feat: Implement distro-native version comparison for RPM, Debian, and Alpine packages

- Add RpmVersionComparer for RPM version comparison with epoch, version, and release handling.
- Introduce DebianVersion for parsing Debian EVR (Epoch:Version-Release) strings.
- Create ApkVersion for parsing Alpine APK version strings with suffix support.
- Define IVersionComparator interface for version comparison with proof-line generation.
- Implement VersionComparisonResult struct to encapsulate comparison results and proof lines.
- Add tests for Debian and RPM version comparers to ensure correct functionality and edge case handling.
- Create project files for the version comparison library and its tests.
This commit is contained in:
StellaOps Bot
2025-12-22 09:49:38 +02:00
parent aff0ceb2fe
commit 634233dfed
112 changed files with 31925 additions and 1813 deletions

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# CVE → Symbol Mapping
_Last updated: 2025-12-22. Owner: Scanner Guild + Concelier Guild._
This document describes how Stella Ops maps CVE identifiers to specific binary symbols/functions for precise reachability analysis.
---
## 1. Overview
To determine if a vulnerability is reachable, we need to know which specific functions are affected. The **CVE→Symbol Mapping** service bridges:
- **CVE identifiers** (e.g., `CVE-2024-1234`)
- **Package coordinates** (e.g., `pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21`)
- **Affected symbols** (e.g., `lodash.template`, `openssl:EVP_PKEY_decrypt`)
---
## 2. Data Sources
### 2.1 Patch Diff Analysis
The highest-fidelity source: analyze git commits that fix vulnerabilities.
```
CVE-2024-1234 fixed in commit abc123
→ Diff shows changes to:
- src/crypto.c: EVP_PKEY_decrypt() [modified]
- src/crypto.c: decrypt_internal() [added guard]
→ Affected symbols: EVP_PKEY_decrypt, decrypt_internal
```
**Implementation**: `StellaOps.Scanner.VulnSurfaces.PatchDiffAnalyzer`
### 2.2 Advisory Metadata
Structured advisories with function-level detail:
- **OSV** (`affected[].ranges[].events[].introduced/fixed`)
- **NVD CPE** with CWE → typical affected patterns
- **Vendor advisories** (GitHub, npm, PyPI security advisories)
**Implementation**: `StellaOps.Concelier.Connectors.*`
### 2.3 Heuristic Inference
When precise mappings unavailable:
1. **All public exports** of affected package version
2. **CWE-based patterns** (e.g., CWE-79 XSS → output functions)
3. **Function name patterns** (e.g., `*_decrypt*`, `*_parse*`)
**Implementation**: `StellaOps.Scanner.VulnSurfaces.HeuristicMapper`
---
## 3. Mapping Confidence Tiers
| Tier | Source | Confidence | Example |
|------|--------|------------|---------|
| **Confirmed** | Patch diff analysis | 0.951.0 | Exact function from git diff |
| **Likely** | Advisory with function names | 0.70.9 | OSV with `affected.functions[]` |
| **Inferred** | CWE/pattern heuristics | 0.40.6 | All exports of vulnerable version |
| **Unknown** | No data available | 0.00.3 | Package-level only |
---
## 4. Query Interface
### 4.1 Service Contract
```csharp
public interface IVulnSurfaceService
{
/// <summary>
/// Get symbols affected by a CVE for a specific package.
/// </summary>
Task<VulnSurfaceResult> GetAffectedSymbolsAsync(
string cveId,
string purl,
VulnSurfaceOptions? options = null,
CancellationToken ct = default);
/// <summary>
/// Batch query for multiple CVE+PURL pairs.
