Add Canonical JSON serialization library with tests and documentation
- Implemented CanonJson class for deterministic JSON serialization and hashing. - Added unit tests for CanonJson functionality, covering various scenarios including key sorting, handling of nested objects, arrays, and special characters. - Created project files for the Canonical JSON library and its tests, including necessary package references. - Added README.md for library usage and API reference. - Introduced RabbitMqIntegrationFactAttribute for conditional RabbitMQ integration tests.
This commit is contained in:
master
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I’m sharing a **competitive security‑tool matrix** that you can immediately plug into Stella Ops strategy discussions — it maps real, *comparable evidence* from public sources to categories where most current tools fall short. Below the CSV is a short Markdown commentary that highlights gaps & opportunities Stella Ops can exploit.
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---
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## 🧠 Competitive Security Tool Matrix (CSV)
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**Columns:**
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`Tool,SBOM Fidelity,VEX Handling,Explainability,Smart‑Diff,Call‑Stack Reachability,Deterministic Scoring,Unknowns State,Ecosystem Integrations,Policy Engine,Offline/Air‑Gapped,Provenance/Attestations,Public Evidence`
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```
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Tool,SBOM Fidelity,VEX Handling,Explainability,Smart‑Diff,Call‑Stack Reachability,Deterministic Scoring,Unknowns State,Ecosystem Integrations,Policy Engine,Offline/Air‑Gapped,Provenance/Attestations,Public Evidence
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Trivy (open),CycloneDX/SPDX support (basic),Partial* (SBOM ext refs),Low,No,No,Moderate,No,Strong CI/CD/K8s,Minimal,Unknown,SBOM only evidence; VEX support request exists but unmerged⟨*⟩,:contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}
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Grype/Syft,Strong CycloneDX/SPDX (generator + scanner),None documented,Low,No,No,Moderate,No,Strong CI/CD/K8s,Policy minimal,Unknown,Syft can create signed SBOMs but not full attestations,:contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
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Snyk,SBOM export likely (platform),Unknown/limited,Vuln context explainability (reports),No,No,Proprietary risk scoring,Partial integrations,Strong Black/White list policies in UI,Unknown,Unknown (not focused on attestations),:contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
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Prisma Cloud,Enterprise SBOM + vuln scanning,Runtime exploitability contexts?*,Enterprise dashboards,No formal smart‑diff,No,Risk prioritization,Supports multi‑cloud integrations,Rich policy engines (CNAPP),Supports offline deployment?,Unknown attestations capabilities,:contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
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Aqua (enterprise),SBOM via Trivy,Unknown commercial VEX support,Some explainability in reports,No documented smart‑diff,No,Risk prioritization,Comprehensive integrations (cloud/CI/CD/SIEM),Enterprise policy supports compliance,Air‑gapped options in enterprise,Focus on compliance attestations?,:contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
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Anchore Enterprise,Strong SBOM mgmt + format support,Policy engine can ingest SBOM + vulnerability sources,Moderate (reports & SBOM insights),Potential policy diff,No explicit reachability analysis,Moderate policy scoring,Partial,Rich integrations (CI/CD/registry),Policy‑as‑code,Air‑gapped deploy supported,SBOM provenance & signing via Syft/in‑toto,:contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}
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Stella Ops,High fidelity SBOM (CycloneDX/SPDX) planned,Native VEX ingestion + decisioning,Explainability + proof extracts,Smart‑diff tech planned,Call‑stack reachability analysis,Deterministic scoring with proofs,Explicit unknowns state,Integrations with CI/CD/SIGSTORE,Declarative multimodal policy engine,Full offline/air‑gapped support,Provenance/attestations via DSSE/in‑toto,StellaOps internal vision
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```
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---
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## 📌 Key Notes, Gaps & Opportunities (Markdown)
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### **SBOM Fidelity**
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* **Open tools (Trivy, Syft)** already support CycloneDX/SPDX output, but mostly as flat SBOM artifacts without long‑term repositories or versioned diffing. ([Ox Security][1])
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* **Opportunity:** Provide *repository + lineage + merge semantics* with proofs — not just generation.
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### **VEX Handling**
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* Trivy has an open feature request for dynamic VEX ingestion. ([GitHub][2])
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* Most competitors either lack VEX support or have no *decisioning logic* based on exploitability.
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* **Opportunity:** First‑class VEX ingestion with evaluation rules + automated scoring.
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### **Explainability**
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* Commercial tools (Prisma/Snyk) offer UI report context and dev‑oriented remediation guidance. ([Snyk][3])
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* OSS tools provide flat scan outputs with minimal causal trace.
