Add reference architecture and testing strategy documentation
- Created a new document for the Stella Ops Reference Architecture outlining the system's topology, trust boundaries, artifact association, and interfaces. - Developed a comprehensive Testing Strategy document detailing the importance of offline readiness, interoperability, determinism, and operational guardrails. - Introduced a README for the Testing Strategy, summarizing processing details and key concepts implemented. - Added guidance for AI agents and developers in the tests directory, including directory structure, test categories, key patterns, and rules for test development.
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Below is a **feature → moat strength** map for Stella Ops, explicitly benchmarked against the tools we’ve been discussing (Trivy/Aqua, Grype/Syft, Anchore Enterprise, Snyk, Prisma Cloud). I’m using **“moat”** in the strict sense: *how hard is it for an incumbent to replicate the capability to parity, and how strong are the switching costs once deployed.*
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### Moat scale
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* **5 = Structural moat** (new primitives, strong defensibility, durable switching cost)
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* **4 = Strong moat** (difficult multi-domain engineering; incumbents have only partial analogs)
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* **3 = Moderate moat** (others can build; differentiation is execution + packaging)
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* **2 = Weak moat** (table-stakes soon; limited defensibility)
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* **1 = Commodity** (widely available in OSS / easy to replicate)
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---
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## 1) Stella Ops candidate features mapped to moat strength
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| Stella Ops feature (precisely defined) | Closest competitor analogs (evidence) | Competitive parity today | Moat strength | Why this is (or isn’t) defensible | How to harden the moat |
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| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------: | ------------: | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **Signed, replayable risk verdicts**: “this artifact is acceptable” decisions produced deterministically, with an evidence bundle + policy snapshot, signed as an attestation | Ecosystem can sign SBOM attestations (e.g., Syft + Sigstore; DSSE/in-toto via cosign), but not “risk verdict” decisions end-to-end ([Anchore][1]) | Low | **5** | This requires a **deterministic evaluation model**, a **proof/evidence schema**, and “knowledge snapshotting” so results are replayable months later. Incumbents mostly stop at exporting scan results or SBOMs, not signing a decision in a reproducible way. | Make the verdict format a **first-class artifact** (OCI-attached attestation), with strict replay semantics (“same inputs → same verdict”), plus auditor-friendly evidence extraction. |
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| **VEX decisioning engine (not just ingestion)**: ingest OpenVEX/CycloneDX/CSAF, resolve conflicts with a trust/policy lattice, and produce explainable outcomes | Trivy supports multiple VEX formats (CycloneDX/OpenVEX/CSAF) but notes it’s “experimental/minimal functionality” ([Trivy][2]). Grype supports OpenVEX ingestion ([Chainguard][3]). Anchore can generate VEX docs from annotations (OpenVEX + CycloneDX) ([Anchore Docs][4]). Aqua runs VEX Hub for distributing VEX statements to Trivy ([Aqua][5]) | Medium (ingestion exists; decision logic is thin) | **4** | Ingestion alone is easy; the moat comes from **formal conflict resolution**, provenance-aware trust weighting, and deterministic outcomes. Most tools treat VEX as suppression/annotation, not a reasoning substrate. | Ship a **policy-controlled merge semantics** (“vendor > distro > internal” is too naive) + required evidence hooks (e.g., “not affected because feature flag off”). |
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| **Reachability with proof**, tied to deployable artifacts: produce a defensible chain “entrypoint → call path → vulnerable symbol,” plus configuration gates | Snyk has reachability analysis in GA for certain languages/integrations and uses call-graph style reasoning to determine whether vulnerable code is called ([Snyk User Docs][6]). Some commercial vendors also market reachability (e.g., Endor Labs is listed in CycloneDX Tool Center as analyzing reachability) ([CycloneDX][7]) | Medium (reachability exists, but proof portability varies) | **4** | “Reachability” as a label is no longer unique. The moat is **portable proofs** (usable in audits and in air-gapped environments) + artifact-level mapping (not just source repo analysis) + deterministic replay. | Focus on **proof-carrying reachability**: store the reachability subgraph as evidence; make it reproducible and attestable; support both source and post-build artifacts. |
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| **Smart-Diff (semantic risk delta)**: between releases, explain “what materially changed in exploitable surface,” not just “CVE count changed” | Anchore provides SBOM management and policy evaluation (good foundation), but “semantic risk diff” is not a prominent, standardized feature in typical scanners ([Anchore Docs][8]) | Low–Medium | **4** | Most incumbents can diff findings lists. Few can diff **reachability graphs, policy outcomes, and VEX state** to produce stable “delta narratives.” Hard to replicate without the underlying evidence model. | Treat diff as first-class: version SBOM graphs + reachability graphs + VEX claims; compute deltas over those graphs and emit a signed “delta verdict.” |
