feat: Add VEX Status Chip component and integration tests for reachability drift detection
- Introduced `VexStatusChipComponent` to display VEX status with color coding and tooltips. - Implemented integration tests for reachability drift detection, covering various scenarios including drift detection, determinism, and error handling. - Enhanced `ScannerToSignalsReachabilityTests` with a null implementation of `ICallGraphSyncService` for better test isolation. - Updated project references to include the new Reachability Drift library.
This commit is contained in:
StellaOps Bot
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## Trust Algebra and Lattice Engine Specification
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This spec defines a deterministic “Trust Algebra / Lattice Engine” that ingests heterogeneous security assertions (SBOM, VEX, reachability, provenance attestations), normalizes them into a canonical claim model, merges them using lattice operations that preserve **unknowns and contradictions**, and produces a **signed, replayable verdict** with an auditable proof trail.
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The design deliberately separates:
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1. **Knowledge aggregation** (monotone, conflict-preserving, order-independent), from
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2. **Decision selection** (policy-driven, trust-aware, environment-aware).
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This prevents “heuristics creep” and makes the system explainable and reproducible.
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---
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# 1) Scope and objectives
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### 1.1 What the engine must do
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* Accept VEX from multiple standards (OpenVEX, CSAF VEX, CycloneDX/ECMA-424 VEX).
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* Accept internally generated evidence (SBOM, reachability proofs, mitigations, patch/pedigree evidence).
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* Merge claims while representing:
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* **Unknown** (no evidence)
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* **Conflict** (credible evidence for both sides)
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* Compute an output disposition aligned to common VEX output states:
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* CycloneDX impact-analysis states include: `resolved`, `resolved_with_pedigree`, `exploitable`, `in_triage`, `false_positive`, `not_affected`. ([Ecma International][1])
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* Provide deterministic, signed, replayable results:
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* Same inputs + same policy bundle ⇒ same outputs.
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* Produce a proof object that can be independently verified offline.
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### 1.2 Non-goals
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* “One score to rule them all” without proofs.
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* Probabilistic scoring as the primary decision mechanism.
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* Trust by vendor branding instead of cryptographic/verifiable identity.
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---
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# 2) Standards surface (external inputs) and canonicalization targets
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The engine should support at minimum these external statement types:
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### 2.1 CycloneDX / ECMA-424 VEX (embedded)
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CycloneDX’s vulnerability “impact analysis” model defines:
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* `analysis.state` values: `resolved`, `resolved_with_pedigree`, `exploitable`, `in_triage`, `false_positive`, `not_affected`. ([Ecma International][1])
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* `analysis.justification` values: `code_not_present`, `code_not_reachable`, `requires_configuration`, `requires_dependency`, `requires_environment`, `protected_by_compiler`, `protected_at_runtime`, `protected_at_perimeter`, `protected_by_mitigating_control`. ([Ecma International][1])
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This is the richest mainstream state model; we will treat it as the “maximal” target semantics.
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### 2.2 OpenVEX
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OpenVEX defines status labels:
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* `not_affected`, `affected`, `fixed`, `under_investigation`. ([Docker Documentation][2])
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For `not_affected`, OpenVEX requires supplying either a status justification or an `impact_statement`. ([GitHub][3])
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### 2.3 CSAF VEX
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CSAF VEX requires `product_status` containing at least one of:
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* `fixed`, `known_affected`, `known_not_affected`, `under_investigation`. ([OASIS Documents][4])
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### 2.4 Provenance / attestations
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The engine should ingest signed attestations, particularly DSSE-wrapped in-toto statements (common in Sigstore/Cosign flows). Sigstore documentation states payloads are signed using the DSSE signing spec. ([Sigstore][5])
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DSSE’s design highlights include binding the payload **and its type** to prevent confusion attacks and avoiding canonicalization to reduce attack surface. ([GitHub][6])
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---
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# 3) Canonical internal model
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## 3.1 Core identifiers
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### Subject identity
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A **Subject** is what we are making a security determination about.