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* **Opportunity:** Link vulnerability flags back to *proven code paths*, enriched with SBOM + call reachability.
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### **Smart‑Diff & Unknowns State**
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* No major tool advertising *smart diffing* between SBOMs for incremental risk deltas across releases.
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* **Opportunity:** Automate risk deltas between SBOMs with uncertainty margins.
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### **Call‑Stack Reachability**
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* None of these tools publicly document call‑stack based exploit reachability analysis out‑of‑the‑box.
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* **Opportunity:** Integrate dynamic/static reachability evidence that elevates scanning from surface report → *impact map*.
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### **Deterministic Scoring**
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* Snyk & Prisma offer proprietary scoring that blends severity + context. ([TrustRadius][4])
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* But these aren’t reproducible with *signed verdicts*.
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* **Opportunity:** Provide *deterministic, attestable scoring proofs*.
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### **Ecosystem Integrations**
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* Trivy/Grype excel at lightweight CI/CD and Kubernetes. ([Echo][5])
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* Enterprise products integrate deeply into cloud/registry. ([Palo Alto Networks][6])
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* **Opportunity:** Expand *sigstore/notation* based pipelines and automated attestation flows.
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### **Policy Engine**
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* Prisma & Aqua have mature enterprise policies. ([Aqua][7])
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* OSS tools have limited simple allow/deny.
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* **Opportunity:** Provide *lattice/constraint policies* with proof outputs.
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### **Offline/Air‑Gapped**
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* Anchore supports air‑gapped deployment in enterprise contexts. ([Anchore][8])
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* Support across all open tools is ad‑hoc at best.
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* **Opportunity:** Built‑in deterministic offline modes with offline SBOM stores and VEX ingestion.
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### **Provenance/Attestations**
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* Syft supports SBOM output in various formats; also *in‑toto* for attestations. ([Ox Security][1])
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* Most competitors don’t prominently advertise *attestation pipelines*.
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* **Opportunity:** End‑to‑end DSSE/in‑toto provenance with immutable proofs.
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---
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### 📌 Public Evidence Links
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* **Trivy / Syft / Grype SBOM support & formats:** CycloneDX/SPDX; Syft as generator + Grype scanner. ([Ox Security][1])
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* **Trivy VEX feature request:** exists but not mainstream yet. ([GitHub][2])
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* **Snyk platform capability:** scans containers, IaC, dev‑first prioritization. ([Snyk][3])
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* **Prisma Cloud container security:** lifecycle scanning + policy. ([Palo Alto Networks][6])
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* **Anchore Enterprise SBOM mgmt & policy:** central imports + CI/CD ecosystem. ([Anchore Docs][9])
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---
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If you’d like this in **Excel, JSON, or Mermaid graph form** next, I can generate it — just tell me the format you prefer.
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[1]: https://www.ox.security/blog/sbom-tools/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Top 5 SBOM Tools for Securing the Software Supply Chain"
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[2]: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/8047?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Support for dynamic VEX retrieval from \"External ..."
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[3]: https://snyk.io/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Snyk AI-powered Developer Security Platform | AI-powered ..."
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[4]: https://www.trustradius.com/compare-products/palo-alto-networks-prisma-cloud-vs-snyk?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Palo Alto Networks Prisma Cloud vs Snyk"
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[5]: https://www.echohq.com/blog/best-container-scanning-tools?utm_source=chatgpt.com "10 Best Container Scanning Tools for 2025"
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[6]: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud/container-security?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Container Security Solutions"
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[7]: https://www.aquasec.com/integrations/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Integrations - Aqua Security"
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[8]: https://anchore.com/blog/effortless-sbom-analysis-how-anchore-enterprise-simplifies-integration/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Effortless SBOM Analysis with Anchore Enterprise"
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[9]: https://docs.anchore.com/current/docs/sbom_management/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "SBOM Management"
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Below is a **deep, implementation-grade elaboration** that turns the comparison matrix into **actionable architecture and product differentiation** for Stella Ops. I will deliberately avoid marketing language and focus on **mechanics, evidence, and execution gaps**.
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---
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## 1. Why existing tools plateau (root cause analysis)
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Across Trivy, Syft/Grype, Snyk, Prisma, Aqua, Anchore, there is a **structural ceiling** they all hit — regardless of OSS vs enterprise.
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### Shared structural limitations
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1. **SBOM is treated as a static artifact**
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* Generated → stored → scanned.
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* No concept of *evolving truth*, lineage, or replayability.
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2. **Vulnerability scoring is probabilistic, not provable**
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* CVSS + vendor heuristics.
