsoft.com/.default` (Application). Admin consent required once.
|
||||
- **Token audience**: `https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/`.
|
||||
- **Grant type**: client credentials. Concelier will request tokens via `POST https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenantId}/oauth2/v2.0/token`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Secret/credential policy
|
||||
|
||||
- Maintain two client secrets (primary + standby) rotating every 90 days.
|
||||
- Store secrets in the Concelier secrets vault; Offline Kit deployments must mirror the secret payloads in their encrypted store.
|
||||
- Record rotation cadence in Ops runbook and update Concelier configuration (`CONCELIER__SOURCES__VNDR__MSRC__CLIENTSECRET`) ahead of expiry.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Concelier configuration sample
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
concelier:
|
||||
sources:
|
||||
vndr.msrc:
|
||||
tenantId: "<azure-tenant-guid>"
|
||||
clientId: "<app-registration-client-id>"
|
||||
clientSecret: "<pull from secret store>"
|
||||
apiVersion: "2024-08-01"
|
||||
locale: "en-US"
|
||||
requestDelay: "00:00:00.250"
|
||||
failureBackoff: "00:05:00"
|
||||
cursorOverlapMinutes: 10
|
||||
downloadCvrf: false # set true to persist CVRF ZIP alongside JSON detail
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. CVRF artefacts
|
||||
|
||||
- The MSRC REST payload exposes `cvrfUrl` per advisory. Current connector persists the link as advisory metadata and reference; it does **not** download the ZIP by default.
|
||||
- Ops should mirror CVRF ZIPs when preparing Offline Kits so air-gapped deployments can reconcile advisories without direct internet access.
|
||||
- Once Offline Kit storage guidelines are finalised, extend the connector configuration with `downloadCvrf: true` to enable automatic attachment retrieval.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 State seeding helper
|
||||
|
||||
Use `src/Tools/SourceStateSeeder` to queue historical advisories (detail JSON + optional CVRF artefacts) for replay without manual Mongo edits. Example seed file:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"source": "vndr.msrc",
|
||||
"cursor": {
|
||||
"lastModifiedCursor": "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"documents": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"uri": "https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/sug/v2.0/vulnerability/ADV2024-0001",
|
||||
"contentFile": "./seeds/adv2024-0001.json",
|
||||
"contentType": "application/json",
|
||||
"metadata": { "msrc.vulnerabilityId": "ADV2024-0001" },
|
||||
"addToPendingDocuments": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"uri": "https://download.microsoft.com/msrc/2024/ADV2024-0001.cvrf.zip",
|
||||
"contentFile": "./seeds/adv2024-0001.cvrf.zip",
|
||||
"contentType": "application/zip",
|
||||
"status": "mapped",
|
||||
"addToPendingDocuments": false
|
||||
}
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Run the helper:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
dotnet run --project src/Tools/SourceStateSeeder -- \
|
||||
--connection-string "mongodb://localhost:27017" \
|
||||
--database concelier \
|
||||
--input seeds/msrc-backfill.json
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Any documents marked `addToPendingDocuments` will appear in the connector cursor; `DownloadCvrf` can remain disabled if the ZIP artefact is pre-seeded.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Outstanding items
|
||||
|
||||
- Ops to confirm tenant/app names and provide client credentials through the secure channel.
|
||||
- Connector team monitors token cache health (already implemented); validate instrumentation once Ops supplies credentials.
|
||||
- Offline Kit packaging: add encrypted blob containing client credentials with rotation instructions.
|
||||
48
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/nkcki.md
Normal file
48
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/nkcki.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
# NKCKI Connector Operations Guide
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
The NKCKI connector ingests JSON bulletin archives from cert.gov.ru, expanding each `*.json.zip` attachment into per-vulnerability DTOs before canonical mapping. The fetch pipeline now supports cache-backed recovery, deterministic pagination, and telemetry suitable for production monitoring.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Key options exposed through `concelier:sources:ru-nkcki:http`:
|
||||
|
||||
- `maxBulletinsPerFetch` – limits new bulletin downloads in a single run (default `5`).
