Add StellaOps Authority planning artifacts and config templates
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								StellaOps.Authority.TODOS.Security.md
									
									
									
									
									
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								StellaOps.Authority.TODOS.Security.md
									
									
									
									
									
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| # StellaOps Authority — Security Guild Plan | ||||
|  | ||||
| > **Read first:** `AGENTS.md`, `StellaOps.Authority.TODOS.md`, and this plan. Track progress in both TODO files. | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Mission | ||||
| Define and verify the security posture of StellaOps Authority: password/secret policies, audit logging, throttling, threat modelling, and offline revocation guarantees. | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Task Breakdown | ||||
|  | ||||
| | Order | Task IDs | Description | Dependencies | Acceptance | | ||||
| |-------|----------|-------------|--------------|------------| | ||||
| | 1 | SEC1 | Select and configure password hashing (Argon2 preferred) + identity lockout parameters; contribute config defaults. | PLG3, CORE3 | Hash verified via unit test + red team review. | | ||||
| | 2 | SEC2 | Specify audit log schema/content (principal, client, scopes, IP) and ensure Authority Core implementation meets requirements. | CORE5–CORE7 | Review sample logs; ensure PII handled safely. | | ||||
| | 3 | SEC3 | Define lockout & rate limit policies (per user/IP) and validate implementation in Authority Core. | CORE8 | Test harness proves lockouts triggered appropriately. | | ||||
| | 4 | SEC4 | Design offline revocation list format + signing procedure; review implementation with Core/DevOps. | CORE9, OPS3 | Provide verification script for downstream systems. | | ||||
| | 5 | SEC5 | Conduct threat model / security review (STRIDE) covering plugins, token flows, admin endpoints; produce mitigation backlog if needed. | CORE1–CORE10 | Document stored in `/docs/security`. | | ||||
| | 6 | Oversight | Perform security review of CLI/Feedser integration changes (token handling, bypass masks). | FSR2, CLI2 | Approve PRs or request hardening changes. | | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Implementation Notes | ||||
| - Require secrets (client, bootstrap API keys) to meet minimum entropy; document rotation expectations.   | ||||
| - Ensure bypass mask usage is fully logged + alertable.   | ||||
| - Recommend default TLS cipher suites for Authority deployments.   | ||||
| - Validate plugin capability metadata doesn’t expose insecure combinations (e.g., plugin without password support cannot be selected for password grant).   | ||||
| - Develop checklist for production readiness (penetration test, log review, key rotation rehearsal). | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Deliverables | ||||
| - Security configuration recommendations (encoded in options + documentation).   | ||||
| - Approved audit log schema & sample records.   | ||||
| - Threat model document + mitigation backlog (if gaps discovered).   | ||||
| - Sign-off memo to enable production rollout. | ||||
|  | ||||
| ## Coordination | ||||
| - Work closely with Authority Core and Plugin teams during implementation; request changes early.   | ||||
| - Pair with DevOps on key rotation / secret storage solutions.   | ||||
| - Review Docs to ensure operator guidance includes security-critical steps.   | ||||
| - Attend weekly Auth Guild sync to surface risks/blockers. | ||||
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