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Minimum viable Subject key:
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* `artifact.digest` (e.g., OCI image digest, binary hash)
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* `component.id` (prefer `purl`, else `cpe`, else `bom-ref`)
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* `vuln.id` (CVE/OSV/etc.)
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* `context.id` (optional but recommended; see below)
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```
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Subject := (ArtifactRef, ComponentRef, VulnerabilityRef, ContextRef?)
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```
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### Context identity (optional but recommended)
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ContextRef allows environment-sensitive statements to remain valid and deterministic:
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* build flags
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* runtime config profile (e.g., feature gates)
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* deployment mode (cluster policy)
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* OS / libc family
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* FIPS mode, SELinux/AppArmor posture, etc.
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ContextRef must be hashable (canonical JSON → digest).
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---
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## 3.2 Claims, evidence, attestations
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### Claim
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A **Claim** is a signed or unsigned assertion about a Subject.
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Required fields:
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* `claim.id`: content-addressable digest of canonical claim JSON
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* `claim.subject`
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* `claim.issuer`: principal identity
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* `claim.time`: `issued_at`, `valid_from`, `valid_until` (optional)
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* `claim.assertions[]`: list of atomic assertions (see §4)
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* `claim.evidence_refs[]`: pointers to evidence objects
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* `claim.signature`: optional DSSE / signature wrapper reference
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### Evidence
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Evidence is a typed object that supports replay and audit:
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* `evidence.type`: e.g., `sbom_node`, `callgraph_path`, `loader_resolution`, `config_snapshot`, `patch_diff`, `pedigree_commit_chain`
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* `evidence.digest`: hash of canonical bytes
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* `evidence.producer`: tool identity and version
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* `evidence.time`
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* `evidence.payload_ref`: CAS pointer
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* `evidence.signature_ref`: optional (attested evidence)
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### Attestation wrapper
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For signed payloads (claims or evidence bundles):
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* Prefer DSSE envelopes for transport/type binding. ([GitHub][6])
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* Prefer in-toto statement structure (subject + predicate + type).
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---
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# 4) The fact lattice: representing truth, unknowns, and conflicts
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## 4.1 Why a lattice, not booleans
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For vulnerability disposition you will routinely see:
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* **no evidence** (unknown)
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* **incomplete evidence** (triage)
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* **contradictory evidence** (vendor says not affected; scanner says exploitable)
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A boolean cannot represent these safely.
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## 4.2 Four-valued fact lattice (Belnap-style)
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For each atomic proposition `p`, the engine stores a value in:
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```
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K4 := { ⊥, T, F, ⊤ }
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⊥ = unknown (no support)
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T = supported true
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F = supported false
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⊤ = conflict (support for both true and false)
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```
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### Knowledge ordering (≤k)
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* ⊥ ≤k T ≤k ⊤
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* ⊥ ≤k F ≤k ⊤
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* T and F incomparable
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### Join operator (⊔k)
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Join is “union of support” and is monotone:
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* ⊥ ⊔k x = x
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* T ⊔k F = ⊤
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* ⊤ ⊔k x = ⊤
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* T ⊔k T = T, F ⊔k F = F
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This operator is order-independent; it provides deterministic aggregation even under parallel ingestion.
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---
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# 5) Atomic propositions (canonical “security atoms”)
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For each Subject `S`, the engine maintains K4 truth values for these propositions:
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1. **PRESENT**: the component instance is present in the artifact/context.
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2. **APPLIES**: vulnerability applies to that component (version/range/cpe match).
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3. **REACHABLE**: vulnerable code is reachable in the given context.
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4. **MITIGATED**: controls prevent exploitation (compiler/runtime/perimeter/controls).
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5. **FIXED**: remediation has been applied to the artifact.
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6. **MISATTRIBUTED**: the finding is a false association (false positive).