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* Cannot answer: *“Show me why this CVE is exploitable here.”*
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3. **Exploitability ≠ reachability**
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* “Runtime context” ≠ call-path proof.
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4. **Diffing is file-level, not semantic**
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* Image hash change ≠ security delta understanding.
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5. **Offline support is operational, not epistemic**
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* You can run it offline, but you cannot **prove** what knowledge state was used.
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These are not accidental omissions. They arise from **tooling lineage**:
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* Trivy/Syft grew from *package scanners*
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* Snyk grew from *developer remediation UX*
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* Prisma/Aqua grew from *policy & compliance platforms*
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None were designed around **forensic reproducibility or trust algebra**.
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---
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## 2. SBOM fidelity: what “high fidelity” actually means
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Most tools claim CycloneDX/SPDX support. That is **necessary but insufficient**.
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### Current reality
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| Dimension | Industry tools |
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| ----------------------- | ---------------------- |
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| Component identity | Package name + version |
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| Binary provenance | Weak or absent |
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| Build determinism | None |
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| Dependency graph | Flat or shallow |
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| Layer attribution | Partial |
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| Rebuild reproducibility | Not supported |
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### What Stella Ops must do differently
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**SBOM must become a *stateful ledger*, not a document.**
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Concrete requirements:
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* **Component identity = (source + digest + build recipe hash)**
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* **Binary → source mapping**
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* ELF Build-ID / Mach-O UUID / PE timestamp+hash
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* **Layer-aware dependency graphs**
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* Not “package depends on X”
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* But “binary symbol A resolves to shared object B via loader rule C”
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* **Replay manifest**
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* Exact feeds
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* Exact policies
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* Exact scoring rules
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* Exact timestamps
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* Hash of everything
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This is the foundation for *deterministic replayable scans* — something none of the competitors even attempt.
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---
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## 3. VEX handling: ingestion vs decisioning
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Most vendors misunderstand VEX.
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### What competitors do
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* Accept VEX as:
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* Metadata
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* Annotation
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* Suppression rule
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* No **formal reasoning** over VEX statements.
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### What Stella Ops must do
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VEX is not a comment — it is a **logical claim**.
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Each VEX statement:
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```
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IF
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product == X
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AND component == Y
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AND version in range Z
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THEN
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status ∈ {not_affected, affected, fixed, under_investigation}
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BECAUSE
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justification J
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WITH
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evidence E
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```
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Stella Ops advantage:
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* VEX statements become **inputs to a lattice merge**
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* Conflicting VEX from:
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* Vendor
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* Distro
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* Internal analysis
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* Runtime evidence
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* Are resolved **deterministically** via policy, not precedence hacks.
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This unlocks:
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* Vendor-supplied proofs
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* Customer-supplied overrides
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* Jurisdiction-specific trust rules
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---
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## 4. Explainability: reports vs proofs
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### Industry “explainability”
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* “This vulnerability is high because…”
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* Screenshots, UI hints, remediation text.
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### Required explainability
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Security explainability must answer **four non-negotiable questions**:
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1. **What exact evidence triggered this finding?**
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2. **What code or binary path makes it reachable?**
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3. **What assumptions are being made?**
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4. **What would falsify this conclusion?**
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No existing scanner answers #4.
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### Stella Ops model
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Each finding emits:
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* Evidence bundle:
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* SBOM nodes
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* Call-graph edges
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* Loader resolution
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* Runtime symbol presence
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* Assumption set:
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* Compiler flags
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* Runtime configuration
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* Feature gates
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* Confidence score **derived from evidence density**, not CVSS
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This is explainability suitable for:
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* Auditors
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* Regulators
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* Courts
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* Defense procurement
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---
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## 5. Smart-Diff: the missing primitive
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All tools compare:
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* Image A vs Image B
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* Result: *“+3 CVEs, –1 CVE”*
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This is **noise-centric diffing**.
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### What Smart-Diff must mean
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Diff not *artifacts*, but **security meaning**.
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Examples:
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* Same CVE remains, but:
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* Call path removed → risk collapses
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* New binary added, but:
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* Dead code → no reachable risk
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* Dependency upgraded, but:
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* ABI unchanged → no exposure delta
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Implementation direction:
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* Diff **reachability graphs**
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* Diff **policy outcomes**
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* Diff **trust weights**
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* Diff **unknowns**
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Output:
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> “This release reduces exploitability surface by 41%, despite +2 CVEs.”
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No competitor does this.
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|
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---
|
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## 6. Call-stack reachability: why runtime context isn’t enough
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### Current vendor claim
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“Runtime exploitability analysis.”
