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feat(docs): Add comprehensive documentation for Vexer, Vulnerability Explorer, and Zastava modules

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- Introduced AGENTS.md, README.md, TASKS.md, and implementation_plan.md for Vexer, detailing mission, responsibilities, key components, and operational notes.
- Established similar documentation structure for Vulnerability Explorer and Zastava modules, including their respective workflows, integrations, and observability notes.
- Created risk scoring profiles documentation outlining the core workflow, factor model, governance, and deliverables.
- Ensured all modules adhere to the Aggregation-Only Contract and maintain determinism and provenance in outputs.
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# Excititor agent guide
## Mission
Excititor converts heterogeneous VEX feeds into raw observations and linksets that honour the Aggregation-Only Contract.
## Key docs
- [Module README](./README.md)
- [Architecture](./architecture.md)
- [Implementation plan](./implementation_plan.md)
- [Task board](./TASKS.md)
## How to get started
1. Open ../../implplan/SPRINTS.md and locate the stories referencing this module.
2. Review ./TASKS.md for local follow-ups and confirm status transitions (TODO → DOING → DONE/BLOCKED).
3. Read the architecture and README for domain context before editing code or docs.
4. Coordinate cross-module changes in the main /AGENTS.md description and through the sprint plan.
## Guardrails
- Honour the Aggregation-Only Contract where applicable (see ../../ingestion/aggregation-only-contract.md).
- Preserve determinism: sort outputs, normalise timestamps (UTC ISO-8601), and avoid machine-specific artefacts.
- Keep Offline Kit parity in mind—document air-gapped workflows for any new feature.
- Update runbooks/observability assets when operational characteristics change.

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# StellaOps Excititor
Excititor converts heterogeneous VEX feeds into raw observations and linksets that honour the Aggregation-Only Contract.
## Responsibilities
- Fetch OpenVEX/CSAF/CycloneDX statements via restart-only connectors.
- Store immutable VEX observations with full provenance.
- Publish linksets and events that drive policy suppression decisions.
- Provide deterministic exports for Offline Kit and downstream tooling.
## Key components
- `StellaOps.Excititor.WebService` scheduler/API host.
- Connector libraries under `StellaOps.Excititor.Connector.*`.
- Normalization helpers and exporters in `StellaOps.Excititor.*`.
## Integrations & dependencies
- Policy Engine for evidence queries.
- UI/CLI for conflict visibility and explanation.
- Notify for VEX-driven alerts.
## Operational notes
- MongoDB for observation storage and job metadata.
- Offline kit packaging aligned with Concelier merges.
- Connector-specific runbooks (see `docs/modules/concelier/operations/connectors`).
## Backlog references
- DOCS-LNM-22-006 / DOCS-LNM-22-007 (shared with Concelier).
- CLI-EXC-25-001..002 follow-up for CLI parity.
## Epic alignment
- **Epic 1 – AOC enforcement:** maintain immutable VEX observations, provenance, and AOC verifier coverage.
- **Epic 7 – VEX Consensus Lens:** supply trustworthy raw inputs, trust metadata, and consensus hooks for the lens computations.
- **Epic 8 – Advisory AI:** expose citation-ready VEX payloads for the advisory assistant pipeline.

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# Task board — Excititor
> Local tasks should link back to ./AGENTS.md and mirror status updates into ../../TASKS.md when applicable.
| ID | Status | Owner(s) | Description | Notes |
|----|--------|----------|-------------|-------|
| EXCITITOR-DOCS-0001 | TODO | Docs Guild | Validate that ./README.md aligns with the latest release notes. | See ./AGENTS.md |
| EXCITITOR-OPS-0001 | TODO | Ops Guild | Review runbooks/observability assets after next sprint demo. | Sync outcomes back to ../../TASKS.md |
| EXCITITOR-ENG-0001 | TODO | Module Team | Cross-check implementation plan milestones against ../../implplan/SPRINTS.md. | Update status via ./AGENTS.md workflow |

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# component_architecture_excititor.md — **Stella Ops Excititor** (Sprint 22)
> Consolidates the VEX ingestion guardrails from Epic 1 with consensus and AI-facing requirements from Epics 7 and 8. This is the authoritative architecture record for Excititor.
> **Scope.** This document specifies the **Excititor** service: its purpose, trust model, data structures, observation/linkset pipelines, APIs, plug-in contracts, storage schema, performance budgets, testing matrix, and how it integrates with Concelier, Policy Engine, and evidence surfaces. It is implementation-ready.
---
## 0) Mission & role in the platform
**Mission.** Convert heterogeneous **VEX** statements (OpenVEX, CSAF VEX, CycloneDX VEX; vendor/distro/platform sources) into immutable **VEX observations**, correlate them into **linksets** that retain provenance/conflicts without precedence, and publish deterministic evidence exports and events that Policy Engine, Console, and CLI use to suppress or explain findings.
**Boundaries.**
* Excititor **does not** decide PASS/FAIL. It supplies **evidence** (statuses + justifications + provenance weights).
* Excititor preserves **conflicting observations** unchanged; consensus (when enabled) merely annotates how policy might choose, but raw evidence remains exportable.
* VEX consumption is **backend-only**: Scanner never applies VEX. The backend’s **Policy Engine** asks Excititor for status evidence and then decides what to show.
---
## 1) Aggregation guardrails (AOC baseline)
Excititor enforces the same ingestion covenant as Concelier, tailored to VEX payloads:
1. **Immutable `vex_raw` documents.** Upstream OpenVEX/CSAF/CycloneDX files are stored verbatim (`content.raw`) with provenance (`issuer`, `statement_id`, timestamps, signatures). Revisions append new versions linked by `supersedes`.
2. **No derived consensus at ingest time.** Fields such as `effective_status`, `merged_state`, `severity`, or reachability are forbidden. Roslyn analyzers and runtime guards block violations before writes.