|
||||
- `maxListingPagesPerFetch` – maximum listing pages visited during pagination (default `3`).
|
||||
- `listingCacheDuration` – minimum interval between listing fetches before falling back to cached artefacts (default `00:10:00`).
|
||||
- `cacheDirectory` – optional path for persisted bulletin archives used during offline or failure scenarios.
|
||||
- `requestDelay` – delay inserted between bulletin downloads to respect upstream politeness.
|
||||
|
||||
When operating in offline-first mode, set `cacheDirectory` to a writable path (e.g. `/var/lib/concelier/cache/ru-nkcki`) and pre-populate bulletin archives via the offline kit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Telemetry
|
||||
|
||||
`RuNkckiDiagnostics` emits the following metrics under meter `StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki`:
|
||||
|
||||
- `nkcki.listing.fetch.attempts` / `nkcki.listing.fetch.success` / `nkcki.listing.fetch.failures`
|
||||
- `nkcki.listing.pages.visited` (histogram, `pages`)
|
||||
- `nkcki.listing.attachments.discovered` / `nkcki.listing.attachments.new`
|
||||
- `nkcki.bulletin.fetch.success` / `nkcki.bulletin.fetch.cached` / `nkcki.bulletin.fetch.failures`
|
||||
- `nkcki.entries.processed` (histogram, `entries`)
|
||||
|
||||
Integrate these counters into standard Concelier observability dashboards to track crawl coverage and cache hit rates.
|
||||
|
||||
## Archive Backfill Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
Bitrix pagination surfaces archives via `?PAGEN_1=n`. The connector now walks up to `maxListingPagesPerFetch` pages, deduplicating bulletin IDs and maintaining a rolling `knownBulletins` window. Backfill strategy:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Enumerate pages from newest to oldest, respecting `maxListingPagesPerFetch` and `listingCacheDuration` to avoid refetch storms.
|
||||
2. Persist every `*.json.zip` attachment to the configured cache directory. This enables replay when listing access is temporarily blocked.
|
||||
3. During archive replay, `ProcessCachedBulletinsAsync` enqueues missing documents while respecting `maxVulnerabilitiesPerFetch`.
|
||||
4. For historical HTML-only advisories, collect page URLs and metadata while offline (future work: HTML and PDF extraction pipeline documented in `docs/concelier-connector-research-20251011.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
For large migrations, seed caches with archived zip bundles, then run fetch/parse/map cycles in chronological order to maintain deterministic outputs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Failure Handling
|
||||
|
||||
- Listing failures mark the source state with exponential backoff while attempting cache replay.
|
||||
- Bulletin fetches fall back to cached copies before surfacing an error.
|
||||
- Mongo integration tests rely on bundled OpenSSL 1.1 libraries (`src/Tools/openssl/linux-x64`) to keep `Mongo2Go` operational on modern distros.
|
||||
|
||||
Refer to `ru-nkcki` entries in `src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Ru.Nkcki/TASKS.md` for outstanding items.
|
||||
24
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/osv.md
Normal file
24
docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors/osv.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
# Concelier OSV Connector – Operations Notes
|
||||
|
||||
_Last updated: 2025-10-16_
|
||||
|
||||
The OSV connector ingests advisories from OSV.dev across OSS ecosystems. This note highlights the additional merge/export expectations introduced with the canonical metric fallback work in Sprint 4.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Canonical metric fallbacks
|
||||
- When OSV omits CVSS vectors (common for CVSS v4-only payloads) the mapper now emits a deterministic canonical metric id in the form `osv:severity/<level>` and normalises the advisory severity to the same `<level>`.
|
||||
- Metric: `osv.map.canonical_metric_fallbacks` (counter) with tags `severity`, `canonical_metric_id`, `ecosystem`, `reason=no_cvss`. Watch this alongside merge parity dashboards to catch spikes where OSV publishes severity-only advisories.
