feat(rate-limiting): Implement core rate limiting functionality with configuration, decision-making, metrics, middleware, and service registration
- Add RateLimitConfig for configuration management with YAML binding support. - Introduce RateLimitDecision to encapsulate the result of rate limit checks. - Implement RateLimitMetrics for OpenTelemetry metrics tracking. - Create RateLimitMiddleware for enforcing rate limits on incoming requests. - Develop RateLimitService to orchestrate instance and environment rate limit checks. - Add RateLimitServiceCollectionExtensions for dependency injection registration.
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docs/airgap/proof-chain-verification.md
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docs/airgap/proof-chain-verification.md
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# Proof Chain Verification in Air-Gap Mode
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> **Version**: 1.0.0
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> **Last Updated**: 2025-12-17
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> **Related**: [Proof Chain API](../api/proofs.md), [Key Rotation Runbook](../operations/key-rotation-runbook.md)
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This document describes how to verify proof chains in air-gapped (offline) environments where Rekor transparency log access is unavailable.
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---
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## Overview
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Proof chains in StellaOps consist of cryptographically-linked attestations:
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1. **Evidence statements** - Raw vulnerability findings
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2. **Reasoning statements** - Policy evaluation traces
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3. **VEX verdict statements** - Final vulnerability status determinations
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4. **Proof spine** - Merkle tree aggregating all components
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In online mode, proof chains include Rekor inclusion proofs for transparency. In air-gap mode, verification proceeds without Rekor but maintains cryptographic integrity.
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---
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## Verification Levels
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### Level 1: Content-Addressed ID Verification
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Verifies that content-addressed IDs match payload hashes.
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```bash
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# Verify a proof bundle ID
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stellaops proof verify --offline \
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--proof-bundle sha256:1a2b3c4d... \
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--level content-id
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# Expected output:
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# ✓ Content-addressed ID verified
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# ✓ Payload hash: sha256:1a2b3c4d...
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```
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### Level 2: DSSE Signature Verification
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Verifies DSSE envelope signatures against trust anchors.
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```bash
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# Verify signatures with local trust anchors
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stellaops proof verify --offline \
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--proof-bundle sha256:1a2b3c4d... \
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--anchor-file /path/to/trust-anchors.json \
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--level signature
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# Expected output:
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# ✓ DSSE signature valid
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# ✓ Signer: key-2025-prod
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# ✓ Trust anchor: 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000
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```
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### Level 3: Merkle Path Verification
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Verifies the proof spine merkle tree structure.
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```bash
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# Verify merkle paths
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stellaops proof verify --offline \
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--proof-bundle sha256:1a2b3c4d... \
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--level merkle
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# Expected output:
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# ✓ Merkle root verified
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# ✓ Evidence paths: 3/3 valid
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# ✓ Reasoning path: valid
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# ✓ VEX verdict path: valid
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```
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### Level 4: Full Verification (Offline)
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Performs all verification steps except Rekor.
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```bash
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# Full offline verification
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stellaops proof verify --offline \
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--proof-bundle sha256:1a2b3c4d... \
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--anchor-file /path/to/trust-anchors.json
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# Expected output:
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# Proof Chain Verification
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# ═══════════════════════
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# ✓ Content-addressed IDs verified
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# ✓ DSSE signatures verified (3 envelopes)
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# ✓ Merkle paths verified
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# ⊘ Rekor verification skipped (offline mode)
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#
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# Overall: VERIFIED (offline)
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```
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---
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## Trust Anchor Distribution
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In air-gap environments, trust anchors must be distributed out-of-band.
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### Export Trust Anchors
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```bash
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# On the online system, export trust anchors
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stellaops anchor export --format json > trust-anchors.json
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# Verify export integrity
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sha256sum trust-anchors.json > trust-anchors.sha256
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```
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### Trust Anchor File Format
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```json
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{
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"version": "1.0",
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"exportedAt": "2025-12-17T00:00:00Z",
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"anchors": [
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{
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"trustAnchorId": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
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"purlPattern": "pkg:*",
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"allowedKeyids": ["key-2024-prod", "key-2025-prod"],
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"allowedPredicateTypes": [
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"evidence.stella/v1",
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"reasoning.stella/v1",
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"cdx-vex.stella/v1",
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"proofspine.stella/v1"
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],
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"revokedKeys": ["key-2023-prod"],
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"keyMaterial": {
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"key-2024-prod": {
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"algorithm": "ECDSA-P256",
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"publicKey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n..."
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},
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"key-2025-prod": {
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"algorithm": "ECDSA-P256",
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"publicKey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n..."
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}
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}
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}
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]
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}
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```
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### Import Trust Anchors
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```bash
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# On the air-gapped system
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stellaops anchor import --file trust-anchors.json
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# Verify import
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stellaops anchor list
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```
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---
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## Proof Bundle Distribution
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### Export Proof Bundles
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```bash
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# Export a proof bundle for offline transfer
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stellaops proof export \
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--entry sha256:abc123:pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21 \
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--output proof-bundle.zip
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# Bundle contents:
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# proof-bundle.zip
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# ├── proof-spine.json # The proof spine
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# ├── evidence/ # Evidence statements
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# │ ├── sha256_e1.json
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# │ └── sha256_e2.json
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# ├── reasoning.json # Reasoning statement
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# ├── vex-verdict.json # VEX verdict statement
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# ├── envelopes/ # DSSE envelopes
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# │ ├── evidence-e1.dsse
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# │ ├── evidence-e2.dsse
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# │ ├── reasoning.dsse
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# │ ├── vex-verdict.dsse
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# │ └── proof-spine.dsse
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# └── VERIFY.md # Verification instructions
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```
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### Verify Exported Bundle
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```bash
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# On the air-gapped system
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stellaops proof verify --offline \
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--bundle-file proof-bundle.zip \
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--anchor-file trust-anchors.json
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```
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---
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## Batch Verification
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For audits, verify multiple proof bundles efficiently:
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```bash
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# Create a verification manifest
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cat > verify-manifest.json << 'EOF'
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{
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"bundles": [
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"sha256:1a2b3c4d...",
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"sha256:5e6f7g8h...",
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"sha256:9i0j1k2l..."