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| **Unknowns as first-class state**: represent “unknown-reachable/unknown-unreachable” and force policies to account for uncertainty | Not a standard capability in common scanners/platforms; most systems output findings and (optionally) suppressions | Low | **4** | This is conceptually simple but operationally rare; it requires rethinking UX, scoring, and policy evaluation. It becomes sticky once orgs base governance on uncertainty budgets. | Bake unknowns into policies (“fail if unknowns > N in prod”), reporting, and attestations. Make it the default rather than optional. |
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| **Air-gapped epistemic mode**: offline operation where the tool can prove what knowledge it used (feed snapshot + timestamps + trust anchors) | Prisma Cloud Compute Edition supports air-gapped environments and has an offline Intel Stream update mechanism ([Prisma Cloud Docs][9]). (But “prove exact knowledge state used for decisions” is typically not the emphasis.) | Medium | **4** | Air-gapped “runtime” is common; air-gapped **reproducibility** is not. The moat is packaging offline feeds + policies + deterministic scoring into a replayable bundle tied to attestations. | Deliver a “sealed knowledge snapshot” workflow (export/import), and make audits a one-command replay. |
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| **SBOM ledger + lineage**: BYOS ingestion plus versioned SBOM storage, grouping, and historical tracking | Anchore explicitly positions centralized SBOM management and “Bring Your Own SBOM” ([Anchore Docs][8]). Snyk can generate SBOMs and expose SBOM via API in CycloneDX/SPDX formats ([Snyk User Docs][10]). Prisma can export CycloneDX SBOMs for scans ([Prisma Cloud Docs][11]) | High | **3** | SBOM generation/storage is quickly becoming table stakes. You can still differentiate on **graph fidelity + lineage semantics**, but “having SBOMs” alone won’t be a moat. | Make the ledger valuable via **semantic diff, evidence joins (reachability/VEX), and provenance** rather than storage. |
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| **Policy engine with proofs**: policy-as-code that produces a signed explanation (“why pass/fail”) and links to evidence nodes | Anchore has a mature policy model (policy JSON, gates, allowlists, mappings) ([Anchore Docs][12]). Prisma/Aqua have rich policy + runtime guardrails (platform-driven) ([Aqua][13]) | High | **3** | Policy engines are common. The moat is the **proof output** + deterministic replay + integration with attestations. | Keep policy language small but rigorous; always emit evidence pointers; support “policy compilation” to deterministic decision artifacts. |
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| **VEX distribution network**: ecosystem layer that aggregates, validates, and serves VEX at scale | Aqua’s VEX Hub is explicitly a centralized repository designed for discover/fetch/consume flows with Trivy ([Aqua][5]) | Medium | **3–4** | A network layer can become a moat if it achieves broad adoption. But incumbents can also launch hubs. This becomes defensible only with **network effects + trust frameworks**. | Differentiate with **verification + trust scoring** of VEX sources, plus tight coupling to deterministic decisioning and attestations. |
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| **“Integrations everywhere”** (CI/CD, registry, Kubernetes, IDE) | Everyone in this space integrates broadly; reachability and scoring features often ride those integrations (e.g., Snyk reachability depends on repo/integration access) ([Snyk User Docs][6]) | High | **1–2** | Integrations are necessary, but not defensible—mostly engineering throughput. | Use integrations to *distribute attestations and proofs*, not as the headline differentiator. |
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---
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## 2) Where competitors already have strong moats (avoid head‑on fights early)
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These are areas where incumbents are structurally advantaged, so Stella Ops should either (a) integrate rather than replace, or (b) compete only if you have a much sharper wedge.
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### Snyk’s moat: developer adoption + reachability-informed prioritization
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* Snyk publicly documents **reachability analysis** (GA for certain integrations/languages) ([Snyk User Docs][6])
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* Snyk prioritization incorporates reachability and other signals into **Priority Score** ([Snyk User Docs][14])
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**Implication:** pure “reachability” claims won’t beat Snyk; **proof-carrying, artifact-tied, replayable reachability** can.
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### Prisma Cloud’s moat: CNAPP breadth + graph-based risk prioritization + air-gapped CWPP
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* Prisma invests in graph-driven investigation/tracing of vulnerabilities ([Prisma Cloud Docs][15])
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* Risk prioritization and risk-score ranked vulnerability views are core platform capabilities ([Prisma Cloud Docs][16])
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* Compute Edition supports **air-gapped environments** and has offline update workflows ([Prisma Cloud Docs][9])
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**Implication:** competing on “platform breadth” is a losing battle early; compete on **decision integrity** (deterministic, attestable, replayable) and integrate where needed.
