Add authority bootstrap flows and Concelier ops runbooks

This commit is contained in:
2025-10-15 10:03:56 +03:00
parent ea8226120c
commit 0ba025022f
276 changed files with 21674 additions and 934 deletions

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@@ -10,32 +10,50 @@
The **Offline Update Kit** packages everything StellaOps needs to run on a
completely isolated network:
| Component | Contents |
|-----------|----------|
| **Merged vulnerability feeds** | OSV, GHSA plus optional NVD 2.0, CNNVD, CNVD, ENISA, JVN and BDU |
| **Container images** | `stella-ops`, *Zastava* sidecar (x8664 &arm64) |
| **Provenance** | Cosign signature, SPDX 2.3 SBOM, intoto SLSA attestation |
| **Delta patches** | Daily diff bundles keep size \<350MB |
*Scanner core:* C# 12 on **.NET{{ dotnet }}**.
*Imports are idempotent and atomic — no service downtime.*
| Component | Contents |
|-----------|----------|
| **Merged vulnerability feeds** | OSV, GHSA plus optional NVD 2.0, CNNVD, CNVD, ENISA, JVN and BDU |
| **Container images** | `stella-ops`, *Zastava* sidecar (x8664 &arm64) |
| **Provenance** | Cosign signature, SPDX 2.3 SBOM, intoto SLSA attestation |
| **Attested manifest** | `offline-manifest.json` + detached JWS covering bundle metadata, signed during export. |
| **Delta patches** | Daily diff bundles keep size \<350MB |
**RU BDU note:** ship the official Russian Trusted Root/Sub CA bundle (`certificates/russian_trusted_bundle.pem`) inside the kit so `feedser:httpClients:source.bdu:trustedRootPaths` can resolve it when the service runs in an airgapped network. Drop the most recent `vulxml.zip` alongside the kit if operators need a cold-start cache.
*Scanner core:* C# 12 on **.NET{{ dotnet }}**.
*Imports are idempotent and atomic — no service downtime.*
---
## 1·Download & verify
```bash
curl -LO https://get.stella-ops.org/ouk/stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz
curl -LO https://get.stella-ops.org/ouk/stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz.sig
cosign verify-blob \
--key https://stella-ops.org/keys/cosign.pub \
--signature stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz.sig \
stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz
```bash
curl -LO https://get.stella-ops.org/ouk/stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz
curl -LO https://get.stella-ops.org/ouk/stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz.sig
curl -LO https://get.stella-ops.org/ouk/offline-manifest-<DATE>.json
curl -LO https://get.stella-ops.org/ouk/offline-manifest-<DATE>.json.jws
cosign verify-blob \
--key https://stella-ops.org/keys/cosign.pub \
--signature stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz.sig \
stella-ops-offline-kit-<DATE>.tgz
````
Verification prints **OK** and the SHA256 digest; crosscheck against the
[changelog](https://git.stella-ops.org/stella-ops/offline-kit/-/releases).
Verification prints **OK** and the SHA256 digest; crosscheck against the
[changelog](https://git.stella-ops.org/stella-ops/offline-kit/-/releases).
Validate the attested manifest before distribution:
```bash
cosign verify-blob \
--key https://stella-ops.org/keys/cosign.pub \
--signature offline-manifest-<DATE>.json.jws \
offline-manifest-<DATE>.json
jq '.artifacts[] | {name, sha256, size, capturedAt}' offline-manifest-<DATE>.json
```
The manifest enumerates every artefact (`name`, `sha256`, `size`, `capturedAt`) and is signed with the same key registry as Authority revocation bundles. Operators can ship the manifest alongside the tarball so downstream mirrors can re-verify without unpacking the kit.
---