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Reality:
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* Usually:
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* Process exists
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* Library loaded
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* Port open
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This is **coarse correlation**, not proof.
|
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|
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### Stella Ops reachability model
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Reachability requires **three layers**:
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1. **Static call graph**
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|
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* From entrypoints to vulnerable symbols
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2. **Binary resolution**
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* Dynamic loader rules
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* Symbol versioning
|
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3. **Runtime gating**
|
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|
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* Feature flags
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* Configuration
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* Environment
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Only when **all three align** does exploitability exist.
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This makes false positives *structurally impossible*, not heuristically reduced.
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|
||||
---
|
||||
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## 7. Deterministic scoring: replacing trust with math
|
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Every competitor uses:
|
||||
|
||||
* CVSS
|
||||
* EPSS
|
||||
* Proprietary weighting
|
||||
|
||||
Problem:
|
||||
|
||||
* Scores are **non-reproducible**
|
||||
* Cannot be attested
|
||||
* Cannot be audited
|
||||
|
||||
### Stella Ops scoring
|
||||
|
||||
Score = deterministic function of:
|
||||
|
||||
* Evidence count
|
||||
* Evidence strength
|
||||
* Assumption penalties
|
||||
* Trust source weights
|
||||
* Policy constraints
|
||||
|
||||
Same inputs → same outputs → forever.
|
||||
|
||||
This enables:
|
||||
|
||||
* Signed risk decisions
|
||||
* Cross-org verification
|
||||
* Legal defensibility
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Unknowns as a first-class state
|
||||
|
||||
Industry tools suppress uncertainty.
|
||||
|
||||
Stella Ops must **surface it**.
|
||||
|
||||
States:
|
||||
|
||||
* Known-safe
|
||||
* Known-vulnerable
|
||||
* **Unknown-reachable**
|
||||
* **Unknown-unreachable**
|
||||
|
||||
Unknowns are **risk**, but different from vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
This is critical for:
|
||||
|
||||
* Air-gapped environments
|
||||
* Novel exploits
|
||||
* Zero-day windows
|
||||
|
||||
No competitor models this explicitly.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Offline / air-gapped: epistemic completeness
|
||||
|
||||
Competitors:
|
||||
|
||||
* “Yes, we can run offline.”
|
||||
|
||||
But cannot answer:
|
||||
|
||||
> “Exactly what knowledge did you have when you made this decision?”
|
||||
|
||||
Stella Ops must:
|
||||
|
||||
* Snapshot feeds
|
||||
* Snapshot policies
|
||||
* Snapshot scoring rules
|
||||
* Snapshot trust anchors
|
||||
|
||||
Then bind them cryptographically to scan results.
|
||||
|
||||
This creates **forensic replayability**, not just offline execution.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Strategic conclusion (no hype)
|
||||
|
||||
### Where Stella Ops can **objectively dominate**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Deterministic replayable scans
|
||||
2. Formal VEX reasoning
|
||||
3. Reachability-backed exploitability
|
||||
4. Semantic smart-diff
|
||||
5. Evidence-first explainability
|
||||
6. Unknowns modeling
|
||||
7. Jurisdiction-ready offline trust
|
||||
|
||||
### Where competitors remain stronger (for now)
|
||||
|
||||
* Mass-market UX polish
|
||||
* SaaS onboarding friction
|
||||
* Marketplace integrations
|
||||
|
||||
These are solvable later. The **hard parts** above are not.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
If you want, next I can:
|
||||
|
||||
* Convert this into **developer implementation milestones**
|
||||
* Map features → **moat strength vs competitors**
|
||||
* Design the **Trust Algebra / Lattice Engine spec**
|
||||
* Produce a **regulator-grade threat & evidence model**
|
||||
|
||||
Tell me which vector you want next.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
|
||||
I’m sharing a **competitive security‑tool matrix** that you can immediately plug into Stella Ops strategy discussions — it maps real, *comparable evidence* from public sources to categories where most current tools fall short. Below the CSV is a short Markdown commentary that highlights gaps & opportunities Stella Ops can exploit.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 🧠 Competitive Security Tool Matrix (CSV)
|
||||
|
||||
**Columns:**
|
||||
`Tool,SBOM Fidelity,VEX Handling,Explainability,Smart‑Diff,Call‑Stack Reachability,Deterministic Scoring,Unknowns State,Ecosystem Integrations,Policy Engine,Offline/Air‑Gapped,Provenance/Attestations,Public Evidence`
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Tool,SBOM Fidelity,VEX Handling,Explainability,Smart‑Diff,Call‑Stack Reachability,Deterministic Scoring,Unknowns State,Ecosystem Integrations,Policy Engine,Offline/Air‑Gapped,Provenance/Attestations,Public Evidence
|
||||