3. **Linkset-only joins.** Product aliases, CVE keys, SBOM hints, and references live under `linkset`; ingestion must never mutate the underlying statement.
4. **Deterministic canonicalisation.** Writers sort JSON keys/arrays, normalize timestamps (UTC ISO‑8601), and hash content for reproducible exports.
5. **AOC verifier.** `StellaOps.AOC.Verifier` runs in CI and production, checking schema compliance, provenance completeness, sorted collections, and signature metadata.
### 1.1 VEX raw document shape
```json
{
"_id": "vex_raw:openvex:VEX-2025-00001:v2",
"source": {
"issuer": "vendor:redhat",
"stream": "openvex",
"api": "https://vendor/api/vex/VEX-2025-00001.json",
"collector_version": "excititor/0.9.4"
},
"upstream": {
"statement_id": "VEX-2025-00001",
"document_version": "2025-08-30T12:00:00Z",
"fetched_at": "2025-08-30T12:05:00Z",
"received_at": "2025-08-30T12:05:01Z",
"content_hash": "sha256:...",
"signature": {
"present": true,
"format": "dsse",
"key_id": "rekor:uuid",
"sig": "base64..."
}
},
"content": {
"format": "openvex",
"spec_version": "1.0",
"raw": { /* upstream statement */ }
},
"identifiers": {
"cve": ["CVE-2025-13579"],
"products": [
{"purl": "pkg:rpm/redhat/openssl@3.0.9", "component": "openssl"}
]
},
"linkset": {
"aliases": ["REDHAT:RHSA-2025:1234"],
"sbom_products": ["pkg:rpm/redhat/openssl@3.0.9"],
"justifications": ["reasonable_worst_case_assumption"],
"references": [
{"type": "advisory", "url": "https://..."}
]
},
"supersedes": "vex_raw:openvex:VEX-2025-00001:v1",
"tenant": "default"
}
```
### 1.2 Issuer trust registry
To enable Epic 7’s consensus lens, Excititor maintains `vex_issuer_registry` documents containing:
- `issuer_id`, canonical name, and allowed domains.
- `trust.tier` (`critical`, `high`, `medium`, `low`), `trust.confidence` (0–1).
- `products` PURL patterns the issuer is authoritative for.
- `signing_keys` with key IDs and expiry.
- `last_validated_at`, `revocation_status`.
The registry is distributed as a signed bundle and cached locally; ingestion rejects statements from issuers without registry entries or valid signatures.
### 1.3 Normalised tuple store
Excititor derives `vex_normalized` tuples (without making decisions) for downstream consumers:
```json
{
"advisory_key": "CVE-2025-13579",
"artifact": "pkg:rpm/redhat/openssl@3.0.9",
"issuer": "vendor:redhat",
"status": "not_affected",
"justification": "component_not_present",
"scope": "runtime_path",
"timestamp": "2025-08-30T12:00:00Z",
"trust": {"tier": "high", "confidence": 0.95},
"statement_id": "VEX-2025-00001:v2",
"content_hash": "sha256:..."
}
```
These tuples allow VEX Lens to compute deterministic consensus without re-parsing heavy upstream documents.
### 1.4 AI-ready citations
`GET /v1/vex/statements/{advisory_key}` produces sorted JSON responses containing raw statement metadata (`issuer`, `content_hash`, `signature`), normalised tuples, and provenance pointers. Advisory AI consumes this endpoint to build retrieval contexts with explicit citations.
---
## 2) Inputs, outputs & canonical domain
### 1.1 Accepted input formats (ingest)
* **OpenVEX** JSON documents (attested or raw).
* **CSAF VEX** 2.x (vendor PSIRTs and distros commonly publish CSAF).
* **CycloneDX VEX** 1.4+ (standalone VEX or embedded VEX blocks).
* **OCI‑attached attestations** (VEX statements shipped as OCI referrers) — optional connectors.
All connectors register **source metadata**: provider identity, trust tier, signature expectations (PGP/cosign/PKI), fetch windows, rate limits, and time anchors.
### 1.2 Canonical model (observations & linksets)
#### VexObservation
```jsonc
observationId // {tenant}:{providerId}:{upstreamId}:{revision}
tenant
providerId // e.g., redhat, suse, ubuntu, osv
streamId // connector stream (csaf, openvex, cyclonedx, attestation)
upstream{
upstreamId,
documentVersion?,
fetchedAt,
receivedAt,
contentHash,
signature{present, format?, keyId?, signature?}
}
statements[
{
vulnerabilityId,
productKey,
status, // affected | not_affected | fixed | under_investigation
justification?,
introducedVersion?,
fixedVersion?,
lastObserved,
locator?, // JSON Pointer/line for provenance
evidence?[]
}
]
content{
format,
specVersion?,
raw
}
linkset{
aliases[], // CVE/GHSA/vendor IDs
purls[],
cpes[],
references[{type,url}],
reconciledFrom[]
}
supersedes?
createdAt
attributes?
```
#### VexLinkset
```jsonc
linksetId // sha256 over sorted (tenant, vulnId, productKey, observationIds)
tenant
key{
vulnerabilityId,
productKey,
confidence // low|medium|high
}
observations[] = [
{
observationId,
providerId,
status,
justification?,
introducedVersion?,
fixedVersion?,
evidence?,
collectedAt
}
]
aliases{
primary,
others[]
}
purls[]
cpes[]
conflicts[]? // see VexLinksetConflict
createdAt
updatedAt
```
#### VexLinksetConflict
```jsonc
conflictId
type // status-mismatch | justification-divergence | version-range-clash | non-joinable-overlap | metadata-gap
field? // optional pointer for UI rendering
statements[] // per-observation values with providerId + status/justification/version data
confidence
detectedAt
```
#### VexConsensus (optional)
```jsonc
consensusId // sha256(vulnerabilityId, productKey, policyRevisionId)
vulnerabilityId
productKey
rollupStatus // derived by Excititor policy adapter (linkset aware)
sources[] // observation references with weight, accepted flag, reason
policyRevisionId
evaluatedAt
consensusDigest
```
Consensus persists only when Excititor policy adapters require pre-computed rollups (e.g., Offline Kit). Policy Engine can also compute consensus on demand from linksets.