|
||||
- Merge precedence still prefers GHSA over OSV; the shared severity-based canonical id keeps Merge/export parity deterministic even when only OSV supplies severity data.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. CWE provenance
|
||||
- `database_specific.cwe_ids` now populates provenance decision reasons for every mapped weakness. Expect `decisionReason="database_specific.cwe_ids"` on OSV weakness provenance and confirm exporters preserve the value.
|
||||
- If OSV ever attaches `database_specific.cwe_notes`, the connector will surface the joined note string in `decisionReason` instead of the default marker.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Dashboards & alerts
|
||||
- Extend existing merge dashboards with the new counter:
|
||||
- Overlay `sum(osv.map.canonical_metric_fallbacks{ecosystem=~".+"})` with Merge severity overrides to confirm fallback advisories are reconciling cleanly.
|
||||
- Alert when the 1-hour sum exceeds 50 for any ecosystem; baseline volume is currently <5 per day (mostly GHSA mirrors emitting CVSS v4 only).
|
||||
- Exporters already surface `canonicalMetricId`; no schema change is required, but ORAS/Trivy bundles should be spot-checked after deploying the connector update.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Runbook updates
|
||||
- Fixture parity suites (`osv-ghsa.*`) now assert the fallback id and provenance notes. Regenerate via `dotnet test src/Concelier/StellaOps.Concelier.PluginBinaries/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Osv.Tests/StellaOps.Concelier.Connector.Osv.Tests.csproj`.
|
||||
- When investigating merge severity conflicts, include the fallback counter and confirm OSV advisories carry the expected `osv:severity/<level>` id before raising connector bugs.
|
||||
238
docs/modules/concelier/operations/mirror.md
Normal file
238
docs/modules/concelier/operations/mirror.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
|
||||
# Concelier & Excititor Mirror Operations
|
||||
|
||||
This runbook describes how Stella Ops operates the managed mirrors under `*.stella-ops.org`.
|
||||
It covers Docker Compose and Helm deployment overlays, secret handling for multi-tenant
|
||||
authn, CDN fronting, and the recurring sync pipeline that keeps mirror bundles current.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
- **Authority access** – client credentials (`client_id` + secret) authorised for
|
||||
`concelier.mirror.read` and `excititor.mirror.read` scopes. Secrets live outside git.
|
||||
- **Signed TLS certificates** – wildcard or per-domain (`mirror-primary`, `mirror-community`).
|
||||
Store them under `deploy/compose/mirror-gateway/tls/` or in Kubernetes secrets.
|
||||
- **Mirror gateway credentials** – Basic Auth htpasswd files per domain. Generate with
|
||||
`htpasswd -B`. Operators distribute credentials to downstream consumers.
|
||||
- **Export artifact source** – read access to the canonical S3 buckets (or rsync share)
|
||||
that hold `concelier` JSON bundles and `excititor` VEX exports.
|
||||
- **Persistent volumes** – storage for Concelier job metadata and mirror export trees.
|
||||
For Helm, provision PVCs (`concelier-mirror-jobs`, `concelier-mirror-exports`,
|
||||
`excititor-mirror-exports`, `mirror-mongo-data`, `mirror-minio-data`) before rollout.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.1 Service configuration quick reference
|
||||
|
||||
Concelier.WebService exposes the mirror HTTP endpoints once `CONCELIER__MIRROR__ENABLED=true`.
|
||||
Key knobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- `CONCELIER__MIRROR__EXPORTROOT` – root folder containing export snapshots (`<exportId>/mirror/*`).
|
||||
- `CONCELIER__MIRROR__ACTIVEEXPORTID` – optional explicit export id; otherwise the service auto-falls back to the `latest/` symlink or newest directory.
|
||||
- `CONCELIER__MIRROR__REQUIREAUTHENTICATION` – default auth requirement; override per domain with `CONCELIER__MIRROR__DOMAINS__{n}__REQUIREAUTHENTICATION`.
|
||||
- `CONCELIER__MIRROR__MAXINDEXREQUESTSPERHOUR` – budget for `/concelier/exports/index.json`. Domains inherit this value unless they define `__MAXDOWNLOADREQUESTSPERHOUR`.