Trivy (open),CycloneDX/SPDX support (basic),Partial* (SBOM ext refs),Low,No,No,Moderate,No,Strong CI/CD/K8s,Minimal,Unknown,SBOM only evidence; VEX support request exists but unmerged⟨*⟩,:contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}
|
||||
Grype/Syft,Strong CycloneDX/SPDX (generator + scanner),None documented,Low,No,No,Moderate,No,Strong CI/CD/K8s,Policy minimal,Unknown,Syft can create signed SBOMs but not full attestations,:contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
|
||||
Snyk,SBOM export likely (platform),Unknown/limited,Vuln context explainability (reports),No,No,Proprietary risk scoring,Partial integrations,Strong Black/White list policies in UI,Unknown,Unknown (not focused on attestations),:contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
|
||||
Prisma Cloud,Enterprise SBOM + vuln scanning,Runtime exploitability contexts?*,Enterprise dashboards,No formal smart‑diff,No,Risk prioritization,Supports multi‑cloud integrations,Rich policy engines (CNAPP),Supports offline deployment?,Unknown attestations capabilities,:contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
|
||||
Aqua (enterprise),SBOM via Trivy,Unknown commercial VEX support,Some explainability in reports,No documented smart‑diff,No,Risk prioritization,Comprehensive integrations (cloud/CI/CD/SIEM),Enterprise policy supports compliance,Air‑gapped options in enterprise,Focus on compliance attestations?,:contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
|
||||
Anchore Enterprise,Strong SBOM mgmt + format support,Policy engine can ingest SBOM + vulnerability sources,Moderate (reports & SBOM insights),Potential policy diff,No explicit reachability analysis,Moderate policy scoring,Partial,Rich integrations (CI/CD/registry),Policy‑as‑code,Air‑gapped deploy supported,SBOM provenance & signing via Syft/in‑toto,:contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}
|
||||
Stella Ops,High fidelity SBOM (CycloneDX/SPDX) planned,Native VEX ingestion + decisioning,Explainability + proof extracts,Smart‑diff tech planned,Call‑stack reachability analysis,Deterministic scoring with proofs,Explicit unknowns state,Integrations with CI/CD/SIGSTORE,Declarative multimodal policy engine,Full offline/air‑gapped support,Provenance/attestations via DSSE/in‑toto,StellaOps internal vision
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 📌 Key Notes, Gaps & Opportunities (Markdown)
|
||||
|
||||
### **SBOM Fidelity**
|
||||
|
||||
* **Open tools (Trivy, Syft)** already support CycloneDX/SPDX output, but mostly as flat SBOM artifacts without long‑term repositories or versioned diffing. ([Ox Security][1])
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Provide *repository + lineage + merge semantics* with proofs — not just generation.
|
||||
|
||||
### **VEX Handling**
|
||||
|
||||
* Trivy has an open feature request for dynamic VEX ingestion. ([GitHub][2])
|
||||
* Most competitors either lack VEX support or have no *decisioning logic* based on exploitability.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** First‑class VEX ingestion with evaluation rules + automated scoring.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Explainability**
|
||||
|
||||
* Commercial tools (Prisma/Snyk) offer UI report context and dev‑oriented remediation guidance. ([Snyk][3])
|
||||
* OSS tools provide flat scan outputs with minimal causal trace.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Link vulnerability flags back to *proven code paths*, enriched with SBOM + call reachability.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Smart‑Diff & Unknowns State**
|
||||
|
||||
* No major tool advertising *smart diffing* between SBOMs for incremental risk deltas across releases.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Automate risk deltas between SBOMs with uncertainty margins.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Call‑Stack Reachability**
|
||||
|
||||
* None of these tools publicly document call‑stack based exploit reachability analysis out‑of‑the‑box.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Integrate dynamic/static reachability evidence that elevates scanning from surface report → *impact map*.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Deterministic Scoring**
|
||||
|
||||
* Snyk & Prisma offer proprietary scoring that blends severity + context. ([TrustRadius][4])
|
||||
* But these aren’t reproducible with *signed verdicts*.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Provide *deterministic, attestable scoring proofs*.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Ecosystem Integrations**
|
||||
|
||||
* Trivy/Grype excel at lightweight CI/CD and Kubernetes. ([Echo][5])
|
||||
* Enterprise products integrate deeply into cloud/registry. ([Palo Alto Networks][6])
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Expand *sigstore/notation* based pipelines and automated attestation flows.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Policy Engine**
|
||||
|
||||
* Prisma & Aqua have mature enterprise policies. ([Aqua][7])
|
||||
* OSS tools have limited simple allow/deny.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Provide *lattice/constraint policies* with proof outputs.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Offline/Air‑Gapped**
|
||||
|
||||
* Anchore supports air‑gapped deployment in enterprise contexts. ([Anchore][8])
|
||||
* Support across all open tools is ad‑hoc at best.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** Built‑in deterministic offline modes with offline SBOM stores and VEX ingestion.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Provenance/Attestations**
|
||||
|
||||
* Syft supports SBOM output in various formats; also *in‑toto* for attestations. ([Ox Security][1])
|
||||
* Most competitors don’t prominently advertise *attestation pipelines*.