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These atoms are intentionally orthogonal; external formats are normalized into them.
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---
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# 6) Trust algebra: principals, assurance, and authority
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Trust is not a single number; it must represent:
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* cryptographic verification
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* identity assurance
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* authority scope
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* freshness/revocation
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* evidence strength
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We model trust as a label computed deterministically from policy + verification.
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## 6.1 Principal
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A principal is an issuer identity with verifiable keys:
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* `principal.id` (URI-like)
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* `principal.key_ids[]`
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* `principal.identity_claims` (e.g., cert SANs, OIDC subject, org, repo)
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* `principal.roles[]` (vendor, distro, internal-sec, build-system, scanner, auditor)
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## 6.2 Trust label
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A trust label is a tuple:
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```
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TrustLabel := (
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assurance_level, // cryptographic + identity verification strength
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authority_scope, // what subjects this principal is authoritative for
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freshness_class, // time validity
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evidence_class // strength/type of evidence attached
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)
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```
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### Assurance levels (example)
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Deterministic levels, increasing:
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* A0: unsigned / unverifiable
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* A1: signed, key known but weak identity binding
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* A2: signed, verified identity (e.g., cert chain / keyless identity)
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* A3: signed + provenance binding to artifact digest
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* A4: signed + provenance + transparency log inclusion (if available)
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Sigstore cosign’s attestation verification references DSSE signing for payloads. ([Sigstore][5])
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DSSE design includes payload-type binding and avoids canonicalization. ([GitHub][6])
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### Authority scope
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Authority is not purely cryptographic. It is policy-defined mapping between:
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* principal identity and
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* subject namespaces (vendors, products, package namespaces, internal artifacts)
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Examples:
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* Vendor principal is authoritative for `product.vendor == VendorX`.
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* Distro principal authoritative for packages under their repos.
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* Internal security principal authoritative for internal runtime reachability proofs.
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### Evidence class
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Evidence class is derived from evidence types:
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* E0: statement-only (no supporting evidence refs)
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* E1: SBOM linkage evidence (component present + version)
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* E2: reachability/mitigation evidence (call paths, config snapshots)
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* E3: remediation evidence (patch diffs, pedigree/commit chain)
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CycloneDX/ECMA-424 explicitly distinguishes `resolved_with_pedigree` as remediation with verifiable commit history/diffs in pedigree. ([Ecma International][1])
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## 6.3 Trust ordering and operators
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Trust labels define a partial order ≤t (policy-defined). A simple implementation is component-wise ordering, but authority scope is set-based.
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Core operators:
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* **join (⊔t)**: combine independent supporting trust (often max-by-order)
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* **meet (⊓t)**: compose along dependency chain (often min-by-order)
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* **compose (⊗)**: trust of derived claim = min(trust of prerequisites) adjusted by method assurance
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**Important:** Trust affects **decision selection**, not raw knowledge aggregation. Aggregation retains conflicts even if one side is low-trust.
