docs(ops): Complete operations runbooks for Epic 3500

Sprint 3500.0004.0004 (Documentation & Handoff) - T2 DONE

Operations Runbooks Added:
- score-replay-runbook.md: Deterministic replay procedures
- proof-verification-runbook.md: DSSE/Merkle verification ops
- airgap-operations-runbook.md: Offline kit management

CLI Reference Docs:
- reachability-cli-reference.md
- score-proofs-cli-reference.md
- unknowns-cli-reference.md

Air-Gap Guides:
- score-proofs-reachability-airgap-runbook.md

Training Materials:
- score-proofs-concept-guide.md

UI API Clients:
- proof.client.ts
- reachability.client.ts
- unknowns.client.ts

All 5 operations runbooks now complete (reachability, unknowns-queue,
score-replay, proof-verification, airgap-operations).
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# Proof Verification Operations Runbook
> **Version**: 1.0.0
> **Sprint**: 3500.0004.0004
> **Last Updated**: 2025-12-20
This runbook covers operational procedures for Proof Verification, including DSSE signature validation, Merkle tree verification, transparency log checks, and offline verification workflows.
---
## Table of Contents
1. [Overview](#1-overview)
2. [Verification Operations](#2-verification-operations)
3. [Offline Verification](#3-offline-verification)
4. [Transparency Log Integration](#4-transparency-log-integration)
5. [Troubleshooting](#5-troubleshooting)
6. [Monitoring & Alerting](#6-monitoring--alerting)
7. [Escalation Procedures](#7-escalation-procedures)
---
## 1. Overview
### What is Proof Verification?
Proof Verification is the process of cryptographically validating that a scan result has not been tampered with and was produced by an authorized StellaOps instance. It involves:
- **DSSE Signature Verification**: Validate the signing envelope
- **Merkle Tree Verification**: Confirm the root hash matches the proof
- **Certificate Chain Validation**: Verify the signing certificate
- **Transparency Log Check**: Optional Rekor/Sigstore verification
### Verification Components
| Component | Purpose | Verification Type |
|-----------|---------|-------------------|
| DSSE Envelope | Contains signed payload | Signature validation |
| Merkle Proof | Cryptographic proof of inclusion | Hash verification |
| Certificate | Signing identity | Chain validation |
| Rekor Entry | Transparency log record | Log inclusion proof |
### Trust Model
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Trust Hierarchy │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Root CA (Offline) │
│ └── Intermediate CA │
│ └── Signing Certificate (Scanner Instance) │
│ └── DSSE Envelope │
│ └── Proof Bundle │
│ └── Manifest + Score │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
---
## 2. Verification Operations
### 2.1 Basic Proof Verification
#### Via CLI
```bash
# Verify a proof bundle file
stella proof verify --bundle bundle.tar.gz
# Verify with verbose output
stella proof verify --bundle bundle.tar.gz --verbose
# Verify and output as JSON
stella proof verify --bundle bundle.tar.gz --output json
```
#### Expected Output (Success)
```
Proof Verification Result
══════════════════════════════════════════
✓ DSSE Signature VALID
✓ Merkle Root VALID
✓ Certificate Chain VALID
✓ Not Expired VALID
──────────────────────────────────────────
Overall: VERIFIED
Root Hash: sha256:abc123...
Signed By: scanner-prod-01.stellaops.local
Signed At: 2025-01-15T10:30:00Z
Valid Until: 2026-01-15T10:30:00Z
```
#### Expected Output (Failure)
```
Proof Verification Result
══════════════════════════════════════════
✓ DSSE Signature VALID
✗ Merkle Root INVALID
✓ Certificate Chain VALID
✓ Not Expired VALID
──────────────────────────────────────────
Overall: FAILED
Error: Merkle root mismatch
Expected: sha256:abc123...
Actual: sha256:def456...
```
### 2.2 Verification via API
```bash