|
||||
- `CONCELIER__MIRROR__DOMAINS__{n}__ID` – domain identifier matching the exporter manifest; additional keys configure display name and rate budgets.
|
||||
|
||||
> The service honours Stella Ops Authority when `CONCELIER__AUTHORITY__ENABLED=true` and `ALLOWANONYMOUSFALLBACK=false`. Use the bypass CIDR list (`CONCELIER__AUTHORITY__BYPASSNETWORKS__*`) for in-cluster ingress gateways that terminate Basic Auth. Unauthorized requests emit `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` so downstream automation can detect token failures.
|
||||
|
||||
Mirror responses carry deterministic cache headers: `/index.json` returns `Cache-Control: public, max-age=60`, while per-domain manifests/bundles include `Cache-Control: public, max-age=300, immutable`. Rate limiting surfaces `Retry-After` when quotas are exceeded.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.2 Mirror connector configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Downstream Concelier instances ingest published bundles using the `StellaOpsMirrorConnector`. Operators running the connector in air‑gapped or limited connectivity environments can tune the following options (environment prefix `CONCELIER__SOURCES__STELLAOPSMIRROR__`):
|
||||
|
||||
- `BASEADDRESS` – absolute mirror root (e.g., `https://mirror-primary.stella-ops.org`).
|
||||
- `INDEXPATH` – relative path to the mirror index (`/concelier/exports/index.json` by default).
|
||||
- `DOMAINID` – mirror domain identifier from the index (`primary`, `community`, etc.).
|
||||
- `HTTPTIMEOUT` – request timeout; raise when mirrors sit behind slow WAN links.
|
||||
- `SIGNATURE__ENABLED` – require detached JWS verification for `bundle.json`.
|
||||
- `SIGNATURE__KEYID` / `SIGNATURE__PROVIDER` – expected signing key metadata.
|
||||
- `SIGNATURE__PUBLICKEYPATH` – PEM fallback used when the mirror key registry is offline.
|
||||
|
||||
The connector keeps a per-export fingerprint (bundle digest + generated-at timestamp) and tracks outstanding document IDs. If a scan is interrupted, the next run resumes parse/map work using the stored fingerprint and pending document lists—no network requests are reissued unless the upstream digest changes.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Secret & certificate layout
|
||||
|
||||
### Docker Compose (`deploy/compose/docker-compose.mirror.yaml`)
|
||||
|
||||
- `deploy/compose/env/mirror.env.example` – copy to `.env` and adjust quotas or domain IDs.
|
||||
- `deploy/compose/mirror-secrets/` – mount read-only into `/run/secrets`. Place:
|
||||
- `concelier-authority-client` – Authority client secret.
|
||||
- `excititor-authority-client` (optional) – reserve for future authn.
|
||||
- `deploy/compose/mirror-gateway/tls/` – PEM-encoded cert/key pairs:
|
||||
- `mirror-primary.crt`, `mirror-primary.key`
|
||||
- `mirror-community.crt`, `mirror-community.key`
|
||||
- `deploy/compose/mirror-gateway/secrets/` – htpasswd files:
|
||||
- `mirror-primary.htpasswd`
|
||||
- `mirror-community.htpasswd`
|
||||
|
||||
### Helm (`deploy/helm/stellaops/values-mirror.yaml`)
|
||||
|
||||
Create secrets in the target namespace:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
kubectl create secret generic concelier-mirror-auth \
|
||||
--from-file=concelier-authority-client=concelier-authority-client
|
||||
|
||||
kubectl create secret generic excititor-mirror-auth \
|
||||
--from-file=excititor-authority-client=excititor-authority-client
|
||||
|
||||
kubectl create secret tls mirror-gateway-tls \
|
||||
--cert=mirror-primary.crt --key=mirror-primary.key
|
||||
|
||||
kubectl create secret generic mirror-gateway-htpasswd \
|
||||
--from-file=mirror-primary.htpasswd --from-file=mirror-community.htpasswd
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> Keep Basic Auth lists short-lived (rotate quarterly) and document credential recipients.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Deployment
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Docker Compose (edge mirrors, lab validation)
|
||||
|
||||
1. `cp deploy/compose/env/mirror.env.example deploy/compose/env/mirror.env`
|
||||
2. Populate secrets/tls directories as described above.
|
||||
3. Sync mirror bundles (see §4) into `deploy/compose/mirror-data/…` and ensure they are mounted
|
||||
on the host path backing the `concelier-exports` and `excititor-exports` volumes.