### 1.3 Exports & evidence bundles
* **Raw observations** — JSON tree per observation for auditing/offline.
* **Linksets** — grouped evidence for policy/Console/CLI consumption.
* **Consensus (optional)** — if enabled, mirrors existing API contracts.
* **Provider snapshots** — last N days of observations per provider to support diagnostics.
* **Index** — `(productKey, vulnerabilityId) → {status candidates, confidence, observationIds}` for high-speed joins.
All exports remain deterministic and, when configured, attested via DSSE + Rekor v2.
---
## 3) Identity model — products & joins
### 2.1 Vuln identity
* Accepts **CVE**, **GHSA**, vendor IDs (MSRC, RHSA…), distro IDs (DSA/USN/RHSA…) — normalized to `vulnId` with alias sets.
* **Alias graph** maintained (from Concelier) to map vendor/distro IDs → CVE (primary) and to **GHSA** where applicable.
### 2.2 Product identity (`productKey`)
* **Primary:** `purl` (Package URL).
* **Secondary links:** `cpe`, **OS package NVRA/EVR**, NuGet/Maven/Golang identity, and **OS package name** when purl unavailable.
* **Fallback:** `oci:<registry>/<repo>@<digest>` for image‑level VEX.
* **Special cases:** kernel modules, firmware, platforms → provider‑specific mapping helpers (connector captures provider’s product taxonomy → canonical `productKey`).
> Excititor does not invent identities. If a provider cannot be mapped to purl/CPE/NVRA deterministically, we keep the native **product string** and mark the claim as **non‑joinable**; the backend will ignore it unless a policy explicitly whitelists that provider mapping.
---
## 4) Storage schema (MongoDB)
Database: `excititor`
### 3.1 Collections
**`vex.providers`**
```
_id: providerId
name, homepage, contact
trustTier: enum {vendor, distro, platform, hub, attestation}
signaturePolicy: { type: pgp|cosign|x509|none, keys[], certs[], cosignKeylessRoots[] }
fetch: { baseUrl, kind: http|oci|file, rateLimit, etagSupport, windowDays }
enabled: bool
createdAt, modifiedAt
```
**`vex.raw`** (immutable raw documents)
```
_id: sha256(doc bytes)
providerId
uri
ingestedAt
contentType
sig: { verified: bool, method: pgp|cosign|x509|none, keyId|certSubject, bundle? }
payload: GridFS pointer (if large)
disposition: kept|replaced|superseded
correlation: { replaces?: sha256, replacedBy?: sha256 }
```
**`vex.observations`**
```
{
_id: "tenant:providerId:upstreamId:revision",
tenant,
providerId,
streamId,
upstream: { upstreamId, documentVersion?, fetchedAt, receivedAt, contentHash, signature },
statements: [
{
vulnerabilityId,
productKey,
status,
justification?,
introducedVersion?,
fixedVersion?,
lastObserved,
locator?,
evidence?
}
],
content: { format, specVersion?, raw },
linkset: { aliases[], purls[], cpes[], references[], reconciledFrom[] },
supersedes?,
createdAt,
attributes?
}
```
* Indexes: `{tenant:1, providerId:1, upstream.upstreamId:1}`, `{tenant:1, statements.vulnerabilityId:1}`, `{tenant:1, linkset.purls:1}`, `{tenant:1, createdAt:-1}`.
**`vex.linksets`**
```
{
_id: "sha256:...",
tenant,
key: { vulnerabilityId, productKey, confidence },
observations: [
{ observationId, providerId, status, justification?, introducedVersion?, fixedVersion?, evidence?, collectedAt }
],
aliases: { primary, others: [] },
purls: [],
cpes: [],
conflicts: [],
createdAt,
updatedAt
}
```
* Indexes: `{tenant:1, key.vulnerabilityId:1, key.productKey:1}`, `{tenant:1, purls:1}`, `{tenant:1, updatedAt:-1}`.
**`vex.events`** (observation/linkset events, optional long retention)
```
{
_id: ObjectId,
tenant,
type: "vex.observation.updated" | "vex.linkset.updated",
key,
delta,
hash,
occurredAt
}
```
* Indexes: `{type:1, occurredAt:-1}`, TTL on `occurredAt` for configurable retention.
**`vex.consensus`** (optional rollups)
```
_id: sha256(canonical(vulnerabilityId, productKey, policyRevisionId))
vulnerabilityId
productKey
rollupStatus
sources[] // observation references with weights/reasons
policyRevisionId
evaluatedAt
signals? // optional severity/kev/epss hints
consensusDigest
```
* Indexes: `{vulnerabilityId:1, productKey:1}`, `{policyRevisionId:1, evaluatedAt:-1}`.
**`vex.exports`** (manifest of emitted artifacts)
```
_id
querySignature
format: raw|consensus|index
artifactSha256
rekor { uuid, index, url }?
createdAt
policyRevisionId
cacheable: bool
```
**`vex.cache`** — observation/linkset export cache: `{querySignature, exportId, ttl, hits}`.
**`vex.migrations`** — ordered migrations ensuring new indexes (`20251027-linksets-introduced`, etc.).
### 3.2 Indexing strategy
* Hot path queries rely on `{tenant, key.vulnerabilityId, key.productKey}` covering linkset lookup.
* Observability queries use `{tenant, updatedAt}` to monitor staleness.
* Consensus (if enabled) keyed by `{vulnerabilityId, productKey, policyRevisionId}` for deterministic reuse.