/// </summary>
Task<IReadOnlyList<VulnSurfaceResult>> GetAffectedSymbolsBatchAsync(
IEnumerable<(string CveId, string Purl)> queries,
CancellationToken ct = default);
}
```
### 4.2 Result Model
```csharp
public sealed record VulnSurfaceResult
{
public required string CveId { get; init; }
public required string Purl { get; init; }
public required ImmutableArray<AffectedSymbol> Symbols { get; init; }
public required VulnSurfaceSource Source { get; init; }
public required double Confidence { get; init; }
public DateTimeOffset? CachedAt { get; init; }
}
public sealed record AffectedSymbol
{
public required string Name { get; init; }
public required string SymbolId { get; init; }
public string? File { get; init; }
public int? Line { get; init; }
public string? Signature { get; init; }
public SymbolChangeType ChangeType { get; init; }
}
public enum VulnSurfaceSource
{
PatchDiff,
Advisory,
Heuristic,
Unknown
}
public enum SymbolChangeType
{
Modified, // Function code changed
Added, // New guard/check added
Removed, // Vulnerable code removed
Renamed // Function renamed
}
```
---
## 5. Integration with Concelier
The CVE→Symbol mapping service integrates with Concelier's advisory feed:
```
┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐
│ Scanner │────►│ VulnSurface │────►│ Concelier │
│ (Query) │ │ Service │ │ Advisory API │
└─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘
┌──────────────────┐
│ Patch Diff │
│ Analyzer │
└──────────────────┘
```
### 5.1 Advisory Client
```csharp
public interface IAdvisoryClient
{
Task<Advisory?> GetAdvisoryAsync(string cveId, CancellationToken ct);
Task<IReadOnlyList<AffectedPackage>> GetAffectedPackagesAsync(
string cveId,
CancellationToken ct);
}
```
### 5.2 Caching Strategy
| Data | TTL | Invalidation |
|------|-----|--------------|
| Advisory metadata | 1 hour | On feed update |
| Patch diff results | 24 hours | On new CVE revision |
| Heuristic mappings | 15 minutes | On query |
---
## 6. Offline Support
For air-gapped environments:
### 6.1 Pre-computed Bundles
```
offline-bundles/
vuln-surfaces/
cve-2024-*.json # Pre-computed mappings
ecosystem-npm.json # NPM ecosystem mappings
ecosystem-pypi.json # PyPI ecosystem mappings
```
### 6.2 Bundle Format
```json
{
"version": "1.0.0",
"generatedAt": "2025-12-22T00:00:00Z",
"mappings": {
"CVE-2024-1234": {
"pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21": {
"symbols": ["template", "templateSettings"],
"source": "patch_diff",
"confidence": 0.95
}
}
}
}
```
---
## 7. Fallback Behavior
When no mapping is available:
1. **Ecosystem-specific defaults**:
- npm: All `exports` from package.json
- PyPI: All public functions (`__all__`)
- Native: All exported symbols (`.dynsym`)
2. **Conservative approach**:
- Mark all public APIs as potentially affected
- Set confidence = 0.3 (Inferred tier)
- Include explanation in verdict reasons
3. **Manual override**:
- Allow user-provided symbol lists via policy
- Support suppression rules for known false positives
---
## 8. Performance Considerations
| Metric | Target | Notes |
|--------|--------|-------|
| Cache hit rate | >90% | Most queries hit cache |
| Cold query latency | <500ms | Concelier API call |
| Batch throughput | >100 queries/sec | Parallel execution |
---
## 9. Example Queries
### Simple Query
```http
POST /api/vuln-surfaces/query
Content-Type: application/json
{
"cveId": "CVE-2024-1234",
"purl": "pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21"
}
```
Response:
```json
{
"cveId": "CVE-2024-1234",
"purl": "pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21",
"symbols": [
{
"name": "template",
"symbolId": "js:lodash/template",
"file": "lodash.js",
"line": 14850,
"changeType": "modified"
}
],
"source": "patch_diff",
"confidence": 0.95
}
```
### Batch Query
```http
POST /api/vuln-surfaces/batch
Content-Type: application/json
{
"queries": [
{"cveId": "CVE-2024-1234", "purl": "pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21"},
{"cveId": "CVE-2024-5678", "purl": "pkg:pypi/requests@2.28.0"}
]
}
```
---
## 10. Related Documentation
- [Slice Schema](./slice-schema.md)
- [Patch Oracles](./patch-oracles.md)
- [Concelier Architecture](../modules/concelier/architecture.md)
- [Vulnerability Surfaces](../modules/scanner/vuln-surfaces.md)
---
_Created: 2025-12-22. See Sprint 3810 for implementation details._

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# Replay Verification
_Last updated: 2025-12-22. Owner: Scanner Guild._
This document describes the **replay verification** workflow that ensures reachability slices are reproducible and tamper-evident.