|
||||
* **Opportunity:** End‑to‑end DSSE/in‑toto provenance with immutable proofs.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### 📌 Public Evidence Links
|
||||
|
||||
* **Trivy / Syft / Grype SBOM support & formats:** CycloneDX/SPDX; Syft as generator + Grype scanner. ([Ox Security][1])
|
||||
* **Trivy VEX feature request:** exists but not mainstream yet. ([GitHub][2])
|
||||
* **Snyk platform capability:** scans containers, IaC, dev‑first prioritization. ([Snyk][3])
|
||||
* **Prisma Cloud container security:** lifecycle scanning + policy. ([Palo Alto Networks][6])
|
||||
* **Anchore Enterprise SBOM mgmt & policy:** central imports + CI/CD ecosystem. ([Anchore Docs][9])
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
If you’d like this in **Excel, JSON, or Mermaid graph form** next, I can generate it — just tell me the format you prefer.
|
||||
|
||||
[1]: https://www.ox.security/blog/sbom-tools/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Top 5 SBOM Tools for Securing the Software Supply Chain"
|
||||
[2]: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/discussions/8047?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Support for dynamic VEX retrieval from \"External ..."
|
||||
[3]: https://snyk.io/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Snyk AI-powered Developer Security Platform | AI-powered ..."
|
||||
[4]: https://www.trustradius.com/compare-products/palo-alto-networks-prisma-cloud-vs-snyk?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Palo Alto Networks Prisma Cloud vs Snyk"
|
||||
[5]: https://www.echohq.com/blog/best-container-scanning-tools?utm_source=chatgpt.com "10 Best Container Scanning Tools for 2025"
|
||||
[6]: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud/container-security?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Container Security Solutions"
|
||||
[7]: https://www.aquasec.com/integrations/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Integrations - Aqua Security"
|
||||
[8]: https://anchore.com/blog/effortless-sbom-analysis-how-anchore-enterprise-simplifies-integration/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Effortless SBOM Analysis with Anchore Enterprise"
|
||||
[9]: https://docs.anchore.com/current/docs/sbom_management/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "SBOM Management"
|
||||
Below is a **deep, implementation-grade elaboration** that turns the comparison matrix into **actionable architecture and product differentiation** for Stella Ops. I will deliberately avoid marketing language and focus on **mechanics, evidence, and execution gaps**.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Why existing tools plateau (root cause analysis)
|
||||
|
||||
Across Trivy, Syft/Grype, Snyk, Prisma, Aqua, Anchore, there is a **structural ceiling** they all hit — regardless of OSS vs enterprise.
|
||||
|
||||
### Shared structural limitations
|
||||
|
||||
1. **SBOM is treated as a static artifact**
|
||||
|
||||
* Generated → stored → scanned.
|
||||
* No concept of *evolving truth*, lineage, or replayability.
|
||||
2. **Vulnerability scoring is probabilistic, not provable**
|
||||
|
||||
* CVSS + vendor heuristics.
|
||||
* Cannot answer: *“Show me why this CVE is exploitable here.”*
|
||||
3. **Exploitability ≠ reachability**
|
||||
|
||||
* “Runtime context” ≠ call-path proof.
|
||||
4. **Diffing is file-level, not semantic**
|
||||
|
||||
* Image hash change ≠ security delta understanding.
|
||||
5. **Offline support is operational, not epistemic**
|
||||
|
||||
* You can run it offline, but you cannot **prove** what knowledge state was used.