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---
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# 7) Normalization: external VEX → canonical atoms
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## 7.1 CycloneDX / ECMA-424 normalization
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From `analysis.state` ([Ecma International][1])
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* `resolved`
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→ FIXED := T
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* `resolved_with_pedigree`
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→ FIXED := T and require pedigree/diff evidence (E3)
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* `exploitable`
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→ APPLIES := T, REACHABLE := T, MITIGATED := F (unless explicit mitigation evidence exists)
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* `in_triage`
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→ mark triage flag; leave atoms mostly ⊥ unless other fields present
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* `false_positive`
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→ MISATTRIBUTED := T
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* `not_affected`
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→ requires justification mapping (below)
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From `analysis.justification` ([Ecma International][1])
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Map into atoms as conditional facts (context-sensitive):
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* `code_not_present` → PRESENT := F
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* `code_not_reachable` → REACHABLE := F
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* `requires_configuration` → REACHABLE := F *under current config snapshot*
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* `requires_dependency` → REACHABLE := F *unless dependency present*
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* `requires_environment` → REACHABLE := F *under current environment constraints*
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* `protected_by_compiler` / `protected_at_runtime` / `protected_at_perimeter` / `protected_by_mitigating_control`
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→ MITIGATED := T (with evidence refs expected)
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## 7.2 OpenVEX normalization
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OpenVEX statuses: `not_affected`, `affected`, `fixed`, `under_investigation`. ([Docker Documentation][2])
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For `not_affected`, OpenVEX requires justification or an impact statement. ([GitHub][3])
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Mapping:
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* `fixed` → FIXED := T
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* `affected` → APPLIES := T (conservative; leave REACHABLE := ⊥ unless present)
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* `under_investigation` → triage flag
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* `not_affected` → choose mapping based on provided justification / impact statement:
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* component not present → PRESENT := F
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* vulnerable code not reachable → REACHABLE := F
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* mitigations already exist → MITIGATED := T
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* otherwise → APPLIES := F only if explicitly asserted
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## 7.3 CSAF VEX normalization
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CSAF product_status includes `fixed`, `known_affected`, `known_not_affected`, `under_investigation`. ([OASIS Documents][4])
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Mapping:
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* `fixed` → FIXED := T
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* `known_affected` → APPLIES := T
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* `known_not_affected` → APPLIES := F unless stronger justification indicates PRESENT := F / REACHABLE := F / MITIGATED := T
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* `under_investigation` → triage flag
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---
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# 8) Lattice engine: aggregation algorithm
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Aggregation is pure, monotone, and order-independent.
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## 8.1 Support sets
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For each Subject `S` and atom `p`, maintain:
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* `SupportTrue[S,p]` = set of claim IDs supporting p=true
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* `SupportFalse[S,p]` = set of claim IDs supporting p=false
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Optionally store per-support:
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* trust label
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* evidence digests
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* timestamps
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## 8.2 Compute K4 value
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For each `(S,p)`:
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* if both support sets empty → ⊥
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* if only true non-empty → T
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* if only false non-empty → F
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* if both non-empty → ⊤
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## 8.3 Track trust on each side
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Maintain:
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* `TrustTrue[S,p]` = max trust label among SupportTrue
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* `TrustFalse[S,p]` = max trust label among SupportFalse
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This enables policy selection without losing conflict information.
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---
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# 9) Decision selection: from atoms → disposition
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Decision selection is where “trust algebra” actually participates. It is **policy-driven** and can differ by environment (prod vs dev, regulated vs non-regulated).
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## 9.1 Output disposition space
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The engine should be able to emit a CycloneDX-compatible disposition (ECMA-424): ([Ecma International][1])
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* `resolved_with_pedigree`
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* `resolved`
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* `false_positive`
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* `not_affected`
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* `exploitable`
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* `in_triage`
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## 9.2 Deterministic selection rules (baseline)
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Define `D(S)`:
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1. If `FIXED == T` and pedigree evidence meets threshold → `resolved_with_pedigree`
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2. Else if `FIXED == T` → `resolved`
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3. Else if `MISATTRIBUTED == T` and trust≥threshold → `false_positive`
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4. Else if `APPLIES == F` or `PRESENT == F` → `not_affected`
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5. Else if `REACHABLE == F` or `MITIGATED == T` → `not_affected` (with justification)
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6. Else if `REACHABLE == T` and `MITIGATED != T` → `exploitable`
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7. Else → `in_triage`
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## 9.3 Conflict-handling modes (policy selectable)
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When any required atom is ⊤ (conflict) or ⊥ (unknown), policy chooses a stance:
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* **Skeptical (default for production gating):**
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* conflict/unknown biases toward `in_triage` or `exploitable` depending on risk tolerance
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* **Authority-weighted:**
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* if high-authority vendor statement conflicts with low-trust scanner output, accept vendor but record conflict in proof
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* **Quorum-based:**
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* accept `not_affected` only if:
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* (vendor trust≥A3) OR
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* (internal reachability proof trust≥A3) OR
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* (two independent principals ≥A2 agree)
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Otherwise remain `in_triage`.
