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# Key Features – Capability Cards
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> Stella Ops isn't just another scanner—it's a different product category: **deterministic, evidence-linked vulnerability decisions** that survive auditors, regulators, and supply-chain propagation.
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> **Core Thesis:** Stella Ops isn't a scanner that outputs findings. It's a platform that outputs **attestable decisions that can be replayed**. That difference survives auditors, regulators, and supply-chain propagation.
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---
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## At a Glance
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| What Competitors Do | What Stella Ops Does |
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|--------------------|---------------------|
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| Output findings | Output decisions with proof chains |
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| VEX as suppression file | VEX as logical claim system (K4 lattice) |
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| Reachability as badge | Reachability as signed proof |
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| "+3 CVEs" reports | "Exploitability dropped 41%" semantic deltas |
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| Hide unknowns | Surface and score unknowns |
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| Online-first | Offline-first with full parity |
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---
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Each card below pairs the headline capability with the evidence that backs it and why it matters day to day.
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<!-- TODO: Review for separate approval - added Decision Capsules as feature 0 -->
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## 0. Decision Capsules - Audit-Grade Evidence Bundles (2025-12)
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- **What it is:** Every scan result is sealed in a **Decision Capsule**-a content-addressed bundle containing all inputs, outputs, and evidence needed to reproduce and verify the vulnerability decision.
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- **Evidence:** Each capsule includes: exact SBOM (and source provenance if available), exact vuln feed snapshots (or IDs to frozen snapshots), reachability evidence (static artifacts + runtime traces if any), policy version + lattice rules, derived VEX statements, and signatures over all of the above.
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- **UX surface:** Vulnerability triage is built around VEX-first decisions and one-click immutable audit bundles; see `docs/ux/TRIAGE_UX_GUIDE.md`.
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- **Why it matters:** Auditors can re-run any capsule bit-for-bit to verify the outcome. This is the heart of audit-grade assurance-every decision becomes a provable, replayable fact.
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## 0. Decision Capsules — Audit-Grade Evidence Bundles
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**The core moat capability.** Every scan result is sealed in a **Decision Capsule**—a content-addressed bundle containing everything needed to reproduce and verify the vulnerability decision.
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| Component | What's Included |
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|-----------|----------------|
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| **Inputs** | Exact SBOM, frozen feed snapshots (with Merkle roots), policy version, lattice rules |
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| **Evidence** | Reachability proofs (static + runtime), VEX statements, binary fingerprints |
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| **Outputs** | Verdicts, risk scores, remediation paths |
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| **Signatures** | DSSE envelopes over all of the above |
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**Why it matters:** Six months from now, an auditor can run `stella replay srm.yaml --assert-digest <sha>` and get *identical* results. This is what "audit-grade assurance" actually means.
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**No competitor offers this.** Trivy, Grype, Snyk—none can replay a past scan bit-for-bit because they don't freeze feeds or produce deterministic manifests.
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## 1. Delta SBOM Engine
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- **What it is:** Layer-aware ingestion keeps the SBOM catalog content-addressed; rescans only fetch new layers and update dependency/vulnerability cartographs.
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- **Evidence:** Deterministic Replay Manifest (SRM) captures the exact analyzer inputs/outputs per layer.
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- **Why it matters:** Warm scans drop below one second, so CI/CD pipelines stay fast even under the free-tier quota.
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## 2. Lattice Policy + OpenVEX (Evidence-Linked)
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- **What it is:** Policy engine merges SBOM, advisories, VEX, and waivers through lattice logic that prioritises exploitability. Every VEX assertion includes pointers to an internal evidence graph.
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- **Evidence:** OpenVEX is treated as first-class input; the policy UI renders explain traces with proof-linked decisions. Custom rule packs let teams automate muting, expirations, and non-VEX alert logic.
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- **Why it matters:** Teams can distinguish exploitable risk from noise, tune the experience beyond VEX statements, and prove why a deployment was blocked or allowed. Unlike simplistic yes/no approaches, the lattice model explicitly handles an "Unknown" state, ensuring incomplete data doesn't lead to false safety.
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**Performance without sacrificing determinism.** Layer-aware ingestion keeps the SBOM catalog content-addressed; rescans only fetch new layers.
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- **Speed:** Warm scans < 1 second; CI/CD pipelines stay fast
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- **Determinism:** Replay Manifest (SRM) captures exact analyzer inputs/outputs per layer
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- **Evidence:** Binary crosswalk via Build-ID mapping; `bin:{sha256}` fallbacks for stripped binaries
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**Modules:** `Scanner`, `SbomService`, `BinaryIndex`
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---
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## 2. Lattice Policy + OpenVEX (K4 Logic)
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**VEX as a logical claim system, not a suppression file.** The policy engine uses **Belnap K4 four-valued logic** (Unknown, True, False, Conflict) to merge SBOM, advisories, VEX, and waivers.