---
## 1. Overview
Replay verification answers: *"Given the same inputs, do we get the exact same slice?"*
This is critical for:
- **Audit trails**: Prove analysis results are genuine
- **Tamper detection**: Detect modified inputs or results
- **Debugging**: Identify sources of non-determinism
- **Compliance**: Demonstrate reproducible security analysis
---
## 2. Replay Workflow
```
┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐
│ Original │ │ Rehydrate │ │ Recompute │
│ Slice │────►│ Inputs │────►│ Slice │
│ (with digest) │ │ from CAS │ │ (fresh) │
└─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘
┌───────────────────┐
│ Compare │
│ byte-for-byte │
└───────────────────┘
┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ MATCH │ │ MISMATCH │
│ ✓ │ │ + diff │
└──────────┘ └──────────┘
```
---
## 3. API Reference
### 3.1 Replay Endpoint
```http
POST /api/slices/replay
Content-Type: application/json
{
"sliceDigest": "blake3:a1b2c3d4..."
}
```
### 3.2 Response Format
**Match Response (200 OK)**:
```json
{
"match": true,
"originalDigest": "blake3:a1b2c3d4...",
"recomputedDigest": "blake3:a1b2c3d4...",
"replayedAt": "2025-12-22T10:00:00Z",
"inputsVerified": true
}
```
**Mismatch Response (200 OK)**:
```json
{
"match": false,
"originalDigest": "blake3:a1b2c3d4...",
"recomputedDigest": "blake3:e5f6g7h8...",
"replayedAt": "2025-12-22T10:00:00Z",
"diff": {
"missingNodes": ["node:5"],
"extraNodes": ["node:6"],
"missingEdges": [{"from": "node:1", "to": "node:5"}],
"extraEdges": [{"from": "node:1", "to": "node:6"}],
"verdictDiff": {
"original": "unreachable",
"recomputed": "reachable"
},
"confidenceDiff": {
"original": 0.95,
"recomputed": 0.72
}
},
"possibleCauses": [
"Input graph may have been modified",
"Analyzer version mismatch: 1.2.0 vs 1.2.1",
"Feed version changed: nvd-2025-12-20 vs nvd-2025-12-22"
]
}
```
**Error Response (404 Not Found)**:
```json
{
"error": "slice_not_found",
"message": "Slice with digest blake3:a1b2c3d4... not found in CAS",
"sliceDigest": "blake3:a1b2c3d4..."
}
```
---
## 4. Input Rehydration
All inputs must be CAS-addressed for replay:
### 4.1 Required Inputs
| Input | CAS Key | Description |
|-------|---------|-------------|
| Graph | `cas://graphs/{digest}` | Full RichGraph JSON |
| Binaries | `cas://binaries/{digest}` | Binary file hashes |
| SBOM | `cas://sboms/{digest}` | CycloneDX/SPDX document |
| Policy | `cas://policies/{digest}` | Policy DSL |
| Feeds | `cas://feeds/{version}` | Advisory feed snapshot |
### 4.2 Manifest Contents
```json
{
"manifest": {
"analyzerVersion": "scanner.native:1.2.0",
"rulesetHash": "sha256:abc123...",
"feedVersions": {
"nvd": "2025-12-20",
"osv": "2025-12-20",
"ghsa": "2025-12-20"
},
"createdAt": "2025-12-22T10:00:00Z",
"toolchain": "iced-x86:1.21.0",
"environment": {
"os": "linux",
"arch": "x86_64"
}
}
}
```
---
## 5. Determinism Requirements
For byte-for-byte reproducibility:
### 5.1 JSON Canonicalization
```
1. Keys sorted alphabetically at all levels
2. No whitespace (compact JSON)
3. UTF-8 encoding
4. Lowercase hex for all hashes
5. Numbers: no trailing zeros, scientific notation for large values
```
### 5.2 Graph Ordering
```
Nodes: sorted by symbolId (lexicographic)
Edges: sorted by (from, to) tuple (lexicographic)
Paths: sorted by first node, then path length
```
### 5.3 Timestamp Handling
```
All timestamps: UTC, ISO-8601, with 'Z' suffix
Example: "2025-12-22T10:00:00Z"
No milliseconds unless significant
```
### 5.4 Floating Point
```
Confidence values: round to 6 decimal places
Example: 0.950000, not 0.95 or 0.9500001
```
---