---
## 5) Ingestion pipeline
### 4.1 Connector contract
```csharp
public interface IVexConnector
{
string ProviderId { get; }
Task FetchAsync(VexConnectorContext ctx, CancellationToken ct); // raw docs
Task NormalizeAsync(VexConnectorContext ctx, CancellationToken ct); // raw -> ObservationStatements[]
}
```
* **Fetch** must implement: window scheduling, conditional GET (ETag/If‑Modified‑Since), rate limiting, retry/backoff.
* **Normalize** parses the format, validates schema, maps product identities deterministically, emits observation statements with **provenance** metadata (locator, justification, version ranges).
### 4.2 Signature verification (per provider)
* **cosign (keyless or keyful)** for OCI referrers or HTTP‑served JSON with Sigstore bundles.
* **PGP** (provider keyrings) for distro/vendor feeds that sign docs.
* **x509** (mutual TLS / provider‑pinned certs) where applicable.
* Signature state is stored on **vex.raw.sig** and copied into `statements[].signatureState` so downstream policy can gate by verification result.
> Observation statements from sources failing signature policy are marked `"signatureState.verified=false"` and policy can down-weight or ignore them.
### 4.3 Time discipline
* For each doc, prefer **provider’s document timestamp**; if absent, use fetch time.
* Statements carry `lastObserved` which drives **tie-breaking** within equal weight tiers.
---
## 6) Normalization: product & status semantics
### 5.1 Product mapping
* **purl** first; **cpe** second; OS package NVRA/EVR mapping helpers (distro connectors) produce purls via canonical tables (e.g., rpm→purl:rpm, deb→purl:deb).
* Where a provider publishes **platform‑level** VEX (e.g., “RHEL 9 not affected”), connectors expand to known product inventory rules (e.g., map to sets of packages/components shipped in the platform). Expansion tables are versioned and kept per provider; every expansion emits **evidence** indicating the rule applied.
* If expansion would be speculative, the statement remains **platform-scoped** with `productKey="platform:redhat:rhel:9"` and is flagged **non-joinable**; backend can decide to use platform VEX only when Scanner proves the platform runtime.
### 5.2 Status + justification mapping
* Canonical **status**: `affected | not_affected | fixed | under_investigation`.
* **Justifications** normalized to a controlled vocabulary (CISA‑aligned), e.g.:
* `component_not_present`
* `vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path`
* `vulnerable_configuration_unused`
* `inline_mitigation_applied`
* `fix_available` (with `fixedVersion`)
* `under_investigation`
* Providers with free‑text justifications are mapped by deterministic tables; raw text preserved as `evidence`.
---
## 7) Consensus algorithm
**Goal:** produce a **stable**, explainable `rollupStatus` per `(vulnId, productKey)` when consumers opt into Excititor-managed consensus derived from linksets.
### 6.1 Inputs
* Set **S** of observation statements drawn from the current `VexLinkset` for `(tenant, vulnId, productKey)`.
* **Excititor policy snapshot**:
* **weights** per provider tier and per provider overrides.
* **justification gates** (e.g., require justification for `not_affected` to be acceptable).
* **minEvidence** rules (e.g., `not_affected` must come from ≥1 vendor or 2 distros).
* **signature requirements** (e.g., require verified signature for ‘fixed’ to be considered).
### 6.2 Steps
1. **Filter invalid** statements by signature policy & justification gates → set `S'`.
2. **Score** each statement:
`score = weight(provider) * freshnessFactor(lastObserved)` where freshnessFactor ∈ [0.8, 1.0] for staleness decay (configurable; small effect). Observations lacking verified signatures receive policy-configured penalties.
3. **Aggregate** scores per status: `W(status) = Σ score(statements with that status)`.
4. **Pick** `rollupStatus = argmax_status W(status)`.
5. **Tie‑breakers** (in order):
* Higher **max single** provider score wins (vendor > distro > platform > hub).
* More **recent** lastObserved wins.
* Deterministic lexicographic order of status (`fixed` > `not_affected` > `under_investigation` > `affected`) as final tiebreaker.
6. **Explain**: mark accepted observations (`accepted=true; reason="weight"`/`"freshness"`/`"confidence"`) and rejected ones with explicit `reason` (`"insufficient_justification"`, `"signature_unverified"`, `"lower_weight"`, `"low_confidence_linkset"`).
> The algorithm is **pure** given `S` and policy snapshot; result is reproducible and hashed into `consensusDigest`.
---
## 8) Query & export APIs
All endpoints are versioned under `/api/v1/vex`.
### 7.1 Query (online)
```
POST /observations/search
body: { vulnIds?: string[], productKeys?: string[], providers?: string[], since?: timestamp, limit?: int, pageToken?: string }
→ { observations[], nextPageToken? }
POST /linksets/search
body: { vulnIds?: string[], productKeys?: string[], confidence?: string[], since?: timestamp, limit?: int, pageToken?: string }
→ { linksets[], nextPageToken? }
POST /consensus/search
body: { vulnIds?: string[], productKeys?: string[], policyRevisionId?: string, since?: timestamp, limit?: int, pageToken?: string }
→ { entries[], nextPageToken? }
POST /excititor/resolve (scope: vex.read)
body: { productKeys?: string[], purls?: string[], vulnerabilityIds: string[], policyRevisionId?: string }
→ { policy, resolvedAt, results: [ { vulnerabilityId, productKey, status, observations[], conflicts[], linksetConfidence, consensus?, signals?, envelope? } ] }
```
### 7.2 Exports (cacheable snapshots)
```
POST /exports
body: { signature: { vulnFilter?, productFilter?, providers?, since? }, format: raw|consensus|index, policyRevisionId?: string, force?: bool }
→ { exportId, artifactSha256, rekor? }
GET /exports/{exportId} → bytes (application/json or binary index)
GET /exports/{exportId}/meta → { signature, policyRevisionId, createdAt, artifactSha256, rekor? }
```
### 7.3 Provider operations
```
GET /providers → provider list & signature policy
POST /providers/{id}/refresh → trigger fetch/normalize window
GET /providers/{id}/status → last fetch, doc counts, signature stats
```
**Auth:** service‑to‑service via Authority tokens; operator operations via UI/CLI with RBAC.
---
## 9) Attestation integration
* Exports can be **DSSE‑signed** via **Signer** and logged to **Rekor v2** via **Attestor** (optional but recommended for regulated pipelines).
