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StellaOps Bot
2025-11-23 14:54:17 +02:00
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# DSSE/TUF profile for Mirror thin bundles (v1 draft)
Applies to `mirror-thin-v1.*` artefacts in `out/mirror/thin/`.
## Keys
- Signing algorithm: ed25519
- Key IDs: `mirror-ed25519-test-1`
- Storage: keep private key only in sealed CI secret; public key published alongside metadata at `out/mirror/thin/tuf/keys/mirror-ed25519-test-1.pub`.
## DSSE envelope
- Payload type: `application/vnd.stellaops.mirror.manifest+json`
- Payload: `mirror-thin-v1.manifest.json`
- Signature: ed25519 over base64url(payload)
- Envelope path: `out/mirror/thin/mirror-thin-v1.manifest.dsse.json`
## TUF metadata layout
```
out/mirror/thin/tuf/
root.json
snapshot.json
targets.json
timestamp.json
keys/mirror-ed25519-test-1.pub
```
### Targets mapping
- `mirror-thin-v1.tar.gz` → targets entry with sha256 `210dc49e8d3e25509298770a94da277aa2c9d4c387d3c24505a61fe1d7695a49`
- `mirror-thin-v1.manifest.json` → sha256 `0ae51fa87648dae0a54fab950181a3600a8363182d89ad46d70f3a56b997b504`
### Determinism rules
- Sort keys in JSON; indent=2; trailing newline.
- `expires` set to `2026-01-01T00:00:00Z` for draft; update during release.
- Versions: root=1, targets=1, snapshot=1, timestamp=1 for this draft.
- Signatures should be stable; for test draft, placeholders are used until CI signing is wired.
## Status & TODO to productionize
- Draft signatures now generated with repo test key (`mirror-ed25519-test-1`) via `scripts/mirror/sign_thin_bundle.py`; replace with CI-held key before release.
- CI hook: set `MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64` (base64-encoded Ed25519 PEM) and run `scripts/mirror/ci-sign.sh` to build+sign+verify in one step.
- Rotate keys via TUF root role once CI secrets land.
- Add DSSE signer to assembler pipeline so `make-thin-v1.sh` emits envelope + TUF metadata automatically in CI.
### CI integration sketch (disabled until key is provided)
```
- name: Mirror thin bundle (signed)
run: |
export MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64="${{ secrets.MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64 }}"
export OCI=1
scripts/mirror/ci-sign.sh
if: ${{ secrets.MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64 != '' }}
```

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# PROV-OBS-53-001 draft: provenance observers for mirror bundles
Goal: allow downstream services to verify mirror bundle manifests and tarballs using published hashes and (when available) DSSE/TUF signatures.
## Inputs
- Manifest: `out/mirror/thin/mirror-thin-v1.manifest.json`
- Tarball: `out/mirror/thin/mirror-thin-v1.tar.gz`
- Hashes: `.sha256` files adjacent to artefacts
- (Future) DSSE envelope + TUF metadata under `out/mirror/thin/tuf/`
## Observer checks (draft)
1) Hash verification: recompute SHA256 for manifest and tarball; compare to `.sha256` files.
2) Schema check: ensure manifest fields `version`, `created`, `layers[]`, `indexes[]` exist; all digests are `sha256:`.
3) Determinism: verify tar entry order matches manifest order and tar headers are owner=0:0, mtime=0, sorted paths.
4) Optional DSSE: once available, verify DSSE envelope signature over manifest using `mirror-ed25519-test-1` public key.
5) Optional TUF: once available, verify `timestamp.json` -> `snapshot.json` -> `targets.json` -> artefact hashes.
## Implementation notes
- These checks can be implemented as a small CLI (Go/C#/Python). For now, reference artefacts live in `out/mirror/thin/` for test runners.
- Determinism probe: `tar --list --utc --full-time -vvf mirror-thin-v1.tar.gz` should show epoch mtimes and sorted entries.

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# Mirror bundle signing runbook (CI)
## Prerequisites
- Ed25519 private key (PEM). Keep in CI secrets only.
- Base64-encode the PEM: `base64 -w0 mirror-ci-ed25519.pem > mirror-ci-ed25519.pem.b64`.
- Create CI secret `MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64` with that value.
## Pipeline step (Gitea example)
```
- name: Build/sign mirror thin bundle
env:
MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64: ${{ secrets.MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64 }}
OCI: 1
run: |
scripts/mirror/check_signing_prereqs.sh
scripts/mirror/ci-sign.sh
```
Outputs are placed under `out/mirror/thin/` and `out/mirror/thin/oci/`; archive these as artifacts.
### How to add the secret in Gitea (one-time)
1. Repository → Settings → Secrets.
2. New secret: name `MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64`, value = base64-encoded Ed25519 PEM (no newlines, no header/footer).
3. Scope: repository (or environment-specific if needed).
4. Save. The pipeline step will skip if the secret is empty; keep it present in release branches only.
## Local dry-run with test key
```
MIRROR_SIGN_KEY_B64=$(base64 -w0 out/mirror/thin/tuf/keys/mirror-ed25519-test-1.pem) \
OCI=1 scripts/mirror/ci-sign.sh
```
## Verification
The CI step already runs `scripts/mirror/verify_thin_bundle.py`. For OCI, ensure `out/mirror/thin/oci/index.json` references the manifest digest.
## Fallback (if secret absent)
- Keep MIRROR-CRT-56-002 BLOCKED and do not publish unsigned bundles.
- Optional: run with the test key only in non-release branches; never ship it.

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## Evidence
- When produced, place artefacts under `out/mirror/thin/` and add hashes to this doc.
### v1 sample (published 2025-11-23)
- Manifest: `out/mirror/thin/mirror-thin-v1.manifest.json`
- SHA256: `0ae51fa87648dae0a54fab950181a3600a8363182d89ad46d70f3a56b997b504`
- Tarball: `out/mirror/thin/mirror-thin-v1.tar.gz`
- SHA256: `210dc49e8d3e25509298770a94da277aa2c9d4c387d3c24505a61fe1d7695a49`
## Owners
- Mirror Creator Guild (assembler)
- AirGap Guild (consumer)