|
||||
4. Run the profile validator: `deploy/tools/validate-profiles.sh`.
|
||||
5. Launch: `docker compose --env-file env/mirror.env -f docker-compose.mirror.yaml up -d`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Helm (production mirrors)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Provision PVCs sized for mirror bundles (baseline: 20 GiB per domain).
|
||||
2. Create secrets/tls config maps (§2).
|
||||
3. `helm upgrade --install mirror deploy/helm/stellaops -f deploy/helm/stellaops/values-mirror.yaml`.
|
||||
4. Annotate the `stellaops-mirror-gateway` service with ingress/LoadBalancer metadata required by
|
||||
your CDN (e.g., AWS load balancer scheme internal + NLB idle timeout).
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Artifact sync workflow
|
||||
|
||||
Mirrors never generate exports—they ingest signed bundles produced by the Concelier and Excititor
|
||||
export jobs. Recommended sync pattern:
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 Compose host (systemd timer)
|
||||
|
||||
`/usr/local/bin/mirror-sync.sh`:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=…
|
||||
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=…
|
||||
|
||||
aws s3 sync s3://mirror-stellaops/concelier/latest \
|
||||
/opt/stellaops/mirror-data/concelier --delete --size-only
|
||||
|
||||
aws s3 sync s3://mirror-stellaops/excititor/latest \
|
||||
/opt/stellaops/mirror-data/excititor --delete --size-only
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Schedule with a systemd timer every 5 minutes. The Compose volumes mount `/opt/stellaops/mirror-data/*`
|
||||
into the containers read-only, matching `CONCELIER__MIRROR__EXPORTROOT=/exports/json` and
|
||||
`EXCITITOR__ARTIFACTS__FILESYSTEM__ROOT=/exports`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Kubernetes (CronJob)
|
||||
|
||||
Create a CronJob running the AWS CLI (or rclone) in the same namespace, writing into the PVCs:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
apiVersion: batch/v1
|
||||
kind: CronJob
|
||||
metadata:
|
||||
name: mirror-sync
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
schedule: "*/5 * * * *"
|
||||
jobTemplate:
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
template:
|
||||
spec:
|
||||
containers:
|
||||
- name: sync
|
||||
image: public.ecr.aws/aws-cli/aws-cli@sha256:5df5f52c29f5e3ba46d0ad9e0e3afc98701c4a0f879400b4c5f80d943b5fadea
|
||||
command:
|
||||
- /bin/sh
|
||||
- -c
|
||||
- >
|
||||
aws s3 sync s3://mirror-stellaops/concelier/latest /exports/concelier --delete --size-only &&
|
||||
aws s3 sync s3://mirror-stellaops/excititor/latest /exports/excititor --delete --size-only
|
||||
volumeMounts:
|
||||
- name: concelier-exports
|
||||
mountPath: /exports/concelier
|
||||
- name: excititor-exports
|
||||
mountPath: /exports/excititor
|
||||
envFrom:
|
||||
- secretRef:
|
||||
name: mirror-sync-aws
|
||||
restartPolicy: OnFailure
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- name: concelier-exports
|
||||
persistentVolumeClaim:
|
||||
claimName: concelier-mirror-exports
|
||||
- name: excititor-exports
|
||||
persistentVolumeClaim:
|
||||
claimName: excititor-mirror-exports
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. CDN integration
|
||||
|
||||
1. Point the CDN origin at the mirror gateway (Compose host or Kubernetes LoadBalancer).
|
||||
2. Honour the response headers emitted by the gateway and Concelier/Excititor:
|
||||
`Cache-Control: public, max-age=300, immutable` for mirror payloads.