|
||||
|
||||
These are not accidental omissions. They arise from **tooling lineage**:
|
||||
|
||||
* Trivy/Syft grew from *package scanners*
|
||||
* Snyk grew from *developer remediation UX*
|
||||
* Prisma/Aqua grew from *policy & compliance platforms*
|
||||
|
||||
None were designed around **forensic reproducibility or trust algebra**.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. SBOM fidelity: what “high fidelity” actually means
|
||||
|
||||
Most tools claim CycloneDX/SPDX support. That is **necessary but insufficient**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Current reality
|
||||
|
||||
| Dimension | Industry tools |
|
||||
| ----------------------- | ---------------------- |
|
||||
| Component identity | Package name + version |
|
||||
| Binary provenance | Weak or absent |
|
||||
| Build determinism | None |
|
||||
| Dependency graph | Flat or shallow |
|
||||
| Layer attribution | Partial |
|
||||
| Rebuild reproducibility | Not supported |
|
||||
|
||||
### What Stella Ops must do differently
|
||||
|
||||
**SBOM must become a *stateful ledger*, not a document.**
|
||||
|
||||
Concrete requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Component identity = (source + digest + build recipe hash)**
|
||||
* **Binary → source mapping**
|
||||
|
||||
* ELF Build-ID / Mach-O UUID / PE timestamp+hash
|
||||
* **Layer-aware dependency graphs**
|
||||
|
||||
* Not “package depends on X”
|
||||
* But “binary symbol A resolves to shared object B via loader rule C”
|
||||
* **Replay manifest**
|
||||
|
||||
* Exact feeds
|
||||
* Exact policies
|
||||
* Exact scoring rules
|
||||
* Exact timestamps
|
||||
* Hash of everything
|
||||
|
||||
This is the foundation for *deterministic replayable scans* — something none of the competitors even attempt.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. VEX handling: ingestion vs decisioning
|
||||
|
||||
Most vendors misunderstand VEX.
|
||||
|
||||
### What competitors do
|
||||
|
||||
* Accept VEX as:
|
||||
|
||||
* Metadata
|
||||
* Annotation
|
||||
* Suppression rule
|
||||
* No **formal reasoning** over VEX statements.
|
||||
|
||||
### What Stella Ops must do
|
||||
|
||||
VEX is not a comment — it is a **logical claim**.
|
||||
|
||||
Each VEX statement:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
IF
|
||||
product == X
|
||||
AND component == Y
|
||||
AND version in range Z
|
||||
THEN
|
||||
status ∈ {not_affected, affected, fixed, under_investigation}
|
||||
BECAUSE
|
||||
justification J
|
||||
WITH
|
||||
evidence E
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Stella Ops advantage:
|
||||
|
||||
* VEX statements become **inputs to a lattice merge**
|
||||
* Conflicting VEX from:
|
||||
|
||||
* Vendor
|
||||
* Distro
|
||||
* Internal analysis
|
||||
* Runtime evidence
|
||||
* Are resolved **deterministically** via policy, not precedence hacks.
|
||||
|
||||
This unlocks:
|
||||
|
||||
* Vendor-supplied proofs
|
||||
* Customer-supplied overrides
|
||||
* Jurisdiction-specific trust rules
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Explainability: reports vs proofs
|
||||
|
||||
### Industry “explainability”
|
||||
|
||||
* “This vulnerability is high because…”
|
||||
* Screenshots, UI hints, remediation text.
|
||||
|
||||
### Required explainability
|
||||
|
||||
Security explainability must answer **four non-negotiable questions**:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **What exact evidence triggered this finding?**
|
||||
2. **What code or binary path makes it reachable?**
|
||||
3. **What assumptions are being made?**
|
||||
4. **What would falsify this conclusion?**
|
||||
|
||||
No existing scanner answers #4.
|
||||
|
||||
### Stella Ops model
|
||||
|
||||
Each finding emits:
|
||||
|
||||
* Evidence bundle:
|
||||
|
||||
* SBOM nodes
|
||||
* Call-graph edges
|
||||
* Loader resolution
|
||||
* Runtime symbol presence
|
||||
* Assumption set:
|
||||
|
||||
* Compiler flags
|
||||
* Runtime configuration
|
||||
* Feature gates
|
||||
* Confidence score **derived from evidence density**, not CVSS
|
||||
|
||||
This is explainability suitable for:
|
||||
|
||||
* Auditors
|
||||
* Regulators
|
||||
* Courts
|
||||
* Defense procurement
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Smart-Diff: the missing primitive
|
||||
|
||||
All tools compare:
|
||||
|
||||
* Image A vs Image B
|
||||
* Result: *“+3 CVEs, –1 CVE”*
|
||||
|
||||
This is **noise-centric diffing**.
|
||||
|
||||
### What Smart-Diff must mean
|
||||
|
||||
Diff not *artifacts*, but **security meaning**.