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This is where “trust algebra” expresses **institutional policy** without destroying underlying knowledge.
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---
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# 10) Proof object: verifiable explainability
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Every verdict emits a **Proof Bundle** that can be verified offline.
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## 10.1 Proof bundle contents
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* `subject` (canonical form)
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* `inputs`:
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* list of claim IDs + digests
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* list of evidence digests
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* policy bundle digest
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* vulnerability feed snapshot digest (if applicable)
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* `normalization`:
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||||
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||||
* mappings applied (e.g., OpenVEX status→atoms)
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* `atom_table`:
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||||
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||||
* each atom p: K4 value, support sets, trust per side
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* `decision_trace`:
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||||
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||||
* rule IDs fired
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||||
* thresholds used
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||||
* `output`:
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||||
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||||
* disposition + justification + confidence metadata
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||||
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||||
## 10.2 Signing
|
||||
|
||||
The proof bundle is itself a payload suitable for signing in DSSE, enabling attested verdicts. DSSE’s type binding is important so a proof bundle cannot be reinterpreted as a different payload class. ([GitHub][6])
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|
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---
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# 11) Policy bundle specification (Trust + Decision DSL)
|
||||
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||||
A policy bundle is a hashable document. Example structure (YAML-like; illustrative):
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||||
|
||||
```yaml
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policy_id: "org.prod.default.v1"
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trust_roots:
|
||||
- principal: "did:web:vendor.example"
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min_assurance: A2
|
||||
authority:
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products: ["vendor.example/*"]
|
||||
|
||||
- principal: "did:web:sec.internal"
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min_assurance: A2
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||||
authority:
|
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artifacts: ["sha256:*"] # internal is authoritative for internal artifacts
|
||||
|
||||
acceptance_thresholds:
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resolved_with_pedigree:
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min_evidence_class: E3
|
||||
min_assurance: A3
|
||||
|
||||
not_affected:
|
||||
mode: quorum
|
||||
quorum:
|
||||
- any:
|
||||
- { principal_role: vendor, min_assurance: A3 }
|
||||
- { evidence_type: callgraph_path, min_assurance: A3 }
|
||||
- { all:
|
||||
- { distinct_principals: 2 }
|
||||
- { min_assurance_each: A2 }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
conflict_mode:
|
||||
production: skeptical
|
||||
development: authority_weighted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The engine must treat the policy bundle as an **input artifact** (hashed, stored, referenced in proofs).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# 12) Determinism requirements
|
||||
|
||||
To guarantee deterministic replay:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Canonical JSON** for all stored objects (claims, evidence, policy bundles).
|
||||
2. **Content-addressing**:
|
||||
|
||||
* `id = sha256(canonical_bytes)`
|
||||
3. **Stable sorting**:
|
||||
|
||||
* when iterating claims/evidence, sort by `(type, id)` to prevent nondeterministic traversal
|
||||
4. **Time handling**:
|
||||
|
||||
* evaluation time is explicit input (e.g., `as_of` timestamp)
|
||||
* expired claims are excluded deterministically
|
||||
5. **Version pinning**:
|
||||
|
||||
* tool identity + version recorded in evidence
|
||||
* vuln feed snapshot digests recorded
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# 13) Worked examples
|
||||
|
||||
## Example A: Vendor says not affected; scanner says exploitable
|
||||
|
||||
Inputs:
|
||||
|
||||
* OpenVEX: `not_affected` with justification (required by spec) ([GitHub][3])
|
||||
* Internal scanner: flags exploitable
|
||||
Aggregation:
|
||||
* REACHABLE: ⊤ (conflict)
|
||||
Selection (production skeptical):
|
||||
* verdict: `in_triage`
|
||||
Selection (authority-weighted, vendor authoritative):
|
||||
* verdict: `not_affected`
|
||||
Proof bundle records conflict and why policy accepted vendor.