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### Anchore’s moat: SBOM operations + policy-as-code maturity
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* Anchore is explicitly SBOM-management centric and supports policy gating constructs ([Anchore Docs][8])
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**Implication:** Anchore is strong at “SBOM at scale.” Stella Ops should outperform on **semantic diff, VEX reasoning, and proof outputs**, not just SBOM storage.
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### Aqua’s moat: code-to-runtime enforcement plus emerging VEX distribution
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* Aqua provides CWPP-style runtime policy enforcement/guardrails ([Aqua][13])
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* Aqua backs VEX Hub for VEX distribution and Trivy consumption ([Aqua][5])
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**Implication:** if Stella Ops is not a runtime protection platform, don’t chase CWPP breadth—use Aqua/Prisma integrations and focus on upstream decision quality.
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---
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## 3) Practical positioning: which features produce the most durable wedge
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If you want the shortest path to a *defensible* position:
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1. **Moat anchor (5): Signed, replayable risk verdicts**
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* Everything else (VEX, reachability, diff) becomes evidence feeding that verdict.
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2. **Moat amplifier (4): VEX decisioning + proof-carrying reachability**
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* In 2025, VEX ingestion exists in Trivy/Grype/Anchore ([Trivy][2]), and reachability exists in Snyk ([Snyk User Docs][6]).
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* Your differentiation must be: **determinism + portability + auditability**.
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3. **Moat compounding (4): Smart-Diff over risk meaning**
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* Turns “scan results” into an operational change-control primitive.
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---
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## 4) A concise “moat thesis” per feature (one-liners you can use internally)
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* **Deterministic signed verdicts:** “We don’t output findings; we output an attestable decision that can be replayed.”
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* **VEX decisioning:** “We treat VEX as a logical claim system, not a suppression file.”
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* **Reachability proofs:** “We provide proof of exploitability in *this* artifact, not just a badge.”
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* **Smart-Diff:** “We explain what changed in exploitable surface area, not what changed in CVE count.”
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* **Unknowns modeling:** “We quantify uncertainty and gate on it.”
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---
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If you want, I can convert the table into a **2×2 moat map** (Customer Value vs Defensibility) and a **build-order roadmap** that maximizes durable advantage while minimizing overlap with entrenched competitor moats.
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[1]: https://anchore.com/sbom/creating-sbom-attestations-using-syft-and-sigstore/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Creating SBOM Attestations Using Syft and Sigstore"
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[2]: https://trivy.dev/docs/v0.50/supply-chain/vex/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "VEX"
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[3]: https://www.chainguard.dev/unchained/vexed-then-grype-about-it-chainguard-and-anchore-announce-grype-supports-openvex?utm_source=chatgpt.com "VEXed? Then Grype about it"
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[4]: https://docs.anchore.com/current/docs/vulnerability_management/vuln_annotations/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Vulnerability Annotations and VEX"
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[5]: https://www.aquasec.com/blog/introducing-vex-hub-unified-repository-for-vex-statements/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Trivy VEX Hub:The Solution to Vulnerability Fatigue"
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[6]: https://docs.snyk.io/manage-risk/prioritize-issues-for-fixing/reachability-analysis?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Reachability analysis"
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[7]: https://cyclonedx.org/tool-center/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "CycloneDX Tool Center"
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[8]: https://docs.anchore.com/current/docs/sbom_management/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "SBOM Management"
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[9]: https://docs.prismacloud.io/en/compute-edition?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Prisma Cloud Compute Edition"
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[10]: https://docs.snyk.io/developer-tools/snyk-cli/commands/sbom?utm_source=chatgpt.com "SBOM | Snyk User Docs"
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[11]: https://docs.prismacloud.io/en/compute-edition/32/admin-guide/vulnerability-management/exporting-sboms?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Exporting Software Bill of Materials on CycloneDX"
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[12]: https://docs.anchore.com/current/docs/overview/concepts/policy/policies/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Policies and Evaluation"
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[13]: https://www.aquasec.com/products/cwpp-cloud-workload-protection/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Cloud workload protection in Runtime - Aqua Security"
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[14]: https://docs.snyk.io/manage-risk/prioritize-issues-for-fixing?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Prioritize issues for fixing"
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[15]: https://docs.prismacloud.io/en/enterprise-edition/content-collections/search-and-investigate/c2c-tracing-vulnerabilities/investigate-vulnerabilities-tracing?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Use Vulnerabilities Tracing on Investigate"
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[16]: https://docs.prismacloud.io/en/enterprise-edition/use-cases/secure-the-infrastructure/risk-prioritization?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Risk Prioritization - Prisma Cloud Documentation"
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