## 6. Diff Computation
When slices don't match:
### 6.1 Diff Algorithm
```python
def compute_diff(original, recomputed):
diff = SliceDiff()
# Node diff
orig_nodes = set(n.id for n in original.subgraph.nodes)
new_nodes = set(n.id for n in recomputed.subgraph.nodes)
diff.missing_nodes = list(orig_nodes - new_nodes)
diff.extra_nodes = list(new_nodes - orig_nodes)
# Edge diff
orig_edges = set((e.from, e.to) for e in original.subgraph.edges)
new_edges = set((e.from, e.to) for e in recomputed.subgraph.edges)
diff.missing_edges = list(orig_edges - new_edges)
diff.extra_edges = list(new_edges - orig_edges)
# Verdict diff
if original.verdict.status != recomputed.verdict.status:
diff.verdict_diff = {
"original": original.verdict.status,
"recomputed": recomputed.verdict.status
}
return diff
```
### 6.2 Cause Analysis
```python
def analyze_causes(original, recomputed, manifest):
causes = []
if manifest.analyzerVersion != current_version():
causes.append(f"Analyzer version mismatch")
if manifest.feedVersions != current_feed_versions():
causes.append(f"Feed version changed")
if original.inputs.graphDigest != fetch_graph_digest():
causes.append(f"Input graph may have been modified")
return causes
```
---
## 7. CLI Usage
### 7.1 Replay Command
```bash
# Replay and verify a slice
stella slice replay --digest blake3:a1b2c3d4...
# Output:
# ✓ Slice verified: digest matches
# Original: blake3:a1b2c3d4...
# Recomputed: blake3:a1b2c3d4...
```
### 7.2 Verbose Mode
```bash
stella slice replay --digest blake3:a1b2c3d4... --verbose
# Output:
# Fetching slice from CAS...
# Rehydrating inputs:
# - Graph: cas://graphs/blake3:xyz... ✓
# - SBOM: cas://sboms/sha256:abc... ✓
# - Policy: cas://policies/sha256:def... ✓
# Recomputing slice...
# Comparing results...
# ✓ Match confirmed
```
### 7.3 Mismatch Handling
```bash
stella slice replay --digest blake3:a1b2c3d4...
# Output:
# ✗ Slice mismatch detected!
#
# Differences:
# Nodes: 1 missing, 0 extra
# Edges: 1 missing, 1 extra
# Verdict: unreachable → reachable
#
# Possible causes:
# - Input graph may have been modified
# - Analyzer version: 1.2.0 → 1.2.1
#
# Run with --diff-file to export detailed diff
```
---
## 8. Error Handling
| Error | Cause | Resolution |
|-------|-------|------------|
| `slice_not_found` | Slice not in CAS | Check digest, verify upload |
| `input_not_found` | Referenced input missing | Reupload inputs |
| `version_mismatch` | Analyzer version differs | Pin version or accept drift |
| `feed_stale` | Feed snapshot unavailable | Use latest or pin version |
---
## 9. Security Considerations
1. **Input integrity**: Verify CAS digests before replay
2. **Audit logging**: Log all replay attempts
3. **Rate limiting**: Prevent replay DoS
4. **Access control**: Same permissions as slice access
---
## 10. Performance Targets
| Metric | Target |
|--------|--------|
| Replay latency | <5s for typical slice |
| Input fetch | <2s (parallel CAS fetches) |
| Comparison | <100ms |
---
## 11. Related Documentation
- [Slice Schema](./slice-schema.md)
- [Binary Reachability Schema](./binary-reachability-schema.md)
- [Determinism Requirements](../contracts/determinism.md)
- [CAS Architecture](../modules/platform/cas.md)
---
_Created: 2025-12-22. See Sprint 3820 for implementation details._

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# Reachability Slice Schema
_Last updated: 2025-12-22. Owner: Scanner Guild._
This document defines the **Reachability Slice** schema—a minimal, attestable proof unit that answers whether a vulnerable symbol is reachable from application entrypoints.