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| What Competitors Do | What Stella Does |
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|--------------------|------------------|
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| VEX filters findings (boolean) | VEX is logical claims with trust weighting |
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| Conflicts hidden | Conflicts are explicit state (⊤) |
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| "Vendor says not_affected" = done | Vendor + runtime + reachability merged; conflicts surfaced |
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| Unknown = assume safe | Unknown = first-class state with risk implications |
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**Why it matters:** When vendor says "not_affected" but your runtime shows the function was called, you have a *conflict*—not a false positive. The lattice preserves this for policy resolution.
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**Modules:** `VexLens`, `TrustLatticeEngine`, `Excititor` (110+ tests passing)
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---
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## 3. Sovereign Crypto Profiles
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- **What it is:** Bring-your-own trust bundles that switch signing algorithms (FIPS, eIDAS, GOST, SM) without code changes.
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- **Evidence:** Crypto profiles travel with Offline Update Kits and post-quantum trust packs, keeping signatures verifiable in regulated sectors.
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- **Why it matters:** You meet regional crypto requirements while keeping provenance attestations consistent across tenants.
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## 4. Deterministic Replay & Evidence Bundles — The Heart of Audit-Grade Assurance
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- **What it is:** Every scan produces a DSSE + SRM bundle that can be replayed with `stella replay srm.yaml`.
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- **Evidence:** Replay manifests capture analyzer versions, lattice state, and attestations in content-addressed storage for audit trails.
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- **Why it matters:** A CVE found 6 months ago can be re-verified today by running `stella replay srm.yaml`, yielding an identical result—an audit trail no other scanner provides. This is why Stella decisions survive auditors, regulators, and supply-chain propagation.
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**Regional compliance without code changes.** FIPS, eIDAS, GOST, SM, and PQC (post-quantum) profiles are configuration toggles, not recompiles.
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## 5. Transparent Quotas & Offline Operations
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- **What it is:** Valkey-backed counters surface `{{ quota_token }}` scans/day via headers, UI banners, and `/quota` API; Offline Update Kits mirror feeds.
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- **Evidence:** Quota tokens verify locally using bundled public keys, and Offline Update Kits include mirrored advisories, SBOM feeds, and VEX sources.
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- **Platform Service aggregation:** The Console UI consumes health, quotas, onboarding, preferences, and search via the Platform Service aggregator (`docs/modules/platform/platform-service.md`) instead of fanning out to every module.
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- **Why it matters:** You stay within predictable limits, avoid surprise throttling, and operate entirely offline when needed.
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| Profile | Algorithms | Use Case |
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|---------|-----------|----------|
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| **FIPS-140-3** | ECDSA P-256, RSA-PSS | US federal requirements |
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| **eIDAS** | ETSI TS 119 312 | EU qualified signatures |
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| **GOST-2012** | GOST R 34.10-2012 | Russian Federation |
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| **SM2** | GM/T 0003.2-2012 | People's Republic of China |
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| **PQC** | Dilithium, Falcon | Post-quantum readiness |
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## 6. Signed Reachability Proofs — Hybrid Static + Runtime Attestations
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- **What it is:** Every reachability graph is sealed with a graph-level DSSE and optional edge-bundle DSSEs for runtime/init/contested edges; Rekor-backed when enabled. Both static call-graph edges and runtime-derived edges can be attested—true hybrid reachability.
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- **Evidence:** CAS layout `cas://reachability/graphs/{hash}` + `{hash}.dsse`; edge bundles capped and sorted; quarantine/dispute uses per-edge revocation. See `docs/reachability/hybrid-attestation.md`.
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- **Why it matters:** You can prove (or contest) exactly why a vuln is reachable, replay results offline, and avoid flooding transparency logs. Hybrid analysis combining static call-graph analysis with runtime process tracing provides confidence across build and runtime contexts.
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**Why it matters:** Multi-signature DSSE envelopes (sign with FIPS *and* GOST) for cross-jurisdiction compliance. No competitor offers this.
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## 7. Competitive Moats — Four Capabilities (2025-12 refresh)
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- **What it is:** Four capabilities no competitor offers together: (1) Signed Reachability, (2) Deterministic Replay, (3) Explainable Policy (Lattice VEX), (4) Sovereign + Offline Operation. Plus Decision Capsules for audit-grade evidence bundles.