# Verify by scan ID
curl -X POST "https://scanner.stellaops.local/api/v1/scanner/scans/$SCAN_ID/proofs/$ROOT_HASH/verify" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
# Response
{
"valid": true,
"rootHash": "sha256:abc123...",
"checks": [
{"name": "dsse_signature", "passed": true, "message": "Signature valid"},
{"name": "merkle_root", "passed": true, "message": "Root hash matches"},
{"name": "certificate_chain", "passed": true, "message": "Chain valid"},
{"name": "not_expired", "passed": true, "message": "Certificate not expired"}
],
"verifiedAt": "2025-01-16T10:30:00Z"
}
```
### 2.3 Viewing Merkle Spine
The Merkle spine shows the path from leaf nodes to the root:
```bash
stella proof spine --bundle bundle.tar.gz
```
Output:
```
Merkle Tree Spine
══════════════════════════════════════════
Root: sha256:abc123...
├── sha256:node1... (sbom_hash)
├── sha256:node2... (rules_hash)
├── sha256:node3... (policy_hash)
└── sha256:node4... (feed_hash)
Depth: 3
Leaves: 4
Algorithm: SHA-256
```
### 2.4 Certificate Inspection
```bash
# Extract and inspect certificate
tar -xzf bundle.tar.gz
openssl x509 -in bundle/certificate.pem -noout -text
# Check validity period
openssl x509 -in bundle/certificate.pem -noout -dates
# Verify against CA bundle
openssl verify -CAfile /etc/stellaops/ca-bundle.pem bundle/certificate.pem
```
---
## 3. Offline Verification
### 3.1 When to Use Offline Verification
- Air-gapped environments
- Network-restricted systems
- Compliance audits without API access
- Disaster recovery scenarios
### 3.2 Prerequisites for Offline Verification
Required files:
- Proof bundle (`.tar.gz`)
- CA certificate bundle (`ca-bundle.pem`)
- Trust root configuration (`trust-roots.json`)
```bash
# Prepare offline verification kit
stella proof offline-kit create \
--output /path/to/offline-kit/ \
--include-ca \
--include-trust-roots
```
Kit contents:
```
offline-kit/
├── ca-bundle.pem # Certificate authority chain
├── trust-roots.json # Trusted signing keys
├── verify.sh # Standalone verification script
└── README.md # Instructions
```
### 3.3 Running Offline Verification
```bash
# Using CLI with offline flag
stella proof verify --bundle bundle.tar.gz --offline
# Using standalone script
./verify.sh bundle.tar.gz
# Manual verification with OpenSSL
./verify.sh bundle.tar.gz --ca-bundle ./ca-bundle.pem
```
### 3.4 Offline Verification Checks
| Check | Online | Offline | Notes |
|-------|--------|---------|-------|
| DSSE Signature | ✓ | ✓ | Local crypto |
| Merkle Root | ✓ | ✓ | Local hash computation |
| Certificate Chain | ✓ | ✓ | Requires CA bundle |
| Certificate Revocation | ✓ | ✗ | Needs CRL/OCSP |
| Rekor Transparency | ✓ | ✗ | Needs network |
### 3.5 Air-Gap Considerations
For fully air-gapped environments:
1. **Pre-stage CA bundle**:
```bash
# On connected system
stella ca export --output ca-bundle.pem
# Transfer to air-gapped system
scp ca-bundle.pem airgap:/etc/stellaops/
```
2. **Pre-stage CRL (optional)**:
```bash
# Download latest CRL
curl -o crl.pem https://ca.stellaops.io/crl/latest.pem
# Transfer and use
stella proof verify --bundle bundle.tar.gz --offline --crl crl.pem
```
---
## 4. Transparency Log Integration
### 4.1 Rekor Overview
StellaOps optionally publishes proof attestations to Sigstore Rekor for immutable transparency logging.
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Transparency Flow │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Proof Bundle │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ DSSE Envelope ──────► Rekor ──────► Inclusion Proof │
│ │ │ │
│ ▼ ▼ │
│ Local Verify Log Entry ID │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### 4.2 Checking Rekor Entry
```bash
# Verify with Rekor check
stella proof verify --bundle bundle.tar.gz --check-rekor
# Get Rekor entry details
stella proof rekor-entry --bundle bundle.tar.gz
```
Output:
```
Rekor Entry
══════════════════════════════════════════
Log Index: 12345678
Entry UUID: 24296fb24b8ad77a...
Log ID: c0d23d6ad406973f...