* `vex.exports.rekor` stores `{uuid, index, url}` when present.
* **Predicate type**: `https://stella-ops.org/attestations/vex-export/1` with fields:
* `querySignature`, `policyRevisionId`, `artifactSha256`, `createdAt`.
---
## 10) Configuration (YAML)
```yaml
excititor:
mongo: { uri: "mongodb://mongo/excititor" }
s3:
endpoint: http://minio:9000
bucket: stellaops
policy:
weights:
vendor: 1.0
distro: 0.9
platform: 0.7
hub: 0.5
attestation: 0.6
ceiling: 1.25
scoring:
alpha: 0.25
beta: 0.5
providerOverrides:
redhat: 1.0
suse: 0.95
requireJustificationForNotAffected: true
signatureRequiredForFixed: true
minEvidence:
not_affected:
vendorOrTwoDistros: true
connectors:
- providerId: redhat
kind: csaf
baseUrl: https://access.redhat.com/security/data/csaf/v2/
signaturePolicy: { type: pgp, keys: [ "…redhat-pgp-key…" ] }
windowDays: 7
- providerId: suse
kind: csaf
baseUrl: https://ftp.suse.com/pub/projects/security/csaf/
signaturePolicy: { type: pgp, keys: [ "…suse-pgp-key…" ] }
- providerId: ubuntu
kind: openvex
baseUrl: https://…/vex/
signaturePolicy: { type: none }
- providerId: vendorX
kind: cyclonedx-vex
ociRef: ghcr.io/vendorx/vex@sha256:…
signaturePolicy: { type: cosign, cosignKeylessRoots: [ "sigstore-root" ] }
```
### 9.1 WebService endpoints
With storage configured, the WebService exposes the following ingress and diagnostic APIs:
* `GET /excititor/status` – returns the active storage configuration and registered artifact stores.
* `GET /excititor/health` – simple liveness probe.
* `POST /excititor/statements` – accepts normalized VEX statements and persists them via `IVexClaimStore`; use this for migrations/backfills.
* `GET /excititor/statements/{vulnId}/{productKey}?since=` – returns the immutable statement log for a vulnerability/product pair.
* `POST /excititor/resolve` – requires `vex.read` scope; accepts up to 256 `(vulnId, productKey)` pairs via `productKeys` or `purls` and returns deterministic consensus results, decision telemetry, and a signed envelope (`artifact` digest, optional signer signature, optional attestation metadata + DSSE envelope). Returns **409 Conflict** when the requested `policyRevisionId` mismatches the active snapshot.
Run the ingestion endpoint once after applying migration `20251019-consensus-signals-statements` to repopulate historical statements with the new severity/KEV/EPSS signal fields.
* `weights.ceiling` raises the deterministic clamp applied to provider tiers/overrides (range 1.0‒5.0). Values outside the range are clamped with warnings so operators can spot typos.
* `scoring.alpha` / `scoring.beta` configure KEV/EPSS boosts for the Phase 1 → Phase 2 scoring pipeline. Defaults (0.25, 0.5) preserve prior behaviour; negative or excessively large values fall back with diagnostics.
---
## 11) Security model
* **Input signature verification** enforced per provider policy (PGP, cosign, x509).
* **Connector allowlists**: outbound fetch constrained to configured domains.
* **Tenant isolation**: per‑tenant DB prefixes or separate DBs; per‑tenant S3 prefixes; per‑tenant policies.
* **AuthN/Z**: Authority‑issued OpToks; RBAC roles (`vex.read`, `vex.admin`, `vex.export`).
* **No secrets in logs**; deterministic logging contexts include providerId, docDigest, observationId, and linksetId.
---
## 12) Performance & scale
* **Targets:**
* Normalize 10k observation statements/minute/core.
* Linkset rebuild ≤ 20 ms P95 for 1k unique `(vuln, product)` pairs in hot cache.
* Consensus (when enabled) compute ≤ 50 ms for 1k unique `(vuln, product)` pairs.
* Export (observations + linksets) 1M rows in ≤ 60 s on 8 cores with streaming writer.
* **Scaling:**
* WebService handles control APIs; **Worker** background services (same image) execute fetch/normalize in parallel with rate‑limits; Mongo writes batched; upserts by natural keys.
* Exports stream straight to S3 (MinIO) with rolling buffers.
* **Caching:**
* `vex.cache` maps query signatures → export; TTL to avoid stampedes; optimistic reuse unless `force`.
### 11.1 Worker TTL refresh controls
Excititor.Worker ships with a background refresh service that re-evaluates stale consensus rows and applies stability dampers before publishing status flips. Operators can tune its behaviour through the following configuration (shown in `appsettings.json` syntax):
```jsonc
{
"Excititor": {
"Worker": {
"Refresh": {
"Enabled": true,
"ConsensusTtl": "02:00:00", // refresh consensus older than 2 hours
"ScanInterval": "00:10:00", // sweep cadence
"ScanBatchSize": 250, // max documents examined per sweep
"Damper": {
"Minimum": "1.00:00:00", // lower bound before status flip publishes
"Maximum": "2.00:00:00", // upper bound guardrail
"DefaultDuration": "1.12:00:00",
"Rules": [
{ "MinWeight": 0.90, "Duration": "1.00:00:00" },
{ "MinWeight": 0.75, "Duration": "1.06:00:00" },
{ "MinWeight": 0.50, "Duration": "1.12:00:00" }
]
}
}
}
}
}
```
* `ConsensusTtl` governs when the worker issues a fresh resolve for cached consensus data.