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- **Evidence:** `docs/market/competitive-landscape.md` distils a 15-vendor comparison; `03_VISION.md` lists moats; `docs/reachability/lead.md` details the reachability proof moat.
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- **Why it matters:** Clear differentiation guides roadmap and sales; keeps us focused on replayable, sovereign, evidence-linked, and explainable security.
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**Modules:** `Cryptography`, `CryptoProfile`, `RootPack`
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## 8. Semantic Smart-Diff (2025-12)
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- **What it is:** Diff security meaning, not just artifacts. Compare reachability graphs, policy outcomes, and trust weights between releases.
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- **Evidence:** Drift detection in `src/Scanner/__Libraries/StellaOps.Scanner.ReachabilityDrift/`; DSSE-attested drift results.
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- **Why it matters:** Outputs "This release reduces exploitability by 41% despite +2 CVEs" — no competitor quantifies semantic security deltas.
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---
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## 9. Unknowns as First-Class State (2025-12)
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- **What it is:** Explicit modeling of Unknown-Reachable and Unknown-Unreachable states with risk scoring implications.
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- **Evidence:** Unknowns Registry in Signals; `unknowns_pressure` factor in scoring; UI chips for unknowns.
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- **Why it matters:** Uncertainty is risk. We don't hide it — we surface and score it. Critical for air-gapped and zero-day scenarios.
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## 4. Deterministic Replay
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## 10. Call-Path Reachability Proofs (2025-12)
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- **What it is:** Three-layer reachability: static call graph + binary resolution + runtime gating. All three must align for exploitability.
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- **Evidence:** Vulnerability surfaces in `src/Scanner/__Libraries/StellaOps.Scanner.VulnSurfaces/`; confidence tiers (Confirmed/Likely/Present/Unreachable).
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- **Why it matters:** Makes false positives *structurally impossible*, not heuristically reduced. Path witnesses are DSSE-signed.
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**The audit-grade guarantee.** Every scan produces a DSSE + SRM bundle that can be replayed with `stella replay srm.yaml`.
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## 12. Trust Algebra and Lattice Engine (2025-12)
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- **What it is:** A deterministic claim resolution engine using **Belnap K4 four-valued logic** (Unknown, True, False, Conflict) to aggregate heterogeneous security assertions (VEX, SBOM, reachability, provenance) into signed, replayable verdicts.
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- **Evidence:** Implementation in `src/Policy/__Libraries/StellaOps.Policy/TrustLattice/`; 110 unit+integration tests; normalizers for CycloneDX, OpenVEX, and CSAF VEX formats; ECMA-424 disposition output (resolved, exploitable, in_triage, etc.).
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- **Technical primitives:**
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- **K4 Lattice**: Conflict-preserving knowledge aggregation with join/meet/order operations
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- **Security Atoms**: Six orthogonal propositions (PRESENT, APPLIES, REACHABLE, MITIGATED, FIXED, MISATTRIBUTED)
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- **Trust Labels**: Four-tuple (AssuranceLevel, AuthorityScope, FreshnessClass, EvidenceClass) for issuer credibility
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- **Disposition Selection**: Priority-based rules that detect conflicts before auto-dismissal
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- **Proof Bundles**: Content-addressed audit trail with decision trace
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- **Why it matters:** Unlike naive VEX precedence (vendor > distro > scanner), the lattice engine:
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- Preserves conflicts as explicit state (⊤) rather than hiding them
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- Reports critical unknowns (PRESENT, APPLIES, REACHABLE) separately from ancillary ones
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- Produces deterministic, explainable dispositions that survive audit
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- Makes "what we don't know" visible and policy-addressable
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```bash
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# Six months later, prove what you knew
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stella replay srm.yaml --assert-digest sha256:abc123...
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# Output: PASS - identical result
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```
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## 11. Deterministic Task Packs (2025-11)
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- **What it is:** TaskRunner executes declarative Task Packs with plan-hash binding, approvals, sealed-mode enforcement, and DSSE evidence bundles.
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- **Evidence:** `docs/task-packs/spec.md` and `docs/task-packs/registry.md`; architecture contract in `docs/modules/taskrunner/architecture.md`; runbook in `docs/task-packs/runbook.md`.
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- **Why it matters:** Security teams get auditable, air-gap-friendly automation with human approvals and provable provenance, reusing the same workflows online or offline.
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**What's frozen:**
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- Feed snapshots (NVD, KEV, EPSS, distro advisories) with content hashes
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- Analyzer versions and configs
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- Policy rules and lattice state
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- Random seeds for deterministic ordering
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## 13. Evidence-Grade Testing and Deterministic Gates (2025-12)
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- **What it is:** A model-driven test taxonomy and CI lanes that make determinism, offline behavior, and contract stability continuously provable.