Integrated: 2025-01-15T10:30:05Z
Inclusion Proof:
Root Hash: sha256:rekor-root...
Tree Size: 98765432
Hashes: [sha256:a1b2..., sha256:c3d4...]
Verification: ✓ INCLUDED
```
### 4.3 Manual Rekor Verification
```bash
# Using rekor-cli
rekor-cli verify --artifact bundle.tar.gz \
--signature bundle/dsse-envelope.json \
--public-key bundle/certificate.pem
# Search for entries
rekor-cli search --sha sha256:abc123...
```
### 4.4 When Rekor is Unavailable
If Rekor is temporarily unavailable:
1. Verification still succeeds for DSSE and Merkle checks
2. Rekor check is marked as "SKIPPED"
3. Re-verify later when Rekor is available
```bash
# Skip Rekor check
stella proof verify --bundle bundle.tar.gz --skip-rekor
```
---
## 5. Troubleshooting
### 5.1 DSSE Signature Invalid
**Symptoms**: `DSSE signature verification failed`
**Diagnostic Steps**:
1. Extract and inspect envelope:
```bash
tar -xzf bundle.tar.gz
cat bundle/dsse-envelope.json | jq .
```
2. Check payload type:
```bash
cat bundle/dsse-envelope.json | jq -r '.payloadType'
# Expected: application/vnd.stellaops.proof+json
```
3. Verify signature format:
```bash
cat bundle/dsse-envelope.json | jq '.signatures[0].sig' | base64 -d | xxd | head
```
**Common Causes**:
| Cause | Resolution |
|-------|------------|
| Corrupted bundle | Re-download from API |
| Wrong public key | Check trust roots configuration |
| Signature algorithm mismatch | Verify ECDSA-P256 or RSA support |
| Encoding issue | Check Base64 encoding |
### 5.2 Merkle Root Mismatch
**Symptoms**: `Merkle root does not match expected value`
**Diagnostic Steps**:
1. Recompute Merkle root locally:
```bash
stella proof compute-root --bundle bundle.tar.gz
```
2. Compare manifest hashes:
```bash
cat bundle/manifest.json | jq '.hashes'
```
3. Check for trailing whitespace or encoding:
```bash
sha256sum bundle/manifest.json
```
**Resolution**:
- Bundle may have been modified after signing
- Re-export bundle from source system
- If legitimate change, re-sign bundle
### 5.3 Certificate Chain Validation Failed
**Symptoms**: `Certificate chain verification failed`
**Diagnostic Steps**:
1. Check certificate expiry:
```bash
openssl x509 -in bundle/certificate.pem -noout -dates
```
2. Verify chain:
```bash
openssl verify -verbose -CAfile /etc/stellaops/ca-bundle.pem bundle/certificate.pem
```
3. Check for missing intermediates:
```bash
openssl x509 -in bundle/certificate.pem -noout -issuer
```
**Common Errors**:
| Error | Cause | Fix |
|-------|-------|-----|
| `certificate has expired` | Cert past validity | Re-sign with valid cert |
| `unable to get issuer certificate` | Missing intermediate | Update CA bundle |
| `certificate revoked` | Key compromised | Use new signing key |
| `self-signed certificate` | Wrong trust root | Import correct CA |
### 5.4 Bundle Extraction Fails
**Symptoms**: `Failed to extract bundle` or `Invalid archive format`
**Diagnostic Steps**:
1. Check file type:
```bash
file bundle.tar.gz
```
2. Test archive integrity:
```bash
gzip -t bundle.tar.gz
tar -tzf bundle.tar.gz
```
3. Check for truncation:
```bash
ls -la bundle.tar.gz
# Compare with expected size from API
```
**Resolution**:
- Re-download if corrupted
- Check network transfer (use checksums)
- Verify sufficient disk space
---
## 6. Monitoring & Alerting
### 6.1 Key Metrics
| Metric | Description | Alert Threshold |
|--------|-------------|-----------------|
| `proof_verification_total` | Total verifications | Baseline |
| `proof_verification_failures` | Failed verifications | > 5/hour |
| `proof_verification_duration_ms` | Verification latency | p99 > 5s |
| `certificate_expiry_days` | Days until cert expiry | < 30 days |
| `rekor_verification_failures` | Rekor check failures | > 0 (warning) |
### 6.2 Grafana Queries
```promql
# Verification success rate
sum(rate(proof_verification_success_total[1h])) /
sum(rate(proof_verification_total[1h])) * 100