|
||||
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
|
||||
* Same CVE remains, but:
|
||||
|
||||
* Call path removed → risk collapses
|
||||
* New binary added, but:
|
||||
|
||||
* Dead code → no reachable risk
|
||||
* Dependency upgraded, but:
|
||||
|
||||
* ABI unchanged → no exposure delta
|
||||
|
||||
Implementation direction:
|
||||
|
||||
* Diff **reachability graphs**
|
||||
* Diff **policy outcomes**
|
||||
* Diff **trust weights**
|
||||
* Diff **unknowns**
|
||||
|
||||
Output:
|
||||
|
||||
> “This release reduces exploitability surface by 41%, despite +2 CVEs.”
|
||||
|
||||
No competitor does this.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Call-stack reachability: why runtime context isn’t enough
|
||||
|
||||
### Current vendor claim
|
||||
|
||||
“Runtime exploitability analysis.”
|
||||
|
||||
Reality:
|
||||
|
||||
* Usually:
|
||||
|
||||
* Process exists
|
||||
* Library loaded
|
||||
* Port open
|
||||
|
||||
This is **coarse correlation**, not proof.
|
||||
|
||||
### Stella Ops reachability model
|
||||
|
||||
Reachability requires **three layers**:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Static call graph**
|
||||
|
||||
* From entrypoints to vulnerable symbols
|
||||
2. **Binary resolution**
|
||||
|
||||
* Dynamic loader rules
|
||||
* Symbol versioning
|
||||
3. **Runtime gating**
|
||||
|
||||
* Feature flags
|
||||
* Configuration
|
||||
* Environment
|
||||
|
||||
Only when **all three align** does exploitability exist.
|
||||
|
||||
This makes false positives *structurally impossible*, not heuristically reduced.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Deterministic scoring: replacing trust with math
|
||||
|
||||
Every competitor uses:
|
||||
|
||||
* CVSS
|
||||
* EPSS
|
||||
* Proprietary weighting
|
||||
|
||||
Problem:
|
||||
|
||||
* Scores are **non-reproducible**
|
||||
* Cannot be attested
|
||||
* Cannot be audited
|
||||
|
||||
### Stella Ops scoring
|
||||
|
||||
Score = deterministic function of:
|
||||
|
||||
* Evidence count
|
||||
* Evidence strength
|
||||
* Assumption penalties
|
||||
* Trust source weights
|
||||
* Policy constraints
|
||||
|
||||
Same inputs → same outputs → forever.
|
||||
|
||||
This enables:
|
||||
|
||||
* Signed risk decisions
|
||||
* Cross-org verification
|
||||
* Legal defensibility
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Unknowns as a first-class state
|
||||
|
||||
Industry tools suppress uncertainty.
|
||||
|
||||
Stella Ops must **surface it**.
|
||||
|
||||
States:
|
||||
|
||||
* Known-safe
|
||||
* Known-vulnerable
|
||||
* **Unknown-reachable**
|
||||
* **Unknown-unreachable**
|
||||
|
||||
Unknowns are **risk**, but different from vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
This is critical for:
|
||||
|
||||
* Air-gapped environments
|
||||
* Novel exploits
|
||||
* Zero-day windows
|
||||
|
||||
No competitor models this explicitly.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Offline / air-gapped: epistemic completeness
|
||||
|
||||
Competitors:
|
||||
|
||||
* “Yes, we can run offline.”
|
||||
|
||||
But cannot answer:
|
||||
|
||||
> “Exactly what knowledge did you have when you made this decision?”
|
||||
|
||||
Stella Ops must:
|
||||
|
||||
* Snapshot feeds
|
||||
* Snapshot policies
|
||||
* Snapshot scoring rules
|
||||
* Snapshot trust anchors
|
||||
|
||||
Then bind them cryptographically to scan results.
|
||||
|
||||
This creates **forensic replayability**, not just offline execution.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Strategic conclusion (no hype)
|
||||
|
||||
### Where Stella Ops can **objectively dominate**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Deterministic replayable scans
|
||||
2. Formal VEX reasoning
|
||||
3. Reachability-backed exploitability
|
||||
4. Semantic smart-diff
|
||||
5. Evidence-first explainability
|
||||
6. Unknowns modeling
|
||||
7. Jurisdiction-ready offline trust
|
||||
|
||||
### Where competitors remain stronger (for now)
|
||||
|
||||
* Mass-market UX polish
|
||||
* SaaS onboarding friction
|
||||
* Marketplace integrations
|
||||
|
||||
These are solvable later. The **hard parts** above are not.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
If you want, next I can:
|
||||
|
||||
* Convert this into **developer implementation milestones**
|
||||
* Map features → **moat strength vs competitors**
|
||||
* Design the **Trust Algebra / Lattice Engine spec**
|
||||
* Produce a **regulator-grade threat & evidence model**
|
||||
|
||||
Tell me which vector you want next.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user