* `Damper` lengths are clamped between `Minimum`/`Maximum`; duration is bypassed when component fingerprints (`VexProduct.ComponentIdentifiers`) change.
* The same keys are available through environment variables (e.g., `Excititor__Worker__Refresh__ConsensusTtl=02:00:00`).
---
## 13) Observability
* **Metrics:**
* `vex.fetch.requests_total{provider}` / `vex.fetch.bytes_total{provider}`
* `vex.fetch.failures_total{provider,reason}` / `vex.signature.failures_total{provider,method}`
* `vex.normalize.statements_total{provider}`
* `vex.observations.write_total{result}`
* `vex.linksets.updated_total{result}` / `vex.linksets.conflicts_total{type}`
* `vex.consensus.rollup_total{status}` (when enabled)
* `vex.exports.bytes_total{format}` / `vex.exports.latency_seconds{format}`
* **Tracing:** spans for fetch, verify, parse, map, observe, linkset, consensus, export.
* **Dashboards:** provider staleness, linkset conflict hot spots, signature posture, export cache hit-rate.
---
## 14) Testing matrix
* **Connectors:** golden raw docs → deterministic observation statements (fixtures per provider/format).
* **Signature policies:** valid/invalid PGP/cosign/x509 samples; ensure rejects are recorded but not accepted.
* **Normalization edge cases:** platform-scoped statements, free-text justifications, non-purl products.
* **Linksets:** conflict scenarios across tiers; verify confidence scoring + conflict payload stability.
* **Consensus (optional):** ensure tie-breakers honour policy weights/justification gates.
* **Performance:** 1M-row observation/linkset export timing; memory ceilings; stream correctness.
* **Determinism:** same inputs + policy → identical linkset hashes, conflict payloads, optional `consensusDigest`, and export bytes.
* **API contract tests:** pagination, filters, RBAC, rate limits.
---
## 15) Integration points
* **Backend Policy Engine** (in Scanner.WebService): calls `POST /excititor/resolve` (scope `vex.read`) with batched `(purl, vulnId)` pairs to fetch `rollupStatus + sources`.
* **Concelier**: provides alias graph (CVE↔vendor IDs) and may supply VEX‑adjacent metadata (e.g., KEV flag) for policy escalation.
* **UI**: VEX explorer screens use `/observations/search`, `/linksets/search`, and `/consensus/search`; show conflicts & provenance.
* **CLI**: `stella vex linksets export --since 7d --out vex-linksets.json` (optionally `--include-consensus`) for audits and Offline Kit parity.
---
## 16) Failure modes & fallback
* **Provider unreachable:** stale thresholds trigger warnings; policy can down‑weight stale providers automatically (freshness factor).
* **Signature outage:** continue to ingest but mark `signatureState.verified=false`; consensus will likely exclude or down‑weight per policy.
* **Schema drift:** unknown fields are preserved as `evidence`; normalization rejects only on **invalid identity** or **status**.
---
## 17) Rollout plan (incremental)
1. **MVP**: OpenVEX + CSAF connectors for 3 major providers (e.g., Red Hat/SUSE/Ubuntu), normalization + consensus + `/excititor/resolve`.
2. **Signature policies**: PGP for distros; cosign for OCI.
3. **Exports + optional attestation**.
4. **CycloneDX VEX** connectors; platform claim expansion tables; UI explorer.
5. **Scale hardening**: export indexes; conflict analytics.
---
## 18) Operational runbooks
* **Statement backfill** — see `docs/dev/EXCITITOR_STATEMENT_BACKFILL.md` for the CLI workflow, required permissions, observability guidance, and rollback steps.
---
## 19) Appendix — canonical JSON (stable ordering)
All exports and consensus entries are serialized via `VexCanonicalJsonSerializer`:
* UTF‑8 without BOM;
* keys sorted (ASCII);
* arrays sorted by `(providerId, vulnId, productKey, lastObserved)` unless semantic order mandated;
* timestamps in `YYYY‑MM‑DDThh:mm:ssZ`;
* no insignificant whitespace.

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# Implementation plan — Excititor
## Current objectives
- Maintain deterministic behaviour and offline parity across releases.
- Keep documentation, telemetry, and runbooks aligned with the latest sprint outcomes.
## Workstreams
- Backlog grooming: reconcile open stories in ../../TASKS.md with this module's roadmap.
- Implementation: collaborate with service owners to land feature work defined in SPRINTS/EPIC docs.
- Validation: extend tests/fixtures to preserve determinism and provenance requirements.
## Epic milestones
- **Epic 1 – AOC enforcement:** enforce immutable VEX observation schema, provenance capture, and guardrails.
- **Epic 7 – VEX Consensus Lens:** provide lens-ready metadata (issuer trust, temporal scoping) and consensus APIs.
- **Epic 8 – Advisory AI:** guarantee citation-ready payloads and normalized context for AI summaries/explainers.
- Track DOCS-LNM-22-006/007 and CLI-EXC-25-001..002 in ../../TASKS.md.
## Coordination
- Review ./AGENTS.md before picking up new work.
- Sync with cross-cutting teams noted in ../../implplan/SPRINTS.md.
- Update this plan whenever scope, dependencies, or guardrails change.

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# architecture_excititor_mirrors.md — Excititor Mirror Distribution
> **Status:** Draft (Sprint 7). Complements `docs/modules/excititor/architecture.md` by describing the mirror export surface exposed by `Excititor.WebService` and the configuration hooks used by operators and downstream mirrors.
---
## 0) Purpose
Excititor publishes canonical VEX consensus data. Operators (or StellaOps-managed mirrors) need a deterministic way to sync those exports into downstream environments. Mirror distribution provides:
* A declarative map of export bundles (`json`, `jsonl`, `openvex`, `csaf`) reachable via signed HTTP endpoints under `/excititor/mirror`.