# Verification latency
histogram_quantile(0.99, rate(proof_verification_duration_ms_bucket[5m]))
# Certificate expiry countdown
min(certificate_expiry_days) by (certificate_id)
# Failures by type
sum by (failure_reason) (rate(proof_verification_failures_total[1h]))
```
### 6.3 Alert Rules
```yaml
groups:
- name: proof-verification
rules:
- alert: ProofVerificationFailuresHigh
expr: rate(proof_verification_failures_total[1h]) > 5
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: High proof verification failure rate
- alert: SigningCertificateExpiringSoon
expr: certificate_expiry_days < 30
for: 1h
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: Signing certificate expires in {{ $value }} days
- alert: SigningCertificateExpired
expr: certificate_expiry_days <= 0
for: 1m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: Signing certificate has expired
```
---
## 7. Escalation Procedures
### 7.1 Escalation Matrix
| Severity | Condition | Response Time | Escalate To |
|----------|-----------|---------------|-------------|
| P1 - Critical | Signing certificate expired | Immediate | Security Team + Platform Lead |
| P1 - Critical | Mass verification failures | 15 minutes | Platform Team |
| P2 - High | Rekor unavailable | 1 hour | Platform Team |
| P3 - Medium | Single verification failure | 4 hours | Support Queue |
| P4 - Low | Certificate expiring (>7 days) | Next sprint | Security Team |
### 7.2 P1: Certificate Expired Response
1. **Immediate Actions** (0-15 min):
- Stop accepting new scans (if signing required)
- Notify stakeholders
- Begin emergency certificate rotation
2. **Certificate Rotation** (15-60 min):
```bash
# Generate new certificate
stella signer cert rotate --emergency
# Verify new certificate
stella signer cert show --current
# Resume operations
stella signer status
```
3. **Post-Incident**:
- Implement certificate expiry monitoring
- Schedule proactive rotations
- Update runbooks
### 7.3 Contacts
| Role | Contact | Availability |
|------|---------|--------------|
| Security Team | security@stellaops.io | Business hours |
| Platform On-Call | platform-oncall@stellaops.io | 24/7 |
| Attestor Team | attestor-team@stellaops.io | Business hours |
---
## Appendix A: DSSE Envelope Format
```json
{
"payloadType": "application/vnd.stellaops.proof+json",
"payload": "<base64-encoded-proof>",
"signatures": [
{
"keyid": "sha256:signing-key-fingerprint",
"sig": "<base64-encoded-signature>"
}
]
}
```
### Payload Structure
```json
{
"_type": "https://stellaops.io/proof/v1",
"subject": [
{
"name": "scan-123",
"digest": {
"sha256": "abc123..."
}
}
],
"predicateType": "https://stellaops.io/attestation/score/v1",
"predicate": {
"manifest": {
"sbomHash": "sha256:...",
"rulesHash": "sha256:...",
"policyHash": "sha256:...",
"feedHash": "sha256:..."
},
"score": 7.5,
"rootHash": "sha256:...",
"timestamp": "2025-01-15T10:30:00Z"
}
}
```
---
## Appendix B: CLI Quick Reference
```bash
# Verification Commands
stella proof verify --bundle <path> # Verify bundle
stella proof verify --bundle <path> --offline # Offline verification
stella proof verify --bundle <path> --verbose # Detailed output
stella proof verify --bundle <path> --check-rekor # Include Rekor check
# Inspection Commands
stella proof spine --bundle <path> # Show Merkle tree
stella proof show --bundle <path> # Show bundle contents
stella proof rekor-entry --bundle <path> # Show Rekor entry
# Offline Kit
stella proof offline-kit create --output <dir> # Create offline kit
stella proof offline-kit verify --kit <dir> --bundle <path> # Use kit
# Certificate Commands
stella signer cert show # Show current cert
stella signer cert rotate # Rotate certificate
stella signer cert export --output <path> # Export public cert
```
---
## Revision History
| Version | Date | Author | Changes |
|---------|------|--------|---------|
| 1.0.0 | 2025-12-20 | Agent | Initial release |