---
## 1. Overview
A **slice** is a focused subgraph extracted from a full reachability graph, containing only the nodes and edges relevant to answering a specific reachability query (e.g., "Is CVE-2024-1234's vulnerable function reachable?").
### Key Properties
| Property | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| **Minimal** | Contains only nodes/edges on paths between entrypoints and targets |
| **Attestable** | DSSE-signed with in-toto predicate format |
| **Reproducible** | Same inputs → same bytes (deterministic) |
| **Content-addressed** | Retrieved by BLAKE3 digest |
---
## 2. Schema Definition
### 2.1 DSSE Predicate Type
```
https://stellaops.dev/predicates/reachability-slice/v1
```
### 2.2 Full Schema
```json
{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://stellaops.dev/schemas/reachability-slice.v1.schema.json",
"title": "Reachability Slice",
"type": "object",
"required": ["_type", "inputs", "query", "subgraph", "verdict", "manifest"],
"properties": {
"_type": {
"const": "https://stellaops.dev/predicates/reachability-slice/v1"
},
"inputs": { "$ref": "#/$defs/SliceInputs" },
"query": { "$ref": "#/$defs/SliceQuery" },
"subgraph": { "$ref": "#/$defs/SliceSubgraph" },
"verdict": { "$ref": "#/$defs/SliceVerdict" },
"manifest": { "$ref": "#/$defs/ScanManifest" }
},
"$defs": {
"SliceInputs": {
"type": "object",
"required": ["graphDigest", "binaryDigests"],
"properties": {
"graphDigest": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^blake3:[a-f0-9]{64}$" },
"binaryDigests": {
"type": "array",
"items": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$" }
},
"sbomDigest": { "type": "string" },
"layerDigests": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } }
}
},
"SliceQuery": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"cveId": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^CVE-\\d{4}-\\d+$" },
"targetSymbols": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
"entrypoints": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
"policyHash": { "type": "string" }
}
},
"SliceSubgraph": {
"type": "object",
"required": ["nodes", "edges"],
"properties": {
"nodes": {
"type": "array",
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/SliceNode" }
},
"edges": {
"type": "array",
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/SliceEdge" }
}
}
},
"SliceNode": {
"type": "object",
"required": ["id", "symbol", "kind"],
"properties": {
"id": { "type": "string" },
"symbol": { "type": "string" },
"kind": { "enum": ["entrypoint", "intermediate", "target", "unknown"] },
"file": { "type": "string" },
"line": { "type": "integer" },
"purl": { "type": "string" },
"attributes": { "type": "object" }
}
},
"SliceEdge": {
"type": "object",
"required": ["from", "to", "confidence"],
"properties": {
"from": { "type": "string" },
"to": { "type": "string" },
"kind": { "enum": ["direct", "plt", "iat", "dynamic", "unknown"] },
"confidence": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1 },
"evidence": { "type": "string" },
"gate": { "$ref": "#/$defs/GateInfo" },
"observed": { "$ref": "#/$defs/ObservedInfo" }
}
},
"GateInfo": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"type": { "enum": ["feature_flag", "auth", "config", "admin_only"] },
"condition": { "type": "string" },
"satisfied": { "type": "boolean" }
}
},
"ObservedInfo": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"firstObserved": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"lastObserved": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"count": { "type": "integer" }
}
},
"SliceVerdict": {
"type": "object",
"required": ["status", "confidence"],
"properties": {
"status": { "enum": ["reachable", "unreachable", "unknown", "gated"] },
"confidence": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1 },
"reasons": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
"pathWitnesses": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
"unknownCount": { "type": "integer" },
"gatedPaths": { "type": "array", "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/GateInfo" } }
}
},
"ScanManifest": {
"type": "object",
"required": ["analyzerVersion", "createdAt"],
"properties": {
"analyzerVersion": { "type": "string" },
"rulesetHash": { "type": "string" },
"feedVersions": { "type": "object" },
"createdAt": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" },
"toolchain": { "type": "string" }
}
}
}
}
```
---
## 3. Verdict Status Definitions
| Status | Meaning | Confidence Range |
|--------|---------|------------------|
| `reachable` | Path exists from entrypoint to target | ≥0.7 |
| `unreachable` | No path found, no unknowns | ≥0.9 |
| `unknown` | Unknowns present on potential paths | 0.30.7 |
| `gated` | Path exists but gated by feature flag/auth | 0.50.8 |
### Verdict Computation Rules
```
reachable := path_exists AND min(path_confidence) ≥ 0.7 AND unknown_edges = 0
unreachable := NOT path_exists AND unknown_edges = 0
gated := path_exists AND all_paths_gated AND gates_not_satisfied
unknown := unknown_edges > 0 OR min(path_confidence) < 0.5
```
---
## 4. Example Slice
```json
{
"_type": "https://stellaops.dev/predicates/reachability-slice/v1",
"inputs": {
"graphDigest": "blake3:a1b2c3d4e5f6789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234abcd",
"binaryDigests": ["sha256:deadbeef..."],
"sbomDigest": "sha256:cafebabe..."