* Thin quota/authentication controls on top of the existing export cache so mirrors cannot starve the web service.
* Stable payload shapes that downstream automation can monitor (index → fetch updates → download artifact → verify signature).
Mirror endpoints are intentionally **read-only**. Write paths (export generation, attestation, cache) remain the responsibility of the export pipeline.
---
## 1) Configuration model
The web service reads mirror configuration from `Excititor:Mirror` (YAML/JSON/appsettings). Each domain groups a set of exports that share rate limits and authentication rules.
```yaml
Excititor:
Mirror:
Domains:
- id: primary
displayName: Primary Mirror
requireAuthentication: false
maxIndexRequestsPerHour: 600
maxDownloadRequestsPerHour: 1200
exports:
- key: consensus
format: json
filters:
vulnId: CVE-2025-0001
productKey: pkg:test/demo
sort:
createdAt: false # descending
limit: 1000
- key: consensus-openvex
format: openvex
filters:
vulnId: CVE-2025-0001
```
### Root settings
| Field | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `outputRoot` | – | Filesystem root where mirror artefacts are written. Defaults to the Excititor file-system artifact store root when omitted. |
| `directoryName` | – | Optional subdirectory created under `outputRoot`; defaults to `mirror`. |
| `targetRepository` | – | Hint propagated to manifests/index files indicating the operator-visible location (for example `s3://mirror/excititor`). |
| `signing` | – | Bundle signing configuration. When enabled, the exporter emits a detached JWS (`bundle.json.jws`) alongside each domain bundle. |
`signing` supports the following fields:
| Field | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `enabled` | – | Toggles detached signing for domain bundles. |
| `algorithm` | – | Signing algorithm identifier (default `ES256`). |
| `keyId` | ✅ (when `enabled`) | Signing key identifier resolved via the configured crypto provider registry. |
| `provider` | – | Optional provider hint when multiple registries are available. |
| `keyPath` | – | Optional PEM path used to seed the provider when the key is not already loaded. |
### Domain field reference
| Field | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `id` | ✅ | Stable identifier. Appears in URLs (`/excititor/mirror/domains/{id}`) and download filenames. |
| `displayName` | – | Human-friendly label surfaced in the `/domains` listing. Falls back to `id`. |
| `requireAuthentication` | – | When `true` the service enforces that the caller is authenticated (Authority token). |
| `maxIndexRequestsPerHour` | – | Per-domain quota for index endpoints. `0`/negative disables the guard. |
| `maxDownloadRequestsPerHour` | – | Per-domain quota for artifact downloads. |
| `exports` | ✅ | Collection of export projections. |
Export-level fields:
| Field | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `key` | ✅ | Unique key within the domain. Used in URLs (`/exports/{key}`) and filenames/bundle entries. |
| `format` | ✅ | One of `json`, `jsonl`, `openvex`, `csaf`. Maps to `VexExportFormat`. |
| `filters` | – | Key/value pairs executed via `VexQueryFilter`. Keys must match export data source columns (e.g., `vulnId`, `productKey`). |
| `sort` | – | Key/boolean map (false = descending). |
| `limit`, `offset`, `view` | – | Optional query bounds passed through to the export query. |
⚠️ **Misconfiguration:** invalid formats or missing keys cause exports to be flagged with `status` in the index response; they are not exposed downstream.
---
## 2) HTTP surface
Routes are grouped under `/excititor/mirror`.
| Method | Path | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `GET` | `/domains` | Returns configured domains with quota metadata. |
| `GET` | `/domains/{domainId}` | Domain detail (auth/quota + export keys). `404` for unknown domains. |
| `GET` | `/domains/{domainId}/index` | Lists exports with exportId, query signature, format, artifact digest, attestation metadata, and size. Applies index quota. |
| `GET` | `/domains/{domainId}/exports/{exportKey}` | Returns manifest metadata (single export). `404` if unknown/missing. |
| `GET` | `/domains/{domainId}/exports/{exportKey}/download` | Streams export content from the artifact store. Applies download quota. |
Responses are serialized via `VexCanonicalJsonSerializer` ensuring stable ordering. Download responses include a content-disposition header naming the file `<domain>-<export>.<ext>`.
### Error handling
* `401` – authentication required (`requireAuthentication=true`).
* `404` – domain/export not found or manifest not persisted.
* `429` – per-domain quota exceeded (`Retry-After` header set in seconds).
* `503` – export misconfiguration (invalid format/query).
---
## 3) Rate limiting
`MirrorRateLimiter` implements a simple rolling 1-hour window using `IMemoryCache`. Each domain has two quotas:
* `index` scope → `maxIndexRequestsPerHour`
* `download` scope → `maxDownloadRequestsPerHour`
`0` or negative limits disable enforcement. Quotas are best-effort (per-instance). For HA deployments, configure sticky routing at the ingress or replace the limiter with a distributed implementation.
---
## 4) Interaction with export pipeline
Mirror endpoints consume manifests produced by the export engine (`MongoVexExportStore`). They do **not** trigger new exports. Operators must configure connectors/exporters to keep targeted exports fresh (see `EXCITITOR-EXPORT-01-005/006/007`).
Recommended workflow:
1. Define export plans at the export layer (JSON/OpenVEX/CSAF).
2. Configure mirror domains mapping to those plans.
3. Downstream mirror automation:
* `GET /domains/{id}/index`
* Compare `exportId` / `consensusRevision`
* `GET /download` when new
* Verify digest + attestation
When the export engine runs, it materializes the following artefacts under `outputRoot/<directoryName>`:
- `index.json` – canonical index listing each configured domain, manifest/bundle descriptors (with SHA-256 digests), and available export keys.
- `<domain>/manifest.json` – per-domain summary with export metadata (query signature, consensus/score digests, source providers) and a descriptor pointing at the bundle.