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],
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"options": {
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"checkRekor": false,
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"failFast": false
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}
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}
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EOF
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# Run batch verification
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stellaops proof verify-batch \
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--manifest verify-manifest.json \
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--anchor-file trust-anchors.json \
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--output verification-report.json
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```
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### Verification Report Format
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```json
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{
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"verifiedAt": "2025-12-17T10:00:00Z",
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"mode": "offline",
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"anchorsUsed": ["550e8400..."],
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"results": [
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{
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"proofBundleId": "sha256:1a2b3c4d...",
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"verified": true,
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"checks": {
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"contentId": true,
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"signature": true,
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"merklePath": true,
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"rekorInclusion": null
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}
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}
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],
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"summary": {
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"total": 3,
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"verified": 3,
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"failed": 0,
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"skipped": 0
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}
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}
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```
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---
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## Key Rotation in Air-Gap Mode
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When keys are rotated, trust anchor updates must be distributed:
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### 1. Export Updated Anchors
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```bash
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# On online system after key rotation
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stellaops anchor export --since 2025-01-01 > anchor-update.json
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sha256sum anchor-update.json > anchor-update.sha256
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```
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### 2. Verify and Import Update
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```bash
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# On air-gapped system
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sha256sum -c anchor-update.sha256
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stellaops anchor import --file anchor-update.json --merge
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# Verify key history
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stellaops anchor show --anchor-id 550e8400... --show-history
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```
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### 3. Temporal Verification
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When verifying old proofs after key rotation:
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```bash
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# Verify proof signed with now-revoked key
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stellaops proof verify --offline \
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--proof-bundle sha256:old-proof... \
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--anchor-file trust-anchors.json \
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--at-time "2024-06-15T12:00:00Z"
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# The verification uses key validity at the specified time
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```
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---
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## Manual Verification (No CLI)
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For environments without the StellaOps CLI, manual verification is possible:
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### 1. Verify Content-Addressed ID
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```bash
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# Extract payload from DSSE envelope
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jq -r '.payload' proof-spine.dsse | base64 -d > payload.json
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# Compute hash
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sha256sum payload.json
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# Compare with proof bundle ID
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```
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### 2. Verify DSSE Signature
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```python
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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import json
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import base64
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_pem_public_key
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def verify_dsse(envelope_path, public_key_pem):
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"""Verify a DSSE envelope signature."""
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with open(envelope_path) as f:
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envelope = json.load(f)
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payload_type = envelope['payloadType']
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payload = base64.b64decode(envelope['payload'])
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# Build PAE (Pre-Authentication Encoding)
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pae = f"DSSEv1 {len(payload_type)} {payload_type} {len(payload)} ".encode() + payload
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public_key = load_pem_public_key(public_key_pem.encode())
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for sig in envelope['signatures']:
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signature = base64.b64decode(sig['sig'])
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try:
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public_key.verify(signature, pae, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
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print(f"✓ Signature valid for keyid: {sig['keyid']}")
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return True
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except Exception as e:
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print(f"✗ Signature invalid: {e}")
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return False
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```
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### 3. Verify Merkle Path
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```python
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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import json
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import hashlib
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def verify_merkle_path(leaf_hash, path, root_hash, leaf_index):
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"""Verify a Merkle inclusion path."""
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current = bytes.fromhex(leaf_hash)
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index = leaf_index
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for sibling in path:
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sibling_bytes = bytes.fromhex(sibling)
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if index % 2 == 0:
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# Current is left child
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combined = current + sibling_bytes
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else:
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# Current is right child
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combined = sibling_bytes + current
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current = hashlib.sha256(combined).digest()
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index //= 2
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computed_root = current.hex()
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if computed_root == root_hash:
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print("✓ Merkle path verified")
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return True
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else:
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print(f"✗ Merkle root mismatch: {computed_root} != {root_hash}")
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return False
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```
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---
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## Exit Codes
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Offline verification uses the same exit codes as online:
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| Code | Meaning | CI/CD Action |
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|------|---------|--------------|
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| 0 | Verification passed | Proceed |
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| 1 | Verification failed | Block |
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| 2 | System error | Retry/investigate |
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---
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## Troubleshooting
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### Missing Trust Anchor
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```
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Error: No trust anchor found for keyid "key-2025-prod"
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```
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**Solution**: Import updated trust anchors from online system.
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### Key Not Valid at Time
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```
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Error: Key "key-2024-prod" was revoked at 2024-12-01, before proof signature at 2025-01-15
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```
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**Solution**: This indicates the proof was signed after key revocation. Investigate the signature timestamp.
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### Merkle Path Invalid
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```
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Error: Merkle path verification failed for evidence sha256:e1...
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```
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**Solution**: The proof bundle may be corrupted. Re-export from online system.
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---
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## Related Documentation
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- [Proof Chain API Reference](../api/proofs.md)
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- [Key Rotation Runbook](../operations/key-rotation-runbook.md)
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- [Portable Evidence Bundle Verification](portable-evidence-bundle-verification.md)
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- [Offline Bundle Format](offline-bundle-format.md)
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user