|
||||
|
||||
## Example B: Fixed with pedigree
|
||||
|
||||
Inputs:
|
||||
|
||||
* CycloneDX analysis.state = `resolved_with_pedigree` ([Ecma International][1])
|
||||
* Evidence includes commit history/diff in pedigree
|
||||
Selection:
|
||||
* `resolved_with_pedigree`
|
||||
|
||||
## Example C: Not affected due to mitigations
|
||||
|
||||
Inputs:
|
||||
|
||||
* CycloneDX analysis.state=`not_affected`, justification=`protected_at_runtime` ([Ecma International][1])
|
||||
* Evidence: runtime mitigation proof (E2/E3)
|
||||
Selection:
|
||||
* `not_affected` with justification preserved
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# 14) Implementation checklist
|
||||
|
||||
Minimum viable implementation modules:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Format adapters**
|
||||
|
||||
* CycloneDX/ECMA-424 VEX parser
|
||||
* OpenVEX parser
|
||||
* CSAF VEX parser
|
||||
2. **Canonicalizer**
|
||||
|
||||
* canonical JSON encoder
|
||||
* digest computation
|
||||
3. **Verifier**
|
||||
|
||||
* signature/DSSE verifier (pluggable)
|
||||
* principal resolver (keys/certs/OIDC claims)
|
||||
4. **Normalizer**
|
||||
|
||||
* maps external statements → atoms
|
||||
* maps justifications → conditions/evidence expectations
|
||||
5. **Lattice store**
|
||||
|
||||
* support sets per (S,p)
|
||||
* efficient indexing by artifact/component/vuln
|
||||
6. **Policy evaluator**
|
||||
|
||||
* thresholds, authority scopes, conflict modes
|
||||
7. **Proof generator**
|
||||
|
||||
* deterministic trace emission
|
||||
* optional DSSE signing step
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## What you should build next (practical sequencing)
|
||||
|
||||
1. Implement the **canonical atom model** + K4 aggregation (fast, foundational).
|
||||
2. Add CycloneDX/ECMA-424 ingestion first (richest semantics). ([Ecma International][1])
|
||||
3. Add OpenVEX + CSAF ingestion with mapping to atoms. ([Docker Documentation][2])
|
||||
4. Add trust label computation + policy bundle hashing.
|
||||
5. Add proof bundles + DSSE signing support. ([GitHub][6])
|
||||
|
||||
If you want, I can follow this with:
|
||||
|
||||
* a concrete JSON schema for `Claim`, `Evidence`, `PolicyBundle`, and `ProofBundle`;
|
||||
* an explicit mapping table from OpenVEX/CSAF justifications to ECMA-424 justifications/atoms;
|
||||
* a reference evaluation pseudocode implementation (deterministic, testable).
|
||||
|
||||
[1]: https://ecma-international.org/wp-content/uploads/ECMA-424_1st_edition_june_2024.pdf "ECMA-424, 1st edition, June 2024"
|
||||
[2]: https://docs.docker.com/scout/how-tos/create-exceptions-vex/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Create an exception using the VEX"
|
||||
[3]: https://github.com/openvex/spec/blob/main/OPENVEX-SPEC.md?utm_source=chatgpt.com "spec/OPENVEX-SPEC.md at main"
|
||||
[4]: https://docs.oasis-open.org/csaf/csaf/v2.0/os/csaf-v2.0-os.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Common Security Advisory Framework Version 2.0 - Index of /"
|
||||
[5]: https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/verifying/attestation/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "In-Toto Attestations"
|
||||
[6]: https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse?utm_source=chatgpt.com "DSSE: Dead Simple Signing Envelope"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user