|
||||
3. Configure origin shields in the CDN to prevent cache stampedes. Recommended TTLs:
|
||||
- Index (`/concelier/exports/index.json`, `/excititor/mirror/*/index`) → 60 s.
|
||||
- Bundle/manifest payloads → 300 s.
|
||||
4. Forward the `Authorization` header—Basic Auth terminates at the gateway.
|
||||
5. Enforce per-domain rate limits at the CDN (matching gateway budgets) and enable logging
|
||||
to SIEM for anomaly detection.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Smoke tests
|
||||
|
||||
After each deployment or sync cycle (temporarily set low budgets if you need to observe 429 responses):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Index with Basic Auth
|
||||
curl -u $PRIMARY_CREDS https://mirror-primary.stella-ops.org/concelier/exports/index.json | jq 'keys'
|
||||
|
||||
# Mirror manifest signature and cache headers
|
||||
curl -u $PRIMARY_CREDS -I https://mirror-primary.stella-ops.org/concelier/exports/mirror/primary/manifest.json \
|
||||
| tee /tmp/manifest-headers.txt
|
||||
grep -E '^Cache-Control: ' /tmp/manifest-headers.txt # expect public, max-age=300, immutable
|
||||
|
||||
# Excititor consensus bundle metadata
|
||||
curl -u $COMMUNITY_CREDS https://mirror-community.stella-ops.org/excititor/mirror/community/index \
|
||||
| jq '.exports[].exportKey'
|
||||
|
||||
# Signed bundle + detached JWS (spot check digests)
|
||||
curl -u $PRIMARY_CREDS https://mirror-primary.stella-ops.org/concelier/exports/mirror/primary/bundle.json.jws \
|
||||
-o bundle.json.jws
|
||||
cosign verify-blob --signature bundle.json.jws --key mirror-key.pub bundle.json
|
||||
|
||||
# Service-level auth check (inside cluster – no gateway credentials)
|
||||
kubectl exec deploy/stellaops-concelier -- curl -si http://localhost:8443/concelier/exports/mirror/primary/manifest.json \
|
||||
| head -n 5 # expect HTTP/1.1 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer
|
||||
|
||||
# Rate limit smoke (repeat quickly; second call should return 429 + Retry-After)
|
||||
for i in 1 2; do
|
||||
curl -s -o /dev/null -D - https://mirror-primary.stella-ops.org/concelier/exports/index.json \
|
||||
-u $PRIMARY_CREDS | grep -E '^(HTTP/|Retry-After:)'
|
||||
sleep 1
|
||||
done
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Watch the gateway metrics (`nginx_vts` or access logs) for cache hits. In Kubernetes, `kubectl logs deploy/stellaops-mirror-gateway`
|
||||
should show `X-Cache-Status: HIT/MISS`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Maintenance & rotation
|
||||
|
||||
- **Bundle freshness** – alert if sync job lag exceeds 15 minutes or if `concelier` logs
|
||||
`Mirror export root is not configured`.
|
||||
- **Secret rotation** – change Authority client secrets and Basic Auth credentials quarterly.
|
||||
Update the mounted secrets and restart deployments (`docker compose restart concelier` or
|
||||
`kubectl rollout restart deploy/stellaops-concelier`).
|
||||
- **TLS renewal** – reissue certificates, place new files, and reload gateway (`docker compose exec mirror-gateway nginx -s reload`).
|
||||
- **Quota tuning** – adjust per-domain `MAXDOWNLOADREQUESTSPERHOUR` in `.env` or values file.
|
||||
Align CDN rate limits and inform downstreams.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. References
|
||||
|
||||
- Deployment profiles: `deploy/compose/docker-compose.mirror.yaml`,
|
||||
`deploy/helm/stellaops/values-mirror.yaml`
|
||||
- Mirror architecture dossiers: `docs/modules/concelier/architecture.md`,
|
||||
`docs/modules/excititor/mirrors.md`
|
||||
- Export bundling: `docs/modules/devops/architecture.md` §3, `docs/modules/excititor/architecture.md` §7
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user