},
"query": {
"cveId": "CVE-2024-1234",
"targetSymbols": ["openssl:EVP_PKEY_decrypt"],
"entrypoints": ["main", "http_handler"]
},
"subgraph": {
"nodes": [
{"id": "node:1", "symbol": "main", "kind": "entrypoint", "file": "/app/main.c", "line": 42},
{"id": "node:2", "symbol": "process_request", "kind": "intermediate", "file": "/app/handler.c", "line": 100},
{"id": "node:3", "symbol": "decrypt_data", "kind": "intermediate", "file": "/app/crypto.c", "line": 55},
{"id": "node:4", "symbol": "EVP_PKEY_decrypt", "kind": "target", "purl": "pkg:generic/openssl@3.0.0"}
],
"edges": [
{"from": "node:1", "to": "node:2", "kind": "direct", "confidence": 1.0},
{"from": "node:2", "to": "node:3", "kind": "direct", "confidence": 0.95},
{"from": "node:3", "to": "node:4", "kind": "plt", "confidence": 0.9}
]
},
"verdict": {
"status": "reachable",
"confidence": 0.9,
"reasons": ["Direct call path from main() to EVP_PKEY_decrypt()"],
"pathWitnesses": ["main → process_request → decrypt_data → EVP_PKEY_decrypt"]
},
"manifest": {
"analyzerVersion": "scanner.native:1.2.0",
"rulesetHash": "sha256:...",
"createdAt": "2025-12-22T10:00:00Z",
"toolchain": "iced-x86:1.21.0"
}
}
```
---
## 5. DSSE Envelope Format
Slices are wrapped in DSSE envelopes for attestation:
```json
{
"payloadType": "application/vnd.in-toto+json",
"payload": "<base64-encoded slice JSON>",
"signatures": [
{
"keyid": "sha256:abc123...",
"sig": "<base64-encoded signature>"
}
]
}
```
---
## 6. Storage & Retrieval
### CAS URI Format
```
cas://slices/blake3:<digest>
```
### OCI Artifact Format
```json
{
"mediaType": "application/vnd.stellaops.slice.v1+json",
"digest": "sha256:...",
"annotations": {
"org.stellaops.slice.cve": "CVE-2024-1234",
"org.stellaops.slice.verdict": "reachable"
}
}
```
---
## 7. Determinism Requirements
For reproducible slices:
1. **Node ordering**: Sort by `id` lexicographically
2. **Edge ordering**: Sort by `(from, to)` tuple
3. **Timestamps**: Use UTC ISO-8601 with Z suffix
4. **Floating point**: Round to 6 decimal places
5. **JSON serialization**: No whitespace, sorted keys
---
## 8. Related Documentation
- [Binary Reachability Schema](./binary-reachability-schema.md)
- [RichGraph Contract](../contracts/richgraph-v1.md)
- [Function-Level Evidence](./function-level-evidence.md)
- [Replay Verification](./replay-verification.md)
---
_Created: 2025-12-22. See Sprint 3810 for implementation details._