- `<domain>/bundle.json` – canonical payload containing serialized consensus, score envelopes, and normalized VEX claims for the matching export definitions.
- `<domain>/bundle.json.jws` – optional detached JWS when signing is enabled.
Downstream automation reads `manifest.json`/`bundle.json` directly, while `/excititor/mirror` endpoints stream the same artefacts through authenticated HTTP.
---
## 5) Operational guidance
* Track quota utilisation via HTTP 429 metrics (configure structured logging or OTEL counters when rate limiting triggers).
* Mirror domains can be deployed per tenant (e.g., `tenant-a`, `tenant-b`) with different auth requirements.
* Ensure the underlying artifact stores (`FileSystem`, `S3`, offline bundle) retain artefacts long enough for mirrors to sync.
* For air-gapped mirrors, combine mirror endpoints with the Offline Kit (see `docs/24_OFFLINE_KIT.md`).
---
## 6) Future alignment
* Replace manual export definitions with generated mirror bundle manifests once `EXCITITOR-EXPORT-01-007` ships.
* Extend `/index` payload with quiet-provenance when `EXCITITOR-EXPORT-01-006` adds that metadata.
* Integrate domain manifests with DevOps mirror profiles (`DEVOPS-MIRROR-08-001`) so helm/compose overlays can enable or disable domains declaratively.

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## Status
This document tracks the future-looking risk scoring model for Excititor. The calculation below is not active yet; Sprint 7 work will add the required schema fields, policy controls, and services. Until that ships, Excititor emits consensus statuses without numeric scores.
## Scoring model (target state)
**S = Gate(VEX_status) × W_trust(source) × [Severity_base × (1 + α·KEV + β·EPSS)]**
* **Gate(VEX_status)**: `affected`/`under_investigation` → 1, `not_affected`/`fixed` → 0. A trusted “not affected” or “fixed” still zeroes the score.
* **W_trust(source)**: normalized policy weight (baseline 0‒1). Policies may opt into >1 boosts for signed vendor feeds once Phase 1 closes.
* **Severity_base**: canonical numeric severity from Concelier (CVSS or org-defined scale).
* **KEV flag**: 0/1 boost when CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities applies.
* **EPSS**: probability [0,1]; bounded multiplier.
* **α, β**: configurable coefficients (default α=0.25, β=0.5) stored in policy.
Safeguards: freeze boosts when product identity is unknown, clamp outputs ≥0, and log every factor in the audit trail.
## Implementation roadmap
| Phase | Scope | Artifacts |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Phase 1 – Schema foundations** | Extend Excititor consensus/claims and Concelier canonical advisories with severity, KEV, EPSS, and expose α/β + weight ceilings in policy. | Sprint 7 tasks `EXCITITOR-CORE-02-001`, `EXCITITOR-POLICY-02-001`, `EXCITITOR-STORAGE-02-001`, `FEEDCORE-ENGINE-07-001`. |
| **Phase 2 – Deterministic score engine** | Implement a scoring component that executes alongside consensus and persists score envelopes with hashes. | Planned task `EXCITITOR-CORE-02-002` (backlog). |
| **Phase 3 – Surfacing & enforcement** | Expose scores via WebService/CLI, integrate with Concelier noise priors, and enforce policy-based suppressions. | To be scheduled after Phase 2. |
## Policy controls (Phase 1)
Operators tune scoring inputs through the Excititor policy document:
```yaml
excititor:
policy:
weights:
vendor: 1.10 # per-tier weight
ceiling: 1.40 # max clamp applied to tiers and overrides (1.0‒5.0)
providerOverrides:
trusted.vendor: 1.35
scoring:
alpha: 0.30 # KEV boost coefficient (defaults to 0.25)
beta: 0.60 # EPSS boost coefficient (defaults to 0.50)
```
* All weights (tiers + overrides) are clamped to `[0, weights.ceiling]` with structured warnings when a value is out of range or not a finite number.
* `weights.ceiling` itself is constrained to `[1.0, 5.0]`, preserving prior behaviour when omitted.
* `scoring.alpha` / `scoring.beta` accept non-negative values up to 5.0; values outside the range fall back to defaults and surface diagnostics to operators.
## Data model (after Phase 1)
```json
{
"vulnerabilityId": "CVE-2025-12345",
"product": "pkg:name@version",
"consensus": {
"status": "affected",
"policyRevisionId": "rev-12",
"policyDigest": "0D9AEC…"
},
"signals": {
"severity": {"scheme": "CVSS:3.1", "score": 7.5},
"kev": true,
"epss": 0.40
},
"policy": {
"weight": 1.15,
"alpha": 0.25,
"beta": 0.5
},
"score": {
"value": 10.8,
"generatedAt": "2025-11-05T14:12:30Z",
"audit": [
"gate:affected",
"weight:1.15",
"severity:7.5",
"kev:1",
"epss:0.40"
]
}
}
```
## Operational guidance
* **Inputs**: Concelier delivers severity/KEV/EPSS via the advisory event log; Excititor connectors load VEX statements. Policy owns trust tiers and coefficients.
* **Processing**: the scoring engine (Phase 2) runs next to consensus, storing results with deterministic hashes so exports and attestations can reference them.
* **Consumption**: WebService/CLI will return consensus plus score; scanners may suppress findings only when policy-authorized VEX gating and signed score envelopes agree.
## Pseudocode (Phase 2 preview)
```python
def risk_score(gate, weight, severity, kev, epss, alpha, beta, freeze_boosts=False):
if gate == 0:
return 0
if freeze_boosts:
kev, epss = 0, 0
boost = 1 + alpha * kev + beta * epss
return max(0, weight * severity * boost)
```
## FAQ
* **Can operators opt out?** Set α=β=0 or keep weights ≤1.0 via policy.
* **What about missing signals?** Treat them as zero and log the omission.
* **When will this ship?** Phase 1 is planned for Sprint 7; later phases depend on connector coverage and attestation delivery.