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- **Evidence:** `docs/testing/testing-strategy-models.md` and the catalog in `docs/testing/TEST_CATALOG.yml` define required test types per module; `docs/19_TEST_SUITE_OVERVIEW.md` lists the gated lanes.
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- **Why it matters:** Regression-proof audits and predictable CI gates ensure that evidence, not assumptions, drives releases.
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**Why it matters:** This is what "audit-grade" actually means. Not "we logged it" but "you can re-run it."
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### Explore Further
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- Walk the first deployment in [quickstart.md](quickstart.md).
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- Dive into architectural flows in [`40_ARCHITECTURE_OVERVIEW.md`](40_ARCHITECTURE_OVERVIEW.md).
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- Need detailed matrices? The legacy [feature matrix](04_FEATURE_MATRIX.md) and [vision](03_VISION.md) remain available for deep dives.
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---
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## 5. Offline Operations (Air-Gap Parity)
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**Full functionality without network.** Offline Update Kits bundle everything needed for air-gapped operation.
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| Component | Online | Offline |
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|-----------|--------|---------|
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| Feed updates | Live | Sealed bundle with Merkle roots |
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| Crypto verification | OCSP/CRL | Embedded revocation lists |
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| Transparency logging | Rekor | Local transparency mirror |
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| Trust roots | Live TSL | RootPack bundles |
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**Why it matters:** Air-gapped environments get *identical* results to connected, not degraded. Competitors offer partial offline (cached feeds) but not epistemic parity (sealed, reproducible knowledge state).
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**Modules:** `AirGap.Controller`, `TrustStore`, `EgressPolicy`
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---
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## 6. Signed Reachability Proofs
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**Proof of exploitability, not just a badge.** Every reachability graph is sealed with DSSE; optional edge-bundle attestations for contested paths.
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| Layer | What It Proves | Attestation |
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|-------|---------------|-------------|
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| **Static** | Call graph says function is reachable | Graph-level DSSE |
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| **Binary** | Compiled binary contains the symbol | Build-ID mapping |
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| **Runtime** | Process actually executed the code path | Edge-bundle DSSE (optional) |
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**Why it matters:** Not "potentially reachable" but "here's the exact call path from `main()` to `vulnerable_function()`." You can quarantine or dispute individual edges, not just all-or-nothing.
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**No competitor signs reachability graphs.** They claim reachability; we *prove* it.
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**Modules:** `ReachGraph`, `PathWitnessBuilder`, `CompositeGateDetector`
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---
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## 7. Semantic Smart-Diff
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**Diff security meaning, not CVE counts.** Compare reachability graphs, policy outcomes, and trust weights between releases.
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```
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Before: 5 critical CVEs (3 reachable)
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After: 7 critical CVEs (1 reachable)
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Smart-Diff output: "Exploitability DECREASED by 67% despite +2 CVEs"
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```
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**What's compared:**
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- Reachability graph deltas
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- VEX state changes
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- Policy outcome changes
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- Trust weight shifts
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**Why it matters:** "+3 CVEs" tells you nothing. "Reachable attack surface dropped by half" tells you everything.
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**Modules:** `MaterialRiskChangeDetector`, `RiskStateSnapshot`, `Scanner.ReachabilityDrift`
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---
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## 8. Unknowns as First-Class State
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**Uncertainty is risk—we surface and score it.** Explicit modeling of what we *don't* know, with policy implications.
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| Band | Meaning | Policy Action |
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|------|---------|---------------|
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| **HOT** | High uncertainty + exploit pressure | Immediate investigation |
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| **WARM** | Moderate uncertainty | Scheduled review |
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| **COLD** | Low uncertainty | Decay toward resolution |
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| **RESOLVED** | Uncertainty eliminated | No action |
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**Why it matters:** Competitors hide unknowns (assume safe). We track them with decay algorithms, blast-radius containment, and policy budgets ("fail if unknowns > N").
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**Modules:** `UnknownStateLedger`, `Policy`, `Signals`
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---
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## 9. Three-Layer Reachability Proofs
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**Structural false positive elimination.** All three layers must align for exploitability to be confirmed.
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```
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Layer 1 (Static): Call graph shows path from entrypoint → vulnerable function
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Layer 2 (Binary): Compiled binary contains the symbol with matching offset
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Layer 3 (Runtime): eBPF probe confirms function was actually executed
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```
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**Confidence tiers:**
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- **Confirmed** — All three layers agree
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- **Likely** — Static + binary agree; no runtime data
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- **Present** — Package present; no reachability evidence
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- **Unreachable** — Static analysis proves no path exists
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**Why it matters:** False positives become *structurally impossible*, not heuristically reduced.
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**Modules:** `Scanner.VulnSurfaces`, `PathWitnessBuilder`
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---
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## 10. Competitive Moats Summary
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**Four capabilities no competitor offers together:**
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| # | Capability | Why It's Hard to Copy |
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|---|-----------|----------------------|
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| 1 | **Signed Reachability** | Requires three-layer instrumentation + cryptographic binding |
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| 2 | **Deterministic Replay** | Requires content-addressed evidence + feed snapshotting |
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| 3 | **K4 Lattice VEX** | Requires rethinking VEX from suppression to claims |
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| 4 | **Sovereign Offline** | Requires pluggable crypto + offline trust roots |
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**Reference:** `docs/market/competitive-landscape.md`, `docs/market/moat-strategy-summary.md`
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---
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## 11. Trust Algebra Engine (K4 Lattice)
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**Formal conflict resolution, not naive precedence.** The lattice engine uses Belnap K4 four-valued logic to aggregate heterogeneous security assertions.
|
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|
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| State | Meaning | Example |
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|-------|---------|---------|
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| **Unknown (⊥)** | No information | New package, no VEX yet |
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| **True (T)** | Positive assertion | "This CVE affects this package" |
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| **False (F)** | Negative assertion | "This CVE does not affect this package" |
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| **Conflict (⊤)** | Contradictory assertions | Vendor says not_affected; runtime says called |
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**Security Atoms (six orthogonal propositions):**
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- PRESENT, APPLIES, REACHABLE, MITIGATED, FIXED, MISATTRIBUTED
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|
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**Why it matters:** Unlike naive precedence (vendor > distro > scanner), we:
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- Preserve conflicts as explicit state, not hidden
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- Track critical unknowns separately from ancillary ones
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- Produce deterministic, explainable dispositions
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**Modules:** `TrustLatticeEngine`, `Policy` (110+ tests passing)
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---
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## 12. Deterministic Task Packs
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**Auditable automation.** TaskRunner executes declarative Task Packs with plan-hash binding, approvals, and DSSE evidence bundles.
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- **Plan-hash binding:** Task pack execution is tied to specific plan versions
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- **Approval gates:** Human sign-off required before execution
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- **Sealed mode:** Air-gap compatible execution
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- **Evidence bundles:** DSSE-signed results for audit trails
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**Why it matters:** Same workflows online or offline, with provable provenance.
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**Reference:** `docs/task-packs/spec.md`, `docs/modules/taskrunner/architecture.md`
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---
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## 13. Evidence-Grade Testing
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**Determinism as a continuous guarantee.** CI lanes that make reproducibility continuously provable.
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| Test Type | What It Proves |
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|----------|---------------|
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| **Determinism tests** | Same inputs → same outputs |
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| **Offline parity tests** | Air-gapped = connected results |
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| **Contract stability tests** | APIs don't break |
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| **Golden fixture tests** | Historical scans still replay |
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**Why it matters:** Regression-proof audits. Evidence, not assumptions, drives releases.
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**Reference:** `docs/testing/testing-strategy-models.md`, `docs/19_TEST_SUITE_OVERVIEW.md`
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---
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## Quick Reference
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### Key Commands
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```bash
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# Determinism proof
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stella scan --image <img> --srm-out a.yaml
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stella scan --image <img> --srm-out b.yaml
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diff a.yaml b.yaml # Identical
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# Replay proof
|
||||
stella replay srm.yaml --assert-digest <sha>
|
||||
|
||||
# Reachability proof
|
||||
stella graph show --cve CVE-XXXX-YYYY --artifact <digest>
|
||||
|
||||
# VEX evaluation
|
||||
stella vex evaluate --artifact <digest>
|
||||
|
||||
# Offline scan
|
||||
stella rootpack import bundle.tar.gz
|
||||
stella scan --offline --image <digest>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Documents
|
||||
|
||||
- **Competitive Landscape**: `docs/market/competitive-landscape.md`
|
||||
- **Moat Strategy**: `docs/market/moat-strategy-summary.md`
|
||||
- **Proof Architecture**: `docs/modules/platform/proof-driven-moats-architecture.md`
|
||||
- **Vision**: `docs/03_VISION.md`
|
||||
- **Architecture Overview**: `docs/40_ARCHITECTURE_OVERVIEW.md`
|
||||
- **Quickstart**: `docs